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FOREWORD: SOCIAL CLASS, RACE AND LEGAL
EDUCATION
JOYCE STERLING'
CATHERINE E. SMITH 2
In Class in American Legal Education, Professor Sander offers here
an impassioned argument for class-based preferences for admission into
the legal academy. As we understand his arguments, class-based prefer-
ences would be rooted in "individual circumstances, not group member-
ship" and thus would offer more "fairness" than similar race-based pro-
grams.3 Further, class-based preferences would create much-needed so-
cioeconomic diversity, which race-based programs have failed to create,
and also would alleviate the threat of "mismatch." Based on his previous
highly controversial work, Sanders argues that race-based admissions
policies at elite law schools place students of color into academic envi-
ronments for which they are not adequately prepared and to which they
are fundamentally "mismatched."4 Sander's assertions are based not just
on his own theoretical framework, but also are informed by a number of
data sets, which he has coded and analyzed.
In this special symposium of the Denver Law Review, ten distin-
guished scholars respond to Professor Sander's fundamental argument
that class preferences should be substituted for racial preferences in ad-
1. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., 1967, University of
California at Santa Barbara; M.A., 1970, University of Hawaii; Ph.D., 1977, University of Denver.
2. Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Institutional Diversity and Inclusiveness,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., 1991, Wofford College; M.A., 1993, University
of South Carolina; J.D., 1996, University of South Carolina. I would like to thank Webster Cash and
the Denver University Law Review for the excellent work on this symposium and for having the
courage and foresight to create a venue for this very important and often contentious debate.
3. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 664
(2011).
4. Id. at 666 ("(A]ny schools giving more emphasis to SES preferences, and less emphasis to
racial preferences, would likely reduce mismatch effects to the extent they exist."). For extensive
critiques and commentary regarding Sander's mismatch argument see Ian Ayers & Richard Brooks,
Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2004);
Cheryl Harris & William Kidder, The Black Student Mismatch Myth in Legal Education: The Sys-
temic Flaws in Richard Sander's Affirmative Action Study, 46 J. BLACKS HIGH. EDUC. 102 (2004);
Beverly Moran, The Case for Black Inferiority? What Must Be True If Professor Sander is Right: A
Response to a Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools, 5 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41 (2005); David L. Chambers, et al, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855
(2005); David Wilkins, A Systemic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005); Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students
to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L. 1997 (2005); andre douglas ponds cummings, "Open Water": Af-
firmative Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators-A Response to Richard Sander, 44
BRANDEIs L.J. 795 (2006); Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649 (2008); Anthony Baker,
After the Gold Rush, 36 J.C. & U.C. 249 (2009).
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missions to law schools.' The central notion that socioeconomic status is
an important consideration among many for law school admissions re-
ceived support from every author in the symposium.6 It was, however,
the only point in Class in American Legal Education that generated such
consensus. Indeed, just one contributor-Richard D. Kahlenberg-was
fully aligned with Sander's complete set of arguments. Even if it stands
alone, Kahlenberg's strong endorsement should not be overlooked.
"Low-income students of all races have been the invisible men and
women of American legal education," he writes. "But in the nonfiction
realm, Richard Sander may be their Ralph Ellison."7
Still, given the current legal, social and political landscapes, Profes-
sor Sander's arguments demand intense scrutiny. Already, the Supreme
Court has dealt a heavy blow to school-integration initiatives in the K-12
8context, despite the fact that public schools are more racially segregated
now than they were in 1970.9 As this issue of the Denver Law Review
heads to press, threats to traditional race-based affirmative action in
higher education persist.
Many cautiously watch Fisher v. University of Texas. The plaintiff,
Ms. Fisher, fell below the top 10% of in-state high-school students who
automatically gain admission and therefore was part of the aspiring stu-
dents considered for the remaining 12% of the open slots.'0 Within those
remaining 12% of seats, the University of Texas began to again consider
race in its admissions decisions in 2004 following the Court's opinion in
Grutter." This change was implemented after empirical research demon-
strated that the Top Ten Percent Law had not created "sufficient minority
representation" in classes.' 2 The University prevailed in the Fifth Circuit
5. See id. (suggesting that class-based affirmative action serve as a "partial substitute for
current racial preferences").
6. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV.
U. L. REV. 683, 705 (2011); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Reflections on Richard Sander's Class in
American Legal Education 719, 719 (2011).
7. Kahlenberg, supra note 6, at 719; see also Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Broad Signifi-
cance of Fisher v. Texas, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Jan. 8, 2012), available at
http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/the-broad-significance-of-fisher-v-
texas/31270?sid=at&utm source=at&utm medium=en.
8. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
9. See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE
DREAM? (2003),
available at http://pages.pomona.edu/-vis04747/h21/readings/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
10. This rule was adopted in 1997 by the Texas Legislature. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.803
(West 2006). The Law provides for automatic admission to the top 10% of each high school in
Texas. These students receive automatic admission to University of Texas, Austin. According to the
Fifth Circuit in the Fisher case, in 2008, 81% of the entering class was admitted under the Top Ten
Percent Law, filling 88% of the seats allotted to Texas residents. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d
213, 227 (5th Cir. 2011).
11. Id. at 226.
12. Id. at 225 (citing a University of Texas proposal to consider race and ethnicity in admis-
sions).
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Court of Appeals, but the case is now pending certiorari review before
the U.S. Supreme Court.' 3
In a recent Washington Post article, well-known conservative col-
umnist, George Will, recommended that the Court grant certiorari in
Fisher in reliance on an amicus brief submitted by none other than Rich-
ard Sander and brief co-author Stuart Taylor.14 The Sander-Taylor brief
relies in large part on his arguments (and the critiques) in this Sympo-
sium Issue of the Denver Law Review on Social Class and Legal Educa-
tion.
Whether it is Fisher or some other case in the near future, the Su-
preme Court will revisit the diversity rationale and affirmative action;
indeed, the majority opinion in Grutter talked of an eventual end-point
for race-based programs, albeit 25 years down the road.' 5 This special
Symposium provides a critical opportunity for readers to consider not
only Richard Sander's position in this debate, but also the responses of
well-known legal scholars to his assertions about "class" (and race) and
what factors should and should not inform law-school admissions poli-
cies.
In Part I of this Introduction, we provide a condensed summary of
Sander's arguments. In Part II, we examine and expand on three of the
major lines of critique of Sander's article offered by the contributors: (A)
positioning race vs. class; (B) asserting that class preferences would al-
low beneficiaries to be "invisible" and that such invisibility is desirable;
and (C) relying on data with significant limitations as to the many asser-
tions Sander makes. In Part III, we offer some concluding thoughts. Al-
though our job here is to position and summarize key points of the Sym-
posium, we strongly discourage readers from treating our Introduction as
an abridged version. The arguments set forth by each and every author
here deserve full attention and consideration.
PART 1: CLASS IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
Class in American Legal Education is consistent with Sander's prior
scholarship advocating for the elimination of what he views as admis-
sions preferences for students of color.'6 Sander clearly positions Class
in American Legal Education as the next installment in dismantling race-
based considerations in law school and replacing them with social class
preferences. His arguments revolve around his own analysis of a number
of data sets that he has coded in a manner consistent with his theoretical
13. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept.
15, 2011) (No. 11-345).
14. George F. Will, The Unintended Consequences ofRacial Preferences, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 2011.
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
16. See generally Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
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framework. This Symposium provides an opportunity for legal academ-
ics and others to examine Sander's claims carefully.
Sander begins his discussion of diversity in legal education by
pointing out that academic discussions on this topic always focus on ra-
cial diversity and almost never discuss "class diversity." He asserts that
most law students in American law schools are from relatively elite
backgrounds. Contrasting his perspective with what he defines as the
pervasive viewpoint among legal academics, Sander argues that both
black and Hispanic students are represented in law schools in relation to
their representation in the larger population, but that the same is not true
for students from low and moderate social class backgrounds. Using a
number of datasets, including "After the JD" (AJD), Sander claims that
almost half of the students in law school come from the top tenth of the
social class distribution. Simultaneously, he claims that lower social
class students make up only about one-tenth of the students in law
schools.' 7 After arguing that there is underrepresentation of lower social
class students in American legal education, Sander compares the AJD
Oataset to an historical dataset of information about undergraduate stu-
dents collected by Warkov et.al.18 , and suggests that there has been no
improvement in the representation of lower SES students in the last 40
years.'9
After exploring his assumptions about class and race, Sander pro-
poses that law schools would be better off to use social class for prefer-
ences to expand diversity in legal education. His argument seems to re-
volve around the notion that class preferences could be much smaller
than racial preferences and that there is sufficient overlap of class and
race that would increase racial diversity as a by-product of increasing
social class diversity.20 Sander suggests four advantages of adopting
SES preferences:
1. SES preferences are based on individual circumstances
rather than group membership.
2. SES preferences target those with actual needs.
3. SES preferences are invisible. Lower SES students can not
be easily identified among their peers.
17. Sander, supra note 3, at 637.
18. See Lempert, supra note 6, at 702 n.58 (noting that he based his analysis on the data that
forms the basis of Warkov's book).
19. Sander, supra note 3, at 644.
20. The majority of his arguments revolve around an experiment tried by UCLA after Propo-
sition 209 forbid the use of racial preferences in California. See Sander, supra note 3, at 660.
iv [Vol. 88:4
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4. Consistent with his previous work, Sander suggests that SES
preferences would eliminate the harms associated with "mis-
match." 2 1
PART II: THREE TRENDS WITHIN THE CRITIQUES
The arguments made for and against Sander's proposals fill many
pages within this Symposium. In this section, we focus on three trends of
critique that emerge across many of the articles presented here.
A. Positing Race versus Class
For many contributors, the notion that law schools should or must
choose between class- and race-based preferences in their admission
programs undermines the credibility of Sander's overall arguments. 22 As
Arin Reeves asserts:
The narrative model of pitting SES against race . . . is so irrelevant,
that one can question the logic of introducing race into a theory that
neither requires it nor requests it to withstand scrutiny. In other
words, if one were to take all references to race out of Sander's narra-
tive-the theory that law schools need to explicitly focus on SES in
order to open 'doors of opportunity,' improve 'mobility in American
society' . . . [it should] stand on its own merit.. . . Increasing SES-
based diversity in law schools is not dependent on unraveling race-
based diversity.23
Indeed, the persistence of an either/or approach to class- and race-
based preferences in Sander's arguments leads Danielle Holley-Walker
to conclude, "If the replacement of race-based affirmative action is the
true goal of the promotion of SES diversity, then its merits should be
considered on that basis."24 And, on that basis, several contributors dedi-
cate attention to reaffirming the ongoing need for race-based affirmative
action on numerous fronts, including the benefits of racial and ethnic
diversity in the educational environment as identified in Grutter, contin-
ued racial disparities, the dangers of colorblind rationales, and, more
21. Sander, supra note 3, at 666 n.4; Sander, supra note 16, at 375 n. 18.
22. Arin N. Reeves, Race as a Red Herring? The Logical Irrelevance of the Race vs. Class
Debate, 88 DENv. U. L. REV. 835 (2011); Eli Wald, The Visibility of Socioeconomic Status and
Class-Based Affirmative Action: A Reply to Professor Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 861 (2011);
Deborah C. Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88 DENV. U. L.
REV. 729 (2011); Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race
& Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751 (2011); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke,
Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What's in a Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 808-
09 (2011); Danielle Holley-Walker, Race and Socioeconomic Diversity in American Legal Educa-
tion: A Response to Richard Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV 845 (2011).
23. Reeves, supra note 22, at 837.
24. Holley-Walker, supra note 22, at 846.
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specifically, the detrimental effects of "race neutral" admissions policies
on applicants of color.25
At the same time, Sander asserts that class-based preference pro-
grams should produce at least some racial diversity among their benefici-
aries.26 L. Darnell Weeden concurs with this view: "A race-neutral SES
admissions policy is a necessary and proper tool to effectively generate
graduating classes at elite law schools that reflect the interesting intermix
of SES and racial diversity in American society."27 Other commentators,
however, were much more skeptical. Deborah C. Malamud, for example,
explained that race-based affirmative action seeks to create a "critical
mass" on our campuses:
In the shared vocabulary of elite schools and the Supreme Court,
critical mass is said to be necessary because of the stigmatized nature
of the groups to which the concept is applied. Students from stigma-
tized minority groups need to be present in sufficient numbers to feel
comfortable within the institution, and their numbers must be large
enough to support sufficient internal variation to dispel stigmatizing
stereotypes of group members.28
To many of the authors, it seems unlikely that race-neutral socio-
economic entry policies, standing alone, would open pathways for
enough students of color to achieve or maintain the "critical-mass" goal
at elite schools, or in many others.29
Finally, throughout the Symposium articles, there is much discourse
both about the intersection of race and class in U.S. society and the dan-
gers of conflating those issues. 30 Race is not a substitute for class, and
class is not a substitute for race, yet they are intricately intertwined in the
American experience. In our view, however, more focus likely is needed
on the socioeconomically elite white students and disproportionately
white "legacy admits" who still fill a disproportionate number of seats in
our nation's law schools. As Deirdre Bowen points out:
96% of living alumni at Ivy League schools are white. That being the
case, it is rational to expect that their beneficiaries will be mostly
white as well. These legacy students have a huge advantage in the
application process. For example, at Harvard, non-legacies have a
15% chance of admission while nearly 40% of legacy applicants are
25. Reeves, supra note 22, at 839-42; Onwuachi-Willig & Fricke, supra note 22, at 828-32;
Bowen, supra note 22, at 760-65.
26. Sander, supra note 3, at 664 ("While racial affirmative action has not proven to be an
effective way of achieving SES diversity, class-based affirmative action is often quite effective in
achieving racial diversity.").
27. L. Darnell Weeden, Commentary on Professor Richard Sander's Class in American Legal
Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REv 851, 853 (2011).
28. Malamud, supra note 22, at 734.




admitted. The rate of admission for legacy students is greater than
that of all students of color, whether admitted to Harvard under an af-
firmative action program or not. Yet, legacy admits possess lower
credentials than other applicants. Furthermore, a recent study shows
that affirmative action students and athletic program students outper-
form legacy admits.3 1
Indeed, in asking law schools to pick class over race, Sander sends
the message that it is acceptable to displace "elite" students of color, yet
the idea of subjecting white elites to similar displacement, in order to
create more room for SES admissions, is so taboo as to be unmention-
able. Sander's obsessive focus on race-based admissions practices is par-
ticularly questionable considering the disparate beneficial impact white
elites receive from legacy admissions policies, as Bowen so deftly ex-
plores.32
Instead of positing race versus class, many authors argue that class-
based preferences in law school admissions decisions should be done in
addition to, not instead of, race-based preferences.
B. Asserting Invisibility
Within Sander's framework, a key advantage of SES preferences is
that the students who would benefit from them would be largely invisi-
ble. This invisibility is beneficial on two fronts: (1) because students
would not know the role their SES status played in their admissions, their
positive self-esteem would remain intact, and (2) because their peers
could not look at them and tell whether they had received an SES prefer-
ence, they would not be subjected to stereotyping and bias by peers. The
same cannot be said for students of color admitted under race-based poli-
cies, Sander argues.3 3
Commentators dissect these assertions on three primary fronts.
First, there is some question whether such invisibility is desirable, espe-
cially under the diversity rationale set forth in Grutter. Richard Lempert,
for example, argues that affirmative action plans are designed to serve
three fundamental purposes (advancing equity, enriching educational
environments, and benefiting society) and asserts that SES admits ad-
vance only the first of these three goals. 4 Eli Wald adds richness to this
argument, pointing out that diversity of viewpoints (i.e. enrichment of
educational environments) is a key goal of affirmative action policies;
31. Bowen, supra note 22, at 774-75. For arguments in favor of retaining legacy preferences
see Richard D. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths About Legacy Preferences in College Admissions, CHRON.
HIGHER ED. (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://chronicle.com/article/10-Myths-About-
Legacy/124561/.
32. Bowen, supra note 22, at 774-75.
33. Sander, supra note 3, at 665-66.
34. Lempert, supra note 6, at 706-07.
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invisibility, by its very nature, works directly to undermine this.35 Mala-
mud, meanwhile, offers a slightly different, but related, track of criti-
cism: intrinsic to Sander's arguments of class invisibility, "there is no
need for 'critical mass' for class, and we are left with only the argument
for proportional representation-a different argument from the one that
underpins race-based diversity practice both in the law schools and in the
Supreme Court."3 To this argument, we would add that true class pro-
portionality would be difficult to attain, without greatly expanding the
number of seats available, or setting aside a portion of seats much larger
than those held by students currently admitted with the benefit of race-
conscious admissions plans-the only seats Sander targets within his
discourse.
Second, and on the flip side, some assert that low SES students are
not nearly as invisible as Sander's portrays them to be. Although several
commentators raise questions along these lines, Wald's analysis is per-
haps the most thorough, challenging both Sander and Lempert on their
assertions that low SES students are invisible. Drawing on Yoshino's
covering theory, he argues that, while some low SES students may be
able to "pass" as affluent, it would be difficult. Contrary to Sander's as-
sertion, Wald builds a compelling case about the difficulty of hiding
one's socioeconomic status and dissects the significance of social and
37cultural capital to which low SES students often lack access. He uses
Jewish male law students as an example of this dynamic: "The experi-
ence of Jewish male law students thus demonstrates that social and cul-
tural capital is highly visible both in law school and in law practice and is
hard to cover, and that aspects of socioeconomic status, such as social
capital, including effective networking, and cultural capital, including the
possession of self-esteem, are inherent to one's success as a law student
and as a lawyer." 38 In addition, Wald argues that low SES preferences
will still increase the "costs of affirmative action" that Sander seeks to
avoid, because low SES students are likely to share many of the prob-
lems, including performance issues, Sander criticizes among black stu-
dents.39
Related, the last track of critique comes from commentators who
argue that Sander's expectation of invisibility serves to cloak the very
real needs lower SES students are likely to possess because they are
members of lower or "middling" socioeconomic groups. Several com-
mentators zero in on the pipeline issue among SES students.40 Children
35. Wald, supra note 22, at 878.
36. Malamud, supra note 22, at 735.
37. Wald, supra note 22, at 863 ("Importantly, socioeconomic status, the possession of social
and cultural capital and lack thereof is highly visible, and students of lower socioeconomic status are
unlikely to be able to pass for affluent students or cover their status effectively even if they tried.").
38. Id. at 871.
39. Id. at 875.
40. See Holley-Walker, supra note 22; Lempert, supra note 6, at 698-99.
[Vol. 88:4viii
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who grow up in poverty do not have equitable access to quality K-12
schools-the very kinds of schools that serve to support admission to and
boost student performance in undergraduate and graduate institutions. As
Holley-Walker points out, "the failure of the American public school
system to adequately educate poor children . . . [leads] to an insufficient
pool of poor students who are eligible for admission to law school."4 '
Indeed, Daniel Keil argues here that the entire affirmative action debate
is missing an important element-a focus on the prevention of the kinds
of disparities that later create barriers at the admissions stage.42 He urges
law schools to "signal their commitment to prevention by engaging di-
rectly with minority and low SES students facing disparities. This could
include anything from adopting a school and committing resources to
directly aid students to organizing and supporting individual students,
faculty, and staff involved in direct mentoring or tutoring."4 3
Encouragingly, law schools, including the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law, are increasingly turning their attention to such
matters and building pipeline partnerships that advance educational op-
portunities and advancement at the high school level, among students of
color and those who are low-income or have experienced poverty." In
addition to these pipeline realities, several contributors note that SES
students are, by their very class status, more likely than their affluent
peers to require significant financial aid.45 As Malamud concludes, "To
achieve a major shift in the class privilege of their top-decile heavy stu-
dent bodies of the sort Sander advocates, these schools will need to culti-
vate their appreciation for (and increase the monetary grants to) mid-
dling-SES candidates. I doubt they will be willing to do so."
C. Relying on Data with Significant Limitations
A number of the commentators critique Sander's treatment and
analysis of the data he relied upon for his article. The main criticisms are
as follows:
a. Disagreements with Sander's operational definitions of
class;
41. Holley-Walker, supra note 22, at 845.
42. Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Reframing the Debate
About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 792 (2011).
43. Id. at 801.
44. See generally Catherine E. Smith, Seven Principles: Increasing Access to Law School
Among Students of Color, 96 IoWA L. REV. 1680 (2011). See also Michelle J. Anderson, Legal
Education Reform, Diversity and Access to Justice, 61 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1029-34 (2009);
Leonard M. Baynes, Introduction, The Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of Ronald H. Brown's
Graduation from St. John's School ofLaw, 25 J. Civ. RTS. & ECON. DEv. 1, 14-22 (2010).
45. Lempert, supra note 6, at 703-04.
46. Malamud, supra note 22, at 750.
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b. Use of datasets collected by other researchers to answer re-
search questions other than those raised by Sander; and
c. Lack of population data or even substantial surveys that ad-
dress questions about the extent of the problem of under-
inclusion of lower social class students in legal education.
As Lempert asserts, "Although Professor Sander's index may be the
best he can do given available data, it not only has shortcomings as a
measure of relevant social class characteristics but it would be less than
ideal if its sole purpose were to measure socio-economic status as the
term is used in social sciences."4 7 The questions about operational defini-
tions of "social class" pose issues of validity that need to be addressed by
48Sander. The focus on social class is complicated by the fact that most
studies of students (undergraduate and law school students and gradu-
ates) are not able to measure family income. This omission creates prob-
lems affecting generalizability. In addition, many of the datasets relied
upon by Sander in his formulation of class have missing data, and Sander
adopted a method of addressing the missing data that he considered suit-
able, but one that raises questions of general acceptance by other schol-
ars. 4 9 Further, with respect to measuring social class, Sander does not
address how researchers could create measures of wealth, currently miss-
ing from most of the studies employed in his analysis. Without wealth
measures, the data are surely incomplete. As Onwauchi-Willig and
Fricke assert:
Sander claims to be measuring SES, but he never takes into consid-
eration that racial status is highly important in American society,
conferring both social and economic benefits and detriments. In fact,
he seems to suggest that race itself comes with no disadvantages. His
failure to adjust for the disparate racial impact of certain tools for
measuring SES renders racial inequality invisible. Of particular sig-
nificance is Sander's unnecessary averaging of family household SES
data (as noted in Part I.A), his exclusion of income data in relation to
occupations, and most starkly, his lack of data on wealth, which
would more fully complete the stories about intergenerational wealth.
The true SES of many black families is much lower than Sander em-
phasizes, thus greatly destabilizing his argument that high-SES
blacks are being unfairly advantaged over low-SES whites. 50
Finally, there is no attempt on Sander's part to adjust for cost of liv-
ing, which varies dramatically in a comparison of large and small cities
and different regions in the U.S.
47. Lempert, supra note 6, at 688.
48. Id. at 687; see also Bowen, supra note 22, for a discussion of these issues.
49. This consensus is best represented in the pieces authored by Lempert, Bowen, Onwuachi-
Willig & Fricke, and Malamud.
50. Onwuachi-Willig & Fricke, supra note 22, at 816.
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Aside from issues raised by Sander of whether there is invisibility
of social class, Sander is unable to provide any data on the proportion of
lower class students who matriculate to undergraduate colleges. He does
not present data on the proportion of these same students who apply to
law school. These are problematic omissions, since it becomes impossi-
ble to assess whether Sander's solution to diversifying law students is
even capable of being achieved.'
PART III: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This special issue of the Denver Law Review opens another stage in
the debate about diversity in legal education, providing readers with a
critical opportunity to carefully consider Richard Sander's propositions,
as well as those of scholars who align with-and critique-his asser-
tions. We'd like to add six parting thoughts to the discourse:
I. In his reply to the commentators, Sander devotes a substan-
tial portion to the reintroduction of his mismatch theory, which
originally appeared in the Stanford Law Review. Unfortu-
nately, he crafts his reply as if people have conceded the cor-
rectness of his approach, ignoring the large body of literature
from scholars who fervently critiqued his mismatch theory. 52
I.When Sander speaks of invisibility, we must stop and ask:
What is it that these students are disappearing into and why is
that a lofty objective? Presumably, they are assimilating into
middle- and upper-class norms, especially as they are practiced
by white elites who still claim a disproportionate number of
law-school seats. Although low SES white students may be
able to "pass" and assimilate under these conditions, students
of color will not (and have not.) They remain visible. The ex-
pectation that they attempt to be invisible, even if that were
possible, harkens back to a relic of our racist past.53
51. The Comments authored by Lempert, Bowen and Malamud address some of these omis-
sions.
52. Sander has written previously and extensively in response to critics of his mismatch
theory; he just failed to do so here. See Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Reply to
Ho, 114 YALE L.J. 2005 (2005); Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN L. REV. 1963
(2005). For additional references to the critics of Sander's work on mismatch, see Bowen, supra note
23, at 751 n.3. In addition, see some of the work of Marta Tienda in particular for issues on mis-
match and attention to the Texas Top 10% Law. See Marta Tienda, Equity, Diversity and College
Admission: Lessons from the Texas Uniform Admission Law, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF PROPOSITION 209 (Grodsky & Kurlaender eds. 2010);
Sunny Xinchun Niu & Marta Tienda, The Impact of the Texas Top 10% Law on College Enrollment:
A Regression Discontinuity Approach, 29 J. POLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 84 (2010); Angel Harris &
Marta Tienda, Minority Higher Education Pipeline: Consequences of Changes in College Admis-
sions Policy in Texas, in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
60(2010).
53. See generally Wald, supra note 22; GAYLE WALD, CROSSING THE LINE: RACIAL PASSING
IN U.S. LITERATURE AND CULTURE (2000). For a more critical take, see Randall Kennedy, Racial
Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2001).
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III. Related, we must recognize that students of color are sub-
jected to bias and stereotyping beyond the trigger of any ad-
missions policies. 54 Eliminating race-consciousness from ad-
missions policies will not eliminate racial stereotyping and bias
on our campuses, or in the profession of law. Critical mass
plays an important role for these students' well-being and aca-
demic performance.
IV Low SES students and students of color experience many
of the same barriers. Their "pipeline issues" at the K-12 level
are similar, for example, even if they are not exactly the same.
Sander needs to do a better job explaining why he thinks low
SES students, once they have gained admissions preferences,
will do better than have students of color once they arrive on
the campuses of our nation's most elite law schools. What is it
about these students that frees them of the "mismatch" dangers
that so concern him with students of color? Following his train
of arguments, why should we expect low SES students to ex-
perience less of a mismatch than do students of color who pur-
portedly share class privilege (and are thus, in his worldview,
already class assimilated) with their white law-school peers?
The end game needs to be on ensuring the success of all of our
students.
V In our view, Sander's attempt to cloak the needs of low SES
students threatens to make them even more vulnerable in the
law school environment.55 Further, he ignores the intersections
of race and class, the built-in opportunity for attracting allies to
support his class-based arguments, and the possibility of pur-
posefully nurturing communities of support on our campus that
unify students at the intersections of racial and class identities.
VI. Sander ignores the publication of a number of articles and
the Final Project Report for the Educational Diversity Pro-
jects5 the first results from a major national study on the im-
54. See A.T. Panter, Charles E. Daye, Walter R. Allen, Linda F. Wightman & Meera Deo,
Everyday Discrimination in a National Sample of Incoming Law Students, 1 J. DIVERSITY HIGH.
EDUC. 67 (2008).
55. See Wald, supra note 22, at 873 ("Students of lower socioeconomic status, however, will
not only face the devastating stigma, bias, and stereotyping of affirmative action, they are also more
likely to actually not possess the requisite social and cultural capital so essential for professional
success.").
56. See CHARLES E. DAYE, ABIGAIL T. PANTER, WALTER R. ALLEN & LINDA F. WIGHTMAN,
THE EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY PROJECT: ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL AND CONCURRENT STUDENT
AND FACULTY DATA (2010), available at htp://www.1sac.org/Isacresources/ResearchlGR/GR-10-
01.asp. For the Project website see http://www.unc.eduledp/about/index/htm. Readers interested in
this topic should look for a forthcoming article on diversity in legal education authored by Charles
Daye and Abigail Panter.
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pact of diversity in legal education. This study based at the
University of North Carolina examines the relationship be-
tween race and other factors on educational diversity of incom-
ing law students in the U.S. For the first time, the researchers
are able to distinguish the effects of measures of Contact Di-
versity and Classroom Diversity on student outcomes. They
are able to show positive relationships between these two types
of diversity and measures of Cognitive Openness and Attitudes
Favoring Equal Opportunity. This new research was able to
distinguish and separate school level effects from those meas-
ured at the student level.58
Sander's proposal and the vast range of perspectives offered by
commentators in this symposium issue of the Denver Law Review repre-
sent substantive additions to the continuing debate about how diversity
can best be achieved in the hallways and classrooms of legal academia
and the profession of law. We extend our sincere thanks to all of the par-
ticipants and now invite you, the reader, to delve into the vital discourse
contained within-and beyond-these pages.
57. See Nisha C. Gottfredson, A.T. Panter, Charles E. Daye, Walter F. Allen & Linda F.
Wightman, The Effects of Educational Diversity in a National Sample of Law Students: Fitting
Multilevel Latent Models in Data with Categorical Indicators, 44 MULTIVARIATE BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 305 (2009); Nisha C. Gottfredson, A.T. Panter, Charles E. Daye, Walter A. Allen, Linda
F. Wightman & Meera E. Deo, Does Diversity of Undergraduate Institutions Influence Student
Outcomes?, I J. DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUC. 80 (2008).
58. See Gottfredson et.al,, The Effects of Educational Diversity, supra note 57 (2009). In this
article they develop and employ a multilevel latent model analysis.

CLASS IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
RICHARD H. SANDERt
It is hard to think of any issue in the legal academy that has gener-
ated as much discussion, reflection, or debate over the past forty years as
the quest for student diversity.' Nearly all law schools have some type of
diversity program; the ABA weighs school efforts in fostering diversity
heavily in its process of accrediting law schools; epic legal battles have
been fought to protect the right of law schools to maintain their efforts on
behalf of diversity. In rhetorical terms, the diversity of which the acad-
emy speaks is about both class and race. Opening doors of opportunity
once closed, improving mobility in American society, making sure that
national elites reflect talent from all corners of society, producing gradu-
ating classes that look like America-all of these aspirations would seem
to apply as much to addressing social and economic disadvantage as they
apply to racial disadvantage.
Yet as a practical matter, whenever discussions of law school diver-
sity become concrete, the discussion almost invariably focuses on race.2
Sometimes gender and sexual orientation come up as important diversity
topics as well, but almost never is there an explicit focus on class. In-
deed, there is no official data generated by law schools that even consid-
ers socioeconomic issues, and there are almost no research efforts any-
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Many people have helped to
foster and nourish my interest over the past generation in the issues explored in this paper. Norm
Abrams, a then-Associate Dean who went on to serve as UCLA's Chancellor, supported a 1990
survey of the socioeconomic background of UCLA law students that framed my empirical perspec-
tive. David Sklansky and Alison Anderson worked closely and imaginatively with me to launch
UCLA's 1997 experiment in socioeconomic admissions preferences. Richard Kahlenberg has been a
constant source of ideas as well as a careful reader and critic. I am very grateful to the editors of the
Denver University Law Review for approaching me with the idea for this symposium, and for the
imagination, diligence and patience with which they have implemented it. I received valuable re-
search assistance from Yana Kucheva, Flori So, and Robert Sockloskie. I appreciate the feedback I
have received on this and earlier drafts from the other contributors to this symposium (Kahlenberg
and Richard Lempert in particular) and from Patrick Anderson, Stuart Taylor, Doug Williams, Jane
Yakowitz, and the participants at earlier presentations at the 2008 Law & Society meeting in Mont-
real, and at UCLA Law School. I have received helpful financial support for this work from the
Searle Freedom Trust and UCLA.
1. See generally, e.g., LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS, 1984-
2001: SELECTING LAWYERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 1986)
(containing a series of papers, speeches, and discussions largely revolving around the issue of diver-
sifying the legal profession).
2. See generally id.; Robert Zelnick, Accreditation and Affirmative Action (Sept. 11, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing the ABA's battle with George Mason University Law School
over its lack of racial diversity), available at http://seaphe.org/pdf/zelnick-accreditation.pdf. ABA
accreditation committees, as documented in this battle and in my other interactions with the process,
are consistently concerned about racial diversity but give no attention whatsoever to socioeconomic
diversity. Zelnick, supra.
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where in the legal academy that have a mandate to help the legal acad-
emy understand socioeconomic questions. 3
A parallel disparity between rhetoric and behavior long existed in
the world of elite undergraduate education, but that has changed mark-
edly in just the past few years. Richard Kahlenberg's 1996 book, The
Remedy, pointed out the neglect of class matters, and changed-at least a
little bit-the terms of the discussion. Two researchers, encouraged by
Kahlenberg, produced a widely-discussed study in 2004 which showed
that young people from the top socioeconomic quartile in America were
some twenty-five times as likely to matriculate at elite colleges as were
young people from the bottom quartile. In the same year, prominent
educator William Bowen published Equity and Excellence, which docu-
mented in detail the lack of class-based diversity at elite colleges and the
attitudinal and programmatic barriers that impeded the access of low-
socioeconomic ("SES") students.6 These works, and the discussions they
produced, have led to the adoption of initiatives at a number of Ivy
League colleges and other elite schools that aim to sharply reduce or
waive tuition and fees for low- and moderate-income students.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to uncover and explore
some of the basic facts about socioeconomic diversity in law schools,
and second, to compare racial and "class" diversity as objectives that law
schools should pursue. While the available data is not perfect, it is de-
tailed enough to make possible several robust conclusions:
* The vast majority of American law students come from rela-
tively elite backgrounds; this is especially true at the most
prestigious law schools, where only five percent of all stu-
dents come from families whose SES is in the bottom half of
the national distribution.
3. The various institutions that have been established to, in part, gather information helpful
to the legal academy-such as the Law School Admissions Council, the National Association for
Law Placement, the American Association of Law Schools, and the American Bar Foundation-all
gather extensive data related to race, but none, so far as I am aware, gather any systematic data about
class or socioeconomic status among law students, law faculties, or lawyers.
4. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1996).
5. Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and
Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low-INCOME STUDENTS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 106 tbl.3.1 (Richard Kahlenberg ed., 2004).
6. WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005).
7. Harvard Liberalizes Undergraduate Financial Aid, HARV. MAG. (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://harvardmagazine.com/breaking-news/harvard-liberalizes-undergraduate-financial-aid; see also
Tom Hayden, We Can't Afford to Be Quiet About the Rising Cost of College, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Mar. 28, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Rising-Cost-of-College-We/64813/; Harvard An-
nounces Sweeping Middle-Income Initiative, HARV. GAZETTE (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://news.harvard.edulgazette/story/2007/12/harvard-announces-sweeping-middle-income-
initiative/; Harvard Expands Financial Aid for Low- and Middle-Income Families, HARV. U.
GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.news.harvard.edulgazette/2006/04.06/0 1-finaid.html.
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* The degree of SES eliteness across law schools is very simi-
lar in recent surveys (from the 1990s and early 2000s) as it
was in surveys from the early 1960s. Although racial diver-
sity has increased sharply during the intervening decades, the
great majority of non-white law students are, like whites,
from relatively elite backgrounds.
* Both racial minorities and non-elite classes are underrepre-
sented when we compare law school enrollments to the gen-
eral population. But blacks and Hispanics are numerically
well-represented in law schools compared to the general
pool of college graduates. This is not true of low- and mod-
erate-SES college graduates.
* Law school admission policies use very large and relatively
mechanical racial preferences, but appear to generally ignore
SES considerations. Some law school policies militate
against the admission of low- and moderate-SES applicants.
Even in awarding grants and scholarships, law schools ap-
parently generally ignore need; low-SES whites receive half
as much scholarship aid as do high-SES whites.
* Policies implemented by both law schools and undergraduate
colleges have shown that class-based preferences are feasible
and effective in creating diversity, and they involve much
smaller academic costs than do racial preferences.
In short, a serious discussion in the legal academy about how to ad-
dress socioeconomic diversity is long overdue. I hope the collective work
in this issue of the Denver University Law Review will convey such a
consensus, and will be followed by some organized effort within the
academy to pursue these questions in a thoughtful and sustained way.
I. DATA AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CLASS
Class position in modem Western society is complicated, reflecting
myriad aspects of life, including friendship networks, lifestyles, sources
and uses of power, and resources of various kinds. Yet there is a definite
convention among a great many social scientists that class--or at least
socioeconomic status, which is the prosaic stand-in for class when statis-
tics are involved-can be reasonably well-captured with three types of
information about individuals: their income, their level of education, and
8their occupation. Because these three characteristics are highly corre-
8. See generally PETER M. BLAU & OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (1967); ROBERT ERIKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT
FLUX: A STUDY OF CLASS MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1992).
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lated with one another, researchers will often use one or two of the three
measures as indices of SES. 9 In research involving students, SES is
measured by the characteristics of the student's parents.' 0 When data is
collected through surveys of students, researchers often ask only about
the education and occupation of parents-on the grounds that students
are likely to have good information about their parents' educational
level, and certainly about their occupation, while their knowledge about
their parents' income or assets may be largely speculative (or, if known,
might be information the student feels she should not reveal without the
parents' permission)."
Such is the case with the After the JD study ("AJD"),12 which is
probably our best source of information on the SES of contemporary law
students. AJD created a nationally-representative sample of some four
thousand law graduates who became licensed attorneys in 1999 or
2000.13 Participants completed paper surveys or phone interviews in late
2002 and 2003; while most questions focused on the early careers of
participants, AJD asked a number of questions about family background
and schooling, including questions about the educational level and occu-
pation of both parents. Nearly three-quarters of the participants provided
useful responses to at least two of the four SES questions.
How best can responses from questions such as these be translated
into an analytically convenient SES scale? The goal is to create a scale
that allows one to assign to each student's household an SES value be-
tween 0 and 100, where a value of, say, 60, would mean that the house-
hold had SES indicators that were higher than 60% of the general popu-
lation. Any method involves imperfect assumptions and tradeoffs, and
the use of numbers should not be taken as an assertion on my part that
these measurements are truly precise. They are not. However, quantify-
ing SES in some reasonable way is necessary if one is to have a discus-
9. HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 327-65 (Delbert C.
Miller ed., 5th ed. 1991) (discussing a number of SES scales, which draw to various degrees on
education, occupation, and income, but tend to single out occupation as the single most useful meas-
ure); see also Vickie L. Shavers, Measurement of Socioeconomic Status in Health Disparities Re-
search, 99 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 1013 (2007) (discussing a recent study of the advantages and
disadvantages of various SES measures).
10. See, e.g., MASSEY ET AL, THE SOURCE OF THE RIVER, 41-44 (2003) (discussing a major
study of the social origins of elite college students. The study uses an unusually wide range of meas-
ures of social background-including some measures of sibling achievement-but relies principally
on parental characteristics to capture socioeconomic status).
11. Consequently, questions about parental income tend to have a higher non-response rate
than questions about parental education or occupation. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with
Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 477, 483 & tbl.2 (1997).
12. For a good overview of AJD, see RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (Janet E. Smith et al. eds., 2004). AJD was
based at the American Bar Foundation, and the research was conducted with the support of the
NALP Foundation, the National Science Foundation, LSAC, the National Conference of Bar Exam-
iners, and others.
13. AJD also included oversamples of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, bringing the total sam-
ple to around 4,500. Id. at 14-15.
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sion that moves beyond vague generalities. I believe that a numerical
SES index is a very valuable heuristic for making discussion concrete,
and I believe that the ways in which this heuristic is used in this analysis
are robust to alternative methods of measuring SES. Appendix I provides
a detailed explanation of how I generated SES percentiles for each AJD
respondent. The discussion that follows summarizes some key elements
of the method.
First, one must decide upon an appropriate comparison group. To
whom, demographically, should one compare the parents of law students
who completed law school around 2000? I compared the AJD data to
2000 census data for adults between the ages of 45 and 65, reasoning that
most people who became lawyers around 2000 had parents who were
between 45 and 65 that year.
Second, I assigned percentile values to specific levels of educational
attainment. The AJD asks respondents to assign one of nine levels of
educational achievement to their parents, ranging from "grade school" to
"graduate or professional degree." Similar-but not identical-
categories exist in decennial long-form census data, 14 so one can deter-
mine the distribution of educational achievement for men and women
(separately) aged 45 to 65 in the 2000 census.' 5 By taking a representa-
tive sample of women from the census and ranking them from lowest
educational level to highest, one can determine the median percentile of
each given level of education. Thus, I assigned a "33 rd percentile" meas-
ure to women with a high school diploma but no further education; in
comparison, a woman with a B.A. is assigned an 84t percentile.' 6 I ap-
plied the same procedure to men.
It is a little more challenging to assign percentiles to occupations,
but there are well-developed protocols for this purpose. A number of
sociologists have created occupational indices that rank occupations by
their socioeconomic status; some of these use correlations between occu-
pation and other measures of social class, while others use subjective
measures of prestige.18 One of the most widely used systems is the Cam-
bridge Social Interaction and Stratification ("CAMSIS") scale, which
measures levels of social interaction between occupations to create a
14. The AJD data includes, between "high school diploma" and "associate degree or some
college," a category called "trade or vocational school." There is no direct counterpart for this in the
census data, so I treated this category as equivalent to "associate degree or some college."
15. Specifically, I used the 2000 Public Use Microdata 5% Sample, or PUMS 5%, a standard
electronic extract produced by the Census that captures households representing roughly one in
twenty American households. The sample was weighted to better approximate the American popula-
tion as a whole.
16. For a chart of all education levels and corresponding percentiles, see infra Appendix I,
Table Al-1.
17. See generally DONALD J. TREIMAN, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1977).
18. See, e.g., BLAU & DUNCAN, supra note 8, at 118-28.
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hierarchy. Though developed in England, CAMSIS scales have been
developed for many countries and lately have been rescaled after each
decennial census. Since I sought to measure the socioeconomic status of
occupations reported around the year 2000, I used the CAMSIS scale
developed from occupational categories in the 2000 U.S. Census.19
The CAMSIS scale ranks occupations from lower to higher SES,
but it does not directly associate a percentile ranking with particular oc-
cupations. To create this, I assigned CAMSIS codes to random samples
of female and male census respondents (aged 45-64, as before), deter-
mined their CAMSIS occupational code, ranked them, and assigned per-
centiles. Thus, for example, women physicians have a CAMSIS code of
82.46; 99% of employed women in this age cohort have lower CAMSIS
codes, so women physicians are assigned a percentile of 99. Women who
are registered nurses have a CAMSIS code of 59.11; 75% of employed
women in this age cohort have lower CAMSIS codes, so registered
nurses are assigned a percentile of 75.20
I averaged the educational and occupational percentiles for the par-
ents of each respondent, and then used my random sample of census
households to rescale these averages (this corrected for regression to the
mean from averaging). The end result was a percentile between 0 and
100 for each of some 3,300 AJD respondents.2 1
These measures are not precise-no measure of SES is really pre-
cise-but neither are they unduly subjective or arbitrary. The education
and occupation percentiles derived through this method correlate highly
22with one another, and both correlate highly with household income. As
we will see, one can improve on these measures significantly by includ-
ing such factors as household wealth and the SES of one's neighborhood,
but given the very limited extant information on the SES of law school
students, this is a good start.
II. SES PROFILES FROM THE AJD
By following the process described above, we can make interesting
and useful comparisons between the law school population and the
broader American population of young adults. As noted above, it is im-
portant not to be too entranced by the seeming precision of specific num-
bers. This methodology has several flaws: some law students and law-
19. For a helpful overview of CAMSIS, see Paul Lambert, Introduction, CAMSIS: SOCIAL
INTERACTION AND STRATIFICATION SCALE, http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/ (last modified May 25,
2008).
20. For a full chart of CAMSIS codes and percentiles for women, see infra Appendix I, Table
Al -2.
21. I only used respondents who reported at least two of the four possible values for their
parents.
22. The correlation of the mean education and occupation measures for households is .6 in my
PUMS sample. On the relation of these measures to income, see infra note 25.
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yers in the U.S. have arrived from overseas; the SES status of students
from single-parent families will tend to be overstated by the approach
used here; the AJD sample is comprised of law students who eventually
passed the bar, and is thus a bit unrepresentative of law students gener-
ally.23 In one important respect, this method will be too conservative in
characterizing the eliteness of law students. In a population (like law
students) that obviously includes many persons from privileged back-
grounds, many will have values that tilt towards the elite end of standard-
ized categories.24 Thus, many law students' parents have not just bache-
lor degrees, but bachelor degrees from very elite schools. In standardiz-
ing these characteristics, one undoubtedly derogates the currency of an
elite group.
Table 1 summarizes the SES distribution of law students as meas-
ured by the AJD. Students are split into five categories, based on the
eliteness of their law school, and into five tiers of SES. The results
should be sobering to those who imagine our law schools are socially
diverse places. Across the spectrum of law schools, there is a lopsided
concentration of law students towards the high end of the socioeconomic
spectrum, which becomes more lopsided with the eliteness of the law
school. At the most elite twenty law schools (combining the first two
rows), only two percent of students come from American households
with low SES (that is, SES in the bottom quartile), while more than
three-quarters come from households with high SES (SES in the top
quartile) and well over half come from households with very high SES
(SES in the top decile). One way of describing this disparity is that
roughly half the students at these schools come from the top tenth of the
SES distribution, while only about one-tenth of the students come from
the bottom half
Or, to put it differently: among young people in the United States, a
person whose family SES placed them in the top decile was twenty-four
times as likely to grow up and attend an elite law school as was a person
whose family SES placed them in the bottom halfof the national distri-
bution.
23. This potential bias appears to be quite small; the educational distribution of AJD respon-
dents is very close to the educational distribution of a sample of first-year law students studied in a
1995 national survey.
24. An easy way to see this is to consider the following thought experiment. Among the
general American population aged 45-64 in 2000, about 40% of college graduates have an advanced
degree. Among the parents of AJD respondents, however, [60%] of the parents with bachelor de-
grees have some more advanced degree as well. Thus, if we measured educational achievement only
up to the B.A. level, we would understate the actual eliteness of the AJD respondents. The same
tendency exists in the measures that really are unobserved in our data (eliteness of schools attended,
income, status within occupation, etc.), so our statistics understate the eliteness of these respondents.
This is quite analogous to the concept of the "principle of the return of the repressed," an idea De-
boarah Malamud has discussed in a different context. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 456-58 (1997).
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At less elite schools, the disparities are substantially smaller. None-
theless, even if we consider legal education as a whole, it appears that
students from top decile families are nearly ten times as likely to end up
in law school as students from the bottom half, and more than eighteen
times as likely as students from the bottom quartile.25
25. One important question raised by this data is whether the suggested levels of eliteness
really translate into economic eliteness-that is, whether these socially elite students are in fact
actually rich. While the AJD does not tell us this directly, there are many reasons to believe this is
so. In the general population (as captured by the PUMS), the correlation between our SES index and
household income is fairly high-between .4 and .45, depending on how the measurement is done.
The Warkov data, discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 32-43, found law students in the
1960s to be as economically elite as they were elite by measures based on parental education. In my
own past research, I have gathered data on several cohorts of UCLA students, and consistently found
the students to be from households that were as elite in economic terms as they were in educational
or occupational terms.
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Table 1
SES Eliteness of Law Students in AJD Panel
PROPORTION OF STUDENTS WITH SES IN THE FOLLOWING RANGES:
SCHOOL
ELITENESS Bottom Third Second 75 ' to 90' 901 to 99 h
Quartile Quartile Quartile Percentile Percentile
(1) "Top Ten" 1% 4% 13% 25% 57%
(n=272)
(2) Ranked
11th-20th 3% 9% 12% 28% 49%
(n=346)
(3) Ranked
21st-50th 3% 7% 17% 25% 48%
(n= 533)
(4) Ranked
51"-100 7% 12% 17% 27% 36%
(n=880)
(5) Ranked
101" & lower 6% 15% 21% 31% 27%
(n=814)
(6) All Schools 5% 11% 17% 28% 39%
(n=2944)
Source: See text and Appendix I. Rankings are based on the 1997 U.S. News rankings of law
schools (when most of these respondents entered law school). Note that the totals in row 6 in-
clude 99 respondents who did not provide a usable answer to the "law school" question and thus
could not be included in an "eliteness" category.
An interesting and important question is whether these disparities
are completely conditioned by other parts of the educational system. For
example, are the relative odds of completing college so heavily tilted
against low-SES students that there is no meaningful pool of potential
law school entrants? Fortunately, an excellent and recent study provides
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26useful comparison figures for a national sample on this issue. Among a
representative sample of young people who graduated from high school
in 1992 (making them exact contemporaries of the typical AJD respon-
dent), the authors found that young people from the top quartile had a
68% rate of securing a bachelor's degree, compared to 43% for the sec-
ond quartile, 28% for the third quartile, and 14% for the fourth quartile.27
These are dispiriting numbers-students from the top quartile were
nearly five times as likely to finish a four-year college as students from
the bottom quartile-but the disparities are much smaller than those in
law school. As a comparison of the second row of Table 2 with the fifth
row of Table 1 suggests, even the least elite law schools admit students
whose average SES is significantly higher than the SES of new college
graduates generally.
Table 2
SES Eliteness of Undergraduate Students
UNDERGRADUATE Bottom Third Second Top
COLLEGE GROUP Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
(1) Attending
"Tier One" 3% 6% 17% 74%
Schools
(2) All students
achieving bache- 7.6% 15.3% 27.4% 49.7%
lor's degree __
Source: The "Tier One" statistics come from Carnevale & Rose, supra note 5. Row 2 figures
are calculated from the Table 3 statistics in Goldin et al, infra note 26.
At the same time, it does seem very likely that the admissions and
recruitment practices of elite colleges do help shape the high-SES char-
acter of law students. Row (1) in Table 2 shows the SES distribution of
students attending "Tier 1" colleges-roughly one hundred forty under-
graduate colleges and universities which have median SAT scores above
1240. Even though this is a fairly broad definition of "elite" colleges, the
concentration of SES privilege at these schools is very high (strikingly
similar, in fact, to the SES distribution of Tier 3 law schools). Since these
elite colleges are prime recruiting grounds for law schools, it is perhaps
not surprising that their SES character is similar. It is important to note,
however, that the Tier I and Tier 2 law schools appear to have even
higher SES levels than the elite colleges.
As we shall see in more detail below, there is nothing inevitable
about the predominance of SES elites at most top undergraduate schools.
The University of Califomia-Berkeley and UCLA, which are generally
ranked among the top five public universities in the nation, have dra-
26. See Claudia Goldin et al., The Homecoming ofAmerican College Women: The Reversal of
the College Gender Gap, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2006, at 138-42, 146-48 & tbl.3.
27. See id. at 147.
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matically more socioeconomic diversity than other elite schools. A sim-
ple comparative measure of SES diversity is the proportion of students
who receive Pell Grants, which are need-based. Very roughly speaking,
students in the bottom half of the income distribution are eligible for Pell
Grants, and those in the top half are not.2 9 Thirty-two percent of Berkeley
undergraduates and 33% of UCLA undergrads receive Pell Grants. 30 The
numbers for other elite public schools, such as the University of Virginia
and the University of Wisconsin, are 8% and 11%, respectively-lower
even than the Ivy League average of 12%. ' We will explore the reasons
for these disparities further in Part VII, but for now the important point is
that SES diversity can be significantly influenced by college policies.
III. SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Faced with any interesting phenomenon, it is generally helpful to
seek out an historical perspective; some sense of trends over time. In the
world of legal education, there is no official data to draw upon. We do,
however, have one very helpful source, created through the efforts of an
economist named Seymour Warkov.3 2
In the early 1960s, Warkov was part of a research team at the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center ("NORC") that surveyed a large cross-
section of college students. 33 In a follow-up survey, NORC tracked the
post-graduate activities of these students, and Warkov undertook a de-
tailed analysis of the twelve hundred or so students in the original sample
who landed in law school.34 The NORC questionnaires gathered substan-
tial data on the educational experiences, aspirations, and achievements of
28. Economic Diversity: National Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/national-economic-diversity (last
visited Feb. 9, 2011).
29. The Pell formula takes into account multiple factors, such as net household wealth, the
needs of other dependent children, and whether a student is "independent" of his parents (e.g., older
students returning to school), but grants are highly correlated with income. As one authoritative
source reports, "Pell Grants are awarded primarily to low-income students. For example, among
1995-96 beginning students, 87 percent of Pell Grants were awarded either to dependent students
whose parents' incomes were under $45,000 (59 percent) or to independent students with incomes
under $25,000 (28 percent)." Wei, Horn and Carroll, "Persistence and Attainment of Beginning
Students with Pell Grants," National Center for Education Statistics (May 2002), p. 17. Another
useful source are University of California statistics on financial aid for freshmen, reported here:
http://statfinder.ucop.edu/reports/financialaid/default.aspx?Year-2008-09. Calculations from this
data suggest that 87% of all UC freshmen receiving Pell Grants were dependent students with family
incomes under $48,000; moreover, 93% of these dependent students with family incomes under
$48,000 received Pell grants.
30. Economic Diversity: National Universities, supra note 28.
31. These numbers cover the 2008-09 academic year and come from charts compiled as part
of the U.S. News college rankings report. Id
32. SEYMOUR WARKOv, LAWYERS IN THE MAKING (1963). This book is ajoint publication of
the National Opinion Research Center and the American Bar Foundation. It is included in the
NORC's Monographs in Social Research.
33. Id at iii.
34. Id. at iii-v.
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participating students, and also asked about the education, occupation,
and income of respondents' parents.
On socioeconomic matters, Warkov made two basic findings. First,
American law students tended to come from the very elite strata. Second,
the eliteness of student backgrounds was correlated with the eliteness of
law schools. A representative table from Warkov showed the following:
Table 3
Income of the Parental Family of Law Students, by Law School Strata
FAMILY INCOME LAW SCHOOL STRATUM
I II III
$20,000 or more 42% 31% 21%
$15,000-$19,999 16% 8% 11%
$10,000-14,999 15% 20% 21%
$7,500-9,999 11% 17% 18%
$5,000-7,499 8% 14% 21%
Under $5,000 8% 10% 8%
Total 100% 100% 100%
"n" in sample 262 311 449
Source: WARKOV, supra note 32, at 59.
In grouping law schools, Warkov put eight very elite schools in
Stratum I (all schools in this group had median LSAT scores above 600),
sixteen moderately elite schools in Stratum II (schools with median
LSAT scores between 500 and 600), and the rest of law schools in Stra-
tum III (schools with median LSAT scores below 500).36 It is worth not-
ing that well over half of Warkov's sample-which was apparently rep-
resentative-attended one of the top twenty-four schools; the other one
hundred-odd schools were typically quite small.37 Roughly speaking,
Warkov's Stratum 1 would be analogous-both in relative academic
35. Id. Appendix I contains the undergraduate survey; questions 56, 57 and 58 deal with
parental education, occupation and income.
36. The LSAT has been rescaled twice since Warkov's time (when the mean was roughly 500
points and the standard deviation was roughly 100 points). Under the current scale, the mean is
roughly 150 points and the standard deviation is roughly 10 points, creating a 120 to 180 scale. Thus,
the Stratum I schools in Warkov's time had LSAT medians equivalent to about 160 under the mod-
em LSAT scale. Of course, Stratum I schools today have much higher medians-a reflection of
vastly increased numbers of applicants and far more competition for slots in the elite schools. The
origins of this trend is discussed in Richard H. Sander & E. Douglas Williams, Why Are There So
Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 462-63 &
tbl.13 (1989).
37. Keep in mind that as recently as 1964, accredited American law schools granted only
9,638 degrees, about one-fifth of current production. Richard Abel, American Lawyers (1989), p.
256. Few of the elite schools were part of the dramatic enrollment increases of the intervening dec-
ades, so the elite schools accounted for a much larger proportion of all lawyers than they do now.
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strength and numbers-to the top twenty schools in my Table I hierar-
chy (Tiers 1 and 2). Similarly, Stratum 2 would be analogous to the next
thirty schools (Tier 3), and Stratum 3 would be analogous to the rest of
the law schools (Tiers 4 and 5).
By modem price levels, the income levels in Table I look quite low;
but if one multiplied the income figures by 10, one would probably have
a reasonably good comparison with present day income levels (nominal
median family income in the U.S. increased by a factor of almost exactly
ten between 1960 and 2005).3 In 1960, only 5.7% of American families
reported incomes of $15,000 or higher, while 58% of the families of elite
law students had incomes above this level.39 Similarly, 57% of the fa-
thers of Stratum I law students were college graduates, at a time when
just over 10% of adult males in the United States had bachelor degrees.40
Roughly speaking, Warkov's data show-for the elite schools-patterns
very similar to those we observe today in elite schools: some fifty per-
cent of the students at these schools came from families in the upper
tenth of the socioeconomic pyramid, while only a tenth of the students
came from the bottom half of the pyramid.4 1
Without the original data, it is impossible to compute SES indices
that are directly comparable to those I use in Table 1. Nonetheless, one
simple and interesting way of directly comparing the Warkov data to the
AJD data is through a measure of distribution known as the index of dis-
similarity.4 2 The index compares two categorical distributions and meas-
ures how much overlap there is between them. If the two distributions
are identical, the index has a value of 100. If the distributions are com-
pletely disjoint, the index has a value of 0. Consider this example: sup-
pose there are only three categories of educational achievement (low,
medium, and high), suppose that in the general population people are
evenly distributed across these three levels (33% of people attain each
level), and suppose that among some comparison group (fans of NPR)
the distribution is 10%, 20%, and 70%. Then the index of educational
dissimilarity between NPR fans and the general population would be .37,
which is to say that 37% of NPR fans would have to change their level of
38. Median family income was $5,620 in 1960 and $56,194 in 2005. The 1960 figure comes
from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES
To 1970, at 297 (1975). The 2005 figure comes from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at tbl.683 (2010).
39. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 38, at 290; WARKOV, supra note 32, at 59 tbl.4.1.
40. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 3, at 380 (citing a figure from 1959); WARKOV,
supra note 32, at 58 tbl. 4.1.
41. See infra Table 4.
42. An explanation of how to compute the index of dissimilarity can be found at Racial Resi-
dential Segregation Measurement Project, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN: POPULATION STUDIES
CENTER, http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/calculate.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). The index was
originally developed to analyze residential segregation levels, where the categories compared are
small geographic units like census tracts, but it is now used in much sociological research to com-
pare differences in distributions across fixed categories.
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educational attainment (move from the "high" category to the "low" or
"medium" category) to achieve the same distribution as the general
population.
In Table 4, below, I report indices of "educational dissimilarity" be-
tween the fathers of students in each of Warkov's three law school strata
and the level of educational attainment of American males generally in
1960. I then compare these with indices of educational dissimilarity be-
tween the fathers of AJD respondents who attended each of the five law
school tiers, and the educational attainment of American males aged 45-
64 in 2000. While the comparison is not perfect, it is revealing. The edu-
cational eliteness of law student's fathers seems to have generally in-
creased across the top three tiers of American law schools, relative to
comparable institutions in the early 1960s. It has decreased some at the
low-tier schools, partly reflecting, perhaps, the fact that most of these
schools did not exist in the earlier period, or were much smaller opera-
tions.
These measures are probably not accurate enough for one to opine
convincingly on whether the socioeconomic eliteness of American law
students has become more intense or less intense since Warkov's time.
But this chart, along with the other comparisons one can make between
the Warkov and AJD data, persuasively shows that there has been no
marked improvement in SES diversity over the past forty years. During
this period, schools have undertaken aggressive affirmative action pro-
grams, federal loan programs have been created that make available tens
of thousands of dollars of credit on reasonable terms for most students,
and the scale of "public" legal education has greatly increased.43 Based
on the available evidence, it seems that none of these changes has had
much impact in making legal education more accessible to low-SES stu-
dents-or, if there has been an impact, it has been largely or entirely
negated by other developments.
43. On the scale of public legal education, 1960 enrollment statistics can be found in John G.
Hervey, Law School Registration, 1960, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 248, 248-61 (1960). Statistics from
2002 can be found in AM. BAR Ass'N & LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 2004 EDITION (2003). By these sources, first-year enrollment at public
law schools nearly tripled from 1960 to 2002, rising from 5,283 tol4,262. (Of course, private law
school enrollments also rose sharply during these years.) On the development and scale of law
school affirmative action over these decades, see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirma-




Indices of Educational Dissimilarity for Law Student's Fathers: Comparing
the Warkov data on 1961 matriculants with AJD 1996-97 matriculants
INDICES OF EDUCATIONAL DISSIMILARITY FOR FATHERS OF:
Warkov's 3 1961 1996-97 Five Tiers of
Law School Matriculants Matriculants Contemporary
"Strata" Law Schools
Tier 1
Stratum 1 56.9 (most elite)
(most elite) 52.7 (most elite)
49.9 Tier 2
Stratum II 41.7 46.8 Tier 3
34.6 Tier 4
Stratum IlI
(least elite) 29.6 Tier 5
(least elite)
Sources: WARKOV, supra note 32, and calculations from Appendix I.
IV. COMPARING RACIAL AND SES DIVERSITY
The pursuit of greater diversity has, of course, been a major objec-
tive in higher education generally-including, and perhaps especially, in
legal academia-for the past forty years. Although the rhetoric of diver-
sity often invokes both class and race, or, more generally, social "disad-
vantage,"4 4 I believe that nearly all of the actual diversity effort has fo-
cused on race. As a first step towards assessing this claim, consider the
relative underrepresentation among various racial groups and SES
groups.
Table 5 attempts to quantify underrepresentation, by comparing the
presence of various groups in law schools to their numbers in the general
population. For example, about one in every seventy whites in their mid-
twenties enrolls in law school (i.e., 1.4%). For blacks, the rate is about
one in one hundred and sixty (i.e., 0.62%).45 This suggests that for a
44. See sources cited in notes 1 and 2, supra. See also Robert E. Hirshon, President's Mes-
sage: Excellence and Diversity, ABA Journal June 2002: "..if the American bar is to represent this
culture, it must reflect the diversity of America. This is fundamental to fostering the public's percep-
tion that our system is fair, unbiased, and inclusive. Without that perception, our judicial system
ultimately fails. Such long overdue change in our profession's diversity can only begin in law
schools... nothing divides this society so completely as race.. .which is only exacerbated by the cold
reality that wealth, and the potential for wealth, is decidedly not colorblind." Id. at 1-2. See also
MacCrate report; Carnegie report....
45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at tbl.10
(2010); Legal Education Statistics, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.abanet.orglegaled/statistics/
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white and black born in 1985, the white child had about 2.2 times the
chance, as compared to the black child, of growing up to become a law
student. Or, to put it the other way, for every one hundred white children
who would grow up to attend law school, only forty-five black children
would grow up to attend law school.
There are various assumptions and oversimplifications in these cal-
culations, 4 6 but the point here is to get a general idea of relative "life-
chances" for various groups we might consider to be disadvantaged from
a racial or socioeconomic standpoint. Appendix 2 provides the raw data
on which these numbers are based (as well as those in Tables 6 and 7),
and shows in some detail how the rates are calculated.
Table 5
Estimated Relative Representation of Racial and Socioeconomic Groups
Comparing Law Students to the General Population





SES in 5 0 thto 9 0th percentile 29%
SES in top 10% SES in bottom half 8%
SES in bottom quartile 5%
SES in 50th to 7 5th percentile 25%
SES in top quartile SES in bottom half 12%
SES in bottom quartile 7%
SES in top half SES in bottom half 19%
SES in bottom quartile 12%
Source and calculations: See Appendix II.
The disparities in representation are shockingly large for both racial
minorities (excepting Asians47) and low-SES groups. Many readers will
be surprised that, despite the inclusion of Hispanics in affirmative action
efforts by most law schools for a generation or more, young Hispanics,
stats.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
46. For example, as noted below, many blacks at American law schools are not "African-
Americans" per se. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
47. Note that both "Hispanics" and "Asians" are broad ethnic categories that include sub-
groups with very different levels of representation. See Sean A. Pager, Antisubordination of Whom?
What India's Answer Tells Us About the Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 289, 302-03 (2007) (discussing the problems associated with defining ethnic groups in
broad categories when major discrepancies exist among subgroups in those categories). Americans
of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, or Cuban origin are very well-represented, while Americans of Mexi-
can, Puerto Rican, Cambodian, Vietnamese, or Filipino origin are not. Id at 309, 333.
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on a per capita basis, are one-quarter as likely to enroll in law school as
are whites. Yet, stark as black and Hispanic underrepresentation is, it
pales in comparison to the absence of students from the bottom half of
the SES distribution. Depending on the control group we choose, Ameri-
cans in the bottom quarter of the SES distribution are between one-eighth
and one-twentieth as likely to attend law school as their more affluent
peers. For the entire bottom half, the chances range from one-twelfth to
less than one-fifth.
Much of the reason for underrepresentation of some groups in law
48school has to do with low rates of college entrance and completion.
This is particularly true for young Hispanics, who often drop out of high
school to help support their families, and who have relatively low rates
of college entrance even among those who finish high school.4 9 For
blacks, a major barrier to graduate education is the low rate of graduation
among those who start college.50
Another way of comparing access, then, is to examine representa-
tion in law school among the pool of young people who graduate from
college. This is, after all, the pool from which law schools can recruit and
choose students. Table 6 presents these results; the numbers are calcu-
lated the same way as in Table 5, except here we are measuring relative
representation rates among college graduates (see Appendix 2 for de-
tails).
48. See infra Appendix II, Table A2- 1; see also Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 43.
49. On high school dropout patterns, see Jordan, Lara and McPartland, "Exploring the Causes
of Early Dropout among Race-Ethnic and Gender Groups," 28 Youth & Society 62 (1996). Among
Hispanics aged 25-29 in 2009, 29.9% had not completed high school, compared with 7.8% of the
rest of the U.S. population. Among those who completed high school, only 59% had attended any
college, compared with 75.6% of the non-Hispanic population. Author's calculations from 2009
ACS data.
50. Among U.S. blacks aged 25-29 in 2009, only 34.7% of those who had ever attended
college had earned a bachelor's degree, compared with 52.3% for the non-black population.
Author's calculations from 2009 ACS data.
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Table 6
Estimated Relative Representation of Racial and Socioeconomic Groups
Comparing Law Students to College Graduates






SES in 50" to 9 0th percentile 50%
SES in top 10% SES in bottom half 42%
SES in bottom quartile 39%
SES in 5 0th to 7 5th percentile 46%
SES in top quartile SES in bottom half 52%
SES in bottom quartile 48%
SES in bottom half 65%
SES in top half
SES in bottom quartile 60%
Source and calculations: See Appendix II.
Table 6 presents quite a contrast to Table 5; the representation rates
are uniformly higher, and sometimes much higher. Clearly, the "pool"
problem is important: law schools cannot admit students who do not
even reach the applicant pool, and the applicant pool is limited to college
graduates. But the contrast between "race" and "SES" representation is
still striking. College graduates of all races attend law school at rates that
approach or even exceed the white rate. But low-and-middle SES college
graduates are far less likely to attend law school than are high-SES
graduates.
The contrast becomes stunning if we examine elite law schools. Ta-
ble 7 reports the same set of calculations as Table 6, except it only counts
students at the top ten law schools.
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Table 7
Estimated Relative Representation of Racial and Socioeconomic Groups,
Comparing "Top 10" Law Students to College Graduates






SES in 50th to 90th percentile 30%
SES in top 10% SES in bottom half 9%
SES in bottom quartile 4%
SES in 5 0 th to 75t' percentile 29%
SES in top quartile SES in bottom half 13%
SES in bottom quartile 6%
SES in top half SES in bottom half 17%
SES in bottom quartile 8%
Source and calculations: See Appendix II. "Racial representation" is based on 2002 data for
college graduates and first-year law students; "SES representation" is based on 1996 data.
Among the pool of college graduates, most minority groups are rep-
resented at elite law schools at rates that exceed white rates. The only
exception is blacks, and that is a relatively recent development. 1
But the same is not even faintly true across class lines. Among the
pool of college graduates, someone with an SES in the top tenth is more
than twenty times as likely to attend an elite law school as a graduate
from the bottom quarter of the SES distribution. All of the SES compari-
sons produce dramatic discrepancies. Indeed, it is fair to say that low-
SES representation at elite law schools is comparable to racial represen-
tation fifty years ago, before the civil rights revolution.52
V.WHAT IS THE OVERLAP OF RACIAL AND SES DIVERSITY?
An obvious question is raised by the patterns we just examined:
why does racial diversity at law schools add so little to class diversity?
51. During the 1990s, the black representation rate substantially exceeded the white rate, but
that has changed in recent years as the number of black college graduates has risen sharply with a
much smaller rise in black law school enrollments. See the last paragraph of Appendix II for further
discussion of this pattern.
52. In 1964, blacks accounted for 1.3% of American law students; depending on whether we
calculate their representation relative to pool of college graduates or relative to the general popula-
tion, their representation rate was between 10% and 300/-similar to the rates of representation for
the low-SES categories, relative to the top 10%, in Tables 5, 6, and 7. See Sander, supra note 48, at
375.
6492011]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The two are often conflated in discussions of diversity; many writers on
affirmative action assume that race-based preferences, by reaching out to
disadvantaged populations, necessarily catalyze socioeconomic diversity
at the same time.53 It is of course true that blacks, Hispanics, and Ameri-
can Indians in the U.S. are all over-represented among the nation's poor.
In fact, poverty rates in each group are at much more than double the
white rate.5 4 But that does not mean that low-SES minorities are the ones
getting into law school.
Table 8 is a first step towards understanding the intersection of race
and class at law schools. It is similar to Table 1, except that the data is
broken down into the four principal racial groups. Additionally, sample
sizes in Table 8 for Native Americans and "others" were too small for
useful analysis, and even in the case of blacks, Asians, and Hispanics, it
is important to note that we are looking at relatively modest samples. I
have consolidated the "tier" analysis to reduce the problem of small cell
sizes.
53. For a recent example, see Michelle Anderson, "Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and
Access to Justice," 61 Rutgers Law Review 1011 (2009). Anderson writes that "there is a justice gap
between impoverished and affluent communities in this country, one that leaves the poor with inade-
quate legal representation....[a]t least 80% of the civil legal needs of low-income Americans are not
being met..." But while Anderson believes that increasing racial diversity in law schools will ad-
dress this problem, she never mentions the absence of socioeconomic diversity in law students of all
races. Id. at 3-4.
54. Many standard reference works fail to distinguish non-Hispanic whites from the rest of
the white population, thus giving a misleading cross-group comparison. My analysis of 2009 Ameri-
can Community Survey ("ACS") data shows, for 2008 reported income levels, an 8.9% poverty rate
among non-Hispanic whites, compared to 21.9% among Hispanics and 24.3% among blacks.
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Table 8
SES Eliteness of AJD Students, by Law School Tier and Race
PROPORTION OF STUDENTS WITH SES IN THE FOLLOWING RANGES
Race School
Tier 4  3  2nd 75-90 90-99
Quart. Quart. Quart. Per. Per
Asian- Top 2 3% 8% 20% 25% 47%
American Tiers
(n=290) All Tiers 7% 9% 19% 26% 39%
African- Top 2 1% 10% 23% 23% 43%
American Tiers
(n=289) All Tiers 7% 17% 22% 25% 29%
Top 2 21% 16% 15% 19% 29%Hispanic Tiers
(n=266)
All Tiers 20% 20% 18% 19% 23%
White Top2 1% 6% 11% 28% 54%
(n=2410)
All Tiers 4% 10% 17% 28% 41%
Source: AJD data analyzed by the author. See text and Appendix I for details. Bear in mind
that in some cells the underlying "n" is quite small, especially for nonwhites, so anomalous num-
bers are likely to reflect some random variation and should not be taken too literally.
There are multiple stories embedded in Table 8, so let me peel off
several different layers of interpretation that strike me as important. For
all racial groups, in all law school groupings, the SES distribution is
tilted towards the top-that is to say, the typical student has above-
average SES. It is not the case-as many observers imagine-that the
typical beneficiary of race-based law school affirmative action has low
SES. On the other hand, racial minorities are responsible for much of the
small amount of SES diversity we can currently observe in law schools.
White law students are breathtakingly concentrated in the top quartile of
the SES distribution. Each of the other racial groups has a somewhat
unique pattern:
Asian-American law students have very high SES measures.
In fact, the SES measures are nearly as high as those for
whites, but there is a larger sprinkling of Asian students in
the bottom two quartiles. Much of this is due to the large
proportion of these students who are immigrants or the chil-
dren of immigrants. The AJD did not ask respondents about
their immigrant status (for fear of discouraging participation
from illegal immigrants), but it did ask whether respondents'
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parents were born in the U.S. Somewhat more than three-
fifths of the Asian respondents reported that both parents
were born outside the U.S., and these respondents accounted
for three-quarters of Asians in the sample who fell into the
bottom two SES quartiles. It is more difficult to apply our
SES scale to an immigrant, since international education lev-
els may not be strictly comparable. Asian-American respon-
dents with native-born parents had SES levels indistinguish-
able from those of whites.
* Black respondents in the AJD also had remarkably high SES
levels. Two-thirds of blacks from the top two tiers of law
schools have SES in the top quartile. Yet, it is important to
keep in mind that the measures we use are particularly likely
to overstate black SES. Blacks disproportionately come from
single-parent families, whose income will usually be
lower-despite high educational and occupational prestige-
than otherwise similar two-parent families. 56 Black house-
holds tend to have much lower wealth at a given level of in-
come (or occupation or education) than otherwise compara-
ble white households.57 And, middle-class blacks are much
more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods with high
poverty rates than are whites with otherwise similar SES.
Unfortunately, none of the data sources I know of on the
SES of the general population of law students help us take
these factors into account. It seems fair to say that although
most black law students are upper-middle-class, that means
something different than what it means when applied to
whites or Asians.
* Hispanic respondents show by far the greatest SES diversity
in this data. Yet, just as our SES measures probably over-
state the degree of black privilege, they probably understate
it for Hispanics. Only a third of the AJD Hispanics have two
immigrant parents (about half the rate for Asians) although,
as with Asians, the children of immigrants account for a dis-
proportionate share of the low-SES Hispanics. More impor-
tantly, there is a considerable disjunction between measured
educational and occupational SES levels among AJD His-
55. See infra Table 8.
56. Many of the issues discussed in this paragraph are explored, in the context of law stu-
dents, in Sander, supra note 11.
57. The best-known work on this issue remains MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO,
BLACK WEALTH/ WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (originally pub-
lished 1995; 2nd edition, 2006).
58. Sander, supra note 11, at 494-95.
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panics that does not exist with the other racial groups exam-
ined here. The mean occupational SES of AJD Hispanic par-
ents is 12 points higher (on our 100-point scale) than the
mean educational SES of those parents. Many of these par-
ents, in other words, have modest educational credentials but
high-status occupations and, probably, relatively high in-
comes.
This discussion cautions us that there are important nuances in-
volved in making SES comparisons across racial groups. One way of
sidestepping this issue-which gives us further insight into the race/class
connection-is to use intra-racial measures of SES. In other words,
rather than comparing the parents of Asian law students to the SES dis-
tribution of middle-aged Americans generally, we can compare them to
Asians aged 45-64, and similarly compare the parents of black law stu-
dents to the general SES distribution of middle-aged blacks, and so on.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 9.
Table 9
SES Eliteness of AJD Students, by Law School Tier and Race
Using Intra-Racial Measures of SES
PROPORTION OF STUDENTS WITH SES IN THE FOLLOWING RANGES
SchoolRace Scol hrd nd
Tier 4t 3 2 75-90 90-99
Quart. Quart. Quart. Per. Per
Asian- Top 2 4% 15% 24% 18% 39%
Tiers
American
(n=290) All 9% 14% 24% 21% 32%
Tiers
Afic .an- Topr2 0% 5% 18% 18% 59%
American
All
(n=289) Tir 6% 10% 19% 22% 43%Tiers
Top 2 3% 16% 21% 18% 42%
Hispanic Tiers
(n=266) All
Ties A 6% 13% 24% 21% 36%Tiers
Top 2 2% 7% 12% 29% 50%
White Tiers
(n=2434) All
(n=2434) Tir 6% 11% 17% 28% 38%
Tiers
Source: AJD data analyzed by the author. See text and Appendix I for details.
Using the intra-racial method, the differences in SES eliteness
among these four racial groups dwindle. By visual inspection, it is hard
to see any meaningful difference between the relative SES eliteness of
blacks and whites. Hispanics and Asians are somewhat more socio-
economically diverse (particularly Asians at non-elite schools), but for
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all four racial groups, the relative odds of students coming from the "top
tenth" rather than the "bottom half' are ten to one or greater.
We might then speak of white law students (as a group) as "first
among elites." They have the highest SES, on average, of all the racial
groups, and the interpretation of what those high SES numbers means is
less complicated for whites than it is for the other racial groups. But it is
also clear that within each racial group, the most privileged members are
very disproportionately over-represented in law school. Therefore, the
contribution racial diversity makes to socioeconomic diversity in legal
education is quite modest. Even though nonwhites constitute over one-
fifth of all students, they raise the overall proportion of law students from
the bottom SES quartile only from 4% (the white proportion) to 5% (the
proportion for all law students); they raise the overall proportion of law
students from the bottom half of SES only from 14% to 16%. This helps
explain the patterns we saw in Tables 5, 6, and especially 7: achieving
some kind of racial representation-if it is done with SES blinders on-
does not imply much socioeconomic representation.
The next issue, then, is to look at why this is. What are admissions
officers doing when they try to create diverse law school classes?
VI. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS PRACTICES
Most legal educators are aware that law schools give substantial
admissions preferences to underrepresented racial minorities-most
commonly to blacks, but also, at most schools, for Hispanics and Ameri-
can Indians, and, at a few schools, for particular Asian ethnicities.59 In
most cases, these preferences are very large: equivalent to a fifteen point
LSAT boost for African Americans, and a seven or eight point LSAT
boost for Hispanics.60 What is less well-known is that these preferences
are applied in a fairly mechanical way. Justice O'Connor, in giving con-
stitutional blessing to the race-preferences system used by the University
of Michigan Law School, viewed its admissions system as one in which
race was simply one of a multitude of factors considered in creating a
strong and diverse class. In fact, the University of Michigan Law
School in the late 1990s did what most law schools still do today: it ad-
mitted, with a few exceptions, the students with the highest LSAT scores
and undergraduate grades within each racial cohort.62
To see this point more clearly, let us consider an example chosen
more or less at random 63 from scores of school admissions databases my
59. See Sander, supra note 48, at 385-86.
60. Jane Yakowitz & Richard Sander, Race and Admissions at American Law Schools 28-29
(Jan. 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file the Denver University Law Review).
61. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
62. See Sander, supra note 48, at 404-05.
63. Schools that seemed clearly un-representative were omitted.
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research team has gathered over the past few years. The example is the
University of Missouri at Columbia ("UMC"), a strong but non-elite law
school that has a fairly typical student body and racial makeup. UMC
calculates an index for each student, based essentially on LSAT score
and undergraduate performance. The index probably has a theoretical
maximum of 100, but few applicants have scores above 80. In the 2006-
07 admissions cycle, having an index score of 68 or higher almost guar-
anteed admission. The school had 129 white applicants with scores of 68
or higher, and it admitted nearly all (122) of them. For whites with scores
of 63 to 67, the odds of admission were still good-100 out of 143
whites in that range were admitted. For whites with index scores in the
58 to 62 range, the odds of admission were relatively low-50 out of 144
whites in that range were admitted. Whites had very low chances of ad-
mission if their index score was below 58-only 18 of 259 white appli-
cants in that range (about 7%) were admitted.64
If index score was the predominant determinant of admission for
whites, it carried even more weight in the school's consideration of
blacks. In this same admissions cycle, the school admitted all but one
black applicant who had an index score above 44, and rejected every
black applicant who had an index score below 44. This is a marked con-
trast to white admissions in two ways: blacks were virtually guaranteed
admission in a credential range where nearly all whites were rejected,
and the school had no "middle range" for blacks where index scores were
important but not completely determinative of admission.65
The two points are connected. Law schools are understandably con-
cerned about the academic effects of using large racial preferences. They
would like to minimize the credential distance between their black and
Hispanic students on the one hand and their white and Asian students on
the other.6 6 Given the goal of admitting a "representative" number of
minority students, they achieve the goal by focusing almost entirely on
the credentials of those students.
This, then, leads us to the answer of our earlier question about the
overlap of class and race. Law schools do not try to pick out and admit
the most "disadvantaged" black and Hispanic applicants, because they
see nearly all of these applicants as already handicapped by low creden-
tials. They therefore try to admit the very strongest blacks and Hispanics
in the pool, as measured by traditional criteria, and these strong appli-
cants come from predominantly advantaged backgrounds. This, in a nut-
64. Author's analysis of UMC Law School Data; original datafile is available from the author
and on file at the University of Denver Law Review.
65. Id.
66. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the Ass'n of American Law Schools in Support of Petitioner
at 24-26, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811), 1977 WL
187968.
67. This is my empirical inference from the data, not the stated policy of the schools.
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shell, is why upper-middle-class minorities capture most of the benefits
of law school preferences.
But what about "class" preferences? Surely, given the lip service
paid to socioeconomic factors in diversity talk, class must play an impor-
tant and independent role in admissions? There is very little evidence
that it does. To begin with, very few law schools collect systematic in-
formation on socioeconomic status. Without some objective measures of
SES, it would be hard to imagine a fair basis on which class preferences
could be given. Similarly, law schools almost never release data on the
SES composition of their students, though they always release data on
their students' racial composition.
More to the point, the available data on law students shows very lit-
tle evidence of "class" preferences, unless it is a preference for upper-
class students. In 1995, a couple of dozen schools participated in a na-
tional study of students in the first semester (the "National Study of Law
Student Performance" or "NSLSP"). 69 Nearly eighty percent of the stu-
dents at the participating schools completed surveys that included a few
demographic questions, and nineteen participating schools provided
background data on their students. 70 Although all data was anonymized,
the schools provided codes that allowed us to match student background
data with their survey responses. We can thus compare the average cre-
dentials of students whose parents have graduate degrees with the cre-
dentials of students whose parents did not finish high school. If schools
are giving significant class preferences, the result would be that students
with poorly-educated parents would have lower credentials than their
classmates.
68. Universities that receive federal aid are required to report to the federal government the
ethnic makeup of their student bodies. Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and Reporting
Racial and Ethnic Data to the U.S. Department of Education, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,266, 59,271 (Oct. 19,
2007).
69. The NSLSP database may be accessed at Databases, PROJECT SEAPHE,
http://www.seaphe.org/databases.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). For a description of the data, see
Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination
ofthe Third Year ofLaw School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 240-44 (2001).




Mean Standardized Index of NSLSP White Students, by Level of Parent's
Education
SAMPLE STANDARDIZED
PARENT'S MEAN EDUCATION SIZE INDEX
< 3.0 (less than 12 years) 79 - 0.09
3.0-4.0 (12-14 years) 567 0.05
4.5-5.0 (14-16 years) 469 0.05
5.5-6.0 (some graduate education) 490 0.00
> 6.0 (prof or doctoral degree) 368 - 0.11*
*Significantly different from mean at 6% level
Grouped into these five categories, the only group of students
whose credentials are significantly lower than those of the other students
are the ones in the most highly-educated category; that is, the most elite
students. A plausible reading of the data in this table is that a few stu-
dents who have overcome dramatic personal hardships receive a thumb
on the scale in admissions (accounting for the possibly lower credentials
of the small group with very low parental education), but that otherwise,
higher SES is, if anything, an advantage in law school admissions.71
Consider, now, similar numbers comparing the standardized index
of law students by race:
71. The reader should also bear in mind that Table 10 is, if anything, biased against a finding
that high-SES is an advantage in admissions. Since in the law student pool as a whole, low-SES law
students have lower academic credentials on average than high-SES students, we would expect that
any given school's students would show a modest credential gap between low- and high-SES stu-
dents. For example, among students with an academic index between 625 and 675, NSLSP
rcspnodents whose average parental education was less than a high school diploma had an average
index of 647.7, while respondents whose average parental education was a post-graduate degree had
an average index of 652.2. This suggests that, if law school admissions were completely unaffected
by student SES, the low-SES students ending up at particular schools would tend to have slightly
lower credentials than their high-SES peers. Since we observe just the opposite pattern, this
strengthens the inference that schools are favoring high-SES applicants.
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Table 11
Mean Standardized Index of NSLSP Students, by Race, Fall 199572
RACE SAMPLE SIZE STANDARDIZED INDEX
Blacks 11 schools - 2.45***
Hispanics 9 schools -1.85***
Asians 13 schools -0.83***
Whites (control group) 18 schools 0.00
*Significantly different from white mean at .01% level
The difference is startling. The mean index of enrolled blacks and
Hispanics at law schools are generally multiple standard deviations be-
low the white mean. The differences here are much more than an order of
magnitude different from the inter-class differences among whites. If we
looked at more recent data, I believe we would find slightly smaller pref-
erences for blacks and Hispanics and a virtual disappearance of prefer-
ences for Asians. But the basic point would be unchanged: racial prefer-
ences and credential disparities are massive, while those related to SES
are comparatively small, and (at least among whites) seem, if anything,
to favor the affluent.
I doubt that law school admissions officers systematically or con-
sciously favor high-SES students. Nonetheless, there are a several ways
in which seemingly neutral admissions policies would tend to have a
disparate negative impact on low-SES students.
First, law schools may use "legacy" preferences-that is, admis-
sions preferences for the children of alumni-to some degree. There is
growing evidence that legacy preferences are still widespread among
undergraduate colleges, and even public universities. 73 Legacies receiv-
ing a preference for admittance into law school will plausibly have much
higher-than-average SES levels because, by definition, at least one parent
has a professional degree. Indeed, legacy preferences might account for
the dip in credentials in the bottom row of Table 10, because they would
imply the admission of some students with lower-than-average creden-
tials, but with a highly educated parent. On the other hand, there is not
72. These statistics are calculated in much the same way as those in Table 10. Each student
has an academic index; for each school I calculated the mean and standard deviation of the academic
index for whites. Then, for each school I calculated the distance, in white standard deviations, be-
tween the mean for whites and the mean for each racial group. I only used schools where there were
at least five valid index observations ofthe racial group in question. This table then reports the mean
"gap" at all the included schools. The goal was to produce calculations that were comparable to
those in Table 10.
73. See generally Daniel Golden, An Analytic Survey of Legacy Preference, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION FOR THE RICH (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).
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much evidence that many law schools use legacy preferences at all, much
less on a wide enough scale to meaningfully affect the socioeconomic
composition of law students. My own law school, UCLA, certainly has
not preferred children of alumni; and yet, when I began studying the
composition of law students in the early 1990s, UCLA's students were as
privileged as those of other schools in its stratum.74 The use of legacy
preferences in law schools is a worthwhile subject to explore at a later
date, but I am not confident they play a major role.
A more likely instrument of bias is the failure of most law schools
to take into account grade inflation in undergraduate grades ("UGPA").
Many law schools appear to treat UGPA as a standardized measure, like
LSAT scores, without considering (if at all, certainly not in a systematic
way) the quality of a student's undergraduate institution, the student's
major, or the difficulty of a student's curriculum. 7 5 Even when admis-
sions officers do take some of these factors into account, they almost
never consider the degree of grade inflation at a college. Yet, as Stuart
Rojstaczer and Christopher Healy have recently shown, grade inflation is
not only pervasive in American colleges, it is also substantially more
severe in private colleges than public ones.76 The mean UGPA at good
private colleges is a full three tenths of a point higher than at good public
colleges. 7 7 Because low-SES students are more likely to attend public
universities rather than private colleges, they will be disproportionately
disadvantaged by law school policies that ignore grade inflation.78
A third systematic influence that may disadvantage lower-SES ap-
plicants is the subtle preference admissions offices give to people with
"interesting" records. I have no hard data on this point, but I have strong
impressions from talking with admissions officers and serving on law
school admissions committees. As we have seen, numerical credentials
dominate decisions, but when admissions officers and their faculty com-
74. See Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 11 at 488-89.
In 1991, several years before UCLA Law School instituted class-based preferences, I conducted a
survey of student SES among first-year students; since the survey was anonymous and there were no
admissions consequences (or other consequences) to providing complete information, the survey had
a high response rate and very little omitted information. Among the UCLA students, 50% had fa-
thers with a graduate degree (putting them in the top 8% of middle-aged men); 56% had mothers
with bachelor's degrees (putting them in the top 14% of middle-aged women); 43% had parental
incomes of $100,000 or more (putting the parents among the top 8% of American families). All
these indicia gave UCLA students SES measures comparable at the high end to students at other
I lh-to-20" ranked law schools in the AJD analysis reported earlier.
75. See Yakowitz & Sander, supra note 63, at 13-16.
76. See Stuart Rojstaczer & Christopher Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Universi-
ties, TCHRS. C. REC., Mar. 4, 2010, at 1-2.
77. Id. at 4.
78. See Marvin A. Titus, Understanding College Degree Completion of Students with Low
Socioeconomic Status: The Influence of the Institutional Financial Context, 47 RES. HIGHER EDUC.
371, 371 (2006). This point should not be overstated, however. According to NELS data, about a
quarter of students in the first and second quartile of SES attend private schools, compared to 43% of
top quartile students (and probably somewhat over half of top decile students). Thus, private/public
school attendance is correlated with SES, but there is no rigid demarcation.
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mittees exercise discretion at the margins, they often look for students
who have done unusual things that can make the entering class more
interesting. They look for the applicant who knows five languages, or
nearly qualified for the Olympic ski team, or interned on Capitol Hill, or
took a year off from college to volunteer as a carpenter for Habitat for
Humanity. These are indeed interesting backgrounds, but they are far
more likely to accrue to the resume of a child of privilege. Talented chil-
dren from lower-middle-class families usually have few opportunities to
live abroad. More typically, they will try to finish college as quickly as
possible and spend their summers living at home while working at the
local machine shop.
These are speculations, but what can be said with confidence is that
law school admissions attach little, if any, special consideration to socio-
economic diversity. Indeed, the evidence very much suggests that law
school policies have the effect of creating especially high barriers to ap-
plicants from low-to moderate-SES backgrounds.
VII. THE ATTAINABILITY OF "CLASS" DIVERSITY
How hard would it be for law schools to achieve significant socio-
economic diversity? This is a crucial question, and it is important to be
clear about the very different ways in which schools might attain this
goal.
As a threshold matter, a law school could simply seek to eliminate
or minimize the harmful effects of practices that favor high-SES appli-
cants-such as those described in Part VI-and make sure that outreach
efforts do not overlook parts of the pipeline that produce low-and-
moderate SES applicants. This is "affirmative action" as it was originally
conceived in the 1960s: not using preferences, but making sure that out-
reach and admissions procedures are fair and class-neutral.79 Reforms
along these lines would be a major step in the right direction, though one
cannot predict how large an effect they would have in fostering SES di-
versity.
Law schools could also institute significant financial aid policies
tied to student need. Table 12 provides estimates of the extent of need-
based scholarships offered by law schools, based on the AJD survey,
which asked lawyers retrospective information about their law school
experiences (respondents generally attended law school in the late
1990s). The data is sobering indeed. Among whites, SES is negatively
79. President William Jefferson Clinton, Address at the National Archives (July 19, 1995)
("[Affirmative action] began simply as a means to an end of enduring national purpose; equal oppor-
tunity for all Americans.").
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correlated with law school grants!80 High-SES blacks receive four times
as much grant assistance as low-SES whites. Those seeking quantitative
evidence that the typical law school is either indifferent or actively hos-
tile towards SES diversity need look no further.
Table 12
Law School Grants and Scholarships by SES and Race
Average proportion of law students' expenses covered
SES Quintile by law school grants and scholarships
Whites Blacks All
respondents
Lowest (n = 95) 5% 19% 10%
4th (n = 114) 7% 11% 8%
3rd (n = 367) 10% 29% 12%
2nd (n = 586) 10% 21% 11%
Highest (n= 1,532) 12% 20% 12%
Source: AJD tabulations by the author
The situation has probably worsened over the past decade, since tui-
tion levels have escalated sharply since the 1990s.8 It is possible that aid
policies have become more generous or at least better targeted, but I am
aware of no research that has shown this to be the case. It is more likely
that the dramatic increase in law school costs (after adjusting for infla-
tion) has further discouraged low-SES students from applying, adding
another push towards increased class stratification.
A third strategy for increasing SES diversity is the systematic use of
admissions preferences based on class. So far as I am aware, this has
only been attempted in states where universities have been barred from
directly taking race into account in admissions.82 In those states, class-
based preferences are widespread, though they take many different
forms. My own institution, UCLA School of Law, launched a full-scale
80. See infra Table 12. Under my analysis of AJD data, if we control for student credentials
among whites, the correlation is no longer statistically significant, but I still find it quite striking that
low-SES whites receive less grant and scholarship aid than high-SES whites.
81. The ABA website tracks average and median tuition trends over time and reports that,
from 1995 to 2008, average in-state tuition at public law schools increased from $5,530 to
$16,836-a 115% increase in real dollars. Out-of-state tuition at public law schools increased by a
larger absolute amount over the same period, but a smaller proportionate amount, since it began at a
higher base. Average private law school tuitions increased from $16,798 to $34,298 during the same
period-again, a smaller percentage increase (44% in real dollars) but a larger absolute increase. For
tuition levels, see Law School Tuition 1985-2008, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/
charts/stats%20-%205.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). For consumer price index levels, see U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at tbl.708 (2010).
82. Thorin Klosowski, Should Race Still be a Factor in College Admissions?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://money.howstuffworks.com/personal-finance/college-planning/admissions/
race-college-admissions.htm/printable (discussing how public universities and colleges in states such
as California and Michigan, which prohibit the consideration of race as a factor in the admissions
process, consider socioeconomic status instead) (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
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experiment in class-based preferences in 1997-the year Prop 209 went
into effect for University of California graduate schools. I have written
about this experiment in detail elsewhere, so here I will very briefly
summarize our method and my conclusions from the experiment.
The UCLA Law School added a series of optional questions to its
application, seeking information on the applicant's parents' income and
net worth, the father's education, mother's education, and the address he
or she lived at during high school. The address was used to assign the
applicant to the census tract (a small neighborhood measure used by the
U.S. census), which in turn was used to estimate three socioeconomic
characteristics of the applicant's high school neighborhood.84 For the two
"wealth" variables, two "education" variables, and three "neighborhood"
variables, applicants received points if they were in the least advantaged
sixth of all applicants on that measure-e.g., if their income fell in the
lowest sixth of all parental incomes reported by applicants, or if the pro-
portion of families on public assistance in their high school neighbor-
hood was among the highest sixth of all applicants. These points were
combined into an index, which was then added to the applicant's aca-
demic index. Race was not considered in applications. Financial aid for
low-and-moderate income admits was generous, based on an overhaul of
the school's aid system in 1994 that replaced largely need-blind assis-
tance with need-focused aid that could equal the full amount of tuition.
The results of the experiment were remarkable. In earlier years, the
Law School's SES makeup had been similar to the Tier 1 schools in Ta-
ble 1; that is, half the students came from the top tenth of the SES distri-
bution, and only one-tenth came from the bottom half. The 1997 matricu-
lants looked quite different; over one-third of the class came from the
bottom half of the SES distribution. The proportion of students with par-
ents earning over $150,000 (about $210,000 in today's dollars) fell from
27% to 8% of the class. Yet these changes were achieved with compara-
tively small preferences. The average preference granted was about 40
index points, which is about half of the preference previously given to
Latinos, and a quarter of the preference previously given to blacks. And
the resulting class was racially diverse; over a third of the class was
83. See generally Sander, supra note 11 (analyzing the UCLA study in detail). Prop 209,
adopted by California voters in 1996, made unconstitutional the use of race as a factor in awarding
various state benefits-including admission to state universities. Id. at 472 n.1L
84. Id. at 482. The three "neighborhood" measures were: the proportion of single-parent
families in the tract, the proportion of households on public assistance, and the high school dropout
rate among young adults. Id. at 483.
85. Id. at 483-85. UCLA Law School's academic index, like those used at other schools, is a
weighted combination of LSAT scores and undergraduate grades. Unlike other indices, however, the
UCLA index adjusts undergraduate grades to reflect both competitiveness of the college and the
degree of grade inflation at the college-thus avoiding some of the low-SES bias discussed in Part
VI. When the school adopted the new UGPA index in 1991, the proportion of matriculants from Cal
State colleges (a common destination for working-class youths in California) shot up.
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86
nonwhite, though a majority of the nonwhites were Asians. Perhaps
because the preferences were small, the 1997 matriculants went on, in
2000, to achieve the highest state bar passage rate in the school's history
before or since.
It is unlikely that the success of the UCLA Law School experiment
in SES diversity could be duplicated on a national scale. The school
benefited from its uniqueness; almost no other law school was giving
SES preferences, so the school faced little competition in recruiting low-
SES students and had a tremendous yield rate from them. On the other
hand, in the absence of a change in legal regime, it is unlikely that many
law schools will institute even modest class-based preferences in the near
future. The field is open for a few schools willing to show leadership in
fostering SES diversity.
Larger-scale experiments in SES preferences have been undertaken
by undergraduate institutions barred by law from taking explicit account
of race. Data from the University of California ("UC") shows that all
campuses began to give significantly greater weight to socioeconomic
factors after the passage of Prop 209 in 1996.8 Over time, most UC
campuses also began to operate large outreach programs to high schools
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and to give preference to
students who graduated from underachieving high schools. Even before
Prop 209, the UC system had far more generous financial aid provisions,
and targeted them with better focus on low-income students, than did
other elite public colleges in the United States. All these factors help
account for the extraordinarily high degree of economic diversity at all
the UC campuses.8 9 Moreover, the shift to class preferences has not
proved inconsistent with racial diversity. Black and Hispanic numbers
have fallen at the two most elite UC campuses (which used the most ag-
gressive racial preferences before Prop 209), but across the UC system,
86. Thirty-five percent of UCLA Law School's 1997 matriculants were nonwhite (possibly
more, since many students did not identify their race in the new regime). Thirteen percent were
underrepresented minorities. See Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra
note 11 at497.
87. The experiment was substantially modified in 1998, chiefly because of faculty disap-
pointment that only ten blacks enrolled under the new system (the law school had averaged 25-30
black matriculants before Prop 209). The school moved a more subjective approach to evaluating
"disadvantage", but this system generated even smaller black enrollments. In 2001, the faculty
adopted its present system of mixing "holistic" assessments of disadvantage and admission to special
programs, notably the Critical Race Studies program. Black enrollment averages at the law school,
however, have continued to be much lower than before Prop 209.
88. Author's analysis of UCOP data on University of California campuses.
89. As noted earlier, Berkeley and UCLA have around three times the proportion of Fell
Grant recipients among their students than other elite public schools, such as the University of Vir-
ginia and the University of Wisconsin. Economic Diversity: National Universities, supra note 28.
One factor unique to California, which also contributes somewhat to the UC's economic diversity, is
the substantial number of low-SES, high-achieving Asian students, many of them immigrants or the
children of immigrants. Min Zhou, Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent
Research on the New Second Generation, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 196, 205 (Charles Hirschman et al. eds., 1999).
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black enrollment has increased by 56% since Prop 209, and Hispanic
enrollment has more than doubled. Graduation rates for both racial
groups have jumped.
None of this is accidental. Institutions of higher education are under
substantial political and interest-group pressure to achieve racial diver-
sity. They are under no such pressure to achieve SES diversity. Thus, left
to their own devices, they tend to maximize racial diversity and neglect
SES diversity. When barred from using racial preferences outright, they
devise SES preferences that help substitute for racial diversity. In other
words, while racial affirmative action has not proven to be an effective
way of achieving SES diversity, class-based affirmative action is often
quite effective in achieving racial diversity. 90
VIII. COMPARING THE ADVANTAGES OF "CLASS" VERSUS "RACIAL"
PREFERENCES
As we have seen, law schools could do a great deal to foster more
SES diversity without using class-based preferences at all. But there is
much to commend going further, and using mild SES preferences as at
least a partial substitute for current racial preferences. Consider some of
the advantages.
SES preferences are based on individual circumstances, not group
membership. This is more appealing on grounds of fairness. It is hard to
justify giving large preferences to blacks and Hispanics from privileged
backgrounds while ignoring the needs of low-SES applicants of all
races.9 ' This simple intuition is probably a major reason why public
opinion polls show that substantial majorities of Americans support SES-
based preferences, but oppose race-based preferences.92
90. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 6, at 7 ("[T]he expansion of current affirmative action
programs to include low-income students . . . can add both economic and racial diversity."). Using
national data, Carnevale and Rose show that current racial preferences produce minimal SES diver-
sity. See id. at 6 ("[U]nder current affirmative action policies, racial minorities are underrepresented,
and . .. the underrepresentation of low-income students is even greater."). Their simulations of
alternative admissions policies suggest that "elite" colleges could, by replacing racial preferences
with SES preferences, quadruple the proportion of students from the bottom half of the SES distribu-
tion (from 10% to 38%) while reducing underrepresented minorities ("URM") representation by
only one-sixth (from 12% to 10%). See id at 55.
91. See Kevin Drum, Obama and Affirmative Action, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, (May 14,
2007, 7:04 PM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_05/011305.php
(including a transcript of the interview by George Stephanopoulos with Barack Obama); see also
Peter S. Canellos, On Affirmative Action, Obama Intriguing but Vague, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29,
2008, at A.2; Eugene Robinson, Op-Ed., A Question of Race vs. Class: Affirmative Action for the
Obama Girls?, WASH. POST, May 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/05/14/AR2007051401233.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Shades of Gray: Barack Obama Has
Gotten Past Affirmative Action. Have We?, SLATE MAG., (Mar. 31, 2008, 7:39 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2187718/.
92. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Conservative Victory in Grutter and Gratz, JURIST (Sept.
5, 2003), http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforum/symposium-aalkahlenberg.php. Three national polls con-
ducted by EPIC/MRA, the Los Angeles Times, and Newsweek early in 2003 found nearly identical
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A competent system of SES preferences-using multiple factors of
the type we used in the UCLA experiment, and considering both parental
SES and community SES-is much more accurately targeted on the in-
tended beneficiaries than race-based preferences. Lani Guinier has
shown that fewer than one-third of the black students who enroll at Har-
vard Law School have four African-American grandparents; the rest are
multiracial, foreign-born, or the children of immigrants. 3 The reason is
simple: foreign-born and multiracial blacks tend to have somewhat
higher test scores than do blacks who grow up in the U.S. with two black
parents.94 As suggested in Part VI, law schools generally pay little atten-
tion to the "diversity" contribution of individual blacks in their quest to
admit blacks with the highest possible credentials. While it may be true
that Caribbean-born blacks, or blacks with both black and white parents,
also contribute to the diversity of a law school class, it is hard to see why
they should be grouped, demographically, with blacks who are Ameri-
can-born and have predominantly black ancestry. The challenges in-
volved in defining who is a "real" Hispanic are even more formidable.95
And, as the United States continues to become more multiracial, and
intermarriage rates continue to increase, the "boundary" groups that only
slightly partake of a particular racial identity will grow as well.96 The
process of defining who shall receive racial benefits must necessarily
become increasingly arbitrary and, thus, unfair and offensive.
As we have seen, class-based preferences can be very effective in
generating diversity, even when they are quite small. Moreover, these
patterns: from 57% to 65% of respondents supported admissions preferences based on income; 26%
to 27% supported preferences based on race. Id.
93. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113, 155 n.166 (2003).
94. See Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An Intro-
duction, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 3 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998).
95. "Hispanics" can-and in many counts do-include fifth generation Americans of Mexi-
can ancestry, Guatemalan immigrants, Cuban-Americans, elite professionals from Argentina, and
natives of Spain. See Hispanic Population of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/hispdef.htmi (last visited Feb. 14, 2011)
(defining "Hispanic origin").
96. Since the census began giving Americans the option of checking a "multiracial" box, this
has become the fastest-growing racial group in the country. Multiracial Americans numbered 4.08
million in 2001, 5.17 million in 2008, and are projected to number 6.44 million by 2015. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 16 tbl.14 (2002); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at tbls.10 & 11 (2010).
This number does not include "partial" Hispanics, since Hispanics are considered an ethnic group,
rather than a race, by the Census. See Hispanic Population of the United States, supra note 94.
Further accelerating this growth is the dramatic increase in interracial marriages in the United States;
according to a recent Pew study, one-seventh of all new marriages in the United States cross racial or
Hispanic lines; 16% of blacks, 26% of Hispanics and 31% of Asians now marry outside their race or
ethnic group. JEFFREY PASSEL, WENDY WANG & PAUL TAYLOR, MARRYING OUT: ONE-IN-SEVEN
NEW U.S. MARRIAGES IS INTERRACIAL OR INTERETHNIC, at ii (2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/755-marrying-out.pdf. Interracial or cross-Hispanic mar-
riages have nearly tripled since 1980. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2010, at tbl.60 (2010).
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preferences are "invisible": once students have matriculated to a law
school, no one can readily tell which of the others have received a pref-
erence. Both the small size and the invisibility of these preferences are
advantages. Students receiving such preferences are much less likely to
be stigmatized and, indeed, may not even be aware that they have re-
ceived a preference. They are also likely to perform scholastically at lev-
els close to the middle of the class, a good thing both for them and for
the academic atmosphere of the school. There is much less likely to be
group self-segregation or the nourishment of group resentment, which
sometimes happens with strictly race-based preferences. 9 7
As I have argued elsewhere, a large preference extended to any stu-
dent can academically harm the student. By my estimates, the current
large preferences used by law schools nearly double the bar failure rate
98among African American law graduates. The most recent estimates
suggest that only one in three blacks who enter law school eventually
graduate and pass the bar on their first attempt. Although the "academic
mismatch" hypothesis is certainly controversial, the evidence supporting
it is steadily mounting.99 Yet despite some hand-wringing that accompa-
nied the publication of my initial mismatch research, the institutions of
legal academia, such as the Law School Admissions Council, the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools-
have officially ignored the issue, or have even taken steps to discourage
research on mismatch effects. It is irresponsible for these institutions to
continue to tacitly (or not so tacitly) support the aggressive use of large
racial preferences without undertaking efforts to measure their true ef-
fects. It is similarly irresponsible for law schools to continue using me-
chanical, large preferences without conducting internal research, and
sharing that research with students and faculty, to determine whether
their own students are harmed by current admissions practices. The issue
is relevant to this discussion in two ways. First, any schools giving more
emphasis to SES preferences, and less emphasis to racial preferences,
would likely reduce mismatch effects to the extent they exist. SES pref-
97. See ORLANDO PATrERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION 157 (1997) ("[N]o group of
people now seems more committed to segregation than Afro-American students and young profes-
sionals.").
98. See Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1964-65 (2005); see
also Sander, supra note 48, at 442-43.
99. See, e.g., Doug Williams, Assoc. Professor of Econ., Univ. of the S., Address at the
American Law and Economics Association: Does Affirmative Action Create Educational Mis-
matches in Law Schools? (May 7, 2010), available at http://econ.duke.edul-hfl4/ERID/
Williams.pdf. One of the leading critiques of the mismatch theory, published by Katherine Barnes in
the Northwestern Law Review, turned out to be filled with erroneous numbers. See generally E.
Douglass Williams, Richard Sander, Marc Luppino & Roger Bolus, Professor Barnes and Law
School Mismatch, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). When done correctly, her analysis is
entirely consistent with the mismatch hypothesis. See id. The other major critiques of the mismatch
effect all turn out to have methodological problems, which, when corrected, produce results showing
generally large mismatch effects. See generally Williams, supra. Williams's research also docu-
ments substantial mismatch effects among Hispanics receiving large admissions preferences. Id.
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erences would tend to be smaller, since they are less used and since the
credentials gap between low- and high-SES students is smaller than the
credentials gap between blacks, American Indians, and Hispanics on the
one hand, and whites on the other.'00 And lessening the intense competi-
tion for racial minority students would necessarily lessen the size of
preferences used to admit them. Second, serious consideration of SES
preferences by law schools should foster better data collection and re-
search on admissions practices and their effects. This could encourage
more candid and fact-based institutional reflection in an arena where,
currently, there is little or none.
Then there are the legal considerations. Differential treatment based
on race is generally unconstitutional-with good reason, of course.' 0'
Preferences for members of racial minorities were tolerated in some con-
texts in the 1970s and 1980s,102 but a series of Supreme Court decisions
so narrowed the permissible scope of race-conscious practices in the
1990s that many constitutional scholars predicted at the turn of the cen-
tury that affirmative action in universities was doomed. 0 3 The Supreme
Court's split decisions in Gratz v. Bollingerl04 and Grutter v. Bollinger'05
proved this prediction wrong, but they seemed to leave only the smallest
of windows through which universities could use racial preferences.106
The preferences needed to be based on an overall assessment of the indi-
vidual in which race was weighed against other diversity contributions,
not a mechanical process where race was often the determinative fac-
tor. 0 7 Preferences needed to be "narrowly tailored"-that is, used as a
last resort for producing a diverse class, not a first resort. 0 8 "Racial bal-
ancing" was prohibited, and institutions needed to have some plan for
phasing out the use of race over time.10 9
Observers will naturally disagree about the extent to which universi-
ties have complied with these standards, but the evidence is fairly over-
whelming that law schools do not. As the Missouri example illustrates,
law schools apply radically different academic standards to different
racial groups and race is often the predominant basis on which students
100. See Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Empirical Investigation ofLaw School Graduates Who
Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 24 (2010).
101. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
103. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39 (1995) (mandating
the application of strict scrutiny to racially-based affirmative action cases); Neal Devins, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action
Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 673, 677-78 (1996) (describing the doomsday-like reaction to
Adarand).
104. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
105. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
106. See id. at 334-35.
107. Id. at 334.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 323, 343.
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are admitted. SES factors play little or no role in admissions which is
particularly relevant in the light of the "narrow tailoring" requirement."10
The UCLA experiment demonstrates that law schools can achieve very
diverse educational environments without relying on race at all."' Law
schools do engage in racial balancing, in the sense that they use prefer-
ences to the extent they need to achieve consistent enrollment levels of
racial minorities from year to year (and tailor the size of the preference to
the race of the applicant based on these same enrollment goals). And I
am aware of no law school that has a meaningful plan to phase out the
use of race in admissions over the timetable suggested by Justice
O'Connor in her Grutter opinion.112
SES preferences do not suffer from any of these problems. They are
not constitutionally suspect. Administered reasonably, they should be
multi-dimensional; they should vary from individual to individual de-
pending on the degree of disadvantage. More generally, since the groups
they favor are diffuse and "invisible," the focus of spectators on whether
a school achieves particular numerical goals is likely to be less intense;
thus, the campus politics of SES preferences are less likely to lead to a
legally-suspect process.
So far as I am aware, there is no current challenge in the federal
courts to law school admissions practices, based on their inconsistency
with the Grutter guidelines. But such a challenge is surely just a matter
of time, and when it comes, the empirical evidence of problematic be-
havior by law schools-if nothing changes in the meantime-will be
overwhelming. From a purely practical point of view, it behooves law
schools to give SES-based alternatives to diversity goals some genuinely
serious consideration.
IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS
In the age of Obama, there is abundant evidence that upper-middle
class minorities have made dramatic gains over the past fifty years, and
experience genuine access to mainstream American institutions. There
are still significant problems for these groups-most of them related to
continuing high levels of racial housing segregation and the persistent
test-score gap-but in most ways the landscape has been transformed
since 1960. This is not so for low-SES households of all races. While
racial inequality has steadily diminished, economic inequality has stead-
ily increased. The United States in modem times has tended to be one of
the more economically divided countries in the developed world; but in
recent decades it has drifted towards levels of inequality rarely seen out-
110. See text accompanying note 65. If a school (1) relies heavily on its academic index in
admissions; and (2) admits all blacks and no whites in a particular index range, then logically race is
completely determinative of admissions decisions in that range.
111. See Sander, supra note 11, and text accompanying notes 82-86.
112. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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side the underdeveloped world. And this drift has occurred with a re-
markable sense of complacency and inevitability.
American legal education reflects this complacency. It congratulates
itself on its diversity achievements while creating incredibly un-diverse
student bodies. It fosters escalating tuition rates while providing little or
no need-based financial aid. It pursues admissions policies that reinforce,
rather than mitigate, the disturbing lack of access of low-SES Americans
to higher education.
I have tried to suggest some of the reasons why this is wrong, and
why the current legal academic systems are becoming more and more out
of touch with the realities of the American social and legal landscape.
The time is more than ripe for organized efforts to reflect on the diversity
programs of legal academia, to foster better data collection and dissemi-
nation, and to develop fresh perspectives and proposals that can make
diversity efforts maximize student opportunities and improve the health,
and the conscience, of law schools.
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APPENDIX I
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE SES METHODOLOGY USED
IN TABLES 1, 8 AND 9 AND THE INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY
USED IN TABLE 4
The purpose of this appendix is to provide some of the empirical de-
tail involved in creating the SES measures discussed in Part I of the main
article-enough detail so that experts can critique the method and com-
pare it with other approaches, and so that novices (by following an ex-
ample) can better understand how the numbers in the text are created.
After the JD ("AJD") surveyed a nationally representative sample of
lawyers in 2002-2003; most of those in the national sample passed the
bar exam in 2000, and generally the respondents completed law school in
1999 or 2000. The survey included an oversample of blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians. The result was a total sample of approximately 4,500 law-
yers; as we will see, 3,255 of these respondents provided enough infor-
mation to be included in the SES analyses in this paper.
There are four questions in the AJD that I used to determine the re-
spondent's SES: those which ask about the education and occupation of
the mother (or female guardian) and father (or male guardian). The "pa-
rental education" questions describe nine levels of education achieve-
ment; with a few simplifications, these can be mapped into the sixteen
levels of education coded in the decennial U.S. census. The "parental
occupation" questions were open-ended, but AJD staff then coded the
responses into occupational categories used by the decennial census. In
both cases, the challenge lies in turning these qualitative characteristics
(e.g., graduating from high school or working as a cook) into quantita-
tive, ranked values that can then be analyzed and compared in a system-
atic way. For all four variables, I sought to assign a percentile to each
observation that would represent where in the American educational or
occupational hierarchy the parent could be reasonably ranked. As the
reader will see, many small assumptions go into an exercise of this sort.
The key questions are whether the methods can be applied consistently,
and whether the basic results of the analysis are robust to reasonable
changes in the assumptions. I think the answer to both questions is "yes".
To see the basic method, consider the education of AJD mothers.
Since the typical AJD participant was in her mid-to-late 20s in 2000, it
seemed reasonable to assume that most AJD mothers would be between
45 and 64 years old in 2000. The women in this age range in the 2000
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census thus became the pool out of which I constructed an educational
hierarchy. The Bureau of the Census creates from each decennial count a
series of very large samples that can be used by anyone to create custom-
ized tabulations of particular characteristics. I used perhaps the best
known of these samples, the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (or 5%
PUMS 2000) to create a table of the distribution of educational achieve-
ment of American women aged 45 to 64, using weights in the sample to
approximate the national population of such women. This distribution is
seen in Column 2 of Table Al-1. Because we almost universally associ-
ate higher educational attainment with higher social status (and because
higher education strongly correlates with other accepted measures of
higher social status), we rank these education levels from lowest to high-
est, and show the cumulative percent of middle-aged women who have
achieved each level.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Table Al-1
Assigning SES Percentiles to Education Levels of AJD Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000 PUMS Cumulative % of AJD Response to: "High- Assigned
Education Level Women Aged 45-64 est level of education Education
reporting this as their completed by SES Percen-





Kindergarten 2.05% Grade School 4
1st -0 grade 3.55%
5th -8th grade 6.06%
9 grade 8.16%
10 grade 11.03%
11 h grade 13.73% Some high school 12
12t grade, no 17.0%
diploma
High school 48.76% High school diploma or 33
graduate or GED equivalent
Some college, 56.95%
no degree
Associate de- Trade or vocational
gree, occupa- 70.69% school; Associate degree 63
tional or some college
Associate de- 77.31%
gree, academic
Bachelor's de- 90.53% Bachelor's or four-year 84
gree degree
Master's degree 97.83% Some graduate or pro-
fessional school
Professional 99.23%
degree Graduate or professional 99
degree / Law degree
Doctorate degree 100%
Source: PUMS 2000 5% sample (author's calculations); AJD survey.
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The nine educational levels offered AJD respondents to describe
their parents' education do not line up perfectly with the census catego-
ries. Sometimes this is unproblematic. For example, AJD respondents
were given the categories "grade school" or "some high school" to de-
scribe parents with less than a high school diploma; it is reasonable to
map "grade school" onto the four census categories that go through 8k"
grade, and "high school" to the categories corresponding to 9 th through
12th grades. Other cases are more difficult; there is no category in the
census that corresponds to "trade or vocational" school, and the category
"associate degree or some college" lumps together two groups with dis-
tinct levels of educational achievement.
Table Al-I shows how I translated the AJD categories into corre-
sponding census categories. At each level, I calculated the median "per-
centile" of persons within a given category. Thus, middle-aged women
with a high school diploma occupied the 17th to the 4 9 th percentile of the
overall distribution; the midpoint of this range was the 33rd percentile, so
I assigned that percentile to all women high school graduates. The per-
centile assigned for each category is shown in column 4.
The steps for assigning percentiles to the educational level of each
respondent's father were very similar; the only difference was that I used
census data on men aged 45-64 to determine the appropriate percentile.
(The distribution of educational achievement is fairly similar for men and
women in this age cohort, but men populate the lower and, especially,
the upper end of the distribution more heavily than women.)
The analogous process I used for occupations was, in some senses,
much more precise. The AJD staff determined which of the five hundred
or so occupational categories each response fit into. Sociologists have
devoted significant effort to the creation of ranking schemes that deter-
mine the relative level of prestige associated with particular occupations,
and one widely used schema, the "CAMSIS" system, has been mapped
into the occupational categories of the 2000 census. I could thus assign a
precise numerical code to each cited occupation, in effect ordinally rank-
ing the occupations from more to less "elite". However, the CAMSIS
numbers are not percentiles in any sense; almost every occupation's code
is between 15 and 85. (For example, among women, physicians have a
CAMSIS code of 82.46; pharmacists are coded 72.15; registered nurses
are coded 59.11; home health aides are coded 29.92.) The challenge was
to put this on a scale so that occupational numbers could be compared
and combined with educational ones.
To do this, I took a random sample of one thousand households
headed by someone between the ages of 45 and 64 in the 2000 PUMS.
This sample included nearly eight hundred men and some six hundred
thirty women with an occupation. I gave each of these a CAMSIS code,
sorted the codes by gender, and assigned percentiles to each part of the
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distribution. (For example, a percentile of "99" described the occupations
in the top two percent of the distribution; "97" described those from the
9 6th to 98th percentile, etc.) I sought to group observations into two-
percentile ranges, but since some occupations are common (even in the
Census's very detailed classification) and since I assigned all persons
with the same occupation to the same percentile, some ranges were
broader, and some narrower, than the two-percentile ideal. (Interested
persons can request my coding sheet to see how my algorithm worked.)
Table Al-2 shows the percentiles I assigned for women's occupations.
Assigning percentiles separately by gender is particularly important
for occupations, because men's occupations (particularly in older age
cohorts like this one) tend to have higher status than women's. Thus, a
CAMSIS code that is at the 85th percentile for men is at the 9 3rd percen-
tile for women, and ten percent of women in this age range have
CAMSIS codes that are in the lowest one percent of status among men's
occupations.
Table A1-2
Percentile Assignments for CAMSIS Ranges in Occupational Data
FCAMSIS RANGE PERCENTILE ASSIGNMENT



















For the general purposes of my analysis, the occupation data is
more useful than the education data, because the classification system is
more precise-we can classify people within much narrower percentile
bands in the occupational coding than in the educational coding. Of
course, some of that precision is misleading, since the actual status of
any occupation is highly contextual and any coding scheme is somewhat
arbitrary. Any single measure of SES has quite a bit of imprecision; the
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combination of education and occupation measures for mothers and fa-
thers helps to reduce the error.
With percentiles assigned to each gender's educational and occupa-
tional distribution, I could now assign scores to the AJD respondents'
answers. To compute an overall SES measure for each household, we
need to combine the four SES measures into one unified measure. Aver-
aging the four values is a reasonable way to combine the information in
them. But averaging alone is not enough. Suppose that the percentile
values for someone's parents were 70, 80, 80, and 90. The average of
these is 80, but this respondent's actual SES (as measured by these indi-
cia) is higher than the 8 0 th percentile, because of the well-known phe-
nomenon of regression to the mean. Households with an especially high
or low value on one measure are likely to have more "average" values on
other measures, so the average of all four measures gravitates towards
the mean. Thus, in my random sample of 1,000 households, nearly 30%
of the "average" SES values were between 40 and 60; only 4% of the
household averages were below 10 and only 6% were above 90. I there-
fore used my PUMS sample to re-normalize these values, assigning a
"99" to those among the top 2% of the averaged values, a "97" to those
in the 96th to 98h percentile, and so on. In cases where an average value
overlapped more than one of my categories, I assigned that household to
the lower percentile category.
Assigning these values to the AJD participants was now straight-
forward. For each response to the education and occupation questions, I
assigned the appropriate percentile. For participants with at least two
responses (i.e., those who were not missing answers to three or all four of
the four questions), I averaged the percentiles and then assigned an over-
all percentile based on the re-normalization value determined from my
PUMS sample. The tables in my paper are based on these percentiles; for
example, a respondent with an overall SES value of 91, 93, 95, 97, or 99
is treated as having an SES background in the top ten percent of the gen-
eral population.
Just under three-quarters of those in the AJD sample answered at
least two of the four SES questions-hence my earlier observation that
there were 3,255 usable observations out of the roughly 4,500 respon-
dents. In Table 1, and when I make statements about the general popula-
tion of law students, I am using the "national" sample. In Table 1 and
other characterizations of the "national" sample, I use the AJD's national
sample, which had 2,944 usable responses out of a total sample of 3,905.
In Tables 5 and 6, which present data separately for the four major racial
groups, I included responses from the AJD's oversamples of blacks, His-
panics, and Asians, which yielded from 266 to 290 usable observations
from each of the minority groups.
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In Part III of the Article, I use the index of dissimilarity to compare
degrees of SES eliteness in the early 1960s and the late 1990s. Here I
provide an example of how the index is calculated.
Table Al-3 shows the distribution of educational credentials across
two groups: the general population of American men aged 45-64 in 2000
(column 2), and the fathers of AJD respondents (column 3)-who, for
reasons I discussed earlier, were probably generally in the 45-64 age
range in 2000. The index is calculated in three steps: (a) determine the
absolute difference between the percentages of the two comparison
populations at each point in the distribution (these differences are in col-
umn 4); (b) sum these differences (producing the sum, 113.8); and divide
the sum by two (56.9). The resulting number-56.9 in this case-tells us
what percentage of those in column (3) would have to change their level
of education to match the distribution in column (2). Here, for example,
the biggest disparity in the distribution is the much larger number of AJD
fathers with advanced degrees; if we "withdrew" 56.9 points from these
top three categories, and redistributed them across the bottom four cate-
gories, we could match the two distributions. A measure of 100 on the
index means there is no overlap between the two groups being compared;
a measure of 0 means there is no difference in the distributions. Gener-
ally, the use of relatively few categories, as here, understates the actual
level of dissimilarity. If we could classify the two groups by more de-
tailed information on the "grade" or "degree" achieved (as in the Cen-
sus's 16 categories) and by the "eliteness" of the schooling, the level of
dissimilarity would undoubtedly be much higher.
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Table A1-3
Calculation of Index of Educational Dissimilarity Between Tier I AJD Fa-
thers And Comparable Men in the General U.S. Population, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Educational level % Males % AJD Fathers, Absolute value of
45-65 Top 10 Law School the difference
Grade School or 7% 1% 6
Less
Some High School 11% 0.5% 10.5
High school grad 28% 4.2% 23.8
Some college or 27% 10.4% 16.6
vocational school
College Graduate 15% 17.2% 2.2
Some Graduate 7% 9.4% 2.4school
Professional or 5% 57.3% 52.3
doctoral degree I 52.
Total 100% 100% 113.8
Sources: PUMS 5% sample, weighted, and responses to "Father's Education" question on the
AJD survey instrument. "Top 10" Schools are those ranked 1-10 in the 1997 U.S. News ranking
of law schools.
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APPENDIX 11
METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE "RELATIVE
REPRESENTATION" TABLES (5, 6, AND 7)
The purpose of Tables 5 through 7 is to show the relative chances
that young people in various demographic groups have of ending up in
law school (or, in Table 7, an elite law school). The basic method for the
"race" representation rates can be most easily explained by reference to
Table A2-1, below. The table shows racial breakdowns for the various
populations we are comparing: the general population of 22-year-olds in
the United States in 2002; college graduates in 2002; students matriculat-
ing to accredited law schools in the fall of 2002; and 2002 matriculants at
elite law schools. These populations do not, of course, match up per-
fectly: people graduate and matriculate into law school at a variety of
ages, and some law school students come from abroad. But these figures
provide the most "comparable" populations I have been able to extract
from the available data sources.
Table A2-1
Racial Distribution of Persons in Key Population Groups, 2002
Population of College 1st-Year "-Year Enroll-
22-year-olds in Gradu- Law En- ment, "Top 10"
the United ates, 2002 rollment, Law Schools,
States, 2002 Fall 2002 Fall 2002
Asians 177,000 83,101 3,601 376
American 48,000 9,165 375 22
Indians I I
Blacks 606,000 116,624 3,491 242
Hispanics 734,000 82,969 2,764 211
Whites and 2,565,000 958,585 38,202 2,261
others
Total 4,130,000 1,250,444 48,433 3,112
Sources: Total population comes from Table 14, 2003 Statistical Abstract; College graduates
come from Table 283, 2004-05 Statistical Abstract (note that non-resident aliens are excluded);
l"-year enrollment comes from ABA's online tables; l"-year enrollment at Top-0 schools
comes from ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, 2004 edition.
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The tables show "relative representation" of the various racial
groups. Suppose we want to calculate how well-represented black col-
lege graduates are at law schools compared to white college graduates.
We determine the ratio of black 2002 law school matriculants to black
2002 college graduates (3,491/116,624, or 2.99%), compute the same
ratio for whites (3.99%), and then take the ratio of these rates (2.99/3.99,
or 75%). The other "race" numbers are calculated in the same manner.
The "class" representation numbers in Table 5 can be directly de-
rived from Table 1. For example, if 39% of law students nationally come
from the top ten percent of the SES distribution, then they are over-
represented by a factor of 3.9. If students in the bottom quartile of the
SES distribution make up only 5% of the law school population, then
they are under-represented by a factor of 0.2. The "relative representa-
tion" of bottom quartile students to "top tenth" students is the ratio of
these two factors, or (0.2/3.9 = .05, or 5%). The other "class" numbers in
Table 5 can be calculated in the same way.
In Tables 6 and 7, we are comparing the representation of law stu-
dents from the pool of college graduates. This is a little more compli-
cated, since we must first determine the class composition of college
graduates, and both government agencies and NGOs rarely collect sys-
tematic data by "class". To determine the SES distribution of college
graduates, I used National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS),
which is one of a series of large-scale tracking studies the Department of
Education has commissioned each decade since the 1970s. NELS identi-
fied a nationally-representative sample of 8th graders in 1988, and
tracked them for the next twelve years. Participants were assigned an
SES measure, based on questions about each person's household and
parents. This cohort is chronologically very close to the cohort of college
graduates who matriculated in law schools in 1996 and 1997, who went
on to be those from whom the After the JD sample was drawn (see Ap-
pendix I). We can use these estimates, along with our numbers from the
AJD, to generate estimates of the various populations we wish to com-
pare, as shown in Table A2-2, below.
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Table A2-2
Estimated Socioeconomic Counts of Persons in Key Population Groups, 1996
SES Group College Gradu- First-year First-year law stu-
ates, 1996 law students dents at "Top 10"
Law Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bottom quartile 88,497 2,132 23
2nd quartile 177,469 4,835 122
3rd quartile 319,112 7,359 400
75 -90 percen- 303,557 11,956 756
tile
90th_99 percen- 274,401 16,963 1,723
tile
Total 1,163,036 43,245 3,024
Note that only the "total" numbers reflect actual counts; the other figures are derived by ap-
plying sample percentages to the totals, and thus all have some range of estimation error.
Sources: The number of college graduates in 1996 comes from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1999, Table 334; the SES distribution of college graduates comes from my calcu-
lations with NELS data; the count of law students comes from ABA's website of legal education
statistics, and the count of law students at "Top 10" schools comes from the 1998 edition of ABA
Approved Law Schools; in both cases, I applied percentages from my Table I to these aggregates.
The SES representation ratios in Tables 6 and 7 can be directly cal-
culated from the numbers in Table A2-2. For example, in Table 6 1 com-
pare the representation of law students in the bottom quartile of SES with
students in the top tenth, including only college graduates in the com-
parison pool. The ratio of bottom quartile law students (column 3) to
bottom quartile college graduates is about 2.41%; the ratio for 9 0t to
99th-percentile law students to college graduates is about 6.18%. The
ratio of these two (2.41/6.18) is 39%, the number reported in Table 6.
Neither the SES nor the racial rates should be taken as exact; they
are rough estimates. Since some law students are teenagers, and others
are over forty, they obviously do not all come from the birth cohort tar-
geted here. Other students come from abroad, and are thus not part of
any American birth cohort. The data on socioeconomic class comes from
sample data on law graduates, so I am assuming that the SES distribution
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of starting law students is similar to that of law graduates."l3 For all of
these reasons, the percentages should be viewed only as approximations.
The value of this heuristic device lies in its ability to help us understand
patterns of minority and low-SES student representation in legal educa-
tion through a few distinct prisms. While there are different ways these
numbers could be calculated, I believe the conclusions that I draw from
the tables are quite robust to different methodologies and different
datasets.
One general caveat should be noted, however. The number of mi-
nority college graduates reported by the National Center for Education
Statistics has increased rapidly over the past two decades. This is partly
due to rising Asian and Hispanic immigration, but the rate of minority
college graduation has risen rapidly even after controlling for immigra-
tion. For example, the number of bachelor degrees earned in a given year
by blacks rose by 150% from 1990 to 2008, even though the number of
22-year-old blacks rose by only about 18% over the same period. Black
and Hispanic enrollment at law schools has continued to grow, but not at
a commensurate rate, largely because the number of blacks applying to
law school, or getting high scores on the LSAT, has not grown by any-
thing like a similar rate. There is a puzzle here, and this Appendix is not
the right venue to solve it; but these trends do mean that some of the ra-
cial representation numbers are changing over time. For example, the
75% representation rate for blacks in Table 6 (using 2002 numbers)
would be 105% if we used 1995 numbers. The 88% representation rate
for blacks in Table 7 would be 131% if we used 1995 numbers. This
means, on the one hand, that the race versus class representation dispari-
ties shown in these tables and discussed in the accompanying text would
be even larger if we used 1995-96 data for all groups. But it also means
that race representation numbers using college graduates as a base have
been declining over the past fifteen or twenty years; further research is
required to know whether a similar trend has affected low-SES students.
113. Other sources we have on the SES of law students, such as from the National Survey of
Law Student Performance and the Bar Passage Study, suggest this is a valid assumption.
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RICHARD LEMPERTt
INTRODUCTION
Professor Richard Sander's Class in American Legal Education' is
an almost unique effort to examine empirically the social class origins of
American law school students and to relate law student class origins to
law school stratification, the class structure of American society and the
potential law school applicant pool. His effort, and the special attention
he gives to the class composition of elite law schools comes perhaps at a
fortuitous time in the history of American legal education. The law de-
gree, like the medical degree, has long been a route for upward mobility
in American society. But the access of recent immigrants and others who
were poorly off to the medical degree was substantially limited almost a
century ago following the Flexner Report,2 which largely eliminated
those medical schools willing to admit almost anyone who could pay
tuition. Although elements of the bar and legal education pushed hard to
emulate the "success" of the medical profession by closing down pro-
prietary schools and other perceived weak sisters of professional educa-
* 3tion, their success was at best limited.
There is, however, some question about the continued viability of
this route to higher status for people born into lower social classes.
f Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology, Emeritus, University
of Michigan. Address correspondence to Rlempert@umich.edu or to Richard Lempert, 1510 N.
Colonial Terrace, Arlington, VA 22209. I thank Professor Deborah Malamud for reading and com-
menting on an earlier draft of this article and Professor Richard Sander for his prompt and helpful
replies to questions I asked about his data and methods.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 631 (2011).
2. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A
REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910).
3. The Carnegie Foundation supplied the law school world with its own version of the Flex-
ner Report, the Reed Report, but its impact was quite different from that of the Carnegie critique of
medical education, which in less than a decade resulted in more than half the nation's medical
schools closing, the consolidation of medical education within universities, and the disappearance of
proprietary medical education. This may have been because Reed, to the disappointment of the law's
professional establishment, saw law as two-tiered rather than unitary profession and supported rather
than called for the termination of part-time legal education. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED,
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 55-56 (1921). Moreover, the timing of Reed's report
undercut the more Flexner-like recommendations of an American Bar Association Committee
chaired by Elihu Root, a distinguished corporate lawyer, diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize Winner.
See ELIHU ROOT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATORS AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1921). Training for the bar through
apprenticeships did, however, almost entirely disappear during the 20 1h century.
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Although life at the bottom of the legal profession has never been easy,
and although forty and fifty years ago many people who sought law de-
grees as evening or part time students or at proprietary law schools
dropped out before graduating or graduated and either failed the bar or
soon gave up on legal careers, many others experienced at least a modi-
cum of success and enhanced social status, especially as compared to
their parents' generation. This was possible because legal education at
many institutions was low cost, and the world students graduated into
was one in which individual clients and local business owners sought out
individual or very small firm (often partnerships in name only) lawyers.
If not all night, part-time and proprietary law school graduates enjoyed
professional success and if even among those who succeeded success
was often precarious, nevertheless anyone who graduated law school and
passed a bar exam could hang a shingle out and make it or not on his5
ability, effort and initiative.
This world has changed dramatically over the last half century, and
the cost of a legal education at even the least prestigious law schools has
sky rocketed. At the same time opportunities for graduates of low pres-
tige law schools seem to have plummeted, at least in weak economic
times.6 Thus, there is reason to think that if law schools are to remain a
major conduit to middle class status for those of lower class origin, at-
tendance at higher tier law schools, including the most elite schools, will
only grow in importance.
Professor Sander's core finding will surprise no one: as compared to
the nation's population students from lower SES backgrounds are under-
represented in law school student bodies, and this underrepresentation is
greatest at the nation's most elite law schools. It could hardly be other-
wise given what we know about how educational opportunities at all
levels vary with socio-economic status and the barriers that costly educa-
tion imposes. Professor Sander has made an admirable, one might say
almost heroic, effort to go beyond these core propositions, or to at least
to put some accurate numbers on them, as he has searched broadly for
relevant research and data and tried to make creative adjustments in the
available data to allow informative analysis. He is also careful through-
4. See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OwN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN
URBAN SETTING 168 (1994).
5. These graduates were overwhelmingly male. See Judith S. Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping
the Third Branch, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 899 (2005) (noting that before and during the 1960s,
women's presence in law schools was miniscule).
6. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2011, at BUI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?src=me&ref-general. Those
who graduate near the bottom of higher prestige law schools are also reporting difficulties in finding
law jobs, though there have been reports that some law schools are serving as employers of last




out his article to acknowledge weaknesses in his data and the places
where assumptions must bridge empirical gaps.
Professor Sander's core findings are undoubtedly correct. That his
work does not succeed in advancing our knowledge greatly or in provid-
ing important new information to guide policy analysis, which is my
assessment of his effort, is hardly his fault. As Professor Sander recog-
nizes, the problem he is attacking is a difficult one, the data are unfortu-
nately both sparse and imperfect, and there are often no obviously or
indisputably correct ways to treat the data. With respect to the policy
implications of his findings, and in particular whether law schools should
engage in affirmative action for students from lower class backgrounds,
there are additional issues. I will address these issues, which for me are
the most interesting aspect of the project, after first discussing a number
of conceptual and methodological matters that make the task of shedding
empirical light on class in American legal education so difficult and limit
the confidence we can have in the specifics of Professor Sander's analy-
sis and thus limit what we can learn from it. By and large the problems I
shall illuminate do not result from errors by Professor Sander; they are
the nature of the beast. With currently available data any analysis would
be bedeviled by them.
I. CONCEPTS AND GOALS
The most fundamental questions raised by the task Professor Sander
has set himself are conceptual rather than statistical because conceptual
clarity is needed to determine what data and statistics relate to which
matters of concern. For me the starting point in thinking about the con-
cept class is to ask why we might want to make special efforts to in-
crease diversity within law schools by increasing enrollments of students
with underrepresented characteristics or backgrounds, including, in par-
ticular, class, ethnicity or race. I see two sets of reasons that speak to
different educationally-related and social values. One I would call the
"individually-oriented fairness set." Students from lower SES back-
grounds and minorities are more likely than advantaged whites to have
been handicapped in their pursuit of higher education. Often their K-12
educations have been inferior to those of better off whites, and the cost of
higher education is a greater barrier for them than for students whose
parents are better off. In addition, cultural disadvantages may have led to
lower grades or otherwise adversely affected the credentials lower class
whites and minorities can offer a law school admissions officer.7 If ap-
plicants disadvantaged by class or race seem to be not quite as attractive
as other applicants, the appearance may be misleading. Their "objec-
tively" measured accomplishments may reflect as much lawyerly poten-
7. See PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION: IN EDUCATION,
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 160, 209 (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
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tial or innate ability as that suggested by the more impressive dossiers of
advantaged white students as well as a history of harder work and greater
achievement. Also included in the fairness set is the historic role of legal
education as an enabler of social mobility. Applicants from lower class
backgrounds and from certain racial and ethnic groups have not been
dealt a fair hand in life when it comes to their ability to succeed in educa-
tional and material ways. Increasing class and race diversity within law
schools by targeted outreach and recruitment and by preferring appli-
cants from disadvantaged backgrounds to somewhat better credentialed
applicants from more advantaged backgrounds can mean evaluating
comparative credentials more fairly and compensating for the unfair dis-
tribution of initial advantage.
The other set of values that may lead us to desire broader inclusion I
see as "social" or "other-directed" in nature. Chief among these is the
idea that greater diversity among a school's matriculants increases the
richness of every student's education. This view holds that the more di-
verse a student body is, the more diverse the experience and points of
view exchanged in classroom discussion and informal conversation, and
the greater and more diverse the opportunities for law-related extracur-
ricular involvements. 9 Law school diversity is also thought to serve soci-
ety because it leads to a more diverse legal profession. Lawyers tend to
serve distinct groups, often in specialized ways, and lawyers can serve as
community leaders and role models even when they are not acting as
attorneys. Lawyers from underrepresented groups are likely to contribute
differently in these ways than lawyers from the white majority.10
Although these benefits of diversity reflect values that many people
share, they are not all equally legitimate as justifications for affirmative
action programs. Although there appears to be no legal impediment to a
school in good faith taking account of one applicant's educational disad-
vantages when comparing his or her credentials to those of another ap-
plicant with an eye to judging lawyerly potential, a willingness to work
8. In addition, a student's identity may affect how his or contribution to a discussion is
received. The same anti-war statement will be received differently if it comes from an Iraqi war
veteran rather than an anti-war activist, and the impact of a statement questioning or supporting race-
based affirmative action will similarly differ depending on whether the speaker is black or white.
9. These conclusions have not to my knowledge been the subject of rigorous empirical
examination, although anecdotal evidence, such as the plethora of journals reflecting gender or
ethnic themes and reports by professors of how their classrooms have been affected by diversity, can
be easily found.
10. A study of the University of Michigan Law School alumni found that lawyers tended
disproportionately to serve clients of their own ethnic group and that Michigan graduates did sub-
stantial pro bono work and often occupied leadership positions in communal or political settings,
with minority law school graduates being more involved in pro bono and leadership activities than
whites. Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan's Minority Gradu-




hard or a person's native ability, the Bakke case" suggests that for state
schools that did not in the recent past invidiously discriminate going be-
yond this and seeking to promote racial balance to correct past injustice
or to promote minority social mobility is unconstitutional.12 Bakke would
appear to similarly rule out justifications for affirmative action based on
such concerns as better serving members of minority communities, pro-
viding role models for minority youth, or filling leadership or other posi-
tions that would benefit from a minority occupant." What is currently
constitutional, and in this sense the favored justification for affirmative
action, are preferences based on the contributions a diverse student body
brings to every student's education.
These limitations apply to raced-based affirmative action. Social
class is not, however, a suspect classification, and there is no reason to
think that a class-based system of affirmative action, which gave prefer-
ences to applicants based on class-related disadvantages, would run afoul
of the Constitution. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to think, as some
do, that correcting for accidents of birth and providing socially disadvan-
taged groups with a head start to upward social mobility, is a morally
superior grounding for affirmative action than the justifications the Court
admits. Still it is important to bear in mind, and I shall come back to this
later, that the judicially favored justification for existing affirmative ac-
tion programs lies in the presumed educational value of racial and ethnic
diversity, with perhaps some recognition after Grutter, that the social
benefits of a more diverse legal profession are also in some measure con-
stitutionally cognizable.
II. OPERATIONALIZING SOCIAL CLASS: LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA
This digression into justifications for the law of affirmative action
relates to how Professor Sander has conceptualized social class, or been
forced to conceptualize it, given the data available to him. Thus to under-
stand what we can learn from his article, it is important to appreciate the
decisions he made regarding the measurement of social class and the
limitations of what he was able to do. To a large extent this simply in-
volves fleshing out the concerns that underlie the caveats Professor
11. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301-02 (1978) (stating that
preferential classifications have never been approved absent a determination of past discrimination).
12. Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue, it is likely that the Civil Rights
Act will be read to prevent private schools from engaging in affirmative action programs that would
be unconstitutional if done by state schools.
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in reaffirming Bakke, might be read as opening
the door to the last of these justifications since Justice O'Connor, who wrote the opinion, specifically
mentioned the special value that minority lawyers have for the military and business. However, as
Professor Sander notes, the continued constitutionality of educational affirmative action is itself
precarious. This is an issue on which the pre-existing views of the Justices seem more influential
than any legal or empirical arguments lawyers might bring to bear. Four of the current Justices
would most likely welcome the opportunity to ban affirmative action while a fifth, Justice Kennedy,
has a position whose nuances are hard to discern.
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Sander appropriately provides. The need for such exegesis does not mean
there is anything inherently right or wrong about how Professor Sander
chose to operationally measure social class. It is simply to recognize the
noisiness of the data, the way it fuzzes numerical relations and the need
for caution in drawing firm empirical or policy conclusions.
To begin with a conceptual matter, it is important to recognize that
Professor Sander's measure of social class, an index of the socio-
economic status (SES) of law school students relative to the general
population, relates directly to only the first, or individualistic, set ofjusti-
fications for affirmative action given above. Individuals who, by Profes-
sor Sander's SES measure, are in the lower social classes have roots that
are likely to have disadvantaged them relative to applicants of higher
social origins. They may also differ from their more advantaged coun-
terparts in that for them professional education is a way to achieve social
mobility, a goal that may not greatly concern those who have already
arrived.14 But, as I shall argue below, students who add diversity only
because of their low-SES backgrounds are not necessarily likely either to
enrich substantially the educational environment of the schools they at-
tend or, after law school, to serve as social and political leaders, role
models or exceptional givers back.
Turning to more technical issues, although Professor Sander's index
may be the best he can do given the available data, it not only has short-
comings as a measure of relevant social class characteristics but it would
also be less than ideal if its sole purpose were to measure socio-economic
status as the term is used in the social sciences. Social class, as Professor
Sander recognizes, is a complex concept not easily captured even when a
researcher has richer information than the AJD data set provides. In clas-
sical Marxism, it involves an individual's relationship to a society's
means of production, which is associated over the long run with a com-
mon set of interests and a common world-view. This is why occupation
figures prominently among the measures used to capture social class.
However, social class reaches beyond occupation to encompass other
matters that relate to social status, including, in particular, education,
income and wealth. More broadly conceived, and in common parlance,
social class is confounded with social status. Class membership, includ-
ing the assignment of people to classes, is associated with such variables
as family heritage, religion, power and influence, friendship circles, cog-
nitive style and a range of cultural preferences. Despite Marx's views
and research practice in defining SES, this last set of variables may relate
more closely to how people see their social class and the class placement
of others and to the attitudes they hold than occupation, income or educa-
14. Except for the bluest of bloods everyone may, of course, rise in social status, but for those
who come from well-educated, well-off families a professional education does not without much
more mean a rise in social status.
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tion. Although variables like religion, friendship circles and cultural
preferences are correlated with the variables used to measure SES, they
are likely to relate more closely to the attitudes and ambitions students
bring to law school and life than SES as Sanders measures it.
Thinking of class in the larger sense and, in particular, as an inher-
ited status which similarly affects attitudes from generation to genera-
tion, one problem with using parents' SES to measure student social
class is that the nation has experienced substantial recent immigration,
and those who came as young immigrants or as the children of immi-
grants are now applying to and graduating from law school. Even if lev-
els of SES, as commonly measured by occupational status, education and
income, are consistently associated with differences in aspirations, values
and attitudes among American families that go back at least two or three
generations as well as with different chances of social mobility, similar
relationships may not hold for recent immigrants and their children.' 5
Indeed, immigrants who had to flee their homelands because they were
on the wrong side of social conflicts may, even if they had less than high
school educations, have been part of local or national aristocracies in
their home countries. A school that sought to give a boost to the children
of lower class origins might find, as UCLA did in an effort Professor
Sander discusses, that they were largely advantaging immigrants' chil-
dren who differed substantially from white, black and Hispanic Ameri-
cans with respect to most class-linked variables even though they all
seemed of the same class when viewed through the lens of SES. Being
unable to account separately for the children of immigrants might lead to
inflated estimates of the proportion of law students of lower class back-
ground while underestimating the law school acceptance rates of lower
class applicants as a proportion of their presence in the applicant pool.'6
Putting aside the limitations of SES as a measure of class and ac-
cepting the convention which leads most demographers to treat SES as
our best indicator, it is still the case that data limitations mean that Pro-
fessor Sander's SES measure is a noisy one and less than ideal. To begin
with, it lacks data on income, one of the three measures integral to the
15. SES scores may also mislead when they place rural and urban families in the same social
class.
16. For example, assume a school had 200 applicants, 40 of whom came from families whose
SES scores placed them in the bottom quarter of all American families and that of these 40, ten came
from families that were intergenerationally lower class while 30 were immigrants' children whose
families, despite occupying low status and low paying jobs in the United States, had backgrounds of
privilege quite distinct from the backgrounds of families we think of as lower class. If the school
admitted 100 students, 10 of whom were immigrants children and 6 of whom were intergeneration-
ally lower class, it would appear from the SES measure that 16% of the entering class came from
lower class origins when, I would argue, only 6% did. At the same time, relative to their representa-
tion in the applicant pool, it would appear that only 37.5% of applicants with lower class origins
were admitted compared to 52.5% of students from more advantaged backgrounds. However, 60%
of the intergenerationally lower class gained acceptance under this hypothetical scenario. I am not
saying these kinds of effects will occur, but the data are such that we cannot exclude this possibility.
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conventional SES scale.17 Working with what he has, Professor Sander
uses four responses to operationalize SES: each respondent's report of
each parent's education and occupation. Information on all four measures
was, however, available for only about 28% of the AJD national sample
or about 38% of those for whom there was usable data. Professor
Sander thus felt compelled to calculate an SES measure so long as in-
formation on at least two of the four measures was available.' 8
The cases with absent information have various configurations of
useable data. In more than a third of them only occupation or only educa-
tion defines the SES index. Perhaps most striking is that there are only
nine instances, one involving a father and eight involving mothers, in
which all we know is one parent's occupation and education.19 This sug-
gests the possibility that missing data may create relevant sample biases
since if respondents were raised in single parent families, one might ex-
pect them to know that parent's education and occupation far more fre-
quently than they would know the absent parent's accomplishments, and
single parent families are known to be, on average, of lower SES than
families where both parents are present. It could be that my fear of re-
porting bias is groundless or that almost no one in the AJD sample was
raised in a single parent household, but it seems more likely that missing
information means Professor Sander's sample excludes a disproportion-
ate number of AJD respondents in the lowest SES brackets. Particularly
likely to fall in this category are the 143 respondents who reported only
their mother's occupation. Because an SES variable cannot be con-
structed for these cases, Professor Sander's analysis is likely to underes-
timate the proportion of law students in the lower reaches of the national
17. Also missing is information on family wealth, which is not included in most studies that
use SES as a variable not because it is conceptually unimportant but because reliable wealth data is
hard to come by. Indeed, conceptually wealth may be the most important indicator of a family's
social class. In its absence, occupation is generally taken to be the best single measure of social class
among the SES index variables because occupational prestige is thought to do most to locate a
person's position in the social hierarchy. I discuss why the absence of income and wealth data is
especially unfortunate given all that Professor Sander seeks to accomplish in the text of note 23
infra.
18. Professor Sander reports that about a quarter of his sample cases lacked information on
either three or all four of the indicators and so were excluded from his analysis. See Class, supra
note 1, at 634. Note also that the parental SES data are frozen at a point in time, but people's occupa-
tion and educational achievements change over time. To the extent these SES variables reflect class
differences by more than definition, a law student's class roots may be different than a current status
report may make them appear. A person working as a retail clerk may have been running a success-
ful business until an economic down turn when his child was a junior in college, or a mother who
worked as a teacher's aide most of her adult life may recently have completed a bachelor's degree
and been hired as a regular teacher.
19. Other categories that are almost empty in the usable sample of almost 3000 are cases
where we know both parents' occupations and one parent's education (8) and cases where we know
one parent's occupation and the other parent's education (5). Particularly puzzling is that although
there were 375 respondents who chose to report only their father's and mother's education or about
half the number who reported only their two parents' occupations, there was no respondent who
reported just one parent's education although there were 534 respondents who reported just one
parents' occupation. Something seems wrong here.
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SES distribution. Race-specific analyses will also be affected if poorly-
off single parent families are disproportionately members of minority
groups, as we have some reason to believe. 2 0
In addition to sample biases that may stem from the disproportion-
ate exclusion of respondents from single parent families and other biases
that may infect an index that is based on more information for some
cases than for others, there is the possibility of general non-response bias
since many in the study sample chose not to participate, and among par-
ticipants more than 900 did not provide sufficient information to con-
struct an SES index.21 It is easy to suppose that students whose parents
had low prestige occupations or were least accomplished educationally
were most reluctant to report, and this tendency could have been greatest
among those attending more elite law schools who may have measured
their parental heritage against the high status backgrounds of most of
their peers. If so the proportion of low SES law students in all law
schools and in elite law schools in particular will have been underesti-
mated in the data Professor Sander presents. I cannot evaluate this possi-
bility. Although I do not think it so serious as to undermine Professor
Sander's core results, I expect that sample biases introduce statistical
noise into an already conceptually noisy measure.22
It is unfortunate that Professor Sander was unable to include in his
SES index measures of family wealth and income.23 As he recognizes,
the exclusion of financial information poses particular problems for the
location of black respondents on the SES scale and hence for evaluating
their contribution to class diversity within American law schools.24 AJD
data indicate that with respect to wealth and/or income black law gradu-
ates are worse off than whites. Only 6% of black AJD respondents
graduated from law school with no educational debt. This compares to
20. I am grateful to Professor Sander for providing me with the detailed breakdowns regard-
ing variable availability that I report in this paragraph. I should add that he recognizes in his paper
the possible overstatement of black SES that could result from the absence of usable data from
students raised in single parent households. Class, supra note 1, at 652.
21. Responses were received from about 51% of those in the nationally representative sample
and from about 43% of those in the minority oversample, where one might expect lower SES attor-
neys to be disproportionately represented.
22. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text for further discussion of sample bias.
23. Professor Sander recognizes this and notes that in the Census PUMS data an index repro-
ducing his measure of SES correlates somewhere between .4 and .45 with household income. Class,
supra note 1, at 638 n.25. Although this correlation is, no doubt, highly significant in the statistical
sense, it does not denote a particularly close relationship or one which justifies dismissing concerns
regarding the implications of the absence of income information for the validity of operationalized
SES. A correlation between the study's SES index and household income of between .4 and .45
means that the SES index explains only sixteen to twenty percent of the variance in household in-
comes in Professor Sander's PUMS subsample. Moreover, this may be an overestimate of the corre-
lation in the AJD data because the PUMS on spousal occupation and education is likely to have been
more complete than it is in the AJD sample.
24. See Class, supra note 1, at 652.
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2519% of white graduates. Moreover, black respondents' families were,
on average, able to contribute only about 9% of the cost of their chil-
dren's legal education, compared to an average contribution of 19% by
26the families of white respondents. Hispanics were more like blacks on
these dimensions and Asians more like whites, with the most notable
statistic being that Asian families contributed, on average, 28% of the
cost of their children's legal educations.27 The data also indicate that
although law students may be relatively better off than Americans in
general, it is a mistake to think of law schools as domains of upper class
privilege. Eighty-four percent of all law students graduated with some
debt, and the median debt among those who owed money was about
$70,000.28
Professor Sander makes an extraordinary effort to map his two SES
indicators for law school graduates onto the SES distribution of the gen-
eral population, but error inescapably affects this effort as well. As
Sander notes, the AJD education data cannot be directly mapped onto the
Census data because the two efforts classify educational achievement in
different ways, and to map one onto the other he must rely on assump-
tions that, no matter how plausible, are necessarily imperfect. Moreover,
even if the Census and AJD coded educational achievement identically,
difficulties in accurately situating AJD respondents against all Americans
would still exist if education is of interest only as a presumed indicator of
social class. The problem is that similarly coded educational achieve-
ments may have wildly different class implications. From a social class
standpoint, there is most likely a wide gap between a person whose par-
ents have Harvard or Yale degrees and one whose parents are Liberty
University or Berea College graduates. Even high school degrees can
represent different achievements and career opportunities. One high
school graduate may have had a rigorous education that prepared her
well for the world of work, while another's degree may represent a series
of social promotions. Moreover GED certificates are counted as high
school diplomas. Imperfect measures are a fact of social science life. In
the context of Professor Sander's study, they are likely to fuzz distinc-
tions between his quartiles.
The mapping of AJD parent occupations onto census categories is
less problematic than the education mapping since Professor Sander re-
ports that the AJD occupational data were coded by census categories
allowing a direct comparison. Issues exist, however, not with respect to
the mapping but with their implications for social class. Professor Sander
25. GITA Z. WILDER, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: FINDINGS FROM THE
FIRST WAVE OF THE AFTER THE JD STUDY 58 tbl.36 (2008), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/raceand-ethnicitymonograph.pdf.
26. Id. at 59 tbl.37.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 58, 60 tbls.36 & 38.
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assigned scores intended as relative class rankings to occupation using
CAMSIS codes based on year 2000 U.S. Census data. This is not an un-
reasonable choice, but CAMSIS coding has its problems. 2 9 For example,
for both men and women farming, fishing and forestry occupations are
well within the bottom 10% of all occupations and below the status as-
cribed to counter attendants and cafeteria workers. Yet one might expect
that the world views of these groups would be quite different and that
within the group of farm, fishery and timber workers there would be con-
siderable differences depending on their relationship to the land and to
their employers (e.g. working on a family farm or as a migrant laborer).
Moreover, the code for farm, fishery and timber workers is more than
100 places below that for hunters and trappers whom we might expect to
be of lower class origin than some in the farm and fishing occupation
categories.
More than 150 occupations above farm workers, one finds the score
for farmers and ranchers and somewhat above them the score for male
but not for female ranch and farm managers. Totally apart from whether
these relative rakings make sense, the AJD questionnaire included only
tiny spaces in which respondents could write their parents' occupation.
Consider the challenge and room for error when a father's occupation is
reported as "farming." If coding is direct to CAMSIS codes, the father
could be placed in the bottom 10% of occupational SES or at about the
60 ' percentile depending on whether the coder assumed the father was a
farm worker or a farm manager. Coding first to census categories and
then to CAMSIS codes does not solve the problem because similar as-
sumptions must be made in deciding which census code best fits.
For men the top occupation on the 569 occupation list and the sec-
ond highest for women is psychologist, which outranks physicians and
surgeons and astronomers and physicists, and is nearly 100 positions
higher than financial managers. Economist and lawyer are both in the top
few percentiles, although the prestige of lawyers in different subspecial-
ties varies widely. 30 It may raise few eyebrows to find that economist
ranks higher than lawyer, but it is surprising to find both about seventy
places above mathematicians and statisticians. At the top end of the scale
as at the low end puzzling ambiguities and inconsistencies are also pre-
sent. Among men those best described as "miscellaneous social scien-
tists, including sociologists" are among the top ten in occupational status,
but if the code chosen is "sociologist" by itself the rank is 23 places
lower. Among women, however, "sociologist" is the more prestigious
category. It ranks 28 places higher than "miscellaneous social scientists
including sociologists."
29. See discussion infra note 31.
30. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (analyzing the social differentiation among different types of law-
yers).
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Further ambiguity and error is introduced when AJD occupational
codes are converted to population percentile rankings by reference to the
CAMSIS scores of a randomly selected subsample of the 5% PUMS
sample. Simply put the assumption that higher CAMSIS scores reflect
higher social status does not seem always to hold. For example, I find it
difficult to believe that female audiologists who would be in the 99th per-
centile after Sander's CAMSIS score conversion are of higher status than
female physicists (9 7 h percentile), nuclear engineers (9 5 h percentile),
CEOs (9 3 rd percentile), or aircraft pilots (8 3rd percentile).
I don't rehearse these difficulties to criticize Professor Sander for
using CAMSIS codes in his analysis, for any coding system has its
weaknesses, and CAMSIS codes were created to better capture class
distinctions.3 1 Rather I mention them because they add another dimen-
sion of uncertainty to the results Professor Sander provides.
An additional reason to be weary of the specifics of Professor
Sander's analysis is selection bias. The AJD sample is limited to those
who not only graduated from law school but also passed the bar exam.
This means that law school drop outs and those who graduate but do not
pass the bar exam are not included in the analysis although they figure in
31. There are other problematic aspects but a detailed discussion would take us far afield and
soon, I expect, pass the limits of my knowledge. Simply put CAMSIS coding is a novel way of
assigning status values to occupations based on interaction patterns of people who, more often than
not, have different occupations. Theoretically these patterns should be based on occupation pairs
involving friends, neighbors and relatives, but often data constraints mean that the only pairs that can
be created are those of husbands and wives. Code creation becomes problematic when data sources
include many couples where only one spouse is working or where there exist what are called
"pseudo diagonals" (strong but misleading husband-wife associations as when a husband may be
categorized as an agricultural proprietor and a wife as an agricultural laborer.) CAMSIS codes,
which were originally established for occupations in the U.K., can and have been established for
different countries as in the U.S. Census data based rankings that Professor Sander employs, but they
can also be created for particular data sets. Moreover, they are claimed by their creators to represent
occupational status directly and not be limited to specifying the relative status of different occupa-
tions. An additional complication exists in combining husband and wife occupations into a common
index, since they are not on the same scale. Thus those who adapted the scale to the 2000 census
data which Professor Sander uses caution:
[It is a little misleading, albeit a commonly made mistake, to analyse [sic] a mixed gen-
der population through CAMSIS scores which are the male scale scores for the men and
the female scale scores for the women. The occupational scale indexing used for men and
women is invariably the same, further giving the impression of equivalent meanings.
However the CAMSIS methodology assumes different systems of relative positions pre-
vail within the male and female occupational structures, and hence implicitly that equiva-
lent titles are not necessarily the same between genders.
Accessing and Using CAMSIS Scale Scores, CAMSIS: SOCIAL INTERACTION AND STRATIFICATION
SCALE, http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/useofscores.html (last visited May 6, 2011) (emphasis in red in
original). Professor Sander converted CAMSIS codes by gender to percentiles as normalized against
the 5% PUMS subsample, perhaps to deal with this issue, but using standard scores or the husband's
score is the recommended procedure. I am unclear how Professor Sander assigned his percentile
scores or what the implications of his assignment across genders are. He reports in a methodological
appendix that for women he assigned a 99"h percentile rankings to codes of 75 and above, yet in the
CAMIS ranking data he kindly provided me, a CMASIS score of 75 for women seems to be at the
941h percentile. For a useful summary of how CAMSIS scores are assigned and cautions in using
them, see id.
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the proportion of students from different social classes who are admitted
to law schools and affect a law school's class composition so long as
they remain law students. Drop outs and graduates who do not pass the
bar would cause no problems if they were distributed randomly with
respect to social class, but it seems likely, almost to the point of cer-
tainty, that students of lower SES are disproportionately represented in
these groups. Bar Passage Study data, which both Professor Sander and I
have used, indicates that financial considerations are an important reason
for law school dropout,32 and as Professor Sander's article indicates
lower status students disproportionately populate the nation's lower
status law schools, which are the schools that have the highest failure
rates on state bar exams. For these reasons alone, Professor Sander's
data are likely to underestimate the degree to which students from lower
status backgrounds are admitted to and attend law school. Underestima-
tion for this reason is, however, likely to be minimal in the data relating
to America's most elite schools. Regardless of background, almost all
students at these schools graduate, and pass the bar if they take it.3 4
A second sample-related problem stems from the two stage strati-
fied random sample that is the basis for the AJD survey. Although it does
a good job of replicating the nation's population of young attorneys
along such lines as gender, practice setting crudely determined, and ra-
cial composition,3 1 it may not do as good a job in replicating social class
32. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 436 (2004); see also David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C.
Kidder & Richard 0. Lempert, The Real Impact ofEliminating Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1855, 1886 n.l 11
(2005).
33. Sander, supra note 1, at 637-39 & tbl.1.
34. Not everyone who graduates law school takes the bar exam. Some move directly into
positions, like teaching or business management, where they can take advantage of their legal educa-
tion without having to qualify for legal practice. Yakowitz estimates that 150,000 people have taken
the bar and never passed, but her estimate is admittedly crude. Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Em-
pirical Investigation ofLaw School Graduates Who Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 15-17
(2010). She also drops a gratuitous footnote calling into question data that I and two coauthors
published, which indicated that 94% of University of Michigan Law School graduates (a claim based
on respondents to a survey we conducted which we believe with little loss of accuracy can be gener-
alized to the population of Michigan Law School graduates had passed at least one bar exam,), and
suggests the truer figure is closer to 85%. Id. at 5 n.14 (citing Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Cham-
bers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000)). I do not know how Yakowitz arrived at her number,
but it is wrong. Reports by state bars back to Michigan for the period 2006-2008 indicate that the
overall bar passage rates of Michigan students during these years was a bit more than 96%, and this
is an underestimate since some bar takers were on their second or third attempt. Moreover, bar
passage standards have tightened since the years when we conducted our study. I expect Yakowitz
may have been misled by Michigan's bar passage rates in California, reputedly the nation's most
difficult bar. These rates during the period for which I saw official data are closer to her estimate, but
only a small fraction of Michigan's graduates ever attempt the California Bar. I also know there
were some earlier years when Michigan's California bar passage rates were at or near the best of any
law school, no doubt a function of the students who took jobs in California.
35. RoNIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF
LEGAL CAREERS 90 (Janet E. Smith et al., eds., 2004). To get the most accurate estimations the
sample should be adjusted with weights the project provides. Professor Sander's data is unweighted,
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distributions. For example, no state from the Deep South is included in
the sample3 6 nor are smaller cities in states like New York, Illinois, and
California, which are represented by samples drawn from their major
legal centers.37 It is possible that unrepresented areas like these are places
where lawyers with lower class backgrounds are particularly likely to be
found and that the sampling units designed to capture some of this vari-
ance do not do adequately rectify the imbalance.
I do not want to make too much of this last point. Indeed, I do not
want to make too much of any of the above points, nor am I making them
to criticize Professor Sander's efforts. For the most part, these data short-
comings are hard to avoid and hard to control, and at numerous points in
his article Professor Sander cautions against putting too much stock in
the exact numbers he arrives at. I have tried to flesh out his cautions and
added a few of my own to emphasize that the imprecision Professor
Sander alerts us to may be considerable. For example, Professor Sander's
data suggest that only a minuscule proportion of students at the nation's
elite law schools come from lower SES backgrounds. Yet the University
of Michigan's Dean for Admissions reports that 30% of students entering
the school in the summer or fall of 2010 had one parent with no more
than a high school education and that 13% of the students had no parent
who had gone beyond high school. These numbers may have been
mentioned because they are atypical. Since this is the first time I recall
seeing such information I have no idea whether Michigan's 2010 enter-
ing class is atypical in this respect. Yet even if the data are atypical, the
message still stands. Professor Sander's work should be read more for
the forest than for its trees. The numbers he reports may be off by a little
or a lot.
III. THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE
A fundamental concern is how best to categorize students by class.
Professor Sander treats social class as a continuous variable that spans an
equally spaced 100 point range, which he divides into four quartiles and
sometimes further subdivides for in his analyses. Dividing a sample into
SES quartiles for purposes of analysis and treating SES as a continuum is
an approach sometimes found in efforts to associate SES with particular
beliefs and outcomes. Social scientists have, however, many competing
and while this might introduce a bit more noise, it appears that using unweighted data changes little.
GABRIELE PLICKERT & RONIT DINOVITZER, AFTER THE J.D: FIRST RESULTS REPORT, TECHNICAL
ADDENDUM 1 ( 2007), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/
weighted ajdreport 9.6.07.pdf.
36. See PLICKERT & DINOVITZER, supra note 34, at 4 (indicating that the border state of
Tennessee, Florida and the cities of Houston and Atlanta were chosen for inclusion).
37. Id. (indicating that New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco are areas
sampled).
38. Sarah Zearfoss, A Snapshot of the Entering Class: 5 Things About the New 1Ls, LAW
QUADRANGLE, Fall 2010, at 1.
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views about the American class structure, and they divide Americans
into different classes in different ways. Dennis Gilbert, for example rec-
ognizes six classes.3 9 He suggests that 12% of the American population
inhabit the underclass, 13% are working poor, 30% are working class,
30% are lower middle class, 14% are upper middle class and 1% belong
to the top tier capitalist class.40 William Thompson and Joseph Hickey
place about 20% of Americans in the lower class, 30% in the working
class, a similar proportion in the lower middle class, 15% in the upper
middle class and 2% in the upper class. 4 1 Leonard Beeghley's estimates
are poor 12%,42 working class 40-45%,43 middle class 46%,44 rich 5%
and superrich .9%.45 John Goldthorpe, who developed the CASMIN
classification scheme which is widely used in comparative class analysis,
identified seven major occupational class groupings, some of which he
broke down into subcategories.4 6 If this variation is not enough, when it
comes to class consciousness results are wildly different. According to a
National Opinion Research Center poll, when asked to self identify their
class status, only 5% of Americans responding said lower class, 45%
said working class, 46% said middle class and 4% said upper class. 4 7
These divisions have remained relatively stable in the years since 1972.48
If I were to continue searching for statistical portraits of class in the
United States, I would find additional definitions and further different
ways of measuring class and assigning people class status. Most, like
those mentioned above, would not divide Americans into four quartiles,
but would see the class structure as one in which there was a small por-
tion of Americans at either extreme and bulges in the intermediate class
or classes. 49 Although Professor Sander's classification scheme may,
39. Dennis Gilbert, The American Class Structure in an Age of Growing Inequality 13 (7th
ed. 2008).
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. William E. Thompson & Joseph V. Hickey, Society in Focus: An Introduction to Sociol-
ogy 216-17 (1994).
42. Leonard Beeghley, The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States 239 (4th ed.
2005).
43. Id. at 213.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 160.
46. GORDON MARSHALL, IN PRAISE OF SOCIOLOGY 16 (1990). These groupings are: I)
Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial establish-
ments; large proprietors; II) Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher-grade
technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees; I1a)
Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce). IlIb Routine non-
manual employees, lower grade (sales and services); IVa) Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with
employees; IVb) Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees; IVc) Farmers and smallhold-
ers; other self-employed workers in primary production; V) Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of
manual workers; VI) Skilled manual workers; VHa) Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not
in agriculture, etc.); and VIIb) Agricultural and other workers in primary production.
47. Jack Metzgar, Politics and the American Class Vernacular, WORKINGUSA, June 2003, at
73 tbl.4.
48. Id.
49. Most class researchers would, however, acknowledge that any categorical breakdown of
class is imperfect, and there can be considerable heterogeneity among those placed in the same
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albeit with some error, situate the year 2000 cohort of law school gradu-
ates vis-i-vis the American population in general along an SES contin-
uum, it may do a considerably poorer job in capturing the social class
characteristics of law school graduates as these relate to self-
identification and world views.
Suppose that Professor Sander had complete information not only
on the two items he includes in his SES index but also on the income and
wealth of his respondents' parents and that there was an incontrovertible
way to create from these variables a true SES score that could be used to
map applicants onto the SES distribution of the American population in
general. One would then be able to perfectly assess the degree to which
the SES of year 2000 law graduates matched that of the American popu-
lation in general as well as how the match varied depending on the status
of the law schools attended. Quartile breaks along the SES continuum
would be one convenient way of illustrating variance. But by many op-
erational as well as conceptual definitions of class, the resulting picture
would not present a true portrait of the prevalence of students with dif-
ferent class backgrounds in America's law schools. Too many students
would be in the top and bottom categories and there would be too few
students in the middle. Moreover, differences in class assignment have
analytic consequences, particularly when the effort is to understand why
the class origins of law school graduates, and in particular graduates of
the more elite law schools, differ so substantially from the overall distri-
bution of class in America.
Thus in seeking to explain why a disproportionately small propor-
tion of all law school graduates and a minuscule proportion of elite law
school graduates have backgrounds that place them in the bottom quartile
of the American class distribution, Professor Sander identifies the role of
potential feeder schools and the class origins of their enrollees as con-
tributing factors.so If, however, Professor Sander had constructed his
lowest class group using Beeghley's estimate of the percentage of
Americans who are poor or Gilbert's definition of the underclass, he
would have found an even smaller proportion of law students came from
the bottom of the class structure, but it is likely that he would have also
social class by whatever coding scheme is used. In Professor Sander's classification scheme, unlike
some other possible schemes, it is obvious that those who place near the bottom of his third quartile
are closer to those in the bottom quartile than they are to those at the top of their class quartile.
Although this information is lost when categorical classifications by quartile are used, it would not
be lost in other forms of quantitative analysis. In fact, there is no single best way to assign people to
positions in a class structure. The most appropriate assignment depends on the purpose behind the
assignment. If, for example, the classic Marxian view of class pertained, and class consciousness
was defined by relationship to means of production, then heterogeneity within a class on dimensions
like education and income would not matter if class consciousness was the key variable. Despite the
heterogeneity on other dimensions, people who stood in the same relationship to means of produc-
tion would share the same, common class consciousness. However, even for the classic Marxist
theorist the world is seldom so neatly organized.
50. Sander, supra note 1, at 648 tbl.6.
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found that a greater proportion of this shortfall was because students
from these backgrounds seldom made it to or through college. By the
same token, graduates whose SES credentials placed them in the range
where Professor Sander's lowest quartile and Gilbert's working poor
overlapped would not appear to be as underrepresented as one might
surmise from the quartile breakdown. Similarly Sander's second highest
quartile as well as part of his top tier would, using Gilbert's allocation of
people to class, be filled by students from lower middle class back-
grounds, the kind who seem to have suffered greatly from the post 2008
economic collapse and hardly an elite group in American society.
Thompson and Hickey would similarly see about 40% of Professor
Sander's top tier as inhabited by students from the lower middle class At
the extreme, if rather than use any sociologist's or economist's scheme,
we chose to locate a student's class roots by self-identification, then Pro-
fessor Sander's bottom two tiers would be filled almost entirely by stu-
dents from working class backgrounds and his top two tiers would be
bastions of middle class enrollment, assuming that self-identification
overlapped completely with Professor Sander's SES measure. But it
would not. Thus one would find students whose parents self-identified as
working class scattered throughout Professor Sander's top two tiers, and
some who self-identified as middle class would be in the lowest SES
class quartiles.
I am not advocating for Beeghley's, Gilbert's or any other class
classification scheme. I am not necessarily suggesting that these are bet-
ter schemes for class analysis than the SES quartile distributions Profes-
sor Sander uses. I am saying that the picture one gets of class of repre-
sentation in American law schools turns on the brush one paints with.
There are many different brushes out there, many if not most of which
are quite different from the brush Professor Sander employs. These
schemes differ not just in the proportion of people allocated to different
spheres, but also conceptually. Professor Sander treats class location as a
continuous variable on which Americans can be given percentile rank-
ings. Others would dispute this.
Perhaps the most important point is that however one subdivides an
SES continuum into class locations, there is a difference between SES as
an operational measure of class and class as a concept.5t Class typically
denotes commonalities of interests, viewpoints, cultural understandings
and practices that go beyond SES. SES is a measure of social-economic
status that is often used to assign people to classes for want of any better
measures, but it is not the same thing. Discrepancies between the opera-
tional and conceptual definitions can matter, as they might, for example,
51. Professor Sander is far from alone in eliding this difference. Researchers, including text
book writers and top scholars, often treat SES as if it exhausted the meaning of social class, perhaps
because SES more than class lends itself to continuous measurement and percentile distributions.
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if one seeks to increase the number of low SES students in American law
schools in order to increase the number of students whose views diverge
from most of their classmates. It may be that Professor Sander chose to
use CAMSIS coding to minimize the gap between operation and con-
cept. 52
IV. EXPLAINING LOWER CLASS UNDERREPRESENTATION
Before turning to what I regard as the most interesting and impor-
tant issue raised by Professor Sander's piece, namely, whether America's
law schools should strive for greater class diversity, there are several
other aspects of his piece that invite discussion. The first has to do with
explanations for the underrepresentation of lower SES students at Amer-
ica's law schools in general and at its most elite law schools in particular.
In this connection, Professor Sander identifies law school admissions
practices that in his view may not only fail to give lower SES applicants
a diversity boost but may in fact disadvantage them.53
Professor Sander's list includes legacy preferences, a failure to con-
sider differential grade inflation associated with an undergraduate
school's public-private status and perhaps its overall eliteness, and a sub-
tle preference for people with "interesting records," such as volunteer
services or travel abroad.54 I would add some additional considerations.
One is the sense of accomplishment that being able to attract students
from the most elite undergraduate schools may have for admissions offi-
cers, an advantage above and beyond any corrections for undergraduate
institution that a school may use to adjust an admissions index. If this
occurs, underrepresentation of lower SES students at the nation's most
elite colleges and universities will exacerbate their underrepresentation at
America's law schools. Students from low SES backgrounds and law
school applicants from non-elite colleges are likely to be further disad-
vantaged by the influence of letters of recommendation. They are less
likely than applicants from more advantaged backgrounds to be able to
secure letters from a law school alumni contributors, legislators, Con-
gressmen or other political figures, or professors whose distinction is
recognized by an admissions officer or who are well practiced in the art
52. The CAMSIS coding methodology was designed to tighten the link between occupational
position and social status by using associational information to create its operational prestige scores,
reflecting the notion that class identities are reflected by and rooted in relationships. As I described
above, there exist limitations to the CAMSIS codes, including limitations that emerge when the only
information on personal associations that is available is for husband-wife pairs, as well as the coun-
terintuitive nature of a scale in which the status of an occupation can vary substantially depending on
the gender of the holder. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. (This is not always problematic
since occupational status, however measured, may be differently sorted by gender, but the differen-
tial sorting is also likely to be more than occasionally in error.) Nevertheless, I regard Professor
Sander's use of CAMSIS codes as one of a number of ways in which he has attempted to make the
best of what, from a data quality/availability standpoint, is a bad situation.




of writing elite school recommendations. A last and more recently im-
portant factor is the increasing tendency of law schools to prefer some-
what older applicants and applicants with advanced degrees. People who
are reasonably well off may be able to afford several years out of the
labor market to pursue advanced degrees or may be able to leave a job
that is paying the bills to get a law degree, but those less well off are
more likely to graduate college in debt and to find that quitting a paying
job, even one with far more limited career prospects than the law, is a
financial impossibility.
My litany of further disadvantages which lower SES applicants may
suffer from in the law school admissions process bolsters Professor
Sander's suggestion that net of other factors admissions officers may
actually give a boost (affirmative action if you will) to students who have
overcome disadvantaged backgrounds, and the boost may be greater than
Professor Sander indicates." Indeed, given that, as Professor Sander
notes, most law schools collect little if any data reflecting class origin,
the boost may actually be substantial in the minority of cases where class
origin, perhaps revealed in a student essay, is known. Any boost, how-
ever, would not be "net of other factors," and it might simply offset sub-
tle biases that work against the lower class applicant.
Although Professor Sander presents data on the "SES Eliteness of
Undergraduate Students" 56 to suggest a baseline for his analysis of the
underrepresentation of low SES students in American law schools,57 he
lacks the data needed to illuminate what might major sources of this dis-
parity; namely, the rate at which college graduates from different socio-
economic strata apply to law school and the degree to which profes-
sions/occupations are hereditary. Thus one reason why students whose
parents have graduate/professional degrees are overrepresented in law
schools as compared to both the general population and those receiving
baccalaureate degrees may be because children of lawyers are strongly
overrepresented among law school applicants. The only data I have seen
that bear on this come from work by Seymour Warkov that Professor
Sander has cited to show the persistence of class effects. These data are
55. Sander, supra note 1, at 657 tbl.10. Only one of five differences tested by Professor
Sander would, by convention, be considered even marginally significant, but the finding of marginal
significance must be discounted when there have been five independent tests. Thus the best conclu-
sion to draw from Sander's data is that, in the sample he examined, there is no substantial evidence
of reliable differences in standardized index scores associated with parental background. If the slight
advantage suggested in the data for those whose parent possesses a professional or doctoral degree is
real, it may reflect the ability of a student with a lawyer parent to get letters of recommendation from
school alumni or other influentials, and what may be a greater likelihood among students from
families with doctoral degrees to themselves pursue advanced academic degrees before applying to
law school.
56. Id. at 661 tbl.2.
57. Id. at 648-49 tbls.6 & 7.
58. Id. at 642 tbl.3. Sander draws his data from the book Lawyers in the Making by Seymour
Warkov and Joseph Zelan published in 1965. I could not acquire a copy of this book but have drawn
on the data analysis that forms the basis for the book: SEYMOUR WARKOV, LAWYERS IN THE
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fifty years old, and the situation today may be vastly different. Hence I
do not claim current empirical support for the possibility that a signifi-
cant portion of the current underrepresentation of lower SES students
relative to their proportion of undergraduate degree holders is due to
their disinterest in applying to law school and their failure to follow up
on possible intentions to apply, but it was a significant factor half a cen-
tury ago, and the situation may be similar today.
Warkov found, for example, that 41% of those who began their col-
lege careers interested in going on to law school came from families with
professionally-headed households compared to 20% of those who began
college aspiring to other careers. 59 Thirty-five percent of these aspiring
lawyers came from families with earnings above $15,000 compared to
12% of those who began college with other future job preferences, 60 and
46% of the fathers of those who aspired to legal careers were college
graduates as opposed to 21% of those with different occupational inter-
ests. 6 1 Moreover, switching career aspirations during college and follow-
ing through on law school attendance exacerbated rather than amelio-
rated these differences, as did low LSAT scores and poor academic per-
formance, both of which were directly related to Warkov's SES meas-
ures. It is a shame that similar data are not available today, and I expect
that no one regrets this more than Professor Sander. But such data are not
available, so we have no good information about the degree to which the
underrepresentation of students from low SES backgrounds is, after con-
trolling for their underrepresentation among college graduates, attribut-
able to disinterest in legal careers among low SES college graduates
rather than other causes.
V. ALLEVIATING THE DISPARITY
Professor Sander offers three suggestions for enhancing the class
diversity of America's law schools and its elite law schools in particular.
The first is to minimize those aspects of the admissions process that dis-
advantage low SES applicants and to stimulate applications from stu-
dents with lower SES backgrounds. It is, however, not at all clear that a
law school interested not just in class diversity but in diversity of all sorts
would be well served by ignoring the kinds of information and consid-
erations that Professor Sander and I have listed as possible reasons why
lower SES students may present weaker profiles than higher status appli-
cants with similar GPAs and LSAT. Students with interesting experi-
ences, like working with an NGO in the Sudan, can add greatly to the
MAKING: THE 1961 ENTRANTS TO AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (1963), available at
http://www.norc.uchicago.edulNR/rdonlyres/7DODE824-FD6E-46CA-B72D-AEFFlDEBB6Fl/0/
NORCRpt 96.pdf. This analysis may contain more tables than what were published so I do not
know if the information that follows was available to Professor Sander.
59. Warkov, supra note 58, at 3-4 & tbl.1.2.
60. Id. at 3, 5 tbl.1.3.
61. Id. at 3, 5 tbl.1.4.
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diversity of perspectives and information in a law school class as can
older students and those with advanced degrees. Similarly, letters of rec-
ommendation can have important added value in distinguishing between
the similar "hard" credentials of two applicants. Although giving too
much credit to inflated grades has nothing to commend it, as Professor
Sander notes, it is easy to overstate these effectS6 2 and, I would add, to
understate the difficulty of correcting for differences.6 3
Professor Sander's second suggestion to increase the law school
representation of lower SES students is greater need-based financial aid.
This certainly will not hurt, and for other reasons as well moving toward
more need-based aid has much to commend it.64 However, I do not be-
lieve that within the realm of the possible increased financial aid can do
much to alleviate the situation. Black law students today, as Sander
notes, do better than students of other ethnic groups, when it comes to
receiving scholarship support in lieu of loans, but compared to students
of other ethnicities a higher proportion of black students graduate with
62. Sander, supra note 1, at 659.
63. Stuart Rojstaczer and Christopher Healy (whose article Professor Sander cites at his
footnote 75) find reliable distinctions between average grade inflation in schools of different types
(e.g. public-private), but the amount of inflation varies within school types, so that a satellite public
school may have grades that are more inflated than those at an elite private college or flagship public
university. See Stuart Rojstaczer & Christopher Healy, Grading in American Colleges and Universi-
ties, TcHRs. C. REc., Mar. 4, 2010, at 2-3. Additionally, grade inflation varies by fields within
universities and these differences will often be greater than grade inflation variation across college
and university types. Id. at 3. Moreover, if this is not complex enough, it could be that within fields
broadly defined grade inflation varies by major. For example, Rojstaczer and Healy's data indicate
that grade inflation is greatest in the humanities where after controlling for likely student ability
grades tend on average to be .4 higher than in the natural sciences and .2 higher than in the social
sciences. Id. A Classics major in a particular school may, however, have grades that are less inflated
than the grades of most other humanities majors and of some or all natural science majors depending
on the school and its professors. Admissions officers whom I have known have had a sense of the
degree of grade inflation by school and by major, or at least of the law school relevant abilities that
grades reflect. Indeed, where admissions officers have dealt with numerous students from a handful
of feeder schools over a sufficiently long period of time, some have developed a sense of grade
inflation not just by school and by major but sometimes also by professor, along with a professor-
specific sense of"letter of recommendation inflation," or, on occasion, deflation.
64. My recollection is that when I first started teaching, most law school financial aid, to the
extent it existed at all, was need-based and the expectation of repayment was presented as a moral
rather than a legal obligation. Later competition for the most able minority students resulted in
financial aid packages for the apparently most able that had a significant non-need component. Still
later, competition for students with the kinds of credentials that boosted U.S. News rankings led to a
broadening of non-need-based awards to all students. These shifts were also supported and perhaps
fostered by the increasing availability of student loans, which meant that students willing to take on
debt could attend law school even without scholarship aid. At some elite schools, like my home
school the University of Michigan, recognition that whether or not a loan was easily met depended
on the career path a law student chose or was forced into, meant that some of what might have been
scholarship aid was channeled to loan forgiveness programs that evaluated need for assistance as it
in fact existed after graduation. Originally, this was done to enable law school graduates to take
relatively low paying public interest jobs. However, since the need for loan repayment assistance
depends on income level and not employment type and from a reluctance to evaluate different ca-
reers by reference to their social value post law school, earned income became the key to post-
graduation financial assistance. I believe much the same trajectory characterizes the history of finan-
cial support at many of the nation's wealthiest and most selective law schools.
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debt, and the amount they owe is on average greater.6 5 Unless substantial
new need-based support were available to law schools, including those
below the most elite levels, I expect the situation would be the same for
66
those from lower SES backgrounds as it is for today's black students.
This leaves admission preferences, or affirmative action, as the most
promising means for increasing the proportion of students from low SES
backgrounds in America's law schools, especially the more selec-
tive/elite institutions. To show what can be accomplished, Professor
Sander offers evidence from an experiment with class-based affirmative
action that he was instrumental in developing for UCLA Law School
after the passage of California's proposition 209 threatened to decimate
UCLA's minority law student population. He characterizes the experi-
ment's results as a "success" and as "remarkable." 6 7 I cannot adjudicate
the truth of his characterization, but I can report that I was part of a group
that was given a briefing about the results of this experiment, and the
briefer regarded the experiment as anything but a success. To begin with,
the UCLA admissions office apparently did not adequately account for
the increased yield that would result from extending offers to the af-
firmative action beneficiaries and so enrolled, if I recall correctly, almost
100 students more than they would ordinarily admit. Moreover, the
students admitted through this program were overwhelmingly Asian,
who benefited from the fact that their parents who were often immigrants
raised in other cultures, who had limited formal education and resided in
relatively impoverished if culturally rich immigrant communities.
Although the potential loss of most of its black student population was
the prime motivator of the plan for many faculty, including (I have been
told) Professor Sander, only five black students enrolled for the follow-
ing fall term,69 and Hispanic enrollment was also way down. Because of
these outcomes the faculty decided to discontinue the experiment.
VI. THE QUESTIONABLE VALUE OF CLASS DIVERSITY
This brings me to what I regard as the most interesting issue raised
by Professor Sander's article: whether law schools have good reason, and
in particular good diversity reasons, to increase the proportion of their
entering students who come from lower SES backgrounds. I am dubi-
65. WILDER, supra note 25, at 58 tbl.36.
66. There is also the question of whether we would be doing lower SES students any favors
by encouraging more to attend law school. See Segal, supra note 6 (noting the financial difficulties
faced by law students graduating with high debt and low job prospects).
67. Sander, supra note 1, at 662-63.
68. Part of the excess was due to the fact that the school was still enrolling better off white
students through the summer to keep its U.S. News rankings up.
69. The five black students were originally spread across UCLA's four first year sections. The
students, I have been told, came to the dean the day before classes began and asked to be placed in
the same section since they felt that the pressures of being the only black in a sea of White and Asian
faces would put too much pressure on them. Their request was granted, meaning that one first year
section had meaningful black representation and the other three sections had none.
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tante. Moreover, regardless of the case that can be made for social class
diversity, I believe that it pales next to the case that can be made for so-
cial and ethnic diversity. 70 In addressing the unconditional and compara-
tive cases that can be made for social class diversity, I shall concern my-
self only with the situation of the nation's most selective law schools
(Professor Sander's top two tiers). Even if those from lower class back-
grounds are underrepresented in less selective law schools, they are still
present in numbers sufficient to provide substantial class background
diversity.7 1 I shall also ignore actions other than affirmative action to
72increase class diversity, some of which I would be happy to see.
Earlier I suggested three kinds of reasons that might be offered in
defense of affirmative action. The first are fairness reasons. Background
70. I agree with several of the points that Professor Sander makes in comparing class-based
and race-based affirmative action. I regard as most likely true his suggestions that to attain similar
"minority" representation, when the minority is those of low SES, preferences would not need to be
as steep as they are when the preferred group is a racial or ethnic minority. (I use the hedging words
most likely only because I am unsure of the implications of class-based differences in law school
attendance and because much depends on how one defines class. I don't think I would as readily
assign a place in the lower class to the children of immigrants from many Asian and some other
countries even if by the SES measures Professor Sander uses they are in the lower ranks. If instead
of this measure we were considering students from families with deeply sunk lower SES or class
roots, like Appalachian whites or urban unskilled laborers, I am not at all certain that the preferences
needed to admit a representative proportion to law schools of varying strata would be any less than
they are for other minorities, and I would not be surprised if they were in fact greater.) I also agree
that in the current political climate class-based preferences would be better received by the public
than race or ethnicity-based preferences and that since class is not a suspect classification, class-
based affirmative action would, at least given the current Supreme Court, rest on firmer constitu-
tional grounds. I also agree that in today's increasingly multi-racial nation there are challenges in
identifying who is Hispanic, Native American or black, for purposes of affirmative action, but I
believe that class too has its ambiguities and problems of definition and that we are fooling ourselves
if we think that crude SES measures define America's lower classes. Where I completely part com-
pany from Professor Sander is on his claims of black disadvantage resulting from affirmative action
by the nation's more elite law schools and in his suggestion that mismatch is at the core of the prob-
lem. Professor Sander and I (and coauthors) along with others who have looked at a range of data
have gone back and forth for some years now on these issues. I remain convinced that Professor
Sander's mismatch thesis is largely if not entirely unsupported and is, if anything, least applicable to
the nation's most elite law schools. I have no desire to rehearse this particular dispute here, but refer
the reader to our mutual contributions to the debate and to works cited therein. See generally Sander,
supra note 32; Chambers, Clydesdale, Kidder & Lempert, supra note 32; Richard H. Sander, A
Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2005); Richard Lempert, William Kidder, Timothy T.
Clydesdale & David L. Chambers, Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: A Critical Re-
sponse to Richard Sander's - A Reply to Critics (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 06-001, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=886382##.
71. Black and Hispanic law students are similarly underrepresented relative to their popula-
tion proportions in almost all the nation's law schools, but a "critical mass" for diversity purposes
has never been defined as a proportional presence equal to the group's population proportion.
72. There are actions schools could take which would have as an expected outcome an in-
crease in lower SES representation, but they do not involve preferences, in the sense of admitting a
student of lower SES ahead of a higher SES student with a higher LSAT/GPA index score. Professor
Sander has identified some of them. One example is eliminating legacy advantages. A second, which
would require funding at a level that I think no law school can afford but which a few wealthy un-
dergraduate colleges manage: it is to run a needs blind admissions system and guarantee students
that if admitted their needs will be met mainly with scholarship aid. A third is to broaden recruitment
to include active outreach not just to a group of select feeder schools but to undergraduate schools
which those from lower SES backgrounds are disproportionately likely to attend. I think each of
these approaches has much to commend it, but each has financial costs that must be recognized.
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factors may mean that some people have a harder time than others in
getting to the point where they could contemplate a career in the law and
become eligible for admission to law school. Moreover, a disadvantaged
background may have created obstacles to achievement such that a per-
son's efforts and intelligence do not yield credentials that are as impres-
sive as those that a similarly skilled more advantaged person can present.
For example, a student who has had to work almost full time while in
school to pay her college tuition may have grades below those of fellow
students whose parents paid their way even though she is smarter and
worked harder than others throughout her college career. Or one stu-
dent's LSAT score may be below another's because her parents could
not afford an LSAT prep course, or because among her friends and ac-
quaintances there was no one to tell her that taking a course prep might
better her chances of being admitted to a top tier law school.
Second are educational enrichment reasons. A student body contain-
ing people from diverse backgrounds, with diverse interests and views, is
likely to provide everyone with a richer education than they would get at
a more homogeneous institution. More points of view will be expressed
in the classroom, more students will have specialized knowledge that
illuminates legal problems, the richness and diversity of extracurricular
educational opportunities will be greater and students will gain a broader
view of the world from meeting and befriending people who are unlike
them.
Finally, diversity among law school graduates, and among the
graduates of the more selective law schools in particular, may have im-
portant social benefits. Segments of society may have greater access to
lawyers and access to better trained lawyers than they would have if law
school populations were less diverse, with people like them more seri-
ously underrepresented. More pro bono work may be done. The views
and interests of disadvantaged social groups may be more adequately
represented at the highest levels of business, government, the military
and in society in general. Role models may lead young people observing
law graduates like them to aspire higher, and they may open doors that
might previously have been closed to them.
Of these reasons, only the first seems likely to be enhanced greatly
by affirmative action programs that give preferences to applicants from
lower SES backgrounds. Even here, however, matters are not simple. To
begin with we should recognize that to some extent preferences for ap-
plicants in this first category should not be considered affirmative action.
For example, as an aid to judging a person's capacity for success in law
school and beyond, a formula which increased an applicant's GPA by a
tenth of a point for every ten hours they worked each week as under-
graduates or which increased LSAT scores by a quarter of a standard
deviation for those who did not take a prep course might do a better job
of predicting than a formula that ignored these factors. Similarly, the
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initiative and strength of character demonstrated by a student who had
numerous financial and cultural obstacles to overcome to even attend
college, much less law school, might indicate someone who will contrib-
ute more to her fellow students and to the legal profession than a student
whose superior GPA and LSAT scores correctly predict to a better law
school GPA.
Admissions officers and admissions committee members recognize
these and similar considerations; indeed it is not much of a stretch to say
they live for them. It is the ability to evaluate the "whole student" that
makes their life interesting and means the task of deciding whom to ad-
mit cannot be delegated to a computer. When personal history leads to
the belief that a student has academic capabilities not captured by her
GPA or LSAT score, or when an applicant stands out for special accom-
plishments, 73 admissions officers and committees have no compunctions
about preferring such applicants to those with somewhat better "num-
bers." Hence to the extent that students from lower SES backgrounds are
admitted because hurdles they have overcome suggest that other aspects
of the credentials they present do adequately capture their capabilities,
affirmative action is not playing a part in the decision.
Affirmative action, or admitting someone who would not be admit-
ted but for her status along a certain dimension, 7 4 occurs when one pre-
sumes disadvantage because an applicant has a certain class background
or believes that even if an applicant's LSAT/academic index accurately
portrays the student's academic ability relative to competing applicants
the student deserves a thumb on the scales because her background
handicapped her in her efforts to become as strong academically as com-
peting applicants. Thus a person whose local schools provided an inferior
K-12 education is likely to be less well educated than someone who be-
73. At Michigan, for example, the list of such students could go on and on. It would include
an Olympic gold medalist, a physician in his 50s who was a leader of the AMA, a concert pianist, a
top chess player, and the like.
74. By this definition beneficiaries of affirmative action include in many schools people of a
certain race or ethnic background, most commonly blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans, some
legacy admits and in the case of public colleges and universities some in-state residents. It would
also not surprise me, although I have no data, if some religiously supported institutions give prefer-
ences to applicant's who share the institution's religious views. The possibility of religiously based
affirmative action has not been examined because the schools that may practice this are private, and
data relating to their applicant and admissions pool is not available for study, and we don't speak of
affirmative action in the case of legacy admits or in-state residents because the preferential admis-
sion of students in these categories has long been regarded as non-problematic. (This view is being
challenged with respect to legacy admits.) Also it is generally believed that preferences accorded
legacies and in-state applicants are not as great as those enjoyed by the beneficiaries of race or
ethnicity-based affirmative action. This is, I am sure, true on the average, but there are cases where
some legacies, or in-state students with powerful governmental backers, have enjoyed preferences as
large as those enjoyed by most minority students. Moreover, at Michigan which is the school I know
best, the distance between the index credentials of the average in-state admit and those of the bottom
10tb percentile non-resident admits has often, and perhaps over the past two decades always, been
greater than the distance between the bottom 10 h' percentile resident admit and the average minority
admit.
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fore college attended high performing public or elite private schools, and
a person whose grades suffered because she had to work full time in col-
lege may in fact have learned less, be less able to adroitly apply her na-
tive intelligence and be less ready for law school than someone who,
because her parents paid her way, had more time for learning. Fairness
considerations might still lead to a preference for the applicant from the
poorer background because she achieved more and has more promise,
not absolutely but relative to the hand life dealt her.
Some might argue that although it is appropriate to consider
whether a person's background indicates that she will perform at a higher
level than her admissions index might predict, it is not the business of
law schools to compensate an applicant, in even a small way, for the fact
that because of class-based or other inherited disadvantage she is, insofar
as we can tell, less educationally and intellectually accomplished than a
competing applicant. I am not in this group and am not troubled by deci-
sions to offset to some degree the effects of structurally rooted educa-
tional disadvantage for reasons of fairness and equality promotion.75
Problems arise, however, because applicants identified as low SES
by available measures may not be those whom the fairness/equality case
for affirmative action justifies admitting, nor may they be people who
because of their cultural or educational disadvantage are better prospects
for legal education than their admissions index scores indicate.76 For
75. The open question is what does "to some degree" mean. I can't state this more precisely
but I can say that I don't find the fact that the UCLA experiment which Professor Sander describes
advantaged those defined as low SES applicants by the equivalent of about 40 LSAT index points
troublesome.
76. This is particularly likely if the SES index, like the one Professor Sander uses in his study,
omits information on family wealth and parental income. The problem of overinclusiveness is com-
mon to all sorts of affirmative action but can only be determined with reference to specific justifica-
tions. To take an innocuous example, affirmative action at state schools for state residents can be
justified on the ground that the parents of such applicants have been paying state taxes in support of
their colleges and universities for years in order to be able to better educate their children. But an in
state preference will be granted to a person who moved to the state eighteen months before applying
to law school and who has paid little if any state taxes. Alternatively the justification could be that
the state needs a highly educated work force to prosper and state residents educated in state are more
likely to remain residents after graduation than those who move to the state solely to get an educa-
tion. If only tax equity justified residency preferences including the recent mover in the applicant
pool benefiting from residence-related affirmative action would be an example of overinclusion. If
the sole justification were the "stay and work" justification and if recent movers are as likely to
remain residents after graduation as those raised in state, then including the recent mover in the
group eligible for residency-based affirmative action would be consistent with the affirmative action
justification. Professor Sander at several points in is article suggests that race and ethnicity-based
affirmative action programs suffer from serious problems of overinclusion. He points out, for exam-
ple, that minority admits at elite law schools have SES credential distributions that are relatively
close to those of the average white, Sander, supra note 1, at 651 tbl.8, and are overwhelmingly intra-
racially elite, Id. at 21 tbl.9. He also faults programs at schools like Harvard for treating as black for
affirmative action purposes applicants from the West Indies or of West Indian parentage and stu-
dents who may call themselves black but have one or more white grandparents. See id. at 665 &
n.92. With respect to the latter groups, I would argue that so long as society characterizes such
students as black regardless of their personal histories or how they racially self- identify, the equity
justification for affirmative action cannot be totally rejected, and the two other affirmative action
justifications I discuss below remain.
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example Professor Sander reports that his attempt to give an affirmative
action boost to low SES applicants helped mainly applicants of Asian
descent. Most of them I expect were children of immigrants who came to
America in search of better lives for themselves and their families. Like
the children of Jewish immigrants of who came to this country between
the late 1880s and the 1920s, their parents were by occupational, in-
come/wealth and parental education measures at the bottom of America's
class structure. But their families had not been nested there for genera-
tions, and their attitudes and opportunities are unlikely to have been the
same as those of families whose heritage is working the unskilled trades
and always being near the bottom of the social ladder. Indeed, for some
Asian and other immigrant families the implications of the SES variables
used as indicators of social class may have been the opposite of what
they were taken to imply. In the United States, for example, achieving
only a high school education characterizes people found in the nation's
two lowest SES quartiles. In some countries completing high school may
mean that the person is just a notch below the countries' educationally
most elite. Similarly a family that is impoverished upon immigrating
here may have been wealthy in their homeland, and their attitudes may
have been and remained those of upper class individuals.
Asian (and other) immigrant families, like Jewish immigrant fami-
lies before them, are likely to have seen education, and especially profes-
sional education, as a route that would lift their children, and through
their children themselves, out of poverty. Moreover, like the generation
of Yiddish speaking Jews, their isolation as a community through lan-
guage and culture may have offered them access to informal sources of
credit and entrepreneurial opportunities that other low SES Americans
lack.77 In addition, immigrant families often have relatives who preceded
them here and have achieved some measure of financial success and
intergenerational mobility. These relatives may serve both as role models
and as sources of financial support for nieces, nephews and cousins who
might be seen, if SES is the measure, as coming from families near the
bottom of America's class structure.
Professor Sander questions the appropriateness of including Carib-
bean-born and multi-racial blacks in black-oriented affirmative action
programs. He writes that although it may be true "that Caribbean-born
blacks, or blacks with both white and black parents . . . contribute to the
diversity of a law school class, it is hard to see why they should be
grouped, demographically, with blacks who are American-born and have
predominantly black ancestry."7 The same can be said of many of those
who would qualify as lower class by measured SES, including not just
77. The AJD data indicate that Asian students received 28% of their support while attending
law school from their families. Whites on average received only 19% of their support while in law
school from their families and blacks only 9%. WILDER, supra note 25, at 59 tbl.37.
78. Sander, supra note 1, at 665.
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Asians and other immigrants, but some native-born whites as well. 79
Why should they be grouped demographically with children from fami-
lies that have a history of poverty?
Professor Sander explains the disproportionate presence among
Harvard's black enrollees of students who are foreign born, multiracial
or the children of immigrants by the fact that blacks with these character-
istics have higher test scores than blacks who grow up in this country. An
analogous outcome is for the same reason likely to be true of the benefi-
ciaries of low SES affirmative action if SES is conventionally meas-
ured." Thus class-based affirmative action programs might most help
those students who are least disadvantaged by their class origins. A pro-
gram that more closely targeted students with backgrounds that suggest
an enmeshed lower class heritage would, however, have a smaller pool
of potential admittees and would most likely have to provide relatively
large preferences to substantially boost target representation.
The kinds of equity considerations I mention above are, despite the
difficulties that exist, not only the ones that most easily justify class-
based affirmative action, but also ones best suited to the use of parental
SES as an indicator of student social class. When it comes to contribut-
ing to diversity within law schools and to social contributions beyond
law school, class-based affirmative action may add little of value and far
less than affirmative action for members of historically disadvantaged
minority racial or ethnic groups. One reason for this lies in the gap be-
tween SES as a measure of social class and social class as a concept re-
82 ~ otnbflecting distinct perspectives and experiences. As will often be true of
immigrant's children, SES may only imperfectly reflect the attitudes and
79. In making this point, I have focused on students of Asian heritage since they were the
group predominantly benefited by the short-lived UCLA experiment, but not all whites who are in
the country's lower SES ranks at the time they apply to law school come from families that have
occupied these ranks all their lives. For example, while a student is in college one parent may have
become unemployed and the other may have been laid off from a well-paying highly skilled position
and been only able to find work as a low paid unskilled clerk.
80. Professor Sander's indicators, with income and perhaps family wealth added, might be the
only reliable indicators of social class that a law school could acquire. Professor Sander also used
census tract data in his UCLA experiment, but low average income census tracts may have pockets
of better off residents.
81. One can still cite equity considerations to argue that students disadvantaged by their
family's low SES status deserve a social mobility boost even if their parent's low SES does not
closely relate to what one might regard as class-linked perspectives and experiences. But refusing to
entertain affirmative action as a mobility booster does not necessarily thwart social mobility; it
simply extends and delays it. Thus many Jews of my parents' generation went to law school, often at
night, and became the lawyers who populated the lower ranks of the bar. Despite their professional
degrees many fared poorly in economic and other ways. But their children were often able to attend
better law schools or follow other entrepreneurial and professional paths that enabled them to move
into careers that placed them well within the ranks of America's upper middle class. To look at the
first generation only, upward mobility attributable to professional training was for many, except to
the extent mobility was defined by professional degrees, not much greater than that enjoyed by the
children of push cart fathers who opened their own shops. Over two generations, however, mobility
was substantial and lower SES origins were left far behind.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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experiences that make for distinct class-based experiences and perspec-
tives. Thus an elite law school that wished to maximize the diversity of
attitudes, values and experiences within its student body might find that
gains from class-based affirmative action would not be great.
Indeed I think "not be great" overstates likely gains in viewpoint di-
versity. Students choose to go to college; they choose within limits set by
financial and other constraints which college to attend, and they choose
to apply to law school. Even putting aside the questionable assignment to
the lower class of immigrants' children and the children of parents who
have moved from higher SES families of origin to the lower regions of
the SES scale, students from lower class backgrounds who apply to the
more elite law schools may have attitudes and perspectives that are quite
different from the perspectives of those with apparently similar class
roots who did not attend college or, if they did go to college, did not ap-
ply to law school.84 Indeed, students from lower class backgrounds who
apply to and attend elite law schools may by the time they reach law
school have largely shed their lower class identities. Elite law schools,
for example, draw a disproportionate number of their enrollees from elite
undergraduate colleges, and, in particular from Ivy League or similarly
prestigious institutions. A student of lower class origins who enters Yale
or Princeton necessarily differs in class-relevant ways from age mates of
similar SES and may by the time he graduates have attitudes, aspirations,
speech habits and mannerisms more like his Eli or Tiger classmates than
like those of the people he grew up with. Recruiting from Ivy League and
equally elite undergraduate institutions may, from a diversity perspective
yield meager returns no matter what a student's class origins or the cur-
rent SES of a student's parents. Lower class graduates of elite schools
will not stand out in the law school crowd and may not only have already
have shifted their attitudes to be more like those of their more privileged
peers but will also have shared with them many of their most important
recent life experiences.
83. I do not think there is one set of experience or viewpoints that characterizes all or even
most members of a particular social class or of a racial or ethnic group for that matter. Nor do people
who fall into the same social class as defined by SES necessarily have the same interests much less
political, religious or other preferences. It is possible, however, to link statistically attitudes and
experiences with class location and to find systematic differences between classes in how these are
distributed.
84. I know of no good current data that would shed reliable empirical light on this matter. The
Warkov data discussed at note 58 supra suggests this supposition is reasonable.
85. I do not mean to suggest that all differences between lower class and more privileged law
students will be wiped out by a shared elite education. Commenting on an earlier version of this
piece, Deborah Malamud pointed out that the family situation of the low-SES law student will not
rapidly change and that a student's continued involvement with family may shape her attitudes and
behavior. I am sure she is right and that this example is not unique. Moreover, people differ. I have
no doubt that some students from lower class backgrounds with elite undergraduate educations make
distinct contributions to a law school's education environment which students from more advantaged
backgrounds could not or would not make. Similarly, to qualify an argument below, there are no
doubt students from low SES backgrounds who go on to high paying, high status careers but who
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The situation is not the same for most beneficiaries of race and eth-
nicity-based affirmative action. A black student may wish his blackness
were invisible in a law school crowd, but it cannot be, and this is true
even for students of mixed race raised mainly by a white parent." What-
ever one's interior racial or ethnic identity, others will assign a racial and
sometimes an ethnic identity regardless. Black students whose views and
identities are like those of most of their white counterparts still contribute
uniquely to a school's diversity because their views are likely to be inter-
preted in the context of their race, often adding to a discussion in ways
that differ from what would have been added had white students said the
same things.
Moreover, whatever a black student's self-identity or however much
his opinions are like those of white law students, he will have experi-
ences as a student that he would not have had if he were white. Lower
SES students will, by contrast, blend into the student body, and in most
settings students find themselves in they will be responded to according
to race, gender and/or age rather than according to class status. Take dat-
ing as an example. The sight of a black law student dating a white law
student may trigger involuntary staring or even intentionally insulting
behavior. This will occur regardless of how similar the daters' class
backgrounds. But, except perhaps in family contexts, no heads will turn
if an upper class white student is out with a student from the bottom of
the SES pecking order. Casual observers will simply not know. If this
example seems trivial, consider that no one has ever posited a crime of
"driving while lower class," but blacks regardless of social status have
testified to the "crime" of "driving while black." The relevance of the
latter experience to discussions of criminal procedure is obvious.
A good test of the contribution that different bases for affirmative
action make to educational diversity is to note the various extracurricular
learning opportunities that exist in law schools. Numbers of the more
specialized journals that exist at Michigan and other law schools have
because of their own backgrounds not only remain concerned with the situations of low SES indi-
viduals but also work to better their conditions. Nevertheless, I still maintain that with respect to
diversity standpoint an elite law school is likely to get fewer benefits from admitting more lower
SES students than one might expect and fewer benefits than those gained by ensuring the presence of
a critical mass of minority law students. I believe the same will be true of post-graduation societal
benefits. Moreover, I would not be surprised if a large proportion of low SES students bring noth-
ing in the way of an educational or societal diversity payoff. I recognize, however, that these are
empirical claims, and we lack empirical evidence.
86. Barack Obama's, Dreams from My Father, which chronicles his development of a black
identity provides as good an example of the push toward blackness as 1 can think of. Recently,
however, there has been some pushback, as more young people of mixed heritage are asserting a
multiracial identity. Susan Saulny, Black? White? Asian? More Young Americans Choose All of the
Above, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2011, at Al.
87. For example the views of a black student who thinks affirmative action for blacks is
unconstitutional will contribute uniquely to a discussion because unlike the same views expressed by




racial or ethnic themes or are devoted to issues, like immigration, that are
a special concern of a particular racial or ethnic group. Courses have
been created with a similar impetus, and student groups organized along
racial or ethnic lines bring in speakers to talk about issues that specially
concern them. But participation in such activities and events is not lim-
ited in either theory or practice to students from the racial or ethnic group
that was an activity's primary driver. Thus at Michigan and other law
schools, organized groups of black, Hispanic and Native American stu-
dents have added to every student's educational opportunities.
I do not know how many students from the lower quartile of the
SES distribution have attended Michigan in a typical year, but I am con-
fident there have been more low SES students than students of Native
American heritage, and given Michigan's in-state preferences and blue
collar and rural populations along with a substantial Muslim immigrant
population I expect that in most years there have been at least as many
low SES students as there have been black or Hispanic students." Yet
the school has never started a low SES law journal, nor have there been
groups organized along SES lines to invite speakers to the law school or
to ask for the creation of new courses. I also do not recall ever hearing a
non-minority student explicitly reference a personal experience associ-
ated with his family's poverty or low SES. 89
The situation is likely to be similar when we turn to the third justifi-
cation for affirmative action at elite law schools: giving back, or the con-
tributions a school's graduates make to the community and the larger
society following graduation.90 If Michigan graduates typify the gradu-
ates of elite schools, there is strong evidence that lawyers of a given eth-
nic background (including Asians and whites) disproportionately serve
people of their own race, whether they are dealing with them as individ-
ual clients or as business contacts.9 ' Moreover, affirmative action eligible
minority graduates tend to be more deeply involved in community serv-
ice and politics and do more pro bono work than white alumni.92 It is
88. If black and Hispanic students from low SES backgrounds count for class diversity as well
as racial/ethnic diversity I expect there has often been greater numbers from the nation's lowest SES
quartile.
89. It is possible that making social-economic status salient by adopting an affirmative action
program for students in the bottom quartile of the SES scale would by making SES salient lead to the
creation of groups that would organize to achieve these ends, but unlike the situation with blacks,
Hispanics or Native Americans there has been no serious call for the creation of such preferences
either within or external to the law school community. I am, of course, here talking personally and
anecdotally. No doubt there are occasions where students reference personal experiences stemming
from an impoverished background. Perhaps had I taught welfare law rather than evidence I would
have heard such stories, but even then I expect a good portion of them would have come from mi-
nority students.
90. Let me remind the reader that I am talking about moral/policy justifications for affirma-
tive action and not simply those justifications that the law as currently interpreted recognizes as
compelling state interests.
91. See Lempert, Chambers & Adams, supra note 10, at 438 tbls.18 & 19.
92. Id. at 457-58 tbls.26 & 27.
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doubtful whether elite law school graduates from lower SES back-
grounds would show a similar disproportionate tendency to serve people
like them if for no other reason than the fact that most elite law school
graduates go into business or other large law firm practices, corporate
counsel's offices or government attorney positions.
Moreover, minority graduates do not attend elite law schools ex-
pecting to leave their race behind. If anything, they may think that the
elite law school credential will help elevate them to leadership status
within their race and as representatives of their race in the larger com-
munity. But low SES students who attend elite law schools are seeking
and will obtain a credential that will allow them to transform their class
identity from low to high and guarantee that their children will have a
better head start on life than their parents were able to provide for them.
There are also societal benefits from role modeling and minority
identity that the beneficiaries of race- or ethnicity-based affirmative ac-
tion provide but which beneficiaries of a low SES affirmative action pro-
gram would be unlikely to provide. In part this is due to visibility. It is
likely that virtually all black youth perceive President Obama, Attorney
General Holder and others among his key law-trained advisors as black,
but how many low SES youth know (or care) which of the President's
cabinet members or advisers began life in the lower rungs of society? By
the time these people have acquired sufficient status and connections to
be appointed to high visibility positions, they are no longer people of low
SES, and when a politician trots out his humble roots it seems to be more
as a matter of political theatre than a disclosure that will inspire lower
SES youth to think they can escape their status. In addition, as the busi-
ness and military amicus briefs in Grutter argued, well trained and edu-
cated minorities can be crucial to the success of an operation that in-
volves soldiers or other people of color. It is hard to imagine a similar
need for well-educated leaders whose specific advantage is that they
came from families of humble origin.
In short, I think that most of the values and considerations that jus-
tify affirmative action for discriminated against or otherwise disadvan-
taged ethnic groups do not exist or, if they do exist are not nearly as
strong when applied to students from low SES backgrounds. The overlap
is greatest when equity and fairness are the rationale, but even here is-
sues arise that might give us pause about instituting such programs, often
issues that have analogies in the unease some express about race and
ethnicity-based affirmative action. I do not, however, oppose outreach to,
and informal affirmative action for, students of low SES, especially by
elite law schools. But I do not think formal programs are necessary, and I
do not think the case for low SES affirmative action is nearly as strong as
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the case that can be made for affirmative action in aid of groups disad-
vantaged by racial and ethnic discrimination. 93
CONCLUSION
I hope it is clear from what I have written that I admire Professor
Sander's effort to shed empirical light on the class composition of the
student bodies in America's law schools. At the same time I think the
amount of light he can shed is severely limited by the nature and quality
of the data he had available and by the distance between SES as a meas-
ure of social class and the concept of social class that is best suited to
considering the value and extent of class diversity in legal education. I
have tried to show the limits of what the data can tell us by fleshing out
some of the reasons why readers should take seriously the cautions Pro-
fessor Sander provides throughout his article.
Specifically, I think the core findings Professor Sander reports, that
students from families of low SES are underrepresented in American law
schools relative to their population proportion and that this underrepre-
sentation is most substantial in America's most elite law schools, are
sound, but that the specific numbers he provides cannot be relied on. I
also believe that some of his subsidiary findings, such as his effort to
determine applicant pool effects on SES representation or his attempt to
assign law graduates of different races and ethnicities to different social
classes are problematic due to missing sample data, his operationaliza-
tion of social class by an SES index that is less than ideal and other con-
ceptual and data quality issues.
Moving from his empirical results to his more discursive commen-
tary, I think Professor Sander has provided plausible reasons why the
ordinary law school admissions process may bias and diminish the ad-
missions chances of applicants from low SES backgrounds, and I have
added to the reasons he gives. As Professor Sander suggests, a plausible
result of these biases is that even if law school admissions officers seek
consciously to advantage applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds, as
they well might, low SES applicants on balance gain little if anything
from their status. Finally, I take a different view than Professor Sander of
the relative gains from racial/ethnic as opposed to SES diversity and on
justifications for affirmative action. I think a similar case for affirmative
action may be made on fairness grounds, but I think that in terms of edu-
cational and societal benefits racial/ethnic diversity, especially at elite
law schools, has far more to offer.
93. Some who oppose race-based affirmative action think that discrimination and its effects
are a thing of the past. This is not so. For a summary of recent findings and data, see Richard Lem-
pert, A Personal Odyssey Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States: 1948-2009, 44
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 431,440-55 (2010).
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The data Professor Sander has to work with are flawed and limited,
but he has not pushed the data as far as he might. Specifically, he might
provide empirical answers to some of the questions I raise. For example,
I am concerned that his SES index is less reliable when it is based on two
measures rather than four. He might test this by comparing the SES dis-
tribution of students for whom he has four measures with the distribution
of students for whom he has only two, and by seeing if regardless of
measure the association between SES and school presence by school
status is the same. 9 4 More interestingly, the AJD data allow Professor
Sander to test my supposition that racial and ethnic diversity are more
likely to be associated with attitudinal breadth in elite law schools than
SES diversity. The AJD asked several questions designed to tap respon-
dents' opinions, and Professor Sander could explore whether within law
school strata opinion differences are systematically associated with class,
race, ethnic or gender divisions.
Regrettably, for those interested in pursuing Professor Sander's in-
quiry into the role social class plays in the production of lawyers, the
quality of legal education and the sorting of students into schools of dif-
ferent status, available data are unlikely to allow us to move much be-
yond what Professor Sander's current study provides.95 What is needed is
a longitudinal study, like the one Warkov conducted 50 years ago,96
which follows a large sample of students from secondary school, through
college and law school, with questions aimed at determining the role that
social class plays in the choice of law as a career, in law school choice
among those committed to a legal career and ultimately in the production
and job sorting of attorneys. Such a study could also explore the effects
of race and gender and determine how various status effects are condi-
tioned by the interplay of other variables. If Professor Sander's foray into
94. If there are differences, they will not necessarily mean that using an SES index composed
of only two measures distorts a true picture, for it could be that the number of available measures is
itself an indicator of SES. If this were the case, one might, for example, expect those whose scores
were based on only two variables to contain a higher proportion of the respondents of low SES than
one finds when four measures are available. Still, it would be a comfort if the relationships Professor
Sander reports were robust to differences in index construction.
95. There are some data sources that might be explored to see if they offer anything of value.
The most prominent are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study
and the Longitudinal Study of Youth.
96. WARKOV, supra note 58.
In his reply Professor Sander responds at several points to my critique and at one point, in his dis-
cussion of mismatch, to issues of little relevance to the issues central to this symposium. Not only do
I find aspects of Professor Sander's response insulting, but also portions of his reply ignore relevant
information, make empirical claims that I could not replicate with that I believe are better data, and
are in my view seriously flawed in their assumptions and reasoning. These are strong claims, but
unfortunately the Law Review does not have space to allow me to justify them here. However, a
detailed justification is available at http://www.denverlawreview.org/. The reader should know that I
shared most of the claims I make regarding Professor Sander's mismatch discussion insofar as it
accuses me of misstating facts with him, and I asked him to delete that portion of his article. He has
not done this nor has he chosen to correct the flaws I point to.
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the thicket of social class and the American law school stimulates such a
study, he will have made an important contribution.9 7
97. In his reply Professor Sander responds at several points to my critique and at one point, in
his discussion of mismatch, to issues of little relevance to the issues central to this symposium. Not
only do I find aspects of Professor Sander's response insulting, but also portions of his reply ignore
relevant information, make empirical claims that I could not replicate with that I believe are better
data, and are in my view seriously flawed in their assumptions and reasoning. These are strong
claims, but unfortunately the Low Review does not have space to allow me to justify them here.
However, a detailed justification is available at http://www.denverlawreview.org/. The reader should
know that I shared most of the claims I make regarding Professor Sander's mismatch discussion
insofar as it accuses me of misstating facts with him, and I asked him to delete that portion of his
article. He has not done this nor has he chosen to correct the flaws I point to.
2011] 717

REFLECTIONS ON RICHARD SANDER'S CLASS INAMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG
Low-income students of all races have been the invisible men and
women of American legal education. But in the nonfiction realm, Rich-
ard Sander may be their Ralph Ellison.
Sander's Class in American Legal Education lays bare dramatic
economic inequality within selective U.S. law schools, institutions that
pride themselves on being progressive, inclusive, forward-looking, and
right-thinking. Sander's exposure of stark class inequality in our institu-
tions of legal education parallels the 2004 scholarship of Anthony
Carnevale and Stephen J. Rose, who revealed enormous socioeconomic
disparities in access to undergraduate learning at selective institutions.'
Fortunately, the Carnevale and Rose research spurred a great deal of soul
searching and some action to address inequality at the undergraduate
level.2 One can only hope that Sander's expos6 will launch a similar dis-
cussion and set of actions within the legal academy.
This Article provides some context about-and analysis of-the
significance of Sander's findings on: (1) the degree of socioeconomic
inequality in American legal education; (2) the extent to which racial
affirmative action produces socioeconomic diversity; (3) the lack of in-
stitutional commitment to addressing socioeconomic inequality in law
schools; (4) the potential racial dividend of socioeconomic preferences;
and (5) whether low-income students admitted through class-based af-
firmative action can succeed in legal education and beyond. Finally, the
Article concludes with a discussion of how Sander's research fits into the
larger legal environment surrounding affirmative action.
I. DEGREE OF SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY
As Sander notes, while law schools routinely publish data on the ra-
cial diversity of their student bodies, they rarely publish socioeconomic
data about their students.3 This omission (which is very telling in itself)
t Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation. A.B. Harvard College, 1985. J.D. Harvard Law
School, 1989.
1. Anthony Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selec-
tive College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low-INCOME STUDENTS IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 106-07 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004).
2. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Introduction, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING Low-INCOME
STUDENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 1, 1-3 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).
3. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 631
(2011).
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did not, however, deter Sander, who drew upon a large data base (the
After the JD Study) and constructed an impressive index of socioeco-
nomic status (SES) to give systematic meaning to the data. The analysis
is itself groundbreaking because it provides for the first time a very clear
picture of the socioeconomic makeup of America's law schools.
Moreover, the substantive findings are breathtaking. The degree of
socioeconomic stratification found by Sander at the most elite twenty law
schools is as bad as (indeed, slightly worse than) the stratification found
by Carnevale and Rose at the nation's most selective 146 colleges and
universities (which educate less than 10% of the nation's postsecondary
freshman class).5 Sander found that only 2% of students at the top twenty
law schools come from the bottom socioeconomic quarter of the popula-
tion while more than three quarters come from the richest socioeconomic
quartile.6 This comports with Carnevale and Rose's finding that at the
most selective 146 colleges and universities, only 3% came from the
poorest socioeconomic quartile and 74% from the richest. In other words,
one is 25 times as likely to run into a wealthy student as a low-income
student at the nation's selective campuses, and the tilt is slightly greater
at the top twenty law schools.7 Astoundingly, Sander writes "roughly
half the students at these schools come from the top tenth of the SES
distribution, while only about one-tenth of the students come from the
bottom half."8
II. THE SOCIOECONOMIC DIVIDEND OF RACIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Sander's second important finding is that racial affirmative action in
legal education has done little to promote socioeconomic diversity.9 That
is to say, selective law schools tend to achieve racial diversity by provid-
ing preference in admissions to fairly affluent African American and
Latino students. Sander finds that at top twenty law schools, 89% of Af-
rican Americans, and 63% of Latinos come from the top socioeconomic
half of the population (along with 92% of Asian Americans and 93% of
whites).10 As Sander notes, "upper-middle-class minorities capture most
of the benefits of law school preferences[,]" because the "strongest ap-
plicants come from predominantly advantaged backgrounds."' This
conclusion parallels the findings in selective undergraduate institutions.
In a study of twenty-eight selective colleges and universities, for exam-
4. See Sander, supra note 3, at 639 tbl.1.
5. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 2, at 104.
6. See Sander, supra note 3, at 639 tbl. 1.
7. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 2, at 106 tbl.3. 1.
8. See Sander, supra note 3, at 637 (emphasis omitted).
9. See id. at 644.
10. See id. at 651 tbl.8.
11. Id at 656.
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ple, Derek Bok and William Bowen found that 86% of African Ameri-
cans were from middle or high socioeconomic status families.' 2
Sander's finding is significant because in the discussions of race-
based affirmative action, including among justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, advocates routinely seek to bolster their case by citing the rela-
tively lower socioeconomic status of minority students. In Gratz v.
Bollinger,'3 for example, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, noted that African Americans had a poverty rate of 22.1%, and
Hispanics had a poverty rate of 21.2%, compared with a white poverty
rate of 7.5%.14 Black and Latino students, they noted, "are all too often
educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming institutions."" Like-
wise, in a political cartoon, Rob Rogers of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
depicted an African American girl, who states: "I survived life on wel-
fare and food stamps . . .. In a poor, crime-ridden neighborhood with
crumbling schools filled with guns and drugs ... . In a world that re-
wards rich white men. So now, affirmative action will help me get into
college."16 Her white male colleague retorts, "That's so unfair." As
Sander points out, however, this appealing story, in which affirmative
action benefits low-income minority students, is the rare exception in
practice.
III. THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS TO PROVIDE SOCIOECONOMIC
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Sander's third important finding is that law schools, which often
purport to provide a leg up in admissions to economically disadvantaged
students, do not in fact systematically do so.17 Sander's analysis of a
1995 survey of nineteen law schools suggests that while schools provide
very large preferences to black and Latino students, there is no prefer-
ence provided to students whose parents have lower levels of educa-
tion.
These findings comport with studies of selective undergraduate in-
stitutions. Carnevale and Rose found that racial preferences triple the
representation of black and Hispanic students at the nation's most selec-
tive 146 institutions, but that low socioeconomic students receive no
preference.19 Likewise, William Bowen, Martin Kurzweil, and Eugene
12. William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequence of
Considering Race in College and University Admissions 341 tbl.B.2 (1998) The authors did not
include comparable data on Latino students.
13. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
14. Id. at 299 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 291 tbl.A (2001)).
15. Id. at 299.
16. Rob Rogers, Affirmative Action, ROBROGERS.COM, http://www.robrogers.com/gallery/
old favorites/html/03/affirmative action.html (last visited May 31, 2011).
17. See Sander, supra note 3, at 656.
18. Id. at 655-57.
19. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 2, at 141-42, 148-49.
7212011]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
Tobin found that racial preferences increase the chances of admission for
under-represented minorities at nineteen institutions studied by 27.7 per-
centage points,2 0 but that low-income students receive "essentially no
break in the admissions process; they fare neither better nor worse than
other applicants."21 So too, Thomas Espenshade and Alexandria Walton
Radford found, that at highly selective private colleges and universities,
African American students receive a boost the equivalent of 310 SAT
points, but low-income students receive just a 130-point boost, which
22itself is racially tilted toward under-represented minorities.
Likewise, Sander finds that law school grants and scholarships are
not geared toward financial need.23 Wealthy whites receive twice as
much grant and scholarship money as low-income whites (12% of costs
covered versus 5%).24 And wealthy blacks receive four times as much
grant and scholarship aid as low-income whites (20% versus 5%).25
IV. THE RACIAL DIVIDEND OF SOCIOECONOMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Sander's fourth significant finding is that socioeconomic or class-
based affirmative action can produce a substantial amount of racial di-
versity.26 He discusses the experiment at the UCLA Law School, which
was banned from using race by voter initiative, and turned to socioeco-
nomic status instead.27 The race-blind program produced a class that was
more than one-third nonwhite.2 8
The experiment was subsequently watered down, but even so, the
racial dividend of socioeconomic affirmative action remained significant.
As Table I suggests, in the fall of 2002, to take one example, blacks and
Hispanics benefited considerably from the socioeconomic affirmative
action program. African American students were 16 times as likely to be
admitted under the socioeconomic program as they were under other
programs, and Latino students were 6.8 times as likely to be admitted.
There are a couple of important points to make about the UCLA
Law School experiment.
20. WILLIAM BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 105 tbl.5.1 (2005).
21. Id at 166 (emphasis omitted).
22. THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, No LONGER SEPARATE,
NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFE 92 tbl.3.5
(2009).
23. Sander, supra note 3, at 659.
24. Id. at 661 tbl.12.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 665.
27. Id. at 659.
28. Id. at 662.
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First, the sophisticated definition of socioeconomic status employed
by UCLA Law School surely increased the racial dividend. Some re-
search has suggested that affirmative action based on parental income is
unlikely to produce much racial diversity because poor whites generally
outscore poor blacks on standardized tests.29 This is true in some meas-
ure because low-income black students on average face extra obstacles
not faced by low-income whites: they are more likely to have low wealth
(controlling for income) and are more likely to live in concentrated pov-
erty and attend schools with higher poverty levels. UCLA Law School,
quite properly, accounted for those extra obstacles that disproportion-
ately affect African Americans.
Table 1: Economic and Racial Diversity at
UCLA Law School
UCLA School of Law
Fall 2002 SES Admission Summary
SES All Others
Apps Admits Enrolled Apps Admits Enrolled
Native American 1 0 0 46 7 2
African American 30 19 8 331 13 5
Chicano/Latino 51 26 13 478 36 11
Asian 63 20 17 1221 158 37
White 86 30 17 2521 400 129
Other/Unknown 57 16 9 1724 234 57
Total 288 111 64 6321 848 241
Source: Andrea Sossin-Bergman, director of admissions, UCLA Law School, November 2002
In doing so, UCLA Law was able to capture the legacy of discrimi-
nation and ongoing discrimination in the housing market through eco-
nomic criteria. Housing discrimination, for example, may help explain
why black families with incomes in excess of $60,000 live in neighbor-
hoods with higher poverty rates than white families earning less than
$30,000. And our nation's legacy of discrimination and housing dis-
crimination surely help explain why even among white and black people
of similar income, black people have fewer financial assets. While the
median income of black people is about 62% of the median income of
29. See Thomas Kane, Racial Bias Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 448-51
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
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white people, the median net worth of black people is just 12% of the
median net worth of white people.30
Second, it is important to note that UCLA Law School's successful
use of socioeconomic affirmative action is not isolated: the University of
California undergraduate system as a whole has grown more diverse in
some measure through the use of class-based affirmative action in the
wake of the passage of Prop. 209 in 1996 banning the use of race. The
proportion of new freshman who are under-represented minorities ini-
tially declined from 18% in 1997 to 15% in 1998 (the first year of race-
blind admissions), but has since increased to 24% in 2008. The elite un-
dergraduate institutions-UC Berkeley and UCLA-have fared less
well, but after the share of African American and Latino new freshman
declined from 23% in 1997 to 14% in 1998, it has since rebounded some
to 20%."
Finally, national research comports with the finding that socioeco-
nomic affirmative action can produce substantial racial diversity. Carne-
vale and Rose, for example, found that at the most selective 146 under-
graduate institutions, if grades and test scores were the sole determinants
of admissions, the combined representation of African American and
Latino students would be 4%. Using race triples that figure to 12%.32 But
using socioeconomic affirmative action would do almost as well-
producing a class that was 10% black and Hispanic.3 3 Because Carnevale
and Rose did not use wealth as a factor in their simulation, the inclusion
of that factor would likely raise the racial dividend of socioeconomic
affirmative action even further.
Increasingly, research suggests, the primary barrier to equal educa-
tional opportunity is class rather than race. In 2010, for example, Carne-
vale and coauthor Jeff Strohl found that most of the predictors of low
SAT scores are socioeconomic in nature. 34 Being socioeconomically
disadvantaged (as opposed to highly advantaged) cost a student 399 SAT
points on the math and verbal assessments, while being black (as op-
posed to white) cost a student fifty-six points on average.as
30. See, e.g., EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN
AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 19 tbl.4-1 (202).
31. Tongshan Chang & Heather Rose, A Portrait of Underrepresented Minorities at the
University of Cahfornia, 1994-2008, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 83, 84-89
(Eric Grodsky & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2010).
32. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 2, at 135.
33. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Introduction, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME
STUDENTS IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 14 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004).
34. See Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access is Increasing
Inequality, and What To Do About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING Low-INCOME STUDENTS
SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 71, 173 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).
35. See id at 170, 173.
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V. CAN STUDENTS ADMITTED WITH SES PREFERENCES GRADUATE AND
SUCCEED?
Sander's fifth significant finding is that at UCLA Law School-a
highly selective institution-students given socioeconomic preference in
admission were part of a class that went on, in 2000, "to achieve the
highest state bar passage rate in the school's history before or since."
The finding is very important because if socioeconomic preferences
ended up admitting under-prepared students who could not persist to
graduation or passage of the bar, the program would be doing its so-
called beneficiaries little good. As Sander has noted in widely cited re-
search, bar passage rates for beneficiaries of traditional race-based af-
firmative action has been disturbingly low.37 Sander notes that the weight
of the preference provided to socioeconomically disadvantaged appli-
cants at UCLA Law was about half the weight provided previously to
Latinos, and a quarter of the weight provided previously to African
Americans.38
Again, Sander's research is buttressed by scholarship involving se-
lective undergraduate institutions. Carnevale and Rose found that socio-
economic preferences could boost the proportion of students from the
bottom socioeconomic half of the population from 10% to 38%,39 and yet
graduation rates would actually rise, from 86% today to almost 90%.40
The authors estimated that the preference employed under their model is
roughly half the size currently used for race. 4 1
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF SANDER'S RESEARCH IN A POST-GRUTTER V.
BOLLINGER WORLD
Richard Sander's article comes at an important time in the life of
racial affirmative action programs. While Grutter v. Bollinger,42 the U.S.
Supreme Court's 5-4 decision affirming the use of race at the University
of Michigan Law School43 appeared to give new life to such programs (at
least for twenty-five years), the makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court has
changed, and some observers expect that Grutter may be reversed-or
severely curtailed-in the event that the Supreme Court takes on a chal-
lenge to affirmative action at the University of Texas.
36. Sander, supra note 3, at 663.
37. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 443 (2004).
38. Sander, supra note 3, at 662.
39. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 2, at 149.
40. See id. at 107, 149.
41. Id. at 149.
42. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
43. Id. at 343.
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin44 squarely raises one of the
issues Sander addresses: can race-neutral alternatives to affirmative ac-
tion (such as class-based affirmative action) produce a critical mass of
minority students and thereby render the continued use of race unconsti-
tutional?45 In the suit, white plaintiffs challenged the use of race in ad-
missions, arguing that Texas's Top 10 Percent plan-which automati-
cally admits those in the top 10% of their high school class-creates suf-
ficient racial diversity by itself.46 Plaintiffs noted that using race-blind
criteria produced a class that was 4.5% African American and 16.9%
Hispanic in 2004, so the subsequent reintroduction of race on top of the
Ten Percent plan is unconstitutional.4 7 (In Grutter, a law-school class
that ranged between 13.5% and 20.1% minority was considered to have
achieved a "critical mass" of such students.) 4 8
A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
rejected the claim,4 9 but it may ultimately receive a more favorable hear-
ing in the U.S. Supreme Court. With Justice Alito having replaced Jus-
tice O'Connor on the Court since the 2003 Grutter decision, Justice
Kennedy-a dissenter in Grutter-is the new swing justice. Opponents
of affirmative action are further heartened by Justice Kennedy's 2007
concurring opinion striking down the use of race in school integration
programs in Louisville and Seattle. In the lead decision, Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,50 Justice Kennedy
declared that the individual classification of students by race should be
used only as "a last resort."5' In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy said
the Court should "force educational institutions to seriously explore race-
neutral alternatives." 52 While Justice Kennedy may not wish to overturn
Grutter explicitly, he may be open to substantially altering the nature of
Grutter by vigorously enforcing the decision's requirement to look to
alternatives before using race. The practical implication would be for
universities to earnestly employ the type of class-based affirmative ac-
tion program that Sander describes, as well as top-percent plans, reserv-
ing race for extreme cases.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it may be that the demise of race-based affirmative ac-
tion will finally prompt higher education-including law schools-to
address the great reality of class inequality. Sander notes, stunningly, that
44. 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
45. See id. at 590.
46. Id. at 603.
47. Id. at 593.
48. 539 U.S. at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
49. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
50. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
51. Id at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. 539 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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"low-SES representation at elite law schools is comparable to racial rep-
resentation fifty years ago, before the civil rights revolution." Ironi-
cally, a conservative victory in the U.S. Supreme Court undercutting
race-based affirmative action programs may be the prerequisite to mak-
ing class visible at long last.
53. Sander, supra note 3, at 649.
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CLASS PRIVILEGE IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A RESPONSE TO
SANDER
DEBORAH C. MALAMUDt
I commend Professor Richard Sander for calling our attention to the
many ways in which the admissions and financial aid policies of law
schools-especially elite law schools, on which I will focus in my Re-
sponse-work to perpetuate class privilege. I am not a quantitative social
scientist, and so I must leave questions about Professor Sander's meth-
odology to the experts, a group well-represented in the collected re-
sponses to this Article. I will assume for purposes of this Response that
Sander is right that the class distribution in elite law schools is sharply
skewed in favor of the most privileged. I will also assume, without de-
fense, that socioeconomic integration is an important social good.'
f AnBryce Professor of Law, New York University Law School. My thanks to Richard
Lempert and Eli Wald for comments, to Gretchen Feltes for superb librarianship, and to NYU's
AnBryce Scholars for letting me be part of their lives.
I. I make this assumption without conceding that the imperative for socioeconomic integra-
tion in the United States is as strong as the imperative for racial integration (let alone stronger, which
one might take to be Sander's assumption). It remains my view that race-based differences in oppor-
tunity "weigh[] [more] heavily on the moral scale" than do purely class-based differences. Deborah
C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939,
993 (1997). For a strong philosophical defense of the importance of race-based integration and of
affirmative action as a means of achieving and maintaining it, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE
IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 112-16, 148-54 (2010). The question of the place of mixed-race and
immigrant students, especially black students (given the larger "plus" diversity programs offer to
black applicants), in an integrationist narrative (particularly one which, like Anderson's, is rooted in
historical, durable group-based inequalities) is a complex one. It is best dealt with in "mend it" rather
than "end it" terms. See, e.g., Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirma-
tive Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation ofAscendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educa-
tional Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1277-78 (2008) (arguing for a bright-line rule prioritizing
"ascendant blacks" over black/white biracial and black immigrant applicants for affirmative action
purposes); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141,
1220-21 (2007) (arguing for a standards-based approach, based on the consideration of evidence of
black racial self-identification as part of a Grutter-esque full file review of black candidates). It is
also important to be aware that "race" and "class" are not the only competitors in the ring, where
admissions policies are concerned. There are other diversification values and pressures that might
well dominate the higher-education debate in the future. I have in mind, for example, the diversity
benefits of enrolling immigrants and foreign students in response to globalization, with the political
push-back inherent in the use of preferences for that purpose, should public attention focus on their
use. See, e.g., JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002); Hugh Davis Gra-
ham, The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the Regulatory State, 523 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCt. 50, 61-62 (1992); cf Edna Chun & Alvin Evans, Bridging the Diversity
Divide: Globalization and Reciprocal Empowerment in Higher Education, 35 ASHE HIGHER EDUC.
REPORT, no.1, 2009, at 9-11 (discussing globalization, but, oddly, using it as a justification for
traditional race-based diversity efforts).
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I strongly disagree, however, with Sander's decision to link his
2
class analysis to his critique of race-based affirmative action. I address
this point in Part I of my Response. If the issue of class-based closure of
opportunity is of normative importance, it ought to be able to stand on its
own bottom. That has been the premise of my work on class-based af-
firmative action, and I remain convinced by it.3 Even as a strategic mat-
ter, it does little good to alienate potential allies by requiring them to sign
on to descriptive and normative critiques of race-based affirmative action
as the cost of entry into an alliance in favor of greater class diversity in
elite legal education. The elite undergraduate schools that have revamped
their financial aid policies to further class diversity have maintained their
commitment to race-based affirmative action. Sander need not rest his
support for class-based affirmative action on the suggestion that it serve
as a "partial substitute for current racial preferences." 4 He should recog-
nize that "[o]pposition to [race-based] affirmative action has become a
bottleneck," in which advocacy for greater class equity in admissions
"gets hopelessly entangled."5 By conflating the issues, he needlessly calls
into question the seriousness of his own advocacy on issues of class.
Separated from the issue of race, Sander's argument is that the
skewed class composition within the student bodies of elite law schools
calls for a redistributive response. I respond to this argument in Part II.
The extent to which one shares a normative commitment to redistribution
might well depend on who gains and who loses. Sander provides UCLA
Law School's short-term experiment as a success story in redistribution
from high to low SES applicants,6 but points to unique factors that make
2. I am not "on record" in relation to the debate on Sander's critique of race-based affirma-
tive action in law schools. Consistent with the premise of my Response, I will not use this short
contribution as an occasion to enter that debate. In my own work, I have acknowledged that the
diversity rationale pushes institutions towards a focus on their own institutional goals, rather than on
the consequences of affirmative action for the lives of its intended beneficiaries. See Malamud,
supra note 1, at 958-59. I believe Sander has made it impossible (and rightfully so) to ignore those
consequences-although I am more persuaded by his critics on the merits of the question of what
those consequences are in fact.
3. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1847, 1848 (1996).
4. See Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631,
664 (2011). Richard Kahlenberg's scholarship is motivated, as is Sander's, by a critique of race-
based affirmative action. William Bowen's is not. One of the main sources Sander cites as "encour-
aged by" Kahlenberg in fact concludes that both minorities and low-SES students are underrepre-
sented in elite undergraduate schools, and that both class-based and race-based affirmative action are
appropriate. Id. at 632 & n.5 (citing Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status,
Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low-
INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Richard Kahlenberg ed., 2004)); Carnevale & Rose,
supra, at 152-54.
5. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 4, at 154.
6. Sander, supra note 4, at 661-64. It would be helpful to have more complete data on the
SES-redistributive effects of the UCLA program. Elsewhere, Sander distinguishes (at the top) be-
tween the top decile and top quartile, and (at the bottom) between the bottom and second quartiles.
See id. at 646-49 tbls.5, 6 & 7.
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it unlikely that its success could be replicated on a national scale. In
order to achieve large shifts, the trades will need to take place across
shorter distances-to benefit candidates in the lower-middle and middle-
SES ranges (whom I will refer to as "middling-SES" candidates).
For reasons I will explain below, I believe that elite schools already
do appreciate the "diversity" added by stellar low-SES candidates with
gripping personal stories, and I do not think it would be difficult for them
to marginally increase the number of such students they admit. Whether
they would be committed to providing adequate grant-based financial aid
to persuade them to enroll is another question; the answer might depend
on whether they are prepared to make a high-profile, programmatic
commitment to low-SES diversity.
I think it less likely, in contrast, that elite law schools would adopt
the reforms that would be necessary to bring about major changes in their
middling-SES enrollments. On the admissions front, doing so would
require schools to downplay the value of the myriad kinds of distinction
they seek in their entering classes. On the financial aid front, it would
require them to take a more realistic view of middling-SES families and
their attitudes towards going into debt for elite education.
I. GETTING PAST THE RACE VS. CLASS RHETORIC
A. The Numbers: A Drop in the Bucket?
By juxtaposing race and class, Sander is in essence arguing that law
schools have what one might call a "diversity admissions budget," which
operates on a zero-sum basis to allocate deviations from what would
otherwise be the outcome of a mechanical, numbers-based admissions
policy. Even if one does not agree (as I do not) that elite schools are vio-
lating Grutter by being mechanical in their use of the "numbers," elite
schools compete with each other in the "rankings" by reporting high ad-
missions "numbers." It is not unreasonable to think in terms of a
"budget" for non-high-indicator numbers, to be shared among all of
those candidates deemed desirable despite relatively lower "numbers." It
is useful, then, to consider how much difference it would make, as a
7. Id. at 663. This is in part because of the "unique factor" of California's "substantial num-
ber of low-SES, high-achieving Asian students, many of them immigrants or the children of immi-
grants." Id. at 663 n.88. Race-based affirmative action preferences in favor of immigrants are not
popular in this country. See supra note 1. It is unclear-but seems unlikely-that socioeconomic
preferences for immigrants because of the short-term disadvantages inherent (for many families) in
immigration would be any more popular.
8. For seven years I served as the Faculty Director of the AnBryce Scholarship Program at
New York University Law School, which has done precisely that, and now enrolls approximately ten
low-SES Scholars a year with full-tuition remission and programmatic support. See Richard H.
Pildes, An Introduction to the NYU Journal of Law and Liberty Symposium, "The Unknown Jus-
tice ", 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 475, 476 (2009) (describing the AnBryce Scholarship Program). I
am not aware of similar programs at our peer law schools.
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quantitative rather than a symbolic matter, to make the partial substitu-
tion Sander calls for here.
Both in this Article and in his earlier work, Sander's critique of
race-based affirmative action is most strongly targeted against prefer-
ences for African-Americans in elite law schools.9 Given that Sander also
acknowledges that "racial minorities are responsible for much of the
small amount of SES diversity we can currently observe in law
schools,"'o he is oddly ambivalent in his reporting of the greater class
diversity of black students when compared to white students. In relation
to Table 8 (which deals with the top twenty law schools), Sander flags
the "remarkably high SES" of black students." But 82% of whites versus
66% of blacks are in the top quartile (and, as he notes, blacks in any
given quartile are likely to be less well-off than whites); 33% of blacks
versus 17% of whites are in the second and third quartiles.12 These are
not trivial differences. To the extent that Sander is right that "the contri-
bution racial diversity makes to socioeconomic diversity in legal educa-
tion is quite modest,"' 3 the real reason is that minorities are minorities.
Despite the fact that they are more (I would even say "far more") class-
diverse than whites, whites swamp them in numbers, so their greater
diversity gets lost in the broader pool.
Sander's critique sounds most strongly against extending race-based
preferences to "high-SES" blacks.14 But how many "high-SES" blacks
are there in elite law schools? Is the number large enough so that "voting
them off the island" would make a meaningful difference in class diver-
sity, even assuming all of their places were taken by "low-SES" appli-
cants? 5 I think not. Eliminating the highest-SES black students to free
9. See Sander, supra note 4, at 666-68; see also Richard Sander, "From the Trenches and
Towers, " The Tributaries to the River, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 557, 562-63 (2000).
10. Sander, supra note 4, at 651.
11. Id. at 652.
12. Id. at 651 tbl.8.
13. Id. at 654.
14. Targeting the highest-SES blacks for exclusion has some adverse consequences, of
course. Since the highest-SES blacks will tend to need the smallest preferences and suffer the small-
est performance shortfalls, it should be obvious that by excluding them, the average performance
numbers of the black student population will drop. That is why schools, when they can, prefer
higher-SES blacks. It's not that they are insensitive to race-plus-class inequality, or that they actually
prefer mixed-race or African-immigrant blacks to "ascendent blacks." See Brown & Bell, supra note
1, at 1245-55 (explaining the increasing percentage of black/white biracials and black immigrants on
college campuses and the underrepresentation of ascendent blacks in selective educational pro-
grams). They just want to get past the bad days of black students being clustered at the bottom of the
class so that race will be less stigmatizing.
15. This thought experiment parallels the clever handicapped-parking riff credited to econo-
mist George Akerlof:
Suppose that one parking space in front of a popular restaurant is reserved for disabled
drivers. Many of the nondisabled drivers who pass by the space while circling the parking
lot in search of a place to park may be tempted to think that they would have an easier
time finding a space if the space had not been reserved. Although eliminating the space
would have only a minuscule effect on the average parking search for nondisabled driv-
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up more spots for lower-SES white students is not going to make much
of a difference because their numbers are simply too small to have a
large impact.
Here is a rough estimate based on Sander's data (which, again, I
will accept for purposes of this Response). His table A2-1 shows that the
top tier of law schools (the top ten), with a first-year enrollment of 3,112,
has 242 black students (8% of total enrollment). His Table 8, which gives
socioeconomic breakdown by law school tier and race, gives data for the
top two tiers (the top twenty), rather than the top tier, but it will do for
present purposes. Table 8 shows that 34% of black students in top 20%
schools come from his bottom three SES quartiles.' 6 Assume that, be-
cause they are class-diverse, they get to stay. An additional 23% of
blacks in top 20% schools come from the lower portion of the top quar-
tile (the 75th-90th percentile). Given Sander's acknowledgment that
simplified measures of SES are likely to overstate the SES status of
blacks,17 let us assume for present purposes that they get to stay as well.
That leaves the 43% of top-20-school black students who come from
Sander's top SES decile as the ones who, in Sander's critique, ought to
yield their places to lower-SES candidates chosen without regard to
race.
Since Sander does not provide data on the proportion of black stu-
dents in top ten schools who are in the top SES decile, let us assume that
the number is somewhere between 43% (the proportion of black students
in top twenty schools who are in the top SES decile) and 57% (the pro-
portion of all students in the top ten schools who are in the top SES
decile). By eliminating black top-decile students from the top ten
ers, the cumulative cost perceived by each passing driver is likely to exceed the true cost
simply because people have a difficult time thinking about small probability events.
Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971, 992-
993 (1998). Here, I believe Sander is promoting a distorted assessment of how many handicapped
parking spaces there really are in the shopping mall parking lots, rather than of the chances that you,
driving around, will actually land one.
16. The comparative figure for whites is 18/o-a huge difference. Sander, supra note 4, at
651 tbl.8.
17. Prof. Sander cites me for this point, and I thank him. Sander, supra note 4, at 7 n.24
(citing Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452,
456-58 (1997)).
18. Of course, Sander acknowledges that black students class-diversify even the top decile.
Sander, supra note 4, at 19. Note that this assumes that all top-decile black students in top-20
schools received racial preferences in admissions, an assumption I am prepared to make only for
purposes of this analysis. In fact, even as to top 10 schools, it was never the University of Michi-
gan's claim that black enrollment would drop to zero without affirmative action. Over time, one
hopes that the number of black students (some, if not most, of whom would be top-SES decile) who
would qualify for admission with no consideration given to diversity will rise-although even Jus-
tice O'Connor now acknowledges that 25 years is better seen as a call to action than as a sunset date.
Sandra Day O'Connor & Stewart J. Schwab, Affirmative Action in Higher Education over the Next
Twenty-Five Years: A Need for Study and Action, in THE NEXT 25 YEARS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58, 61-62 (David L. Featherman et
al. eds., 2010).
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schools, the schools could free up between 104 and 138 spots, which is
between three and four percent of their total first year enrollment.
How big a difference would it make if top ten schools redistributed
3-4% of their entering spots from higher-SES blacks to lower-SES
whites and Asians? That is a judgment call, as quantitative judgments
always are. Is a 3-4% difference a lot or a little? It sounds pretty small,
and (for comparison purposes) Sander treats other differences of far
greater magnitude as insignificant as a policy matter (like, for example,
the difference between the proportion of white and black elite law stu-
dents in the top SES decile). Perhaps the more important question is why
one is looking to squeeze that small number of extra spots solely from
the black top-decile SES ranks. I suspect that one could shave away the
lowest-achieving of the white denizens of that SES bracket without any
noticeable damage to the diversity or quality of the entering class. By
cutting out the top-SES members of the black student cohort, in contrast,
Sander's plan would result in screening out the black candidates whose
credentials most resemble those of the student body as a whole. The ef-
fect would be a drop in black student performance, with a parallel in-
crease in the stigma experienced by black students as a group. Further-
more, there is no reason to believe that the trade would benefit low-SES
(as opposed to middling-SES) non-black candidates. That does not sound
like a reasonable policy choice to me, to put it mildly.
B. Critical Mass, Proportionality, and the Charge ofHypocrisy
Sander suggests that elite schools are being hypocritical in affirming
the value of diversity but adopting admissions policies that operate to
favor very-high-SES (top decile) and high-SES (top quartile) candidates
in vast disproportion to their representation in relevant populations as to
which data are available. Sander assumes here that "diversity" really
means "proportionality" in elite-school rhetoric, so that the lack of class
proportionality belies diversity concerns. In contrast to Sander, I am pre-
pared to take elite schools at their word that what they are seeking
through race-based affirmative action is "critical mass," not proportional-
ity.
How does the concept of "critical mass" operate in the parallel con-
text of class representation? In the shared vocabulary of elite schools and
the Supreme Court, critical mass is said to be necessary because of the
stigmatized nature of the groups to which the concept is applied. Stu-
dents from stigmatized minority groups need to be present in sufficient
number to feel comfortable within the institution, and their numbers must
be large enough to support sufficient internal variation to dispel stigma-
tizing stereotypes of group members. Intrinsic to Sander's argument
about why class-based preferences are less dangerous than race-based
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preferences is his view that class is largely "invisible," 9 and that it is not
stigmatizing. If he is right,20 then there is no need for "critical mass" for
class, and we are left with only the argument for proportional representa-
tion-a different argument from the one that underpins race-based diver-
sity practice both in the law schools and in the Supreme Court.
C. Is Class-Based Affirmative Action for Low-SES Students Cost-Free?
One of the major threads in Sander's preference for class-based af-
firmative action is his assertion that, unlike race-based affirmative action,
it does not carry social costs for its intended beneficiaries.2 1 Unlike
Sander, I believe that class is often made visible through social interac-
tion, and that, when visible, it can be intensely stigmatizing. This is es-
pecially true for students at the very bottom of the SES range-the stu-
dents whose triumphs over hardship make their applications stand out to
admissions officers at elite schools. Having been homeless, having been
dependent on welfare, having parents who neither valued education in
their own lives nor encouraged it for their children, lacking the funds to
live near or participate in group activities with your peers-differences
of this kind (and worse) from the dominant middle- (let alone upper-
middle-) class ethos of the world of higher education can be a source of
significant embarrassment for students from lower-SES backgrounds.2 2
Perhaps for this reason, stereotype threat has been demonstrated as oper-
ating in the sphere of class, not only of race.23
Precisely because dramatic SES difference has some commonalities
with racial difference in its stigmatizing effects, Sander should acknowl-
edge that very-low-SES students might well experience some of the
down-sides he insists accompany race-based affirmative action. Given
that legal employers do not conventionally go out of their way to foster
class diversity in hiring, those disadvantages will not be countered by
whatever advantages elite-employer affirmative action practices give to
minority students in the summer and permanent employment markets.
19. Sander, supra note 4, at 665-66.
20. As to the lowest-SES students, I do not think he is. See infra note 22.
21. Sander measures costs in diminished bar passage rates. See Sander, supra note 4, at 662-
63.
22. It may well be that SES disadvantage that comes from immigrant status is less stigmatiz-
ing than SES disadvantage attached to multigenerational poverty in the U.S. If that is the case, class-
based affirmative action that disproportionately favors low-SES immigrants (or low-SES foreign
students) may be the equivalent of race-based affirmative action that disproportionately benefits
foreign-bom or mixed-race blacks. We may need a concept of "legacy"-class to match the concept of
"legacy"-race. Cf Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1, at 1157-60.
23. See, e.g., Lisa A. Harrison et al., The Consequences ofStereotype Threat on the Academic
Performance of White and Non-White Lower Income College Students, 9 SOC. PSYCHOL. OF EDUC.
341 (2006) (finding stereotype threat in lower-income students, but not middle-income students);
Taniesha A. Woods et al., The Development ofStereotypes About the Rich and Poor: Age, Race, and
Family Income Differences in Beliefs, 34 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 437 (2005) (finding that youth
of all classes believe that rich children are better at academics). See also Eli Wald, The Visibility of
Socioeconomic Status and Class-Based Affirmative Action: A Reply to Professor Sander, 88 DENV.
U. L. REV. 861 (2011).
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Given Sander's general views on the subject of preferences, he should be
advising elite-school pioneers in radical class redistribution to take the
obligations of their policies as seriously as they take the benefits.
II. THE ISSUE OF CLASS DIVERSITY
Once we break the spurious connection between race-based affirma-
tive action and class inequality in law school admissions, we can turn to
the real questions at hand.
What factors combine to bring about the current maldistribution of
opportunity? I will focus here, as Sander does, on the factors that are
most within the control of the elite law schools themselves: admissions
and financial aid decision-making. 24
A. High-SES-Friendly Admissions Practices
Sander is right to suggest that many aspects of elite-law-school ad-
missions policies have a tendency to favor high-SES applicants. Sander
acknowledges that it is impossible to predict how large an effect reform-
ing admissions policies would have on assuring greater SES diversity. 25
In my view, the uncertainties are not simply problems of quantification.
Part of the problem is that we do not know the extent to which admis-
sions officers fight against the high-SES-biased tendencies of their usual
methods when evaluating applications from lower-SES candidates. The
more mechanical one believes the admissions process is at present, the
more optimistic one can be about the difference reform will make. Per-
haps that is why Sander is more optimistic than I am.
I suspect that elite schools already take some steps to fight those bi-
ases when they evaluate compelling candidates at the lower end of the
SES range. Put otherwise, I suspect that they are attracted to candidates
from markedly disadvantaged backgrounds who have compelling stories
to tell in their application essays, and that they already do take a non-
mechanical approach to those applications. 26 The methods-invite appli-
cants to disclose socioeconomic hardship in their "diversity" essays, and
then keep hardship in mind when assessing the candidate's true poten-
tial-are already in use. Perhaps if elite schools used these methods more
aggressively, they could increase their very-low-SES admissions num-
bers by some marginal percentage. (Whether this would result in in-
24. The factors outside their control, of course, dwarf those inside-a fact no less true of
class-based inequality in the United States than of race-based inequality. Cf O'Connor & Schwab,
supra note 18, at 62. I view applicant-pool issues as more outside than inside their control, although
better outreach would be helpful. See text accompanying note 30.
25. Sander, supra note 4, at 655-56.
26. I am not claiming here that these schools give "preferences" of any mechanical sort to
low-SES students, or that, in the sense in which Carnevale & Rose use the term, they "actively
recruit" low-SES students. Carnevale & Rose, supra note 4, at 118. I am claiming, however, that
they take low SES into account when assessing applications from students who take advantage of the
opportunity to be self-reflective about their backgrounds.
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creased enrollment numbers depends in large part on financial aid poli-
cies, which I address below).
I am less convinced that elite schools would be willing to revamp
their admissions policies to benefit middling-SES students. Doing so
would involve "close trades"-swapping the weakest candidates from
the bottom-of-the-top SES ranks for the strongest candidates from the
top-of-the-bottom SES ranks. If I am right in this judgment, redistribu-
tive policy reforms would lose the symbolic Robin-Hood-esque clout of
trimming admissions from the top-SES-decile in favor of the bottom
quartile. I also suspect that the task of evaluating middling-SES candi-
dates' class backgrounds and the degree to which their relative lack of
distinction is a product of their backgrounds would be far more difficult.
I will explore these concerns below.
1. The "Numbers"
One need not conclude, as Sander does (and I do not), that elite
schools use "the numbers" mechanically to concede that numbers matter.
Elite schools have continued to insist on their right to be elite in this
sense, and can be expected to continue to do so. Sander's work can help
make these schools more aware of the class effects of their policies, so
that they can take steps to diminish them. My suspicion is that elite law
schools are already on the look out for very-low-SES students who have
been remarkably successful in light of their backgrounds. I think that
elite law schools can and should do more of what I suspect they are al-
ready doing to find those rare low-SES candidates who they predict can
and will thrive at their institutions. Nothing in the admissions process
stands in the way of marginal improvements on that score, and the sym-
bolic (and "diversity") benefits of making those improvements are
strong. I suspect, however, that increased efforts would make only a
marginal difference in the class distribution of the elite law school stu-
dent body.
It would be more difficult-and less likely-for elite schools to re-
orient their admissions policies towards a major redistribution in favor of
the middling-SES range. I suspect that it would be far too difficult for
them to tease apart the class-linked and the purely individual explana-
tions for lack of distinction.
27. Cf Carnevale & Rose, supra note 4, at 122 (discussing popular views on preferences for
children of "low-income" versus "high-income" families, but not discussing trade-offs between
high- and middle-income families). Even as to low-income versus high-income tradeoffs, there is
majority public support for the tradeoff only if test scores are dead equal. Id. at 125. So much for
Robin Hood.
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a. The LSAT
To the extent that scores on tests like the LSAT correlate positively
with socioeconomic status, elite-school reliance on high LSAT scores
serves to suppress lower-SES admissions. Elite schools are not about to
abandon the LSAT because of its class effects. Even schools that care
about racial diversity and are aware of the LSAT's adverse racial impact
have not taken that step.28
In any event, eliminating the LSAT would not be a panacea for
lower-SES students. There are lower-SES students who do relatively
well on the LSAT.29 If a student's undergraduate GPA was depressed
because he needed to work full-time to support himself, or if a student's
high GPA would otherwise be discounted because she attended a less-
competitive undergraduate institution (especially one with which the law
school has no past experience), the LSAT score serves as an aid to ad-
mission rather than as a barrier. Indeed, for an elite law school seeking
class diversity, a relatively high LSAT from a non-feeder school can, and
I suspect does, serve as a signal to take a closer look.
Elite schools can, and should, intervene to make LSAT preparation
(and law-school-application preparation more generally) available to
low-SES potential applicants. One model for doing so is the TRIALS
program, a joint program of Harvard Law School, New York University
Law School, and the Advantage Testing Foundation. The TRIALS pro-
gram considers both ethnic and socioeconomic diversity, and enrolls a
majority of its students from schools that traditionally send no more than
301one graduate per year to the partnering law schools. More such pro-
grams are necessary, but they are a step in the right direction.
How should schools assess the LSAT scores of students from the mid-
dle of the SES range? That is a harder question. Even if the number of
programs like TRIALS grew to meet demand, they would not (by design)
reach middling-SES students who can afford LSAT preparation courses,
28. Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda argue, with respect to undergraduate admissions, that class
rank is the fairest criterion, given the class effects of relying on SATs. Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda,
Diversity, Opportunity, and the Shifting Meritocracy in Higher Education, 72 AM. Soc. REV. 487,
491 (2007). If, as they argue, low-SES students have poor SAT scores because they attend "under-
performing, resource-poor schools," it is hard to argue that being at the top of the class in such a
school is the equivalent of being at the top of the class in a school with the resources to present a
more challenging curriculum. Id.; cf THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD,
No LONGER SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND
CAMPUS LIFE 260 (2009) (arguing that graduate schools recognize the greater difficulty and compe-
tition students face at elite schools, and so are willing to admit students with lower class ranks from
those schools). I do not believe that there is any easy answer to the question of how to assess apti-
tude and achievement in the face of inequality of educational inputs.
29. "Relatively well" can be in relation to the elite school's usual LSAT admissions range, in
relation to the LSAT scores of other graduates of the same college (reported by LSAC Report Form
on the same form that reports the candidate's LSAT score), or in relation to what one might expect
from the candidate given her socioeconomic background as reflected in her application.
30. About the Program, TRIALS, http://trials.atfoundation.org/program (last visited April 29,
2011).
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but who either never consider taking them or actively choose not to do
so. Students from middling-SES backgrounds might not have the "habi-
tus" towards pursuit of admission to an elite law school-at least not to
the extent of being willing to do everything within their power to demon-
strate the kinds of distinction necessary to achieve it.3 1 That is a different
problem, one in which it is harder to disentangle the effects of class-
based limited horizons from the effects of personal lack of ambition.32
b. Undergraduate GPA
Turning to undergraduate GPA, law schools already possess much
of the information they need to make non-mechanical use of GPAs. Ap-
plications routinely ask students about part or full-time jobs held during
term time, and so schools can take term-time employment into account in
determining the extent to which the reported GPA fully measures poten-
tial law school performance. Applicants are given the opportunity,
through essays, to explain the circumstances underlying particularly
weak grades (or semesters). And the LSAC Report Form makes it easy to
identify the upward trajectory in GPA experienced by a student from a
lower-SES background who had a rocky initial adjustment to college.
There is no reason to think that elite schools, which do, in fact, read full
applications, are failing to take this information into account.
Might coming from a middling-SES background also suppress
undergraduate GPA? Just as such students can afford LSAT preparation
classes but do not always take them, they might not be oriented towards
the level of academic success necessary to gain admission to elite law
schools. I do not see how admissions officers will be able to detect the
workings of class in individual cases.
Sander is concerned with grade inflation at elite undergraduate
institutions as a factor favoring high-SES law school applicants. Grade
inflation is a factor, but it is not entirely clear how much should be done
about it. The equitable argument in favor of grade inflation at elite un-
dergraduate institutions, after all, was that students should get a "boost"
because of the (greater) academic excellence of the students against
whom they are competing and the (more) advanced nature of the curricu-
lum, when compared to lesser institutions of higher learning. There is
certainly some merit to these arguments: one must be careful not to over-
correct, lest students be deterred from attending schools that are more
31. Cf Eric Grodsky & Catherine Riegle-Crumb, Those Who Choose and Those Who Don't:
Social Background and College Orientation, 627 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 14 (2010)
(drawing on PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE
(Richard Nice trans.) (1984)).
32. Grodsky & Riegle-Crumb, supra note 31, at 15 (arguing that there is a strong class com-
ponent to educational habitus but also great individual variation within class).
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competitive and more challenging.33 The student with the "inflated" 3.8
GPA from Harvard would arguably have had a higher GPA at a less
competitive school.
That being said, elite law schools are not without information to
evaluate grade inflation. Admissions officers know the grading policies
of feeder schools.34 For less familiar undergraduate institutions, they can
make use of the LSAC Report Form, which shows the mean GPA of
other students from the same school who took the LSAT. Latin honors (if
interpreted on the transcript) can serve as a rough estimate of class rank.
2. Limited Range of Feeder Schools
Sander is right that elite law schools draw from a narrow range of
elite undergraduate institutions, and that the class diversity of these
schools leaves much to be desired.3 5 The problem is likely to get worse.
To the extent that law schools relied in the past on the flagship institu-
tions of the top state university systems to produce SES-diverse appli-
cants, they will need to modify their strategy in the years to come. As
Sander points out, tuition pressures on state flagships are pricing out low-
SES students. 36 Competition from top-SES students is putting the pinch
on the middling-SES group. State flagships are becoming more attractive
to high-SES students, because private undergraduate tuition is also ris-
ing, and because families are economizing at the undergraduate level in
order to save money to cover the costs of increasingly-necessary gradu-
ate and professional education.3 7 The middling-SES student a top-five
law school might have recruited from the University of Michigan ten
33. The deterrence problem is one of the critiques of plans like the Texas Ten Percent plan-
it rewards students who are at the top of weaker schools, and punishes those who take on tougher
curricula and competition at stronger schools but fall outside the top ten percent of the class.
34. Grade inflation at top feeder schools is hardly a secret. See, e.g., ESPENSHADE &
RADFORD, supra note 28, at 260-61 n.54-55 (reporting that 65% of Princeton grads have B+ GPAs
and above, and half of Harvard grads have GPAs in the A-minus/A range).
35. It is important to note that there are two components to this problem: the applicant pool
and the admissions decision. On applicant pool issues at the undergraduate level, see Dawn Koffman
& Marta Tienda, Missing in Application: The Texas Top 10% Law and Campus Socioeconomic
Diversity 23 (March 2008) (paper presented at the 2008 Meetings of the American Educational
Research Association), available at http://theop.princeton.edu/reports/wp/ApplicantSocialClass.pdf
("[C]hanges in admission criteria designed to broaden college access for low-income students, such
as eliminating the SAT filter or guaranteeing admission to top-performing students, will not alter the
socioeconomic composition of college campuses unless the applicant pool is changed.").
36. Cf Koffman & Tienda, supra note 35, at 25 (showing sharp downward shift in students at
top 50 state flagship campuses receiving Pell grants).
37. Recent studies suggest that it is middle-class students, not low-income students, who are
most likely to choose state flagships over highly selective private universities. They are the ones
most likely to be crowded out by higher-SES students seeking bargains they don't need. See
ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 28, at 296; cf Koffman & Tienda, supra note 35, at 20-21
(noting that, post 10% plan, 22% of top-ten students apply to the University of Texas from poor high
schools, versus 44% from high schools in the top-decile of wealth, and puzzling over why, "despite
the admission guarantee in effect since 1998, the socioeconomic composition of the applicant pool to
[the University of Texas' two flagship campuses] has barely changed," and why Rice University, a
more expensive private school, gets a higher share of low-income applicants than do the public
flagships).
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years ago might be at Michigan State or Eastern Michigan University
now. If those schools are smart and well-funded, they will have "Honors
Programs" or other methods for giving their most talented students both
the experience and the credential of a flagship-like experience. If they do
not have such programs, it will be harder for their graduates to gain ad-
mission to elite law schools.
The downward-placement trajectory of talented lower-SES students
has two unfortunate implications. Unfamiliarity is a two-way street. Elite
law schools may not know what to make of a high GPA coming out of a
lower-tier undergraduate institution from which they have not recruited
in the past. Lower-tier institutions are far less likely to encourage their
most talented students to apply to top-tier law schools. Both of these
problems can be solved by outreach, and elite schools already engage in
some outreach activities (like, for example, sending representatives to
law school fairs hosted by regional associations of college pre-law advi-
sors). Internet resources, like the LSAC's own website, make a wide
range of information available to students from outside the "feeder-
school" range. Beyond these efforts, it seems unlikely that elite-school
admissions offices would find more outreach to be cost-justified, given
its likely returns.
As noted above, eliminating the LSAT (or radically deemphasizing
it) would only worsen the feeder-school bias problem. Relatively high
LSATs are the most reliable signal low-SES students from unknown
feeder schools have to offer.
To deal with the problem of uncertainty in the evaluation of appli-
cants from outside the elite school "feeder network," one possible strat-
egy is for elite law schools to use their transfer application process as a
mediated alternative pipeline. Regional law schools with greater experi-
ence with local lower-tier undergraduate institutions in their geographical
areas are in a better position to evaluate records from those schools. Per-
formance at the top of the class at a regional law school would provide
valuable additional information on the likelihood that a student from a
non-feeder undergraduate institution will perform well at an elite school.
Given the dominance of elite law schools in the production of law-
teaching candidates, trusted feeder relationships might well develop be-
tween lower-tier law faculty and the admissions offices at the higher-tier
schools they attended. 39 Elite schools could easily monitor their transfer
students' performance, and fine-tune their recruiting practices accord-
ingly. As a matter of principle, an elite law school might well decide to
38. The LSAC does not have socioeconomic information on LSAT-takers, which means that
schools have no way of using LSAC searches to identify promising lower-SES candidates.
39. Such ties might explain, for example, Supreme Court justices' rare but important devia-
tions from the monopoly of a handful of top feeder law schools in their hiring of law clerks. When a
justice makes an unprecedented hire, "cherchez le (former) clerk" on the "new" school's faculty.
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use the transfer process for this kind of diversity-rather than choosing
transfer candidates from the same feeder schools that shape their IL
classes.40
3. Legacy Preferences
Access to legacy admissions is a resource parents wield in the battle
against intergenerational regression to the mean. Elite law schools (in-
cluding most public elite law schools) are dependent on donations from
alumni, and there is no presumptive reason to expect that law schools
will ignore legacy-admission pressures. Legacy preferences are problem-
atic, but Sander is not arguing that they operate as significantly in elite
law schools as they do in elite undergraduate institutions. I have no rea-
son to question that conclusion. It seems, then, that ending legacy prefer-
ences will not make much of a difference to the pursuit of greater class
equality in elite legal education.41
4. "Soft" Entrance Variables
I believe that Professor Sander is right that many of the "soft" con-
siderations that play into admissions decisions weigh in favor of high-
SES applicants. This is more of a problem for me than it is for Sander,
because I think that the elite-school admissions process is less mechani-
cal than Sander thinks it is. The less mechanical the process is, the more
work (and the more damage) soft variables can do. The problem, from a
reform standpoint, is that the "soft" variables that favor high-SES stu-
dents are legitimate.
Elite schools have good reason, in my view, to prefer students who
have some coherent idea of why they are going to law school, and who
have either prior high-level (meaning non-clerical) job experience in the
white-collar world or prior experience in graduate school. Often the
two-a sense of direction and some (at least potentially) relevant past
experience-are related. Taken together, these factors make for students
who are more self-sufficient, better positioned to maintain their morale
through the often morale-numbing first year of law school, more interest-
ing in the classroom, and better able to navigate both the advanced cur-
riculum (which is massive in many elite schools) and the job-hunting
process.
40. Elite schools would also need to make sure that transfer students have the opportunity to
join prestigious journals, and their placement offices would need to advocate for their transfer stu-
dents in the all-important 2L summer-hiring and judicial-clerkship markets. Otherwise, the greater
opportunities that come from elite-school attendance would be illusory for transfer students. And, of
course, law schools using a transfer strategy would need to make their full array of financial-aid
options available to transfer students. I expect that most elite schools would need to change their
policies to achieve these goals.
41. If one cares about comparisons of relative privilege within Sander's broad SES criteria,
legacy preferences are more problematic in elite law schools with steady (or declining) prestige
rankings than in those whose rankings have markedly risen in the years between the parent's gradua-
tion and the child's application.
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As Sander correctly notes, access to "interesting" jobs is not uni-
formly distributed across the class spectrum. College students who need
to make money cannot afford to take the unpaid term-time and summer
internships that are increasingly the required step-ladders to good post-
college jobs. Schools with fewer resources might lack the staff to help
place students in internships, and lower-SES students are less likely to
have family contacts who can fill the gap with "interesting" job leads.
(Large post-graduate internship programs like Teach for America help to
fill this gap; it would be helpful to know the role that class and race play
in the selection process for such programs.)
This does not mean that only high-SES candidates are served by
having "soft" admission criteria that are given significant weight in the
admissions process. Admissions officers at elite schools are, I suspect,
very open to the "up from adversity" stories their application essays so-
licit (at least when they come from candidates whose "numbers" are in
the ballpark of good-enough). The lowest-SES cohort would be very
poorly served by a reform in the admissions process that moved away
from the consideration of "soft" factors.
What this means, I believe, is that soft variables advantage the ex-
tremes (low- and high-SES) and disadvantage the middle (middling-
SES). Middling-SES students are at risk if they (a) apply to law school
straight out of college for lack of a great job opportunity, or (b) take
post-college jobs that decrease, rather than enhance, the cache of their
undergraduate records. For applicants in this situation, the only distin-
guishing feature in their applications may turn out to be letters of rec-
ommendation from professors. But good letters of recommendation are
hard to come by at schools with unfavorable student-faculty ratios. Tak-
ing the large lecture classes that predominate in the large, popular majors
at large state universities is not helpful. In that setting, especially, getting
strong recommendation letters requires the ambition to work closely with
faculty, which in turn requires a level of self-confidence in asserting one-
self outside of the classroom that is itself, arguably, a class-linked char-
acteristic.
The question, though, is what elite law schools can be expected to
do in the face of this situation. They could, I suppose, apportion a little
more of the class to those students who fit the "middling" portfolio of
"soft" factors as a form of class-based preference. But the kind of "indi-
vidualized consideration" that the Supreme Court applauded in Grut-
ter4 2-and that elite schools actually practice-sits ill at ease with pref-
erences for students whose sole distinction is not yet having distin-
guished themselves. Perhaps the best one can do is to urge elite-school
admissions officers to educate themselves on how much easier it is for
42. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
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the children of the super-privileged than it is for the children of mid-
dling-SES families to "score" the self-actualizing experiences and strong
letters of recommendation that produce winning applications. But in-
creased sensitivity is not likely to make much of a difference in the num-
bers, absent some alternative way of choosing among the vast numbers
of candidates with good-enough numbers but not much else to show for
themselves. 4
III. FINANCIAL AID POLICIES
For purposes of this Response, I will assume that elite law schools
(public and private) are not going to cut back on the rising faculty sala-
ries, ambitious programming (e.g., clinical programs), and rising student
and other administrative services that have contributed to their steeply
rising tuition costs. Rising costs surely help to explain why the increased
availability of student loans has not markedly changed the class composi-
tion of elite school enrollments.4 In the face of those costs, financial aid
programs have become increasingly important.
Sander acknowledges that his data do not permit us to know the
relative contribution of the admissions and financial aid processes to the
class-skewed enrollments of elite law schools. What is clear, however, is
that Sander's rhetorical argument-the opportunity-cost tradeoffs be-
tween race-based affirmative action and class diversity-is predicated
almost entirely on the admissions side of the divide. To the extent finan-
cial aid policy is to blame for the class pattern in elite law school enroll-
ments, there is even less reason for Sander to pair advocacy for class-
based reform on his critique of race-based affirmative action.
A. The Law School Financial Aid Model
Law schools operate on a financial aid model in which "the gold
standard" is full-tuition remission-not "tuition plus stipend." What this
means is that even "fully funded" law students-whether they are fully-
funded under a needs-based or a merit determination-borrow large
amounts of money to cover three years worth of living expenses, books,
and the expenses associated with job search (not always reimbursed).
Thus, even an increase in need-based tuition assistance will not change
the fact that lower-SES students must be willing to take on substantial
indebtedness in order to attend law school.
43. This sounds harsh, but I come from a middling-SES background myself and know first
hand how strong the leveling tendencies within it can be.
44. Sander, supra note 4, at 643 (discussion of Warkov's data). Rising tuition costs is an
obvious "other development" that has tended to neutralize the class-diversifying effects of student
loan availability and affirmative-action admissions policies.
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B. Determining "Need"
How closely does what the law schools deem to be "official need"
track what we might call "actual need"? Years of conversations with
students who have shared their concerns suggest two different family-
related scenarios that cause a gap between "actual" and "official" need.
The first (and most common) is the gap between "official" and "actual"
levels of parental contributions to their children's legal education. For
students whose parents have some resources, there is wide (and at least
in part class-based) variability in the willingness of parents to contrib-
ute-at all, or to the extent expected by the school's aid formula. Mid-
dling-SES students may well find that their parents are unwilling to con-
tribute to their legal education. Under current federal law, all law stu-
dents are considered independent of their parents for purposes of federal
loan programs, but law schools are free to consider parental income and
assets in allocating need-based grants.45 Middling-SES parents who con-
tributed to their child's undergraduate educations may reasonably feel
"tapped out" by the time law school comes along. Their contributions are
less likely than those of higher-SES parents to have come solely at the
cost of deferred discretionary spending. Instead, middling-SES parents
might well have curtailed retirement savings, increased borrowing
against home equity, or deferred spending on health or home mainte-
nance in order to help pay their child's undergraduate tuition.
Middling-SES parents may also be unsympathetic, as a matter of
principle, to requests that they contribute to their child's legal education.
Parental tolerance for long post-adolescent periods of economic depend-
ency may itself vary with class. Middling-SES parents may be particu-
larly likely to reject requests for help from children who have worked
full-time before going to law school-a practice that is encouraged by
elite law schools' preferences for students with interesting job experi-
ence. Parents who understand the importance of graduate-level education
might not believe that it is important for their child to go to law school
(as opposed to lower-cost options) or to go to the "best law school" that
admits her. They may not have the sophistication to recognize the risks
inherent in accepting merit-based grants from lower-tier law schools.4 6
Even parents who are enthusiastic about law school (or elite law school)
for their children may take the view that legal salaries are high enough to
justify any amount of student borrowing.
45. The Free Application for Federal Financial Aid includes website's Q and A on financial
independence states that law school applicants are deemed financially independent for purposes of
federal loans. The FAFSA form questions on parental income and assets, and law schools require
financial aid applicants to fill out the form. For purposes of school-provided grant-based aid,
schools are free to make their own determinations of whether applicants are financially independent
of their parents.
46. See David Segal, Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES, April
30, 2011 (discussing renewability criteria for merit-based aid); Mark Hansen, Boxer Presses ABA on
Law School Data Reporting, ABA JOURNAL, March 23, 2011.
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For students in the lower reaches of the SES range, who either do
not have parents or whose parents have too few resources to be expected
to contribute, "official" need and "actual" need may fall out of alignment
for a different family-related reason. For these students, the problem is
not that their parents are not supporting them; it is that they are support-
ing their parents--or their siblings, or other relatives. "Official" financial
aid formulas do not consider "non-legal" dependents (and federal finan-
cial-aid funds cannot legally be used to support non-legal dependents).
But for the lowest-SES superstars likely to be admitted to an elite law
school, the opportunity costs of attending law school include foregoing
wages they would otherwise be using to feed and house their families
and to help their siblings avoid the worst privations of poverty.
C. Is Debt Too High a Portion ofElite School Financial Aid Packages?
I am assuming here that elite law school financial aid packages meet
the full level of "official" need, with some combination of tuition-
remission and loans. 47 Many applicants find the loan portion of their fi-
nancial aid package too high. As a philosophical matter, elite law schools
seem to be committed to the view that it is appropriate to incur signifi-
cant indebtedness for legal education, because the cost is more than off-
set by improved lifetime earnings (or other lifelong improvements in
non-monetary "utility"). The elite law schools' approach to financial aid
works only for those students who are willing to borrow. Should they be?
1. The Relevance of Undergraduate Indebtedness
In calculating "official" need, the financial-aid calculator used by
FAFSA does not take the candidate's undergraduate indebtedness into
account. This is understandable from the standpoint of a view of need
based on annual budgets, in which only debt repayment obligations that
require payouts during law school count as expenses. But undergraduate
indebtedness is highly relevant to the question of how much debt a stu-
dent should be expected to take on during law school. Indeed, there is
strong evidence that undergraduate debt is a major deterrent to graduate
and professional school enrollment.48 Potential students are voting with
their feet, and elite schools are not paying attention.
Schools could, of course, elicit information on undergraduate in-
debtedness outside the FAFSA process, but I have no evidence that they
do so. I can see no justification for this stance. In deciding that a certain
47. Cf Carnevale & Rose, supra note 4, at 120 (showing increase in the percentage of under-
graduate students at all four-year colleges whose "need" was not met).
48. ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 28, at 267 (citing evidence that "42 percent of
college graduates who do not pursue graduate school blame student loan debt"). The question of
whether students who blame debt for their decisions are, in fact, actually motivated by debt, is a
tricky one. Cf David L. Chambers, The Burdens ofEducational Loans: The Impacts ofDebt on Job
Choice and Standards of Living for Students at Nine American Law Schools, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
187, 227 (1992).
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level of debt is appropriate for law school, given anticipated post-
graduation salaries, one would think that the student's total level of in-
debtedness would be the relevant figure, not merely the portion of the
debt that is attributable to law school attendance.49
2. The Relevance of Post-Law-School Debt Forgiveness
Elite schools are increasingly realistic about the fact that non-
monetary utility doesn't pay the rent, and have moved to self-funded debt
forgiveness programs targeting students doing public-interest or public-
sector work. They prefer ex-post debt forgiveness to an ex-ante shift to
tuition-remission grants because, as expensive as debt forgiveness is, it is
cheaper than providing grants to those students who will earn the "big
law" salaries that enable many of their graduates to significantly pay
down their debt in their early years of law practice. Funds allocated to
debt forgiveness programs are not likely counted in official financial aid
data, but certainly these programs must "count" for something.
Anecdotal evidence-the student demand for debt forgiveness pro-
grams-certainly suggests that these programs do indeed matter. Do ap-
plicants count the prospect of an ex-post debt-forgiveness dollar as heav-
ily as they count each extra dollar borrowed ex ante? Would a rational
applicant do so? Debt-forgiveness programs are not designed as income-
shortfall insurance. The programs have restrictions. They do not cover
periods of unemployment (or part-time employment), and they may be
tied to distinct types of employment (e.g., public interest or public serv-
ice) rather than to salary levels.o Banks and other lenders are likely to
consider the full dollar value of student loans, without promise of debt-
forgiveness, in determining eligibility for home loans. For these reasons,
it is reasonable for students to prefer to avoid debt-just as it is reason-
able for schools to prefer the lower (future) cost of debt-forgiveness to
the higher (present) cost of tuition-remission grants.
C. Eliteness Tradeoffs and Risk Aversion
Especially when combined with high levels of undergraduate debt, I
suspect that risk aversion is the major factor contributing to the enroll-
ment decisions of students from the middling-SES range. Picture an ap-
plicant who has received a needs-based financial aid offer from an elite
school which includes a substantial loan component, and has also re-
49. Here the data are staggering. Espenshade & Radford report that 23% of graduates of four-
year public colleges graduate with too much debt to repay their loans by working as teachers, and
37% borrow too much to work as social workers. ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 28, at 266-
67 (The figures for four-year private colleges are 38% and 55% respectively).
50. Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Finns, A Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. Times, May 23,
2011 (noting that some elite law firms are hiring "career associates" at markedly lower salaries (e.g.,
$50,000-$60,000, versus $160,000), which "make it even more difficult for newly minted lawyers to
pay off their law school debt").
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ceived an all-grant merit-based financial aid offer from a non-elite
school. Do we know what the "rational" applicant should do?
The applicant faced with that choice needs to measure her own risk
aversion. Will she graduate at the top of the class of the non-elite school,
so that excellent jobs (at least at the local or regional level) will await
her? If she goes to the elite school, will her interests (and her academic
performance) land her a "big law" job that will generate the excess in-
come to pay off the loans?5' If she gets a "big law" job, will she be able
to tolerate its intensity for long enough to pay off her loans? What will be
the costs of debt repayment in deferred consumption-for example, the
costs of deferring home ownership and retirement savings, or the costs
(especially for women) of deferring child-bearing? 52 It is not clear in
these situations that the "right answer" is to go to the "best" school you
are admitted to-especially if you know that your parents will not be
able to help you with a home down-payment or with child-care costs
later down the line.5 3
There is also the question of how students from middling-SES fami-
lies view the potential benefits of elite-law-school attendance. Such stu-
dents may have gone to school in-state, and may not have developed a
desire to work in national markets. Their families might well prefer to
have them stay closer to home. Their parents may have held on to middle
class status by avoiding excess debt, and may have taught their children
to be risk-averse where debt is concerned. (Or their parents may have
just slipped out of the middle class because of debt, in which case their
fear of borrowing would be all the greater.) Middling-SES candidates
may well come from households in which home and family (that is, own-
ing a home and being married with children relatively early in life) are an
important part of the meaning of success. In such families, a lifestyle in
which "settling down" is deferred until one's mid-thirties because of
educational debt might feel like downward mobility. Perhaps an admis-
sions counselor at an elite school would advise such a student that she
cannot measure the value of elite education based on preferences devel-
oped in non-elite settings: "your aspirations will grow with your oppor-
tunities" would be the standard advice.54 But that answer is speculative.
51. The same calculations would be made by a "rational" applicant faced with the differential
loan burdens of schools with different costs.
52. On the latter score, if female students are prescient in their decisionmaking, they may be
aware that the high-income pot at the end of the elite-school rainbow-the "big law" job-requires
much the same set of tradeoffs, for reasons of lack of time rather than lack of resources.
53. There is an extensive economics literature on the return to elite higher education. For a
subtle attempt to pin down effects at the undergraduate level (albeit one based on 1970s data), see
Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College:
An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables 29-31 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7322, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/7322.
54. Cf Grodsky & Riegle-Crumb, supra note 31, at 15 (arguing that habitus changes as peo-
ple encounter fields inconsistent with their worldviews).
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Massive debt-loads are real. Who is to say whether the candidates who
are not persuaded by it are making the wrong decision?
D. Merit-Based Versus Need-Based Financial Aid
Elite law schools could significantly increase the tuition-remission
component of their need-based financial aid packages by raising more
money for needs-based financial aid or by allocating more funds to need-
based aid. Instead, at least in schools that are struggling to compete for
the very top candidates in the market, Sander may be right that the trend
is in the opposite direction.
The question is a bit more complex than it seems. First, the line be-
tween need- and merit-based aid is a difficult one to draw, in that schools
likely consider "merit" in deciding how much of the candidate's "offi-
cial" need will be met by tuition remittance and how much by loan. Sec-
ond, class-based financial aid awards would show up on the "merit"
rather than on the "need" side of the line if they are based on low-SES
background rather than on current "need" as reported on FAFSA forms.15
That being said, much merit-based aid goes to students with little or
no financial need. Sander is absolutely right that the "merit" criteria for
merit-based financial aid are skewed in favor of higher-SES candidates. 56
"Merit," most generically, can mean very high LSATs and GPAs. In the
competition for programmatic merit funding (e.g., scholarships for stu-
dents interested in particular legal fields), "merit" can mean high-level
prior internship or post-college job experiences that are disproportion-
ately available to higher-SES candidates.s?
Here, I think there is only one answer. Schools that want to offer
"merit"-based tuition remission to attract the strongest possible candi-
dates should be free to do so, but not by shifting funds (or fund-raising
opportunities) from their need-based financial aid programs.
In sum, it seems quite likely that many candidates who are admitted
to elite law schools choose not to attend because they are deterred by the
amounts of debt they are expected to incur. I do not know how often
admitted low- and middling-SES students make that trade-off; if the pat-
tern follows that documented at the undergraduate level, it is middling-
55. This is the case with NYU's AnBryce Program. As a matter of classification, the NYU
Law School's AnBryce Program would likely be defined as merit-based rather than need-based.
Eligibility is not based on "need" in the financial-aid-formula sense, but on personal and family
socioeconomic considerations more broadly defined.
56. Schools could, of course, offer merit-based financial aid that finds "merit" in students
from more modest SES backgrounds.
57. At least from my exposure to faculty hiring and programmatic innovation in elite law
schools, middling-SES students are likely hurt by the fact that the kinds of legal issues middle class
families face-labor/employment law, family law, consumer bankruptcy, ordinary torts, domestic
real estate issues-are not the kinds of "sexy" issues that elite schools call attention to in their pro-
gramming and faculty hiring.
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SES students who are most likely to economize in this fashion.58 This is
an area in which elite schools should engage in self-study. Students with
attractive financial aid offers from lower-tier schools routinely try to
negotiate similar aid packages from their "top choice" schools. When the
result is unsatisfactory and the candidate turns the elite school down, it
should come as no surprise.
Perhaps the elite schools could do a better job of persuading these
candidates that the costs (and risks) are worth the benefit. Then again, it
is by no means clear that the scholarship presently exists to support the
claim. Perhaps one of Sander's major contributions will be stimulating
the scholarly community to generate the kinds of studies that have re-
cently been published on elite undergraduate education. Until then, I
believe that Sander has made the case that elite law school financial aid
policies will need to change if elite schools are to enroll classes as socio-
economically diverse as the classes they admit.
CONCLUSION
While Professor Sander has performed a valuable service by call-
ing attention to the issue of class privilege in elite legal education, his
decision to link his advocacy for class diversity to his critique of race-
based affirmative action is problematic. Measures to increase class di-
versity ought not come at the expense of (or even as a "partial substitu-
tion" for) existing commitments to racial diversity.
On the issue of class, much of the rhetorical force of Sander's ar-
gument is in its call for redistributing opportunity from the top-decile to
the bottom-quartile of the SES range. I agree that the moral case for
reaching out to the low-SES candidates is very strong, and elite law
schools that provide funding and appropriate programmatic support for
these candidates are to be commended. But elite law schools seeking to
reach a broader socioeconomic student population will need to recognize
that, as a practical matter, the inclusion of students from the bottom of
the SES range is likely to remain a small-numbers phenomenon. To
achieve a major downward shift in the class privilege of their top-decile-
heavy student bodies of the sort Sander advocates, these schools will
need to cultivate their appreciation for (and increase their monetary
grants to) the middling-SES candidate. I doubt they will be willing to do
so.
58. See supra note 37.
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MEETING ACROSS THE RIVER: WHY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
NEEDS RACE & CLASS DIVERSITY
DEIRDRE M. BOWEN, J.D., PH.D.t
Richard Sander's goal in his latest article, Class in Legal Educa-
tion,' is to spur a serious and sustained discussion about how to address
socioeconomic diversity in the legal academy. This goal would be an
admirable one if it were not for its second unwritten goal of denigrating
racial diversity 2 while continuing to promote the author's prolifically
challenged "mismatch theory."3 Sander's article presents a compelling
story about which populations have access to law school and which are
actually deserving of preferences in order to attend.4 Sadly, the story he
tells is wide of the mark, as the empirical evidence demonstrates.
t Associate Professor of Lawyering Skills, Seattle University. B.A. Boston University, J.D.,
State University of New York Buffalo School of Law, Ph.D. University of Washington. Many
thanks to Richard Delgado, Colin "LIN!" Crawford, and andr6 douglas pond cummings for reading
earlier drafts of this article. A massive debt of gratitude goes to my research assistants Stacie
Naczelnik, Sarah Gallagher, and Sarah Albertson. Their herculean efforts are most appreciated.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REv. 631, 633 (2011).
2. Sander criticizes the use of racial diversity as becoming increasingly arbitrary, unfair, and
offensive as the United States becomes more multiracial. Id. at 665. He further alleges possible
harms of affirmative action, including stigmatization, group self-segregation, lower graduation rates,
and higher bar failure rates. Id. at 665-66.
3. See David L. Chambers et al., Response, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN L.
REv. 1855, 1857 (2005) (examining data and concluding that eliminating racial preferences would
yield a "substantial net decline in the number of African Americans entering the bar"); see also Ian
Ayres & Richard Brooks, Response, Does Affirmative action Reduce the Number ofBlack Lawyers?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1816-18 (2004); andrd douglas pond cummings, "Open Water ": Affirma-
tive Action, Mismatch Theory and Swarming Predators-A Response to Richard Sander, 44
BRANDEIS L.J. 795, 795-806 (2006); Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why Affirmative Action
Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997, 2000-02 (2005); Jesse Roth-
stein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences
Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 650-56 (2008) (empirically analyzing Sander's data and concluding
that eliminating affirmative action would reduce the number of black lawyers at far greater rates than
the increase in number of black law students who might pass the bar exam with the elimination of
negligible mismatch effects concentrated in the small pool of the weakest students). See generally
Cheryl I. Harris & William C. Kidder, The Black Student Mismatch Myth in Legal Education: The
Systemic Flaws in Richard Sander's Affirmative Action Study, 46 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 102
(2004) (discussing results of Sander's data and after their own analysis, drawing the opposite con-
clusion).
4. Sander contrasts racial diversity across law schools with SES across law schools, noting
that unlike racial diversity, SES diversity has changed very little since the 1960s and that "the great
majority of non-white law students are, like whites, from relatively elite backgrounds." Sander,
supra note 1, at 632. He then finds that "[flor all racial groups, in all law school groupings, the SES
distribution is tilted towards the top .. .. It is not the case . . . that the typical beneficiary of race-
based law school affirmative action has low SES." Id at 651. This data leads Sander to conclude that
"[i]t is hard to justify giving large preferences to blacks and Hispanics from privileged backgrounds
while ignoring the needs of low-SES applicants of all races." Id. at 664.
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Essentially, Sander asks the same question that Professor Charles
Ogletree asks in his book The Presumption of Guilt: Does class trump
race?' Ogletree examines the dilemma that accomplished African Ameri-
can men in particular, but presumably all people of color, come to ex-
pect: with success comes privilege.6 Specifically, he asserts that license
provides the advantage of "being presumed innocent" or "left alone."
Ogletree raises this benefit in the context of criminal suspicion and guilt
that the large pool of African American men, who have enjoyed aca-
demic and economic success, confront so often.8 The dilemma that
emerges is the issue of exceptionalism 9-what about the millions of
other black males not in possession of an Ivy League degree or high pro-
file position?' 0 Do we treat economically successful minorities differ-
ently than their less well-off peers when it comes to criminal surveil-
lance?" Ogletree answers this question emphatically:
The solution of treating prominent middle- and upper-class African
Americans differently from poor African Americans may be too great
a cost for our community to bear. Indeed, it may have just the oppo-
site impact, leading us to ignore that injustice and inequality . . . is
pervasive and persists .... The class-race distinction may be with us
forever .... 12
While Ogletree addressed this question in the most vexing arena
that African Americans must endure, the criminal justice system, I argue
that the answer to whether we should treat minority college applicants
differently according to class is a resounding "No." The presumption of
"guilt" and racial profiling uniformly permeates the educational system
from preschool to graduate school and virtually every social structure in
which racial groups interact. As discussed below, the historical and
contextual narrative of race is one of guilt and suspicion at every turn.
5. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF HENRY Louis
GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA 99 (2010).
6. Id at 98-99.
7. Id. at 98.
8. Id
9. W.E.B. Du Bois described those academically and economically accomplished African
American men as the "Talented Tenth." W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 78 (Bantam
Classic Reissue 2005) (1903).
10. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 98-99.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 99-100.
13. The focus of this Article is on affirmative action in higher education and the educational
system. For studies of racial interactions in other social institutions see Lathonia Denise Stewart &
Richard Perlow, Applicant Race, Job Status, and Racial Attitude as Predictors of Employment Dis-
crimination, 16 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 259, 259-75 (2001). See also Somnath Saha, Jose J. Arbelaez,
& Lisa A. Cooper, Patient-Physician Relationships and Racial Disparities in the Quality of Health
Care, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1713, 1713-19 (2003).
14. For a full accounting of the variety of ways in which this guilt and suspicion play out
daily in the lives of African Americans, see generally OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 129-241. Another
example is the arrest and felony conviction of a woman who used her father's suburban address to
send her children to a better school. Her felony conviction now prevents her from pursuing her
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At best, Sander naively ignores this central theme, and at worst, he
chooses to promote the theme in order to reify the fiction of a post-race
world in which enough, if not all, minorities have arrived.15 Central to
Sander's argument and empirical narrative is that we live in a colorblind
world in which race is no longer relevant.
In this paper, I take up Ian Haney L6pez's mantel when he writes:
[A] stratification analysis makes clear that no division between a uni-
versalistic focus on class versus a particularistic emphasis on race is
tenable: race and class in the United States inextricably interdigitate
such that neither can be engaged without sustained attention to the
other. A focus on class as a complement to a close engagement with
race would be quite helpful; but a focus on class as a substitute for
race, as part of an evasion of race, will prove counterproductive.
Class should not be used to obfuscate the interrelated yet distinct is-
sues associated with race, nor vice versa. Whether one privileges
class or race, focusing on their interconnection will advance justice,
while stressing one to the exclusion of the other will lead to failure
along both fronts.17
Although Haney L6pez and Ogletree were writing in connection with
criminal justice, I assert this same warning is in order with education and
affirmative action. This Article is divided into three sections, each con-
taining a critique of Sander's arguments and analysis. First, I briefly
reframe and reiterate the history of race and ethnicity in affirmative ac-
tion's origins to directly confront the assumption that Sander makes
about what affirmative action's original purpose entailed.' 8 The goal of
Part I is to correct the erroneous epistemology from which Sander's
study emerges: the entrenched de-contextualization of race and ethnicity
as a means to supplant race with class in an effort to assert that high so-
cioeconomic minorities are over-represented in law school admissions.1 9
Part II critiques the way in which Sander presents the data to create a
teaching career. Meghan Barr, Rev. Al Sharpton Supports Kelley Williams-Bolar In Ohio School
Choice Case, HUFFINGTON POST, (Feb. 17, 2011, 10:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201 1/
02/18/al-sharpton-kelley-williams-bolar n 825144.html.
15. I use this term in the sense to suggest that some individuals of color enjoy academic and
economic success and, therefore, class has triumphed over race.
16. See Sander, supra note 1, at 648. "College graduates of all races attend law school of rates
that approach or even exceed the white rate. But low- and middle-SES college graduates are far less
likely to attend law school than are high-SES graduates." Id.
17. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratication and Mass Incarceration in
the Age ofObama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1051 (2010) (emphasis added).
18. Sander, supra note 1, at 660. Sander asserts that affirmative action, as originally con-
ceived, was "not using preferences, but making sure that outreach and admissions procedures are fair
and class-neutral." Id.
19. I cannot emphasize enough how essential it is to grasp the insidious nature of our current
discourse of colorblindness. See, e.g., Charles A. Gallagher, Color-Blind Privilege: The Social and
Political Functions of Erasing the Color Line in Post-Race America, 10 RACE, GENDER & CLASS,
no. 4, 2003 at 22, 26, 32-33 (finding that the color-blind perspective allows whites to classify them-
selves as progressive, non-judgers of race, view society as a meritocracy and attribute any inequality
as based on class differences not institutional racism).
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narrative that supports his post-race argument rather than presenting
them in the most transparent manner-thus allowing the data in their
fullest form to reveal their story.20 Specifically, Sander ignores wealth as
a key measure of socioeconomic status (SES), ignores the increasing data
on racial inequality, and ignores the data indicating that class and race
are not interchangeable. In Part III of this Article, I consider the argu-
ments Sander continues to reify regarding the harms of affirmative action
for students of color. Ultimately, I argue that while class and racial diver-
sity should and do intersect, racial diversity should play a key role in
higher education regardless of one's SES. In addition, I argue that a cen-
tral component of Sander's goal is to perpetuate the myth of a colorblind
society21 without confronting how best to use racial diversity within edu-
cational institutions. 2 2 Finally, I address the role of wealth and its func-
tion in access to education.
I. A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE ENACTMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. The Social Construction ofRace
Sander observes that it will become increasingly difficult to identify
"true"23 Hispanics or "true" blackS24 as the United States becomes multi-
25racial and "intermarriage" increases. He has a point. It is difficult to
20. To be clear, many social scientists fall into this trap. Indeed, my own work has been
criticized for doing the same. See Mark Strasser, On Disguises, Tokens, and Affirmative Action
Policies, 85 IND. L.J. 1293, 1294 (2010).
21. The language of color blindness came originally from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson in which he stated, "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the context of Plessy, color
blindness is asserted as a lofty goal toward which United States society should work: racial distinc-
tions should be eliminated in the hopes of remedying racial oppression. Id. However, this concept
now finds use to question the legitimacy of race-based remedies to amend race-based discrimination.
See Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities ": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblind-
ness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007). Haney L6pez uses the term "reactionary colorblindness"
specifically to discuss "an anticlassification understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that ac-
cords race-conscious remedies and racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility." Id.
Moreover, Justice Thomas writes in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, "The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution by consign-
ing it to me and Members of today's plurality. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep.
My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy . 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
22. TIM J. WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 69
(2005) ("Conservatives claim that people of color are taking college admissions slots from more-
qualified whites, thanks to affirmative action in higher education."). Essentially, Sander makes the
same claim in this article. See generally Sander, supra note 1.
23. It is not entirely clear what Sander means when he uses the word true. I presume that
means having four grandparents who all share the same racial background as the student. See
Sander, supra note 1, at 665.
24. Blacks are not capitalized here in accordance with the stylistic model that Denver Univer-
sity Law Review uses.
25. I presume that Sander means inter-racial or inter-ethnic marriage when he uses this term.
See Sander, supra note 1, at 665. However, I find the concern for finding "true" racial minorities
interesting. A New York Times chart shows that only 9% of marriages are inter-racial and whites,
both male and female, are least likely of any group to marry a person from a different racial or ethnic
group of color. Haeyoun Park, Who is Marrying Whom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011),
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figure out "true" race. However, any conversation about race must first
begin with a discussion of what is and is not included in the term's defi-
nition. While most individuals view race as a biological classification
based on shared genetic traits and physical attributes, in fact, no defini-
tive, distinctive, and apparent racial characteristics exist. 26 Furthermore,
no "race gene" has been discovered that is completely distinctive from
27one racial group to another. Thus, the classification of the human popu-
lation into particular racial groups is largely arbitrary. Instead, race is
the shared experience of being placed in one particular racial group, not
the perceived physical characteristics of that racial group.28
If race is defined in this fashion-namely, by human interactions-
we are anything but a colorblind society. At the societal level, we come
to a collective agreement as to the meaning of a particular race, as it has
no innate connection to culture or institutions. 29 Significantly, though,
race comes to have vital meaning and impact within an institution once
the individuals and the institution give definition and status to an indi-
vidual's perceived racial/ethnic grouping. This point is central to under-
standing why affirmative action must continue to play a key role among
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/29/us/20110130mixedrace.html. Thus, the larger point
remains that people of color, whether racially mixed or not, will continue to engage with society in a
different way than white people. See, e.g., David Knowles, Obama on 'MythBusters': Top 5 Presi-
dential Myths in Need ofBusting, AOL NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010, 5:17 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/
2010/10/18/obama-on-mythbusters-top-5-presidential-myths-in-need-of-bust/ (stating that among
five myths about President Obama, two that persist include that he is a Muslim and that he was not
born in the United States); Liz Sidoti, That Brief Time Out from Heated Discourse? No More,
CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/13/ap/politics/
main7346308.shtml (stating that at the Conservative Political Action Conference Idaho Representa-
tive Raul Labrador joked that he "was fortunate enough to be an American citizen by birth, and [he
had] the birth certificate to prove it," and pundit Ann Coulter suggested that President Obama
"looked into becoming the President of Egypt [because n]obody would complain about him being a
Muslim then"); Barack Obama Myths, BARACKOPEDIA.ORG,
http://www.barackopedia.org/page/Barack+
Obama+Myths (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (dispelling the myth that President Obama's books contain
racially charged language and ridiculing the "terrorist fist bump" rumor).
26. The attempt to classify human races in any sort of definitive manner appears to meet with
little agreement. In fact, most social scientists will agree only to the conclusion that any race classifi-
cation system that emerges is based on the eye of the beholder. See generally RUTH BENEDICT,
RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS 22-38 (1959).
27. Not only is there no pure race, but differences within alleged racial groups outnumber
those found across racial groups. JOAN FERRANTE & PRINCE BROWN, JR., THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES 132-133 (1998). While it is cer-
tainly true that we can statistically identify certain phenotypes associated with certain groups, as well
as certain diseases that seem more prevalent in one group than another, these phenotypes and dis-
eases are never exclusive to a group. DAVID M. NEWMAN, IDENTITIES AND INEQUALITIES 40-41
(2007).
28. See generally Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSITION 4
(1992) (describing her experiences as a light-skinned black woman at an elite graduate school).
According to one prominent sociologist, "What makes a society multiracial is not the presence of
physical differences between groups, but the attribution of social significance to such physical dif-
ferences as may exist." PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND ETHNICITY: ESSAYS IN
COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY 10 (1970).
29. MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIGION,
AND NATIONAL ORIGINS 26-28 (1964).
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a whole host of remedies available to under-represented minorities
(URM) in the educational system from preschool to graduate school. We,
as faculty and students alike, make agreed-upon assumptions about our
professors and students based on race regardless of SES.30
The meaning of race has changed dramatically over time and be-
tween societies.31 To say that race is socially constructed 3 2 is to suggest
that society defines the reality of race, and this reality is reproduced daily
through interpersonal exchanges as well as interactions with institu-
tions.33 Early on, as individuals are socialized into a specific society, they
learn about the boundaries of group membership, otherness, group posi-
tion,34 and the cultural significance of a particular group status. In giv-
ing meaning to a particular race, society assigns that race a social stand-
ing, or status, among all other racial groups.36 In turn, members of a par-
ticular group come to experience the world-social relationships, rank-
ings, and access to resources-through the eyes of how others perceive
their group's status. 3 7 Interactions with members of other groups as well
as individuals within a group serve to create and reinforce a racial
status.38 Race embeds itself in social relations where coded interpreta-
tions serve as the rules of interaction with others. 39 Society then uses
obvious (or sometimes less obvious) 4 0 physical characteristics, or pheno-
30. Dr. Allen Counter, a prominent neurobiologist at Harvard, was strolling across Harvard
Yard accompanied by students, wearing his usual attire of a high end business suit and tie, when
university police stopped Counter to inform him that he was a bank robbery suspect. OGLETREE,
supra note 5, at 81-82. Dr. Counter had an alibi, bore no resemblance to the suspect, and still the
police insisted the students verify Dr. Counter's identity. Id. at 82.
31. According to Jacobson, "[E]ntire races have disappeared from view, from public discus-
sion, and from modem memory, though their flesh-and-blood members still walk the earth."
MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 2 (1998). In addition, from one geographical location to the next, the mem-
bers of a racial group vary. For example, the race classifications of the United States and Brazil vary
so greatly that a person classified as black in the United States may be considered white in Brazil.
See PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 61-62, 71-72
(1967).
32. Social scientists assert that race is a social construct. By that they mean values and ideas
about race arise and perpetuate themselves through social situations. As Montejano aptly puts it,
"Although race situations generally involve people of color, it is not color that makes a situation a
racial one. . . . [T]he race question . . . represents an arena of struggle and accommodation. . . . [I]t
comes into being when these ideas and sentiments are publicly articulated and institutionalized."
DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS 1836-1986, at 4 (1987).
33. See generally OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 129-241 (profiling 100 successful black men).
34. See STEPHEN CORNELL & DOUGLAS HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE: MAKING
IDENTITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 81-82 (1998).
35. See NEWMAN, supra note 27, at 27, 37.
36. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND
SOCIETY 44-53 (2003); IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
116 (10th anniversary ed. 2006); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 518-21 (6th
ed. 2008).
37. See CORNELL & HARTMANN, supra note 34, at 182-83.
38. Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formations, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN
THE UNITED STATES 12, 16-17 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 6th ed. 2004).
39. See id. at 16.
40. In research I have conducted, students of color increasing report that as white students
attempt to place a student of color in a racial category, but cannot rely on the most obvious pheno-
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types, associated with a particular race as a way of explaining differences
in human nature.4 1
Because society decides racial group membership based on certain
physical traits, these traits become the primary identifiers of one's social
status. Goffman referred to this primary identifier-the characteristic of a
person that overrides all other features of that person's identity, in this
case, race-as his or her "master status."42 One's master status has a sig-
nificant impact on one's sense of self. Cooley articulates this concept as
the "looking glass self."4 3 Specifically, Cooley and other symbolic inter-
actionists assert that one's self perception is the effect of interactions
with others in social settings. For under-represented minorities, social
interactions serve as a daily reminder of their status in the hierarchy of
race. 44
Particularly significant to this concept of "looking glass self' is the
awareness of "significant" others. That is, certain individuals in society
will have more influence over others in the development of one's self-
conception . Goffman asserts that individuals aware of their master
status will engage in impression management46 to achieve desired goals
types, white students will often ask, "So what are you?" Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin: Dis-
pensing With Colorblindness and Critical Mass, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
41. Omi and Winant refer to this process as "amateur biology," in which racial ideology
suggests that one's abilities like athleticism, intelligence, and personality can be presumed from
discernable physical characteristics associated with race. Omi & Winant, supra note 38, at 16.
42. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). This
master status becomes the lens through which all others view an individual regardless of the situa-
tion or setting. Perhaps more significant, every master status accompanies a set of auxiliary traits. An
individual interacting with a person of a particular master status will assume that person possesses
these traits and will react accordingly. PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, CONSTRUCTIONS OF
DEVIANCE 222 (4th ed. 2006). In the case of race, a set of stereotypical traits are imputed on students
of color because one's racial or ethnic status overrides all other statuses an individual may possess.
Theses auxiliary traits then determine how others will interact with that student.
43. See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 183-84
(1902).
44. See id. at 183-210; see also, e.g., CORNELL & HARTMAN, supra note 34, at 184-89.
White normativity is the standard by which all other racial groups find themselves measured. Both
institutionally and individually, "White norms" are the measure of what is acceptable, appropriate
and merit-worthy. See Albert Murray, While Norms, Black Deviation, in THE DEATH OF WHITE
SOCIOLOGY 96, 106-10 (Joyce A. Lander ed., 1998). In the colorblind discourse, "whiteness [is] the
unacknowledged dominant set of norms, aesthetics, and values from which all others are defined and
judged." Black Hawk Hancock, Put a Little Color on That!, 51 SOC. PERSP. 783, 788 (2008).
45. For example, students aware that professors (such as Sander) have lower expectations of
them because they believe the students have lower credentials based on a white meritocracy system,
are likely to perform less well. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 620-21 (1997) [hereinafter
Steele, A Threat in the Air] (demonstrating that highly domain attached individuals are at most risk
for the negative effects of stereotype threat); see also CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI:
AND OTHER CLUES TO How STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 54-62 (2010) [hereinafter STEELE,
WHISTLING VIVALDI]; Deirdre M. Bowen, Visibly Invisible, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT (Angela
Harris & Carmen Gonzales eds., University of Utah Press forthcoming 2011).
46. Goffnan asserts that actors engage in a day to day dramaturgy anytime they interact with
others. Often the goal in any interaction is to create a "front" that idealizes the actor's persona to
conform with the socially sanctioned norms of the particular situation the actor finds him/herself in
and de-emphasize those traits that are considered aberrant. In order to establish these social identi-
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particularly from those who have influence over their access to re-
sources. 47 Put another way, an URM student is aware of his or her racial
group membership and the culturally defined expectations that are asso-
ciated with such membership. In the social context of the university, the
URM student, regardless of her socioeconomic status, will engage in
impression management in an attempt to influence the perceptions of her
peers and professors as she navigates her educational career. The unique
status of URM group membership creates a significant cost; the daily
burden 4 8 of engaging in impression management at institutions of higher
learning demonstrates that "race" always matters-not just for lower
SES minorities, as Sander seems to suggest.4 9 The key point that Sander
ties, individuals will attempt, not always successfully, to control communication and information
about themselves through performance. The performance in social interaction is known as impres-
sion management. See GOFFMAN supra note 42, at 208. The difficulty with impression management
is that an individual can only control so much of the other actors' perceptions. For example, a minor-
ity student may dress, speak, exhibit body language and facial expressions that are all socially exem-
plary, but there is little they can do to overcome the pre-conceived notions that the other actors hold
about that individual based on the color of her skin, i.e. their auxiliary traits. The result, as Goffinan
points out, is that one's master status, in this case, race, can be a stigma. In other words, "Any scien-
tist can disprove all its facts and still leave the beliefuntouched." BENEDICT, supra note 26, at 99.
47. GOFFMAN, supra note 42, at 208.
48. The cost from carrying the daily burden of being a member of a racial group measures
itself in a number of psychological and physiological ways. See Tend T. Lewis et al., Chronic Expo-
sure to Everyday Discrimination and Coronary Artery Calcification in African-American Women:
The SWAN Heart Study, 68 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 362, 365-66 (2006) (finding a correlation be-
tween coronary artery calcification and chronic exposure to discrimination for African American
women); Diane L. Rowley, Closing the Gap, Opening the Process: Why Study Social Contributors
to Preterm Delivery Among Black Women, 5 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 71, 71-74 (2001)
(finding that low birth weight babies among middle class college educated African American women
mirror that of poor uneducated white women); David R. Williams et al., Racial/Ethnic Discrimina-
tion and Health: Findings from Community Studies, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 200, 200-08 (2003)
(finding that physiological responses to discrimination are the same as those associated with dis-
eases). See generally STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 128, 131-32 (reporting the
research on the health effects of managing chronic stereotype threat).
49. Minority students must continually combat the stereotypes that others hold regarding
racial groups. This is particularly acute for under-represented students who attend colleges and
universities with student bodies who have little to no interaction with individuals outside their own
racial background. Unfortunately, these populations receive most of their information about other
racial groups from media portrayals that acutely reify stereotypes of racial minorities. One of the
most significant casualties of under-represented minority students' management of stereotypes is the
negative effect such stereotypes have on a student's performance. Claude Steele's stereotype threat
theory demonstrates that otherwise successful minority students, who are faced with a stereotype that
the dominant group may use to explain their performance, will often not perform as well, or simply
avoid an attempt at achieving success for fear of confirming that stereotype. See generally Steele, A
Threat in the Air, supra note 45, at 613-14, 617, 622, 627. For example, Professor Steele found that
in giving students the same achievement test but in one group telling them it was a problem solving
exercise while telling the other group it was a diagnostic test of intelligence, the average score was
virtually identical for white and black students in the former setting. However, blacks performed half
as well in the latter setting when faced with a stereotype threat. The results were even more profound
when Professor Steele gave the same test to both groups, but in one group asked all students for their
racial background but not in the other. Once again, the performance of black and white students was
identical when race was not asked, but black students performed at a rate of 60% less than white
students when they were asked to identify their race. Such is the power and burden of racial stereo-
types. Id. at 620; see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social
Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1225 (2010) (finding that "students
experience far more stigma at schools without affirmative action, contrary to what the color-blind
idealists would argue. . . .On the other hand, affirmative action seems to be associated with reduced
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and other detractors of affirmative action miss is that the experience of
race is not just a question of who gets into an educational institution
based on a white normative merit-based match, but a question of the ex-
perience of interacting with students and faculty once an URM student
arrives at that institution.so As will be discussed in section three, the pre-
sumption of affirmative action guilt, as I call it, does not dissipate under
a colorblind or even SES model of admissions, as Sander relentlessly
asserts.
Sander is certainly not the first to employ the colorblind discourse.51
He follows a generation of writers who responded to the enactment of
affirmative action before the ink of President Kennedy's signature was
dry.52 Let us examine how anti-affirmative action activists and the judici-
ary manipulated the discourse of race, inequality, and "fairness,,s to as-
sert that race is no longer a significant issue in a "nation of minorities."54
Although Sander argues that the resentment of "reverse discrimination"55
and the feelings of being unqualified undermine URM students' experi-
ences, what is most harmful is the dominant group's failure to acknowl-
levels of racial stigma, both external and internal, for underrepresented minority students"); Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (2000) (arguing
that minorities subject to negative stereotype threat must "work their identities" at much greater rates
with considerable costs and risks).
50. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Riposte: The Mismatch Theory ofLaw School Admissions, 57
SYRACUSE L. REV. 637, 644 (2007) (showing that students of color even at second and third tier law
schools don't seem to outperform their white peers even at schools where affirmative action plays a
marginal role).
51. To be sure this line of discourse is a particular kind of colorblindness that packs a one-two
punch. As Bobo and Kluegel define it, Laissez Faire Racism allows whiteness as a privileged status
to be replaced with equal opportunity in which persons of color are blamed for their cultural inferior-
ity and allows whiteness invisibility in which the dominant group is not culpable for the "pipe line"
problem as Sander calls it, nor the institutional racism that permeates educational institutions. See
Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Status, Ideology, and Dimensions of Whites'Racial Beliefs and
Attitudes: Progress and Stagnation, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
93, 95 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997).
52. President Kennedy used the term affirmative action in an executive order designed to
promote the integration of minorities into the workforce. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(Mar. 6, 1961).
53. Fairness is a term used often in the anti-affirmative action camp. Richard Sander employs
it in his article five times ("fair to say," "fair basis," "fair and class-neutral"), unfair one time ("un-
fair and offensive"), and fairness one time ("grounds of fairness"). Sander, supra note 1, at 649. 652,
656, 660, 664-65.
54. NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 201 (1975). Glazer states:
We have created two racial and ethnic classes in this country to replace the disgraceful
pattern of the past in which some groups were subjected to an official and open discrimi-
nation. The two new classes are those groups that are entitled to statistical parity in cer-
tain key areas on the basis of race, color, and national origin, and those groups that are
not.
Id. at 197 "We are indeed a nation of minorities; to enshrine some minorities as deserving of special
benefits means not to defend minority rights against a discriminating majority but to favor some of
these minorities over others." Id. at 201.
55. Hodding Carter, Jr. used the term in the December 17, 1955, edition of the Saturday
Evening Post, accusing the NAACP of "reverse racism" in response to the Brown v. Boardd of
Education ruling. Hodding Carter, Jr., Racial Crisis in the Deep South, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Dec. 17, 1955, at 26.
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edge the damaging nature of racial narratives and white privilege.5 Be-
low is a brief discussion of how race became unanchored from its his-
torical, institutional, and structural underpinnings.
B. The Ethnicity Model and Reactionary Colorblindness
The success of the anti-affirmative action movement can be attrib-
uted to the slow moving but effective perfect storm of three factors: the
social scientific paradigm away from race-based discourse to ethnic-
based discourse; Sander's favorite, the judiciary's application of so-
called colorblindness in the name of equality for all; and finally, the ma-
nipulation of Martin Luther King's ideas to suggest that he aspired for a
colorblind ideal based on meritocracy. The success of this approach lies
in its complete removal of race from its hierarchical social setting.
Ethnicity is based on a "sense of peoplehood"58 where a group per-
ceives or believes they share ancestry, similar language, customs, relig-
ion, and often a political community.59 Like race, ethnicity is a social, not
a biological phenomenon. Tremendous changes in ethnic identities over
the course of a lifetime, as well as changing generational allegiances,
intermarriage, and transformed social categories suggest that ethnic
groups are not as clearly defined by blood lineage as members may be-
lieve. 6 1 The characteristics that define an ethnic group are flexible, but
they do emerge from a sense of cultural heritage in which the artifacts of
that heritage create inclusionary and exclusionary boundaries.
56. See generally BLACK ON WHITE: BLACK WRITERS ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE WHITE
(David R. Roediger ed., 1999); Bowen, supra note 49; Delgado, supra note 50, at 649; Bowen,
supra note 40 (arguing that white students do not seem to grasp that different racial narratives even
exist or possess the skills to process them).
57. It is not the idea of meritocracy in of itself that is objectionable. It is the institutional
application of a meritocracy that has benefited and continues to benefit the privileged elite. See
generally Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
1139 (2008).
58. GORDON, supra note 29, at 28.
59. Ethnic groups are often accorded specific cultural traits that set them apart into a subcul-
ture within a larger cultural and social system. Melvin M. Tumin, Ethnic Group, in A DICTIONARY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 243-44 (Julius Gould & William L. Kolb eds., 1964).
60. See RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA
16-19 (1990); RICHARD D. ALBA, ITALIAN AMERICANS: INTO THE TWILIGHT OF ETHNICITY 17
(1985); Fredrik Barth, Introduction, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE DIFFERENCE 15-16 (Frederick Barth ed. 1969); MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 389 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoffet al. trans., 1968) (1922).
61. Sociologists Helen and Everett Hughes see the social creation of ethnic differences in this
way:
An ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable differences
from other groups; it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in it and the
people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and outs talk, feel, and act as if it
were a separate group.
EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES & HELEN MACGILL HUGHES, WHERE PEOPLES MEET: RACIAL
AND ETHNIC FRONTIERS 156 (1952).
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Yet, the very essence of the "the melting pot"62 was that Europeans
would shed the cloth of the old country and adorn the quilt of America,
in which a new American identity emerges from the patchwork of many
different ethnic groups. Such was the power of transformation that par-
ticular groups' identities could change from a non-white racial group to
that of a white euro-ethnic group. Thus, the melting pot became a
metaphor for a nation of ethnic groups that had assimilated into Ameri-
can culture and reaped the rewards of economic and political opportu-
nity.
The idea of a nation of ethnicities, rather than of races, may have
begun with the transformation of Southern and Eastern European races
into ethnicities64 but its broader application to other racial groups, most
particularly, African Americans, began with Nathan Glazer and Patrick
65
Moynihan. To devastating effect, they argued that ethnicity should
cross a (darker) color line. However, ethnicity was not embraced to wel-
come African Americans or Puerto Rican Americans into the pool of
economic or political opportunities, or to celebrate the cultural traditions
they could add to the melting pot; rather, ethnicity was used to explain
the lack of economic success of these groups. Instead, African American
and Puerto Rican culture lay at the root of these groups' plight, accord-
ing to Glazer and Moynihan, "to the complete exclusion of structural
factors."66 The discourse of group difference as a celebratory device of
white ethnicities became a weapon of culpability against African Ameri-
62. Israel Zangwill introduced this phrase in the title to his play "The Melting Pot," which
opened in Washington, D.C. in 1908. Zangwill penned the play during the largest wave of immigra-
tion the U.S. had experienced. The immigrants were overwhelmingly Irish, Germans, Italians, and
Eastern Europeans. Wiliam Booth, One Nation, Indivisible: Is it History?, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
1998, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/
melt0222.htm.
63. For example, Italian, Poles, Irish, Greeks and Jewish immigrants experienced significant
hostility by the native born Anglo-Saxon race who viewed themselves as 'real' Americans. Mary C.
Waters, Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?, in ORIGINS AND DESTINIES 445 (Silvia Pedraza &
Rub6n Rumbaut eds., 1996). However, subsequent generations of those immigrants have success-
fully moved up the economic ladder due to educational and economic opportunities, beginning with
the Irish in the mid 1800s. Euro-ethnic groups previously "racialized" as non-white, and therefore
inferior, began to be included in the American social construct of whiteness. What was once a non-
white inferior racial group of European descent now became an ethnic group within the white race.
The same educational and economic opportunities were not afforded to non-European racial minori-
ties. See KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE
IN AMERICA 25, 27, 41-42 (1998).
64. As Haney L6pez points out, the transformation from race to ethnicity was intended to
apply only to those boundaries that divided people who could be clearly classified as whites, i.e.,
Southern and Eastern Europeans often of Jewish descent. Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 1007-08;
see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: How AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECAME
WHITE 22 (2005).
65. Haney Lopez, supra note 21, at 1008; see also Barth, supra note 60, at 13-15; STEVE
FENTON, ETHNICITY 68 (2003); RICHARD JENKINS, RETHINKING ETHNICITY: ARGUMENTS AND
EXPLORATIONS 23-24 (1997). See generally NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
BEYOND THE MELTING POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW
YORK CITY (1963).
66. Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 1010.
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cans.67 By extension, if cultural pathology rather than structural factors
were at the root of African American subordination, then race-based
remedies such as affirmative action would not solve the problems of that
community. Using ethnicity theory, Glazer and Moynihan argued that
affirmative action was simply interest group politics-yet another ethnic
group competing for resources.6 As Haney L6pez writes:
By dropping structural inequality and entrenched racial hierarchy
from the ethnic account, Glazer and Moynihan stripped the clarity of
history from the claims for race-conscious remedies. Such demands
no longer seemed to call on the nation to repair gross injustice; in-
stead, they sounded like special pleading by yet another pressure
group, effectively shifting the moral register of affirmative action
from an impassioned appeal to political pulling.70
The application of ethnicity theory to African Americans as an in-
strument of blame was a particularly tragic backlash against the legal and
political system's coming to terms with the causes of African Americans'
post-World War II subordination in the United States.71 With the slow
adoption of Myrdal's An American Dilemma72 in Brown v. Board of
Education,73 liberal race theory74 briefly took hold amongst the country's
elite. Prejudice came to be viewed as irrational and placed at the feet of
the dominant culture-i.e., white elite.
67. This language of cultural pathology soon found use by neoconservatives during a time
when jobs and wages were decreasing for white workers. While espousing the ideal of equality for
all, neoconservatives ensured the discourse of meritocracy took hold above all else. Thus, African
Americans who might benefit from affirmative action emerged not as victims of monopolized power
and white privilege, but as unqualified beneficiaries of affirmative action. According to this notion,
black people lacked merit because of their own doing, not because of blocked access to opportunity.
Cornel West, Affirmative Action in Context, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 32-33 (George
E. Curry ed., 1996).
68. Daniel P. Moynihan, The New Racialism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1968, at 35, 37-38;
see HANEY L6PEz, supra note 36, at 17 (discussing that defining "White" as a race is a difficult, if
not impossible task for the legal system).
69. This refrain appears in Sander's piece when he says schools are under huge political
pressure to create racial diversity but not socioeconomic diversity. Sander, supra note 1, at 664. It is
worth pointing out why racial diversity remains a key priority; however, pointing out the worth of
racial diversity does not mean that socioeconomic diversity should not receive its due. The vital
point is that race and socioeconomic diversity are important at their intersection and at their diver-
gence. See TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE
115-16, 182-83 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action causes reverse discrimination, against white
men particularly, and that social engineering causes resentment).
70. Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 1012.
71. See generally Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 51, at 93,95 (regarding Laissez Faire Racism).
72. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944) (detailing the struggle of the African American's ability to fully
participate in American society during the 1940s).
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. Liberal race theory, developed in the early 1900s, rejected the notion that physical charac-
teristics could determine one's talents and abilities. Specifically, this theory sought to dispel the idea
that nature aligned racial groups into an indisputable hierarchy. Physical characteristics associated
with race were nothing more than physiognomy. Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 996-97.
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This first step of acknowledging the irrationality of prejudice and
subordination of African Americans led to an individualized cure-
Americans needed to stop engaging in their bigoted practices on a day-
to-day level.7 5 However, as the status of African Americans did not
change in the face of the alleged transformation of individual white atti-
tudes towards African Americans, 6 political leadership looked to redress
the effects of racism embedded in virtually every institution in the United
States. Political leadership understood what the courts had finally come
to comprehend: structural change using race-based means was necessary
to counter the effects of three hundred years of oppression.7 Unfortu-
nately, as Haney L6pez observed, "[T]he window for fundamental
change opened just slightly before blowing shut again in the face of a
quickly gathering backlash."78
As others have written extensively and expertly elsewhere79 about
the Supreme Court's retrenchment of affirmative action in a series of
cases beginning with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,80
75. MYRDAL, supra note 72, at 1003.
76. In fact, three forces made clear that structural, not individual, racism needed to be ad-
dressed. First, a New York Times best selling "paperback," the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, issued its report in 1968 outlining the grim realities and effects of every aspect of
African American life from overt discrimination to appalling housing conditions, substandard
schools, blocked access to health care and employment, police abuses, and police harassment. The
Commission issued the report, known as the Kerner Report, in the hopes of explaining the wave of
riots that took hold in urban areas throughout the United States. The report made clear that the pov-
erty and overall punishing existence of African Americans lay definitively in the hands of white
society. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968), available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docslkemer.pdf;
see Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 1005-06. Second, the report validated the work of Stokely
Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in which they asserted in Black Power that the stark conditions in
the African American Community were a direct function of institutional racism. STOICELY
CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN
AMERICA 4 (1967). Finally, the need to address structural racism came even earlier in 1965 with Dr.
Martin Luther King's assessment:
At the root of the difficulty in Negro life is pervasive and persistent economic want. To
grow from within the Negro needs only fair opportunity for jobs, education, housing and
access to culture. To be strengthened from the outside requires protection from the grim
exploitation that has haunted it for 300 years.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Abbott House, Westchester County, New York (Oct. 29,
1965), available at http://www.directblackaction.com/museum/shmuseum/MLKJR.htm.
77. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act that banned discrimination in public places,
schools, and employment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in sections of 42 U.S.C.). Congress also passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to prevent
barriers to minorities voting. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)). In addition, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 to eliminate discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. Similarly, courts
found that the Constitution required the use of race conscious means to undue discrimination em-
bedded in social institutions. Indeed, in N.C. State Bd ofEd. v. Swann the unanimous Court stated:
"Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy." 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
78. Haney L6pez, supra note 21, at 1004.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1027-28. See generally Richard Delgado, 1998 Hugo L. Black Lecture:
Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action-How Valid?, 50 ALA. L. REV. 135 (1998) (discussing
the arguments against affirmative action).
80. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Grounding his decision in the color-blind ideal, Justice Powell
claimed:
764 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 88:4
will not recite an analysis here, but rather focus briefly on the third factor
enumerated above-the political movement and rhetoric of colorblind-
ness. A key ingredient in colorblindness emerged from both the left and
the right in the early 1990s. Focusing on SES instead of race as a way to
provide affirmative action would assuage those claiming that race-based
admission policies were reverse discrimination,8 1 and at the same time, it
diverted attention from redressing past and present racial discrimina-
tion.82 Specifically, racial identity as a group no longer mattered, but SES
might. The key to the success of this model was that race disappeared as
a vocabulary word in the policy of affirmative action in favor of help for
poor people of all shades. 83 This disappearance was to play a major role
in the shaping of the political movement to come.84
Based on the preceding discussion, I argue that the benefits of di-
versity can and should come from racial groups from all social strata
because we are all still judged based on the color of our skin.85 But even
more importantly, in focusing on high SES minority students without
[T]he United States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and to
some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but
of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps un-
fairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other
groups.
Id. at 292 (footnotes omitted).
81. Steven A. Holmes, The Nation; Mulling the Idea for Affirmative Action for Poor Whites,
N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/weekinreview/the-
nation-mulling-the-idea-of-affirmative-action-for-poor-whites.html. See generally RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (providing support
for Holmes's ideas regarding affirmative action).
82. Holmes, supra note 81; see also West, supra note 67, at 31-32 (arguing that affirmative
action was a weak response to the structural problems of racism and white supremacy and corporate
power in the United States).
83. WISE, supra note 22, at 61-62. As Tim Wise writes, by obscuring the way in which race
permeates interactions at every stage of a student's life, and instead focusing on colorblindness- by
treating low income students of color the same way as low income students who do not face racism
or treating these students like students of higher SES-we ignore the social context within which
low income students of color (or for that matter, high income students of color) must learn. Id. at 62-
63. "[The teacher] would not be educating the actual child, but rather, just a theoretical child, di-
vorced from his or her social reality." Id. at 62. However, this model serves to reinforce white domi-
nation, because white privileges and the ways in which these structures at every level preference
whites never get interrogated. Id. at 63. Instead, we can adopt the passive language of "less fortu-
nate" and "underprivileged." Understandably, this discourse is comforting because one never has to
address a power imbalance. Id. at 63-64.
84. The de-contextualization of race is only part of the story that Sander relies on. The under-
lying theme of Sander's question, shouldn't class trump race, returns to Harris's concept of white-
ness as property. See Sander, supra note 1, at 631-33. While I shall explore this idea in more detail
in section three, it remains a significant thread at this stage too. The privilege of whiteness is that it
is not only an object that possesses the right to exclude, but also an object to be deployed as a re-
source. Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714, 1733 (1993). Writ-
ing of whiteness as a resource worth deploying in order to achieve access to education, Harris was
prescient: "Whiteness [is] an 'object' over which continued control was-and is-expected." Id. at
1730.
85. See Bowen, supra note 49, at 1220-25 (findings show that URM students admitted on the
basis of conventional credentials alone in anti-affirmative action states encounter more hostility than
their counterparts admitted in affirmative action states). The sample includes wealthy students as
well as those from low SES.
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considering wealth or the "pipeline" problem, Sander manipulates the
colorblind discourse so that he might ignore the mounting evidence of
racial inequality. Finally, I am in agreement with Sander that institutions
must do more than congratulate themselves on achieving diversity but
must look carefully at the function of wealth in education.86
1I. WHAT SANDER'S DATA DON'T TELL
Let us begin with the basic facts of who goes to law school. As
Sander points out, one in seventy white and one in 160 black students
enroll in law school.87 Sander notes in Table Five, in which he uses
whites as the control group, that Hispanics are 25% as likely to go to law
school, and blacks are 39% as likely, as whites.88 To his credit, Sander
acknowledges that "[t]he disparities in representation are shockingly
large for both racial minorities."89 However, Sander's point is to convey
that those who are poor are far worse off in law school representation
compared to wealthy students than those members of racial groups iden-
tified in the chart compared to whites. What is problematic is that Sander
changes the reference group from race to SES and then asks us to make a
comparison. This section of the paper will present a critique of the way
in which Sander asks us to consider these numbers for the purposes of
moving forward his post-race agenda that poor students are suffering at
the hands of racial minorities in affirmative action.
A. Ignoring the Pipeline Problem
Sander briefly surmises why the representation rates of blacks and
Hispanics are substantially lower than whites, laying the blame at the feet
of the URM students. Using the laissez faire discourse9 0 that allows for
individual blame, he states, "Much of the reason for underrepresentation
of some groups [read black and Hispanic students] in law school has to
do with low rates of college entrance and completion." 91 As it does not
fit squarely with the narrative Sander wishes to present, he does not
delve into the reasons why high school dropout rates, college entrance
rates, and college dropout rates might be the symptoms for low law
school representation, but not the cause of low representation rates in
higher education. In order to get past the problem of the under-
representation of racial minorities relative to whites, Sander moves
86. See Bowen, American Skin, supra note 40, at 48..
87. Sander, supra note 1, at 645.
88. Id. at 646 tbl.5. He also mentions Asians as a group but correctly observes the oversimpli-
fication of including a whole continent of people from a variety of ethnicities into one classification.
Id at 646 n.47.
89. Id. at 646.
90. Recall that the laissez faire racism model "encompasses an ideology that blames blacks
themselves for their poorer relative economic standing, seeing it as a function of perceived cultural
inferiority." Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 51, at 95.
91. Sander, supra note 1, at 647.
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quickly onto what he finds the more logical population from which to
analyze: the pool of college graduates from whom law school can draw.92
By contrast, I think it is worthwhile to ponder the issue of "the
pool." 93 After all, it is this lack of available applicants that is the prob-
lem, as Sander points out in his life chances analysis.94 To give some
perspective, the intersection of race and poverty is certainly at play in
terms of a student's educational career.95 Hispanics and African Ameri-
cans top the list of Americans living in poverty-approximately 25% for
both groups. However, poverty does not explain the whole picture of
why Hispanics and African Americans are not included in the "pool"
available to apply to law school. We must confront the full reality of race
and education. The schools that blacks and whites attended up until the
1960s were profoundly unequal.9 6 And of course today, with the property
tax funding of schools based on housing values, parental advantage, abil-
ity tracking, classroom climate, and college campus environment,9 we
must acknowledge that poverty and racism play a role in a student of
color's college education. Paraphrasing Ronald J. Fiscus, Tim Wise ob-
serves,
Unless one believes in the inherent inferiority of blacks, for example,
one would have to assume that in the absence of institutional racism
and white privilege, historically speaking, blacks would be roughly
equally distributed throughout the economy and educational institu-
tions, relative to their share of the population.... Unless one believes
blacks to be less capable of succeeding in these professions or in
school, the only rational assumption to make is that the difference in
share of blacks at a given college or in a given job, and their share of
92. Id. at 648 tbl.6.
93. Olivas takes issue with words like "pool" and "pipeline" to describe the available popula-
tion of URM students available for higher education, preferring the term "river." While pool and
pipeline connote finite sources of students, river allows for the possibility of a variety of sources in
which a student could enter the river-tributaries, ponds, puddles, streams. The metaphor could go
on and on, but the point is, long before the stagnate population of URM college applicants, we might
consider how creative we are in bringing individuals to the proverbial water. See Michael A. Olivas,
Law School Admissions After Grutter: Student Bodies, Pipeline Theory, and the River, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 16, 16-18 (2005).
94. Sander, supra note 1, at 646-47.
95. As a point of reference, the 2010 census reports the percentage of people living in poverty
in 2009 as follows: 9.4% of all non-Hispanic White (18.5 million people); 12.5% of all Asian-
American (1.7 million people); 25.3% of all Hispanic (of any nationality) (12.4 million people);
24.2% of all American Indian and Alaska Native; 25.8% of all African-American (9.9 million peo-
ple). CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 15 tbl.4 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.
96. As Tim Wise points out, most would agree that until Brown v. Board ofEducation, Afri-
can Americans did not have the same opportunities for educational equality as whites, yet he notes in
a 1962 poll that 90% of whites believed that they did. WISE, supra note 22, at 39.
97. See id. at 40-45, 50-56.
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the population indicates the effect of discrimination past and present
on black opportunity.98
Thus, the pool of students available to apply to law school, or col-
lege for that matter, cannot so easily be dismissed as part of the honest
dialogue Sander professes to welcome.
B. Race and SES Are Not Good Surrogates for Each Other
As it is readily apparent that race and poverty do intersect, under-
standing the significance of the data may lie in what Sander does not
report in his tables. Sander's Tables Five and Six raise a vexing question:
What is the overlap of who falls in the bottom quartiles of SES based on
race, compared to whites in the three SES categories Sander created?99
However, a number of social scientists have rejected the claim that
we can adequately learn about URM student college participation by
examining the decision making behavior of low-SES students, or vice
versa for that matter.100 In fact, Terenzi et al. note very little association
between race and SES. 01 Thus, Sander has set out to compare two
groups-racial minorities and the poor-that are not effective compari-
son groups. Not only are they not good proxies for each other, but the
reality is that according to Bowen and Bok, low income whites are still in
the majority among all low income college students. 02 Therefore, when
Sander ultimately claims that race barriers can be resolved far more ef-
98. WISE, supra note 22, at 74.
99. To state more plainly, Sander claims that a universal SES affirmative action program
would benefit the truly needy, those students of all shades whose parents do not possess the status,
income, and wealth of the upper echelons of the college educated elite. Therefore, I would be curi-
ous to see the representation of blacks and Hispanics in the 50th-90th percentile, bottom half and
bottom quartile, as comparison groups to the control group of whites in the top 10%, or top quartile
or top half of the SES. That way, the reader could get a clearer sense of the disparity based on the
intersection of race and class against economically privileged whites. A similar exercise would use
blacks and Hispanics as the control group in the upper SES echelons against lower SES whites as
well as lower SES blacks and Hispanics to examine just how the representation over various groups
is presented. Data from a 2001 report reveals some sense of the intersection of race and class.
PATRICK T. TERENZINI ET AL., COLL. ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BD., SWIMMING AGAINST THE
TIDE: THE POOR IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2001), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/rdreport200 3918.pdf In 1992, low SES
students entering post-secondary education were more likely to be members of underrepresented
racial/ethnic groups than their high SES counterparts. Id. at 23. Furthermore, 76% of low SES stu-
dents have parents with a high school diploma or less compared to 0.4% of high SES students and
27% of low SES students live with a single mother versus 6% of high SES students. Id. at 20 tbl.6.
Relatedly, a low SES student is more likely to make a decision to attend college without conferring
with a parent and more likely to attend a public two-year institution, 56% compared to 23% of high
SES students. Id. at v.
100. Id. at 2-3.
101. Id. at 3. ("After examining the association between SES and race in the high school
classes of 1972, 1982, and 1992, Bernal, Cabrera, and Terenzini (1999) found the correlation be-
tween the two ranged from .20 to .27. This low level of association means that 93 to 96 percent of
the variance among high school students' ethnicity or SES status has nothing to do with either race
or SES."). Put simply, one variable is not duplicative of the other in explaining behavior.
102. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
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fectively and fairly through universal SES affirmative action programs
rather than race-based admissions, he ignores some significant social
scientific findings. For example, Olivas wrote, "There is no good proxy,
no more narrowly tailored criterion, no statistical treatment that can re-
place race."1 0 3 The story of being poor and the story of being Hispanic
and/or black may have a cumulative effect, but they also have independ-
ent effects.
C. Selective Samples, Selective Data Gathering, and the Case of the
Missing N's
Perhaps rightly, Sander goes on to focus his analysis on the top ten
law schools to further support his narrative that racial minorities have
representation rates (compared to whites) far greater than do students in
the lowest SES quartiles (compared to students in the highest SES quarti-
les). It is really only in these top ten law schools that one finds the most
aggressive use of affirmative action. 10 4 Indeed, looking at Sander's Table
Seven, one might perceive cause for celebration in that every racial
group, except African Americans, is represented at law schools at rates
equal to or greater than white students. The problem, frankly, lies in what
the percentages do not show. A review of the appendix Table A2-1 10 for
Tables Five, Six, and Seven, shows the actual number of students en-
rolled in top ten law schools. As expected, the numbers are dismal. The
reality is that the over-representation that Sander reports is more a reflec-
tion of the very small sample sizes of these minority groups in the avail-
able pool. For example, only twenty-two Native American students, 242
black students, and 211 Hispanic students enrolled in top ten law schools
in the Fall of 2002.106 Thus, another way of thinking of representation
103. Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of
Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1095, 1117 (1997) (noting
that the anti-affirmative action camp continues to believe that meritocratic measures, such as higher
scores on tests, translate into more deserving applications, and "that reliance upon 'objective' meas-
ures and statistical relationships constitutes a fair, race-neutral process"). "The evidence for this
proposition is exceedingly thin; indeed, a substantial body of research and academic common prac-
tice refutes it." Id. at 1117; see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Eco-
nomic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1913-14 (1996) (arguing that economic surrogates
are poor proxies for race); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and
Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (1996) (arguing that economic measures are ineffective re-
placements for racial-based admissions programs).
104. WILLIAM T. DICKENS & THOMAS J. KANE, RACIAL AND ETHNIC PREFERENCE (1996),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1996/llrace-kane.aspx. See generally Chambers et
al., supra note 3, at 1880 tbl.2 (pointing out the effects of the top law schools not using affirmative
action).
105. Sander, supra note 1, app.II tbl.A2-1.
106. Id. Sander rightly observes that recent DOE figures show that many of the blacks admitted
at top schools were Caribbean, biracial, or African immigrants; and few were descendants of Ameri-
can slaves. Id. at 665-66. My response is twofold. First, these types of students are not exempt from
the contemporary contextualization discussed infra section one. Second, while their scores may be
higher than other minorities landing them a place in the most elite schools, it could be that they are
not experiencing the social contingencies that create negative stereotype threat and under-
performance. We must redouble our efforts to eliminate much earlier in the pipeline the social
contingencies of stereotype threat of other students. Most importantly, we must remember that
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might be to consider that of the 3,112 students enrolled in top ten law
schools, 85% were white or Asian American.10 7
D. Reconfiguring the Data to Show a Different Narrative of Minority
Access to Law School
Furthermore, a more informative piece of data would not be who
enrolls from the pool of available college graduates as Sander presents
the data, but rather, who applies and gets accepted into law school pre-
sented by racial categories. Parker and Redfield provide such an analysis
with the population of students who enrolled a year after the population
that Sander analyzed. Their results are presented below: 08
Figure 10. Law School Admissions 2003
Percentage of Total Applicant Pool and Percentage of Total Admitted Applicant Pool
Race/Ethnicity (Fall 2003)
Black Hisp. Asian PR Chic. Nam Other Non- Cau. /
Wh. Wh.
App. 10.7% 4.3% 8.1% 1.8% 1.6% 0.7% 4.7% 27.3% 64.4%
Adm. 6.4% 3.8% 8.1% 1.6% 1.4% 0.7% 4.5% 22.0% 70.8%
The data considered here represent the pool of candidates who actu-
ally apply to law school and the percentage who are admitted. Under the
analysis above, the only group that is over-represented in admissions is
white students. The data presented in this manner reveal a narrative dif-
ferent than the one Sander presents. In fact, the data are even bleaker
when considering the period since 2003.109
Let us consider the trends of minority access to law school as ana-
lyzed by Professor Conrad Johnson in collaboration with the Society for
American Law Teachers. First, he observes that for the fifteen years
leading up to 2008, African Americans, Chicanos, and Mexican Ameri-
cans have applied to law school at relatively consistent rates with in-
creasingly stronger white-normative objective scores-i.e., UGPA and
LSAT.110 Second, he notes during this same fifteen-year period that
affirmative action is built on diversity theory now, not reparation. The diversity contribution remains
just as valid for student immigrants. To suggest otherwise, is to return to the theme of privileged
black suspicion.
107. Id. at app.II tbl.A2-1. Sander discusses the grand success of UCLA's universal SES af-
firmative action plan in which UCLA had greater diversity than ever before-yet he concedes that
diversity consisted of mostly Asian Americans. 1d. at 29. His analysis above seems remarkably
similar and discouraging.
108. Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker & Sarah E. Redfield, Law Schools Cannot Be Effective in
Isolation, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 43 fig.10 (2005).
109. According to ABA data on law school applicants for 2011, 151 Native American or Alas-
kan Natives applied to law school, representing a 20.1% drop from last year, 3,922 African Ameri-
cans applied, a drop of 9.7%, Hispanics included 2516 applicants, dropping 13.9% while 23,900
whites applied, with a 19.8% drop from 2010. Data on file with author.
110. Conrad Johnson et al., DISTURBING TRENiD L. Sca. DIVERSITY,
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/salt/ (last visited June 6, 2011) (A collaboration between the Society
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twenty-four new law schools emerged, adding three thousand new spots
for law students."' Third, in spite of this colossal increase in available
slots, African American matriculation has declined by 7.5% and Mexican
American matriculation by 11.7% in the last fifteen years. To put it
plainly, in the last fifteen years, of the three thousand additional students
who happily opened their thick manila envelopes offering them a place
in the law school classes of 1993 through 2008, none of them were Afri-
can American or Mexican American. 1 2 Finally, as Sander is clearly and
validly expressing concern about who gets shut out of law school from a
SES point of view, it is worth considering the data from a race standpoint
as well. Nearly double the number of African Americans (6 1%) and one-
third more Mexican Americans (46%) are rejected from all law schools
to which they applied compared to white applicants (34%).1 13
E. Wealth is a Crucial Datum Point Missing from Sander's Analysis
For Sander, however, when it comes to who should get the benefits
of affirmative action, race is not the issue-socioeconomic status is. To
his credit, Sander acknowledges that race and SES can intersect. 114 The
problem is that SES, as measured by education, income, and occupation,
does not capture an important factor in determining educational trajec-
tory: wealth." 5 As Oliver and Shapiro point out, wealth, unlike a parents'
income, education, or occupation, allows for the command of resources
to access education. " Sander acknowledges that SES means different
things in different racial groups and sets out to solve the lack of validity
in his measure.' 17 He does so by comparing the within-group SES rather
than the across-group variety and draws the conclusion that patterns of
admission by racial group reveal no meaningful differences. Unfortu-
nately, the volatility of SES without including the measure of wealth as
part of that index does not allow for Sander to make the conclusion he
does. Terenzini et al. argue that wealth needs to be included in a SES
index along with education, income, and occupation precisely because it
reveals different social locations from which students approach educa-
tional decisions." 8 Specifically, wealth offers the opportunity to live in a





114. Sander, supra note 1, at 650.
115. Wealth is defined as net assets and liabilities. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 30 (10th
anniversary ed. 2006).
116. See id at32.
117. See Sander, supra note 1, at 650-53. 1 use the term validity here to signify that scientifi-
cally SES does measure the same thing from one racial category to the next. See generally THOMAS
D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR
FIELD SETTINGS (1979) (explaining that validity refers to a variable measuring what it is supposed to
represent in the real world).
118. TERENZINI ET AL., supra note 99, at 2.
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certain neighborhood, which allows for meaningful social networks and
social capital." 9
Thus, even comparing within racial groups to suggest that high SES
blacks, for example, relative to low SES blacks land at the top of the
education heap is probably inaccurate. Consider the median net worth of
whites versus non-whites and Hispanics in 2007: $170,400 versus
$27,800.120 The disparity is staggering. Consider further the relative in-
come based on race and gender for individuals with a bachelor's de-
.121
gree:







Although Sander asserts that "upper-middle class minorities have
made dramatic gains over the past fifty years," 2 2 it is worth stating the
percentage of minorities who are actually in the upper middle class123:
32.3% of Asian Americans, 21.6% of whites, 11.7% of Hispanics, and
9.9% of blacks. 12 4 Thus, whites, in income alone, outpace Hispanics and
blacks two to one in the upper middle and upper income categories.
When we consider the data points left out of Sander's analysis-the mas-
sive disparity in wealth between whites and non-whites, the significant
differential in income based on race and gender even with the same level
of educational attainment, and the substantial difference between whites
compared to Hispanics and blacks in the upper and upper middle income
categories-Sander's conclusion that non-white students attending law
schools come from relatively elite backgrounds is suspect.12 5
119. Social capital refers to the resources obtainable within the social structure of a person's
community-norms, social networks, and interpersonal relationships--that contribute to personal
development and attainment. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capi-
tal, 94 AM. J. Soc. 95, 119 (1988).
120. Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. Al, All tbl.4 (2009).
121. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 150
tbl.228 (2011).
122. Sander, supra note 1, at 668.
123. Upper middle class in the United States was estimated as household incomes of over
$122,000 in 2006 according to analysis by the Tax Foundation, which relied on census data. See
GERALD PRANTE, TAX FOUND., NEW CENSUS DATA ON INCOME GiVES A WELCOME DOSE OF FACT
CHECKING TO "MIDDLE-CLASS" RHETORIC, 2 tbl.1. (Sept. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ffl 02.pdf.
124. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 454
tbl.692 (2011). The numbers reflected above actually capture the percentage of the populations with
household incomes above $100,000 because of how the census created income categories.
125. Sander, supra note 1, at 653-54.
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SES alone is thus an imperfect measure of what Sander refers to as
"eliteness."l 26 Two other major variables come into consideration when
looking at income, education, and occupation as measures of Sander's
eliteness measure. First, geography plays a significant role in the income
and cost of living that an individual encounters. Thus, if people of all
races were evenly distributed across the nation in expensive and inexpen-
sive locations, using income as a measure of eliteness might be less prob-
lematic. However, a parent of color may have income that puts the
household in Sander's elite category because that parent may hold two or
even three jobs in order to afford to live in an apartment in a safe neigh-
borhood with decent schools. Never mind that she may live in Boston,
Los Angeles, or New York.
The second issue is access to resources that come about with wealth
accumulation. As Oliver and Shapiro point out, the nature of Sander's
classification of eliteness for minorities is tenuous because households of
color have so little wealth. 12 7 Thus, a serious illness, a job loss, or emer-
gency repairs at one's business can rapidly send a household of color
tumbling out of the elite category.128 Why? Because households of color
tend to have so few resources from which to draw on for their own finan-
cial security. In fact, in an analysis of wealth, Oliver and Shapiro found,
"One startling comparison reveals that poverty-level whites control
nearly as many mean net financial assets as the highest earning blacks
.... This analysis of wealth leaves no doubt regarding the serious mis-
representation of economic disparity that occurs when one relies exclu-
sively on income data."l 2 9
Sander's conclusion regarding the eliteness of students of color
leads him to assert that racial diversity contributes modestly to socioeco-
nomic diversity in legal education.' 30 In addition to the generalized skep-
ticism articulated above, one could ask, who cares? Sander, in his color-
blind agenda, misses the point that the contribution of racial diversity can
work in concert with socioeconomic diversity, but works, perhaps more
importantly, independently. Before I explore this point in further detail in
the next section, Sander's analysis of credentials and conclusion of SES
bias is deserving of comment. Again, what is most significant is the data
not presented.
126. Id
127. Oliver and Shapiro would agree with Sander that the black middle class is central to the
argument of racial equality. They would also agree that educational achievement, earnings, and
occupation are the foundation for those blacks who have found their way into the middle class.
However, I suspect Oliver and Shapiro's line of thinking goes far beyond where Sander would like
to go when they write, "[Aln accurate and realistic appraisal of the economic footing of the black
middle class reveals its precariousness, marginality, and fragility." OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note
115, at 93-95.
128. See id. at 98-99.
129. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
130. Sander, supra note 1, at 654.
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F. The Road Less Travelled: The Concern for (White) Wealth Prefer-
ences and Credentials
In his next set of analyses on credentials, race, and SES, Sander
concludes that racial preferences and credential disparities are mas-
sive.131 First, it would be useful information in Table Eleven, as provided
in Table Ten, to know the sample size of the racial groups. Small sample
sizes lead to less reliable results. 13 2 Second, as mentioned earlier, with
regards to Tables Five, Six, and Seven, as Sander's main point seems to
be that privileged minorities are benefitting above all groups, the reader
would profit from seeing the intersection of the standardized indices
based on race and parents' mean education level. 133
I presume, based on Sander's critique that race preferences are not a
good proxy for SES diversity, that if a more detailed analysis revealed
that black, Hispanic, or Asian applicants whose parents had low mean
education levels were admitted at greater rates than high SES minority
applicants, he would support the current affirmative action program.
Finally, a useful exercise would be to compare the standardized in-
dices of white applicants based on level of education with non-white
standardized indices based on level of education. Such data would pro-
vide an accurate answer to the argument Sander is trying to postulate: to
what degree are white students with parents who have little education
receiving fewer preferences1 3 4 than black students whose parents have a
significant level of education?135
131. Id. at 658.
132. Id. at 657-58; see also Russell V. Lenth, Some Practical Guidelines for Effective Sample-
Size Determination, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 187, 187 (2001) ("An under-sized study can be a waste of
resources for not having the capability to produce useful results .... .").
133. A major flaw with this particular analysis is using education alone as a measure of SES. It
dismisses the potential assets, resources, networks, neighborhoods and income available to a student.
Thus, educational attainment fails to accurately reflect the disparity of income among racial groups
despite accomplishing the same level of educational attainment as whites. Furthermore, it discounts
across racial/ethnic groups the occupational choices available despite having the same educational
level.
134. I use the plural of the word preference because even white students receive some sort of
preference in the law school admission process. The essence of Sander's argument is that reverse
discrimination is at play during the admission process. Less qualified rich minority students are
taking the place of more qualified, poor white students. Using the University of Michigan as a case
in point, Tim Wise points out all of the preferences that were available to white students. Certainly,
URM students had twenty points added to their scores, but so did low income students and students
who attended low resource schools-regardless of race. WISE, supra note 22, at 79. Those points did
not have a cumulative effect. Id. Thus, students from each of these three categories, no matter their
race, received twenty points. However, the point bonanza did not stop there for white students. If
you happened to be a poor white student from Michigan's mostly rural, mostly white upper penin-
sula, sixteen points were added to your score for a total of thirty-six points. Id. at 80. These points
were cumulative. Id. The best for which a poor black student from Detroit could hope was ten points
for being a Michigan resident, for a total of thirty points. Id. Points for wealthy white students were
also in the offing. The University awarded up to ten points for attending an academically challenging
school and eight points for choosing an especially demanding course load.1d. Minorities were least
likely to have access to these points because 84% of whites attended an academically challenging
school while minorities are placed in the more challenging courses 60% less than are white students.
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Oddly, Sander is quite forgiving of law schools' unconscious bias
towards wealthy (white) students. He dismisses the idea that legacy ad-
mits could play a significant role in who finds a place in a law school. He
suggests that not much evidence exists that law schools use the legacy
program to the degree that it meaningfully harms poor (white) students,
but does not provide this evidence.' 3 6 Legacy admissions also occupy a
key role in who gets into the pool of students who can ever apply to law
school, and these students are generally wealthy whites. As Tim Wise
observes, 96% of living alumni at Ivy League schools are white.' That
being the case, it is rational to expect that their beneficiaries will be
mostly white as well. These legacy students have a huge advantage in the
application process. For example, at Harvard, non-legacies have a 15%
chance of admission while nearly 40% of legacy applicants are admit-
ted. 13 8 The rate of admission for legacy students is greater than that of all
students of color, whether admitted to Harvard under an affirmative ac-
tion program or not.139 Yet, legacy admits possess lower credentials than
other applicants.140 Furthermore, a recent study shows that affirmative
Id. But wait, there is more. Four points went to legacy applicants-again, mostly white students-
given the history of educational access in the United States. Id. at 81. Five additional points could be
had for leadership and service. Id. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, these points were
more likely available to wealthy white students who had the opportunities and resources to engage in
leadership and service activities like spending spring break in Mexico building houses for Habitat for
Humanity. Students with athletic ability received the same number of points as students who re-
ceived twenty points for affirmative action. Id Similarly, 20 points could be had under the ubiqui-
tous category known as provost's discretion for students with some special quality not previously
covered. Id. It is not hard to imagine that the special qualities not previously covered might include
the types of characteristics passed down through opportunities made available through assets (as
opposed to income). As Oliver and Shapiro observed, "The potential for assets to expand or inhibit
choices, horizons, and opportunities for children emerged as the most consistent and strongest com-
mon theme in our interviews." OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 86. What Sander's data can-
not tell us is the extent to which minorities in the upper echelons had wealth. Rather, as Wise points
out, Sander focuses on some of the facts above to explain bias in favor of wealthy applicants without
acknowledging wealthy white applicants may benefit disproportionately. See WISE, supra note 22, at
79-81.
135. I imagine the difficulty in doing this analysis is a function of the small sample number
Sander had to rely on in completing his standardized index based on race. Only thirty-three schools
had the minimum five racial minorities per category needed to complete the analysis. Thus, I return
to my earlier point. We have too few minority students in law school in the first place.
136. A survey of the top twenty-five law schools reveals that eleven use legacy admissions
programs. Two schools refused to answer the question regarding legacy admissions. Data on file
with author.
137. WISE, supra note 22, at 122.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: How AMERICA'S RULING CLASS BUYS ITS
WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES-AND WHO GETS LEFT OUTSIDE THE GATES 4 (2006). Golden reveals
that top colleges and universities employ the practice of admitting children of alumni, wealthy do-
nors, celebrities and politicians-some with substandard academic credentials-over applicants with
higher SAT scores or grades who are without wealthy parents or political connections. Id. These
preferential admissions disproportionately benefit wealthy white applicants, and the number of
admitted wealthy white applicants outpaces students of color admitted under affirmative action
programs. Id. at 6. Examples of such preferential treatment include Harvard admitting Al Gore's
son-despite his unimpressive record and Princeton accepting President George W. Bush's niece
after she submitted her application a month late. Id. at 2, 4. Additionally, Harvard accepted a real
estate developer's son with academic numbers below the school's standard, but where the develop-
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action students and athletic program students outperform legacy ad-
mits.141
Sander suspects that grade inflation is more likely the culprit in law
school admissions bias against poor students.142 He observes that low
SES students are more likely to attend public institutions than private
ones. However, while he provides the data for that portion of the student
population, he neglects to reveal the data regarding the proportion of the
students of color attending private institutions-and thus enjoying the
grade inflation preference. In fact, 21% of whites, 18% of Asian Ameri-
cans, 17% of blacks, and 11% of Hispanic students attend private institu-
tions. Perhaps more troubling is that blacks, more than any other racial
group, specifically 15%, attend private for profit institutions.143 These
numbers suggest that minorities may not be the recipients of the advan-
tages of grade inflation to the same degree that white students are.
One final area where typically wealthy students enjoy privilege is in
the arena of early admissions. Indeed, seventeen of the top twenty-five
law schools used early admissions programs.14 4 Furthermore, these pro-
grams directly affect the pool of available undergraduates from prestig-
ious schools who can apply to law school. Early admission programs
have a far more significant impact on the make-up of the college class-
room than affirmative action. Typically, elite schools will offer early
undergraduate admission to students, sometimes with as much as one
hundred-point lower SAT scores, to obtain a commitment from that stu-
dent to attend the school. More affluent students are largely the benefici-
aries of the program because early admission requires strong grades and
SAT scores prior to receiving senior year grades. These students tend to
go to schools with strong resources, have access to test prep programs,
and are less likely to need financial aid. These programs disadvantage
students of color because students of color are unable to take advantage
of competing financial aid offers.14 5 More importantly, it is not family
income, but rather the advantage of wealth, i.e., the ability to deploy
ment office liked some other numbers-namely his father's pledged contribution of $2.5 million. Id.
at 44-45. Other schools employing this practice include Duke, Brown, Notre Dame, the University
of Virginia, Stanford, and Amherst. Id at 54, 56, 117, 122-23, 288.
141. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY
PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (2010).
142. Sander, supra note 1, at 659.
143. For-profit colleges offer many more non-degree programs than legitimate degree pro-
grams. These non-degree programs take less time.to complete and cost the college less to run (be-
tween hundreds and thousands of dollars), but do not yield gainful employment. In short, the costs of
these programs are disproportionately higher than the income students can expect to receive upon
graduation. See Aaron N. Taylor, "Your Results May Vary": Protecting Students and Taxpayers
through Tighter Regulation ofJProprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 729, 753
(2010) ("Proprietary school students tend to be poorer and older than students at traditional schools.
They are also more likely to be first in their families to go to college, be female, and to belong to a
racial or ethnic minority group." (footnotes omitted)).
144. Telephone survey with law schools. Data on file with author.
145. WISE, supra note 22, at 93.
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assets to pay the tuition of an elite school that will be a determinative
factor in accessing these programs. Sander's analysis ignores this impor-
tant variable. Thus, while we may say with confidence, based on the data
I have discussed above regarding wide disparities of wealth between
whites and non-whites, the programs discussed here provide preferential
treatment to the privileged white applicant. Therefore, I am less inclined
to endorse Sander's view that his data prove that white lower SES stu-
dents are denied access to law school precisely because of misused af-
firmative action programs that protect seats for high SES minority stu-
dents. The data I provide implicate programs, like the ones I discussed
above, as the culprit for wealthy white students' access at the expense of
low SES minority and non-minority students. On one point I would agree
with Sander: law school policies (and higher education admission poli-
cies) have the effect of creating barriers for low to moderate SES appli-
cants. 146
III. WHY CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CANNOT REPLACE THE
RACE-BASED VERSION
If only Sander had stopped there. I believe that Sander really is in-
terested in finding "fair" and "class neutral" law school admission poli-
cies because this is the historic discourse of the post-race, reverse-
discrimination crowd. He tips his hand when he writes that SES prefer-
ences could be at least a partial replacement for racial preferences.1 4 7 In
the discussion that follows, Sander employs his prior analysis to chal-
lenge affirmative action's relevancy and legitimacy by resorting to the
now tired arguments of stigma and mismatch that would not exist with
class-based preferences but, according to him, haunt race-based pro-
gramS.148
In this section, I address three points. First, I endeavor to briefly ex-
plain why race and class cannot be even partially duplicative. They are
cumulative because through a contextualized discussion of white prefer-
ences that allowed for the accumulation of wealth-a key variable to the
access of education-minorities encounter a double bind. Next, I explore
why the stigma argument is not relevant and why the mismatch argument
is misguided. Finally, I address what I have come to call the "William
James" problem: "There is nothing so absurd but if you repeat it often
enough people will believe it."14 9 The language, "In the age of
Obama,"'o is code for we are a post-race world in which racial equality
146. Sander, supra note 1, at 659-60.
147. Id. at 664.
148. Id. at 664-67.
149. WILLIAM JOSEPH FEDERER, AMERICA'S GOD AND COUNTRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
QuoTATIONS 317 (2000).
150. Sander, supra note 1, at 668.
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is "close enough." 51 In this section, I argue why, regardless of SES, af-
firmative action is still necessary to create racial diversity. Yet, institu-
tions must take care of how they treat students of color once they arrive.
A. The Cumulative Effect of Class and Race
Let's begin with the theory of race and wealth and why wealth,
more so than income, is most determinative of why we have the pipeline
problem.152 Sander is at least willing to acknowledge that certain racial
groups still face some inequality, but in the context of education, he
would rather focus on class to supplant race in an effort to employ 'out-
reach methods' over affirmative action. Oliver and Shapiro point out
why neither class nor race adequately addresses the problem at hand.15 3
Focusing on race creates evidence problems. Concepts like institutional
racism, implicit bias, and covert racism creep into the discourse, creating
challenges and/or resistance for human observers as well as judges to
understand how to redress these issues. On the other hand, focusing on
class, as Sander does, purges race from the discussion. Oliver and
Shapiro warn, "The materialist perspective that policy should address
broad class groups as opposed to specific racial groups leaves the unique
historical legacy of race untouched." 15 4 Wealth attainment plays a central
role in understanding the interactive effect of race and class that leads to
our current state of racial inequality.
Following the Second World War, the United States adopted a
number of social processes that intentionally or unintentionally provided
a series of preferences for whites and relegated African Americans to
subordinate positions. The Federal Housing Authority allowed for redlin-
ing practices in which white neighborhoods routinely had mortgages
approved and black neighborhoods almost universally were excluded
from homeownership. 55 Moreover, decisions on where to build high-
151. The words of my gun toting, Palin loving, blue collar working, but ever so charming
cousin echo in my ears: "For God's sake, they got one of their own as President. What more do they
need?"
152. Although I call the larger issue at hand here-who has access to law school or higher
education-a pipeline problem, I don't think that Sander would agree. He prefers to slice off the
issue at the stage of applications and focus on who gets accepted to law school.
153. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 34-35.
154. Id. at 35.
155. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE
INNER CITY 28 (2009).
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ways came about in the midst of the great migration 56 and involved the
demolition of inner-city black neighborhoods.15 7
The government also developed social service programs such as So-
cial Security Income (SSI) benefits and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). SSI benefits are available regardless of a recipient's
assets, and given to the survivors of disabled or deceased workers. On
the other hand, AFDC was originally designed for white women and
children as a way to meet basic needs. The benefits are far less generous
than SSI and require that the beneficiaries have minimal assets in order
to qualify. Initially, women of color were routinely denied these benefits
based on white normative "suitability" judgments on home and hearth.
However, by the time President Clinton called for reform of AFDC in the
early 1990s, the recipients were overwhelmingly minorities. 58
Finally, the tax code offers one of the most effective preferences for
wealth creation and preservation. Capital gains allow for reduced tax
rates, and the deduction of mortgage interest and property taxes create
special entitlements for whites more so than for blacks, even though the
latter may have the same income as the former because of the differential
asset portfolio each group carries. The subsidy for home ownership de-
ductions amounts to $54 billion, with the top 5% of taxpayers enjoying
$20 billion of it-the same group to get the tax reduction in capital gains
from the sale of stocks, etc. 159
The net effect of these policies meant that blacks have different ac-
cess to labor markets, neighborhoods, education, housing, and, espe-
cially, wealth.160 Whites had a path into a key means of wealth transfer-
ence-home ownership-from which blacks and Hispanics were ex-
cluded. This wealth is inherited by future generations, invested, and in-
creased.16 t Blacks and Hispanics simply cannot catch up. Even assuming,
arguendo, that Sander is right that some blacks and Hispanics are in the
upper middle class SES bracket, Oliver and Shapiro's work reveals that
by holding income constant (meaning comparing racial groups by the
156. While other groups use an immigration narrative to explain that individual hard work and
merit is the road to middle class, six million African Americans migrated from the South to the
North and West in hopes of better opportunities between 1915 and 1970, but this story has been left
largely as landscape. ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA'S GREAT MIGRATION 8-13 (2010). However, it is this migration that informed housing
and transportation policy in the North and West See WILSON, supra note 155, at 29-33.
157. WILSON, supra note 155, at 29-30 (pointing out that freeways allowing for white exodus
to federally subsidized suburban neighborhoods, created barriers between black and white city
neighborhoods, and blocked access for black neighborhoods to city business districts).
158. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 42.
159. Id. at 43-44.
160. In other words, black mobility is severely hampered by the neighborhood in which they
live, their job prospects and stability, their job income disparity, and the quality of education avail-
able to their children. Id. at 169.
161. Most importantly, the inheritance of this wealth transmits cultural capital, provides cash at
key milestone events (like a private school elementary and/or secondary education), and through
traditional bequests that allow for investment and future wealth attainment. Id.
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same income bracket), "[t]he highest earning black households possess
twenty-three cents of [the] median net financial assets for every dollar
held by [the] high[est]-income white households."l 6 2
Their results are sobering and should be considered carefully when
contemplating Sander's conclusion and assertion that: (1) some blacks
have achieved racial equality in the upper middle class based on their
income measures; and therefore, (2) no longer need racial admission
preferences. The social processes that allowed whites, but not minorities,
to gain a foothold in accessing wealth created a racially stratified legacy
still present today. Oliver and Shapiro paint a grave picture regarding the
lack of access to wealth, which cannot be so easily ignored by comparing
SES data, as they state:
[W]hites evidence a substantial ability to pass on status at the top
and, in general, show some upward movement; blacks, by contrast
display a comparative incapacity to transmit high occupational status
to their offspring coupled with the relative stasis on the mobility lad-
der. We further observed dramatic variations in the financial payoff
for mobility. No matter how high up the ladder blacks climb, they ac-
cumulate very few assets, especially in comparison to equally mobile
whites. Asset poverty is passed on from one generation to the next,
no matter how much occupational attainment or mobility blacks
achieve.163
Ultimately, Sander's analysis and conclusions create yet another
vehicle of suspicion. They suggest that once again, minority students,
particularly those at elite law schools, have gamed the system. His post-
race diatribe reinforces the constant air of suspicion under which students
of color must operate, no matter how much they accomplish.16 4
I agree with Sander that we need better data to solve the problem of
over-representation of wealthy, rather than high SES, students in law
school. Until that time, affirmative action that allows students of color
from all economic backgrounds into law school plays an essential role. If
affirmative action allows for more students of color to enter profes-
162. Id. at 101. Recall that Sander's data did not capture this variable.
163. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 169-70.
164. It reminds me of a certain Harvard Law Review editor who went on to be President of the
United States. He has to be guilty of something. He has to have gamed the system. He is not really
allowed to be president because he hasn't proved his citizenship. In fact, a poll released on February
15, 2011 shows only 28% of likely Republican primary voters firmly believe that Obama was born
in the United States. Scot Kersgaard, Poll: 51 Percent ofRepublicans Think Obama Was Not Born in
U.S., AM. INDEP. (Feb. 15, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://www.americanindependent.com/169644/poll-51-
percent-of-republicans-think-obama-was-not-bom-in-u-s. In fact, even after he released his long
form birth certificate clearly revealing his birth on U.S. soil, detractors created new suspicions
around Obama's educational credentials. Josh Voorhees, Trump Pivots from Obama's Birth Certifi-
cate to College Grades: Says President Needs to Explain How He Got into Harvard, SLATE.
(Apr. 27, 2011, 2:22 p.m.),
http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2011/04/27/obama-s~collegegrades-trump wants-to see president s
transcript.html.
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sions165 that allow for the accumulation of wealth and narrow the racial
gap, then it serves a noble purpose.16 6 Once race is contextualized for the
individual, as discussed in section one of this article, and contextualized
at the institutional level, as discussed here, the compelling nature of the
intersection of race and class becomes plain. Until that time, minorities
remain in a double bind.
B. Misguided Mismatch Theory and the Allegory of Stigma and Invisibil-
ity Part I
I begin this section with a story from Charles Ogletree's book, The
Presumption of Guilt.67 Recall that Sander proposes a mild SES prefer-
ence program and to illustrate the potential for success with his idea, he
describes the UCLA experiment and the "remarkable" results that
emerged with a diverse class, although mostly Asian American.iss
When Mathews [a Harvard Law graduate, and currently an associate
at a law firm in Washington, D.C.] was a freshman at UCLA in 1999
[during the same period when Sander's experiment was underway],
he was having lunch in the dining hall with some friends from the
dorms, all of whom were Black males. They had just settled down to
recap the week's events and devour lunch when a White female stu-
dent approached their table from across the room and asked, "So
what sport do you guys play?" There was an assumption that if there
was a group of Black male students at UCLA, they must be there on
athletic scholarships because of the high admission criteria for "regu-
lar students." Although this was the first time Mathews had encoun-
tered such a stereotype in college, it wasn't the last. Each of them re-
plied with the most nonstereotypical sport they could think of-
badminton, lacrosse, golf, and table tennis-and then continued with
their conversation.
I tell this story to reintroduce the ideas discussed in Part I. This
story illustrates the idea of one's master status-that regardless of SES,
one's race becomes an abstract concept that others define.170 In the case
of the academy, minorities are under suspicion, presumed guilty if you
will, for showing up at UCLA. The white girl in the story has created a
165. See THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT REPORT: BENCHMARKING
WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP 28 (2009), available at http://www.thewhitehouseproject.org/documents/
Report.pdf (reporting on the increased numbers of women of color in management and professional
positions).
166. At minimum, I sincerely hope these students will be inspired to eliminate preference and
institutional racism that occurs in the tax code, mortgage lending decisions, educational tracking, the
criminal code, and employment settings to name a few. As Bowen and Bok found, students admitted
under affirmative action were more likely to contribute to the communities from whence they came.
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 102.
167. OGLETREE, supra note 5.
168. Sander, supra note 1, at 662.
169. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 236.
170. GOFFMAN, supra note 42.
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narrative to explain their presence, to exonerate them of their guilt, after
investigating her suspicions.
This guilt is articulated under the guise of concern through the harm
students of color endure from the stigma that affirmative action inflicts
upon them. In an article published recently, I demonstrate that students
of color do, indeed, encounter stigma, but the stigma experience appears
associated with greater rates at schools that do not practice race-based
admissions.171 Across the board, findings of internal stigma (self-doubt),
external stigma (having others question one's qualifications), and reports
of overt racism were higher in anti-affirmative action states. 172
The story, still, is slightly more complex. Students reporting greater
rates of stigma and overt racism in anti-affirmative action states were
also more racially isolated than their counterparts in race-based admis-
sions states.' Thus, stigma and hostility do not appear to be connected
with affirmative action, but rather with racial isolation. Affirmative ac-
tion appears to play a role in decreasing the chances that a student will
find herself racially isolated in the classroom.174 The key point is that
eradicating affirmative action will not relieve students of color of the
stigma they encounter because affirmative action does not appear to be
the cause of stigma. Students of color are under suspicion whether they
are admitted under a white normative meritocratic system 75 or affirma-
tive action system. However, affirmative action might mitigate some of
the risk of stigma by minimizing racial isolation.
Sander also indicts students of color under his mismatch theory. He
does this earlier in his article with statements such as, "[Law schools] see
nearly all of these [minority] applicants as already handicapped by low
credentials." 7 6 He does it again in the presentation of data about students
admitted at the University of Missouri at Columbia (UMC).177 Sander
goes into great detail offering the gradation of scores and the odds that a
white student was admitted within a certain range, but does not offer the
same data regarding students of color.'7 8 He offers a cut off point under
which UMC admitted all but one black student.17 9 The reader is left to
171. Bowen, supra note 49, at 1234.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1227-29.
174. Id. at 1227. This study was exploratory and had a relatively small sample. However, it did
cover students from twenty-eight states, including the four states with anti-affirmative action poli-
cies. Most importantly, the study does not lay claim to making any causal statements. It suggests
correlations and encourages more study. Nonetheless, it raises questions about the validity of the
harm of stigma at affirmative action's hand.
175. Id. at 1234. Despite having achieved GPAs and SAT scores comparable or superior to
their white counterparts, and most especially their legacy counterparts, minority students are more
likely to encounter a stigma. Id. at 1227-28.
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wonder, how many black students applied? What were their scores?
Were they all lower than the white students? Without providing this in-
formation, Sander gives an impression that all black students were mis-
matched or robbed more qualified white students of seats at UMC.
Finally, it comes as no surprise that Sander asserts that one of the
key advantages of SES preferences is that they are based on individual
circumstances, not group membership.s And with individuality comes
the bonus of invisibility and the removal of stigma. Once again, color-
blindness celebrates the individual and eschews group experience. In-
deed, Gallagher notes, "In a post-race, colorblind world, race can be
seen, but pointing out race-based inequities should not be heard."
Perhaps most disturbing in higher education and law school is the
classroom setting where white individuals are so entrenched in color-
blindness that "[i]t is now possible to define oneself as not being racist
because of the clothes you wear, the celebrities you like or the music you
listen to while believing that blacks or Latinos are disproportionately
poor or over-represented in low pay, dead end jobs because they are part
of a debased, culturally deficient group."' 82 In other words, whites can
consume minority culture as a way of showing progressiveness without
considering privilege or structural barriers because in a post-race society
we are race mute.
We can already see the effects of eliminating affirmative action.
Guerrero notes the sadness a student endures when the absence of minor-
ity students in a classroom permits white students to analyze minority
communities on the basis of their own privileged experiences and to
speculate wildly about how minorities should behave.' 83 Silence due to
180. Id. at 665. Sander also touts the invisibility of SES preferences. Id. at 666. I am not sure if
those who lived in the type of poverty that Sander's SES preferences are designed to help would
necessarily agree. See generally Vivyan Adair, Branded with Infamy: Inscriptions of Poverty and
Class in the United States, 27 SIGNS 451, 456-458 (2002) (highlighting a study showing the added
stigma that those in poverty often bear through the physical signs of poverty throughout their lives.
Scars, limps, missing teeth from lack of medical care, exhaustion, poor skin, emaciation or obesity
from lack of proper nutrition, poor fitting shoes, insufficient winter clothing, and glasses taped
together.). In fact, I recall riding the NYC subway last summer when three young men entered the
car. The two white males were dressed in quality suits, nicely tailored to fit their shapes, fancy ties,
and shiny shoes. Their conversation clearly indicated they were interns at some sort of finance
company. The third male, an African American, wore an ill-fitting suit, slightly worn, a tie that had
seen better days, and scuffed shoes. His eyeglasses were held together in one corner by a paperclip.
One of the white males jokingly inquired about what was on his eyeglasses. The black male tried to
bat his hand away, but the white male insisted on inspecting his glasses and proceeded to mock him.
Not being middle class, not being privileged is not invisible. Or perhaps Sander was thinking of the
invisibility of white people receiving the preference in much the same way that legacy admits are
mostly white and perceive themselves as invisible.
181. Gallagher, supra note 19, at 9.
182. Id at 16.
183. ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 163 (2002).
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absence is one of the most grievous harms from dismantling affirmative
action and most certainly would not be cured with a SES model.184
C. Consider the Cause (Stigma) of Stereotype Threat and Effect (Under-
performed Credentials) and the Tragedy of Mismatch Discourse Part
II
Regardless, others have challenged the mismatch theory in detail,
and I do not intend to repeat their arguments here.'85 Instead, I raise two
points. First, I remind the reader of Claude Steele's famous work on
stereotype threat theory in which the most accomplished students of
color appear most at risk for underperforming on tests.186 Claude Steele
points out that those whose social identity is attached to the domain of
school, i.e., either by privilege or by fighting the odds of poor education,
unsafe neighborhoods, lack of family support, anomie, and low expecta-
tions, consequently possessing high confidence and strong academic
skills,' will perform less than they are capable of on high stakes tests
(like LSATs or Bar exams) when they fear the threat of confirming a
negative stereotype.'" In this case, the negative stereotype is the one that
Sander repeats often-minorities have handicapped credentials.'" 9
Therefore, social identities are a function of the situation in which a
person finds oneself.190 For people of color, the dominant group inflicts a
social identity upon them at the micro level, with individual interactions,
like the UCLA story above, but social identity imposes itself at the insti-
tutional, or macro level, too, when a person finds herself in a particular
social setting and must function in it according to the stereotypes at
hand.' 9' Thus, Sander's attempt (and the attempts of others) to reduce
184. Id.
185. See supra note 3; see also Peter Arcidiacona et al., Does Affirmative Action Lead to a
Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence 19-25 (Econ. Research Initiatives at Duke, Working Paper No.
27, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid-1384022 (arguing that
universities would have to have more private information not shared with students to create mis-
match and highlighting studies that indicate that even with that information, no conclusions regard-
ing mismatch can be made); Doug Williams, Does Affirmative Action Create Educational Mis-
matches in Law Schools? 11-14 (Apr. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://econ.duke.edu/-hfl4/ERID/Williams.pdf (arguing that bar passage data is too flawed to draw
conclusive evidence). The data does not seem to support Sander's assertion that the evidence is
mounting as to the existence of mismatch.
186. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 18-20.
187. Steele refers to these students as vanguard students. Id. at 58.
188. See generally id.
189. See generally Sander, supra note I (suggesting a variety of instances where minorities
have handicapped credentials).
190. Steele refers to these as identity contingencies. Identity contingencies are conditions
unique to your social identity that you must confront and cope with in a setting in order to function
in it. They emerge from the racial hierarchy and stereotypes that occur in any given situation based
on how it is organized. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 68.
191. Steele states:
The reality of stereotype threat also made the point that places like classrooms, university
campuses, standardized-testing rooms, or competitive running tracks, though seemingly
the same for everybody, are, in fact, different places for different people. Depending on
group identity, different people would simply have different things to contend with in
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students of color to a set of under-credentialized test scores robbing more
deserving (white) students of their rightful place in law school ignores
the social reality and effects under which all students of color, regardless
of SES, must struggle. As Ross wryly stated twenty years ago:
In either legal rhetoric or artistic expression, the denial of the full
humanness of the black person has been a central and tragic part of
our discourse. Black abstraction functioned as a lens through which
we remade the context in which our choices were played out. We ab-
stracted away the pieces of reality that might have made those
choices less comfortable. 192
It is this discourse, which only contributes to the self-fulfilling prophecy
that causes psychic harm and the vicious circle of underperformance.
Still, if we are to address the law school admissions of low SES stu-
dents, as Sander articulates as his key goal in this article, we must ad-
dress the minority college graduation rate that makes up the pool of
available law school applicants.' 93 Relying on mismatch here to explain
the smaller numbers of graduates is also misguided. Instead, we might
consider the research done on "undermatching," in which minority stu-
dents from lower SES tend to apply and enroll in schools less selective
than where the students could actually succeed.19 4 The same undermatch-
ing phenomena that put students at risk, both in terms of graduation rates
and achieving the institutional support they may need, may also occur at
law schools. Research suggests that more selective institutions have the
resources to provide the appropriate support students of color may
need.195 Thus, a massive culture shift needs to occur in which we first
humanize the students of color, stop indicting them, and confront the
ways in which institutions of higher education must change to better
serve the diverse student body (and its social contingencies) that these
institutions congratulate themselves on acquiring. That is the subject
taken up in this last section.
these places-different stereotype threats, different ambiguities, about how to interpret
their experience, different goals and preoccupations.
Id at 60. Sander might be interested to know that top white male math performers underperformed
in a challenging math test compared to a control group when the experimental group where faced
with the stereotype that Asian Americans tended to do better on the test. Id. at 91-92.
192. Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 38 (1990).
193. Bowen et al. found that the majority of low SES college students were white. See gener-
ally WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., CROSSING THE FINISH LINE: COMPLETING COLLEGE AT AMERICA'S
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES (2010) (giving a detailed account of education attainment in relation to such
factors as race, gender, and SES).
194. Id. at 87-111.
195. Evan Thomas & Pat Wingert, Minority Report, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 2010 at 42.
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C. Post-Race Diversity Paradox
One of the primary dangers of creating a racially and economically
diverse student body is that institutions do so within a paradigm of "post-
race." The effect is that students of color and white students attend
school with very different social contingencies. Although Sander does
not mention it in his article, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger saw
value in affirmative action because it could enhance the diversity of the
student body for the twin goals of increasing racial understanding and
eradicating racial stereotypes. Unfortunately, achieving these goals
proves incredibly difficult when institutions of higher education gener-
ally, and academics such as Sander, specifically, espouse colorblindness.
In fact, a recent study I conducted, examining whether students of
color in affirmative action versus anti-affirmative action schools enjoyed
the benefits articulated in Grutter, revealed disheartening results. The
study asked whether the Grutter goals were achieved using a series of
measures, but asked the minority students to consider their answers in the
context of a classroom with critical mass, i.e., other students of the same
racial or ethnic background attended the same classes. 19 7 On all meas-
ures, while more URM students in affirmative action states reported that
the Grutter goals were met, barely a third of the URM students agreed or
strongly agreed with any of the measures. Only two exceptions emerged,
critical mass in affirmative action schools led about half the URM stu-
dents to feel more welcome on campus and about 40% experienced in-
creased self-confidence.' 98 However, the most disturbing number was
that only one-third of the minority students at affirmative action schools
and about a quarter of the minority students at anti-affirmative action
schools believed that a critical mass classroom led white students to en-
gage in perspective-taking. 99
The lack of white student perspective-taking is understandable if we
consider the function of colorblindness for students and faculty alike in
higher education. Most white Americans believe that blacks and whites
have achieved racial equality. 200 This belief is a central tenet that allows
the allegedly progressive discourse of the irrelevancy of skin color.
However, Ruth Frankenberg prefers to call colorblindness color evasive-
ness because it allows whites to ignore their place of privilege. Whites
196. 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
197. Bowen, American Skin, supra note 40, at 5. Critical mass was a key component of why
affirmative action was needed. A certain number of students were needed in a classroom to ensure
that others could see the variety of experiences and viewpoints that students in that racial or ethnic
group held. Id.
198. Id. at 35-36.
199. Id. at 41. Gottfredson et al. have found that without perspective taking, it is difficult to
diffuse racial stereotypes. Nisha C. Gottfredson et al., Does Diversity at Undergraduate Institutions
Influence Student Outcomes?, 1 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 80, 82 (2008).
200. Charles M. Blow, A Nation of Cowards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A2 1. (discussing
poll results that show a discrepancy in opinions about race and racism in the U.S.).
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need not, under this model, acknowledge their social "location of struc-
tural advantage."201
The concept of colorblindness is central to Sander's thesis and dis-
course. As I have tried to argue throughout this paper, colorblindness
demands de-contextualization of race. With de-contextualization, advo-
cates of a class-based model of affirmative action do not have to ac-
knowledge the identity implications of race and suspicion, the social
contingency effects of race and stereotype threat, or the historical legacy
of racial inequality through blocked access to wealth and the generational
implications of this legacy on all levels of SES. David Theo Goldberg
views this narrative as essential to claims of reverse racism 2 0 2 and denial
of any claims of current redress.203
Furthermore, the theme of choice also appears in Sander's article.
He argues that "boundary groups" will only slightly partake in a particu-
204lar racial identity. However, it is this idea where Sander and others fail
to grasp the contextualization of race. While a belief that one "partakes"
in a racial identity may hold true for whites in their luxury of optional
ethnicity,205 such a paradigm conveniently allows for Sander and others
to argue that "race no longer matters as an independent force which or-
ganizes social life, allocates resources, or creates obstacles to upward
mobility."206 As discussed in the introduction and Part I, as well as in
Charles Ogletree's book The Presumption of Guilt,207 regardless of SES,
suspicion surrounds minorities in a whole host of social settings, includ-
ing higher education. Again, the double bind rears its head.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Naturally, despite the consistent and mounting evidence of increas-
ing racial inequality, 2 0 8 a glaring question remains: why is Sander so tied
201. Ruth Frankenberg, The Mirage of an Unmarked Whiteness, in THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF WHITENESS 72, 76 (Birgit Brander Rasmussen et al. eds., 2001).
202. A claim Sander certainly makes as to wealthy minorities against poor whites, as well as
his assertion that race-based affirmative action is no longer relevant. See Sander, supra note 1, at
649, 660,664-65.
203. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIAL SUBJECTS: WRITING ON RACE IN AMERICA 55 (1997).
204. Sander, supra note 1, at 665.
205. MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 6 (1990).
206. Ashley W. Donane, Jr., White Identity and Race Relations in the 1990s, in PERSPECTIVES
ON CURRENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 151 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 1997).
207. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 98-100.
208. Orlando Patterson, For African Americans, A Virtual Depression-Why, THE NATION,
July 19, 2010 at 93. Patterson writes that while white America has experienced the Great Recession,
most African-Americans have suffered something as desperate as the Great Depression. Id. Unem-
ployment rates seem unimaginable in the double digits for African Americans. Id. Patterson finds the
current economic crisis has served to open a deeper chasm between the socioeconomic wellbeing of
blacks and whites. Id. He observes on nearly all measures, income, wealth, educational attainment,
homeownership, foreclosures, the gains from the 1990s have been eradicated. Id. Income has de-
clined. Id. Even more disturbing for Patterson is the growth in gulf between white and black wealth.
Id. Black median wealth barely increased in the last 25 years stagnating at $5000 in 2007. Id. White
median wealth quadrupled during this time period, skyrocketing to $100,000. Id
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to the colorblind ideal? As Cheryl Harris explains, property does not
have to be physical. It just has to have value. Being white has value and
provides rights. It is not just a privileged identity, but rather an objective
vested interest legitimized by law long ago. 2 0 9 She points out that 'white-
ness' receives protection because so much is contingent upon it.210 And
this is especially so in the racial hierarchy that is higher education.
Whites have come to see education as their "right" even though it does
not appear as such in the U.S. Constitution.2 11 As Cornel West puts it:
The idea that affirmative action violates the rights of fellow citizens
confuses a right with an expectation. We all have a right to be seri-
ously considered and fairly considered for a job or position. But cal-
culations of merit, institutional benefit, and social utility produce the
results. In the past, those who were never even considered had their
rights violated; in the present, those who are seriously and fairly con-
sidered yet still not selected do not have their rights violated but
rather had their expectations frustrated. 212
The heart of the matter is the frequently invoked use of the word
"fair." As expected, Sander argues fairness on the grounds that "[i]t is
hard to justify giving large preferences to blacks and Hispanics from
privileged backgrounds while ignoring the needs of low-SES applicants
of all races." 2 1 Allow me to unpack this statement in light of what I have
argued above.
First, what Sander really means is it hard to justify giving prefer-
ences to a black applicant whose father is a neurosurgeon at the expense
of a white applicant whose mother is a house cleaner. Second, it is un-
clear to me what Sander defines as privileged when wealth is excluded
from the equation of his analysis. Third, I agree we should not ignore the
needs of low-SES applicants of all races, but as the data shows, the paltry
pool of minority college graduates as compared to low-SES white gradu-
ates demonstrates that we, collectively, continue to ignore low-SES mi-
nority students throughout their educational careers.
Thus, I propose three ideas: First, socioeconomic preferences must
co-exist with affirmative action, not replace them--even incrementally.
As established, minorities operate with a different set of social contin-
gencies, even or perhaps especially, sons and daughters of privileged
209. Harris, supra note 84, at 1724-26.
210. Id. at l730.
211. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)(finding no fundamen-
tal right to education).
212. West, supra note 67, at 34. And, as discussed in depth earlier, the consequences of not
having access to a particular type of education or labor market, has generational effects in wealth
and SES attainment. See supra Part III (enabling whites to maintain a higher SES because wealth is
inherited by future generations, invested, and increased, while blacks and Hispanics, generally, are
unable to catch up to the same level of wealth by the same means).
213. Sander, supra note 1, at 664.
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minority parents.214 Second, we develop a data collection system that
measures wealth in addition to SES. In developing this information we
can better understand who is privileged,2 15 who is applying to law school,
and who is enrolling. We can start developing need-based scholarships at
a much more aggressive rate with these data in mind.216 Third, we revo-
lutionize our educational institutions by implementing color conscious-
ness rather than just inviting diversity in. In doing so, we can acknowl-
edge the different social contingencies under which our students operate.
As administrators, professors, and fellow students, we can learn to re-
spond accordingly. 2 17 We can work to change the settings and cues under
which students operate, particularly those vulnerable to stereotype
threat.2 18 And as it turns out, all students are vulnerable to stereotype
threat-even white students, who often will avoid interaction with mi-
norities for fear of appearing racist.2 19
Sander posits that he sees no evidence that schools are putting into
place plans to draw down their affirmative action plans under the timeta-
ble articulated in Grutter.220 However, former Justice O'Connor recently
called for more empirical evidence and action for affirmative action, not
a withdrawal plan.221 While I agree with Sander's assertion regarding the
successes that have arrived in the wake of the civil rights revolution, it is
214. Not only do students of color have to worry about confirming a negative stereotype,
which results in underperformance, they are still trying to master the concepts and skills a professor
is teaching them. In other words they are multi-tasking in a high stakes setting. Steele states such a
situation has serious consequences for minorities because it is a chronic situation in which cardio-
vascular and working memory effects occur. Overtime, enduring chronic negative stereotype threat
can create serious health consequences for African Americans-even in the high SES group.
STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 108-25; see OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 98-101
(discussing the ongoing suspicion of even highly accomplished minorities in a variety of settings).
Again, this is a chronic situation that all minorities confront. I recall sitting in a law conference that
included recent minority law graduates describing how they navigated employment settings. One
male sighed as he described his law firm experiences, and exasperatedly stated, "Being a Black male
is a full time job!" Massey's study on stereotype threat demonstrated that even privileged minority
students have an extra pressure of identity threat working against their academic success. DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMAN AT AMERICA'S
SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 10- 12 (2002).
See also, Carbado & Gulati, supra note 49, at 1262.
215. Patterson, supra note 208 (observing that the 2007 Pew Foundation/Brookings Institution
study found that the black middle class-the group Sander claims has arrived-is failing to repro-
duce itself). This means the fragile middle class discussed in Section Two is splintering to the point
where its children are not only downwardly mobile, but finding themselves in the bottom of the
income distribution. Thus, I believe we are at little risk of creating a trend where privileged middle
class black children will game the system at the expense of poor white children.
216. See BOWEN, ET. AL, supra note 193, at 230-33 (finding this to be a key factor in maintain-
ing and graduating low SES students).
217. See generally Bowen, American Skin, supra note 40.
218. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI, supra note 45, at 164-80 (revealing a number of means by
which schools can reduce identity threat).
219. Id. at 205-06, 213.
220. Sander, supra note 1, at 37-38.
221. Sandra Day O'Connor & Stewart J. Schwab, Affirmative Action in Higher Education over
the Next Twenty-five Years: A Need for Study and Action, in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58, 58-
62, 71 (David L. Featherman et al. eds., 2010).
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a limited achievement. As Patterson calls it, African Americans enjoy the
inclusion and influence of the public sphere of American life with spe-
cific celebrity figures. 2 22 However, I take issue with Sander's pro-
nouncement regarding middle class minorities. As Steele observed
above, the avoidance of the "other" has led to profound racial segrega-
223tion, or as some call it "hypersegregation." Regardless, the effect is
that African Americans live a dichotomy of public inclusion (symboli-
cally) with private exclusion. All of this is to say that I am brought full
circle in my critique. The data presented here do not capture the lost so-
cial networks, uneven educational training, missed social capital, and
racial contextualization essential to educational and occupational success
and ultimately the stability that comes with wealth. Until I see evidence
in our social structures that stereotype threat has vanished and that deseg-
regation and disparity have decreased, I will continue to advocate for
affirmative action and class-based preferences that consider wealth.
222. Patterson, supra note 208, at 93.
223. STEELE, supra note 45, 199-206.
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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE:




Among the many other accomplishments of Benjamin Franklin is
the creation of the first firefighting organization in Philadelphia. That it
was difficult to convince colonial Philadelphians that a group committed
to firefighting was a good idea is hard to imagine, but Franklin had to
advocate for the creation of just such a group for some time.1 In one
submission to a local newspaper, Franklin argued that prevention of a
catastrophic city-wide fire was certainly preferable to rebuilding a
2burned city from scratch. It was in this context that Franklin noted that
"an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure."3 By the close of
1736, Philadelphia had its first volunteer fire department, the Union Fire
Company.4
Although modem legal debates about the constitutionality of af-
firmative action in higher education admissions may look to the founding
fathers for guidance on the meaning of the Constitution, it is unlikely
much focus has fallen on Ben Franklin's Bucket Brigades, as the Union
Fire Company was affectionately known.5 However, it is Franklin's pre-
scient preference for prevention over cure that has the potential to lead
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law, dkiel@memphis.edu. Thanks to the staff of the Denver Law Review for putting this volume
together and to Prof. Sander and the other authors for continuing this important dialogue. Thanks
also to my research assistant, Anna Rudman Santos, who spent a fair amount of a winter vacation
working with this article and without whom it could not have been completed.
1. Fire Department: The Electric Ben Franklin, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/
franklin/philadelphia/fire.htm (last visited May 18, 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. This quote appeared in the February 4, 1735 edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette.
Writing anonymously as an "old citizen," Franklin wrote:
In the first Place, as an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure, I would advise 'em
to take care how they suffer living Coals in a full Shovel, to be carried out of one Room
into another, or up or down Stairs, unless in a Warmingpan shut; for Scraps of Fire may
fall into Chinks and make no Appearance until Midnight; when your Stairs being in
Flames, you may be forced, (as I once was) to leap out of your Windows, and hazard
your Necks to avoid being oven-roasted.
Id.
4. Citizen Ben: Firefighter, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/13 citizenfirefighter.html
(last visited May 18, 2011).
5. See generally Andrew H. Neilly, The Violent Volunteers: A History of the Volunteer Fire
Department of Philadelphia 1736-1871 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Penn-
sylvania) (on file with the Scholarly Commons Repository, University of Pennsylvania).
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the affirmative action debate from the moral, legal, and educational
quicksand in which it currently lingers.
In its current incarnation, affirmative action in higher education
admissions is the pound of cure. Indeed, the volumes dedicated to the
wisdom or legality of affirmative action or the many details of its imple-
mentation-this volume included-would weigh hundreds of pounds.
Within that conversation is hardly an ounce of discussion of prevention.
This is in part a result of the Supreme Court's consistent rejection of
remedial justifications for affirmative action. However, the omission of
prevention causes the ultimate goals of affirmative action to be obscured
and leads to an unnecessarily confrontational debate on means to attain
those goals. This Article seeks to re-insert the concept of prevention into
the affirmative action discussion.
Challenging the underlying premise that higher education admis-
sions (cure) can be considered independently of underlying educational
disparities (prevention), this Article criticizes affirmative action in higher
education admissions-along with the bulk of the debate concerning it-
as focusing too much energy on treating the symptoms that result from
educational disparities along racial, socioeconomic, and other demo-
graphic lines and too little attention on the disparities themselves. Pre-
vention or minimization of those disparities offers an opportunity to shift
the affirmative action conversation away from the divisive arguments
about the use of race and toward the goal of leveling the playing field so
that race need not be used. This Article then offers some actions univer-
sities, and law schools in particular, can take to participate in broadening
the concept of what affirmative action can mean.
This Article, however, recognizes that universities and law schools
can only play a limited role in directly addressing the larger educational
and societal disparities that make affirmative action necessary to achieve
diverse student bodies. Further, the Article recognizes that even a pana-
cean solution to the underlying disparities would take a generation or
more to impact higher education applicant pools. Thus, although intro-
ducing prevention into the debate, this Article goes on to discuss the cur-
rent cure. Specifically, this Article considers the arguments offered by
Professor Sander regarding socioeconomic diversity in legal education,
agreeing with much, but cautioning against discarding entirely the use of
race in the admissions process. Although the current use of race is imper-
fect and merits significant modification, removing race from the process
erroneously pretends that race, independent of socioeconomic status,
does not affect an applicant's credentials when data indicates otherwise.
Fire prevention is undoubtedly a more efficient way of limiting fire
damage than putting fires out after they have begun. For many minority
and low socioeconomic students applying to college and law school, the
fires of disparate educational opportunities have been burning their entire
lives. Fighting these fires with preferences in the admissions process is
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inefficient and probably ineffective at addressing the underlying educa-
tional disparities-it occurs well after much of the damage has been
done. Putting the fires out earlier in life-or, ideally, preventing them
entirely-should be an explicit goal of any affirmative action policy.
Losing sight of this ultimate goal and limiting the debate to the narrow
means of higher education admissions policies puts any affirmative ac-
tion program at risk of legal, moral, and educational failure.
I. PREVENTION
In narrowly upholding the University of Michigan Law School's
consideration of race in making admissions decisions in order to achieve
student body diversity, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in 2003 that, "We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today."6 Implicit in the Court's statement is the
assumption that something significant will have changed to make the
objective qualifications' of the applicant pool for law school admissions
less racially disparate by 2028. Indeed, Justice O'Connor looked to the
increases in application credentials of minority applicants in the quarter
century following Regents of the University of California v. Bakke8 in
forecasting similar gains following Grutter v. Bollinger.9 Those increases
between 1978 and 2003, of course, had little to do with the use of race at
the university or graduate school admissions stage-making higher edu-
cation more accessible for minority applicants impacts which students
are admitted, not how students are schooled in the decades leading up to
admission.
Thus, the twenty-five year sunset provision for the use of race in
admissions decisions presumes that something wholly outside of the ad-
missions process will render the use of race in that process unnecessary.
The affirmative action debate of today, however, remains largely limited
to the intricacies within the admissions process and does not consider the
ways in which universities and law schools can aid in proving the Court
right. After all, Justice O'Connor's projection of more racially equitable
applicant pools is not going to happen magically, just as the gains fol-
6. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
7. My use of objective criteria, such as standardized tests, in determining qualification is not
an endorsement of such use, but rather an acknowledgement of the prevalence of it. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to critique the meaning of "qualified" for higher education admissions, though
such a reimagining may do more to affect higher education admissions than any tinkering with the
current admissions process.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education.
Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed in-
creased.").
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lowing Bakke were not a result of natural evolution.10 And there is some
evidence that the post-Bakke gains have plateaued, creating an even
greater urgency to confront current disparities." Law schools and univer-
sities can be partners in the broader effort to provide equitable educa-
tional opportunities and ensure that race can indeed "no longer be neces-
sary" when today's toddlers apply to college.
A. Why Do We Have Affirmative Action in Higher Ed Admissions? And
Why Do We Need It?
Before one can engage in a meaningful discussion of affirmative ac-
tion, the purpose of the program must be defined. At its core, affirmative
action in higher education seeks to increase the accessibility of a univer-
sity or graduate education for members of underrepresented groups, most
typically members of minority groups. It was born from a recognition
that simply lifting the restrictions on minority enrollment would not re-
sult in meaningful accessibility for disadvantaged populations.12
Qualified individuals, such as Heman Sweatt13 or G.W. McLaurin,14
may attain advanced degrees, but without more-without something
affirmative-minority representation in higher education would remain
isolated, a status quo some universities were unwilling to accept.
To confront that status quo, institutions began intervening in the
admissions process to ensure greater diversity in incoming classes.' 5 Cur-
10. In the 1970s and 1980s, shrinking of the black-white disparity for 9-year-olds on the
NAEP test follows the same nonlinear trajectory as national reductions in pupil-to-teacher ratios.
RONALD F. FERGUSON, TOWARD EXCELLENCE WITH EQUITY: AN EMERGING VISION FOR CLOSING
THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 43-45 (2007). In addition civil rights gains and changes in family educa-
tional background may have played an important role in decreasing the achievement gap during that
period. See David Grissmer, Ann Flanagan & Stephanie Williamson, Why Did The Black-White Test
Score Gap Narrow in the 1970s and 1980s?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 182, 183
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998). Further, more demanding coursework that was
part of a broad-based movement for accountability in the 1980s may have had significant effects on
increasing achievement. FERGUSON, supra, at 55-5 8.
11. See NAOMI CHUDOWSKY, VICTOR CHUDOWSKY & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC.
POLICY, STATE TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2007-08, PART 3: ARE ACHIEVEMENT GAPS
CLOSING AND IS ACHIEVEMENT RISING FOR ALL? 12 (2009) (noting that while education gaps have
narrowed since the 1970s, "[e]ven with the general narrowing trend, the black-white and Latino-
white gaps on NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress] remain large"); FERGUSON,
supra note 10, at 43 (noting that all of the progress for 9-year-olds in narrowing the achievement gap
was completed by 1986 in math and 1988 for reading).
12. See, e.g., About the AAAA, AM. Ass'N FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
http://www.affirmativeaction.org/about.html (last visited May 18, 2011) (claiming that the goal of
affirmative action is to provide the country with a way "to finally address the systematic exclusion of
individuals of talent on the basis of their gender, or race from opportunities to develop, perform,
achieve and contribute").
13. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (declaring a constitutional requirement
that an African American applicant be admitted to University of Texas law school).
14. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (declar-
ing functional segregation, such as a separate seating area within a classroom, within University of
Oklahoma graduate school of education to be unconstitutional).
15. See TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 150-51 (2004). After Bakke, a number of other colleges and law schools began to formulate
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rently, those interventions include consideration of an applicant's demo-
graphic characteristics-including race-in evaluating credentials for
admission. It is that consideration of race that sparks much of the modem
affirmative action debate.
Although the Supreme Court has narrowed the constitutionally
compelling reasons for considering race, there are a variety of reasons
why schools might consider it in their interests to pursue diverse student
bodies. In Bakke, the admissions program at the UC-Davis Medical
School claimed to serve the purposes of "(i) [R]educing the historic defi-
cit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession; (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination;
(iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communi-
ties currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body."' 6
As is clear from the Bakke list, the program was as much, if not
more, about remedying prior and current discrimination in the world
outside of university admissions (items (i) through (iii)) as it was about
obtaining benefits within higher education (item (iv)). Bakke validated
only the final purpose-pursuing the educational benefits of diversity-
as being constitutionally valid,17 a holding affirmed in Grutter.18 In so
doing, Bakke and Grutter have excluded any discussion of remedial
goals from the legal discussion surrounding affirmative action-a result
that contributes to the exclusive focus on cure over prevention in the
legal literature.
However, the affirmative action debate is not limited to the court-
room. In the broader public debate about affirmative action in higher
education-a debate that is moral, philosophical, and political as much as
legal-the rejected purposes remain relevant. Even if these justifications
are not compelling to courts, remedial goals are undoubtedly part of what
drives the desire for diversity. The Grutter Court acknowledged as much,
noting that law schools in particular "must be inclusive of talented and
their admissions processes around the goal of student body diversity. See Victor V. Wright, Note,
Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages in Suspect Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking
Down an Affirmative Action Admissions Program, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 890 (1997). As a result,
many law schools and colleges now consider race as part of an applicant's overall profile. See
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling
Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 390 (1998).
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978) (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 311-12. Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion in Bakke, rejected the
preference for members of racial groups solely for the purposes of increasing their numbers in the
medical school as being "facially invalid." Id. at 307. In addition, he rejected the University's efforts
to remedy societal discrimination as being too broad without any specific holding of prior discrimi-
nation by the university. Id. at 307-08. Finally, Justice Powell rejected the argument that admitting
more minority applicants would lead to better medical care in minority communities because of a
failure of proof that such enhanced medical care would actually result. Id. at 311.
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
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qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions
that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in Amer-
ica."' 9 Unstated in identifying the need for prospective inclusion is the
history of exclusion of many members of various races and ethnicities
from universities and law schools, institutions which are "the training
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."2 0 Remedying that
historical wrong remains a baseline motivation for any affirmative action
policy, even if institutions cannot say so in court.
B. Prevention is a More Efficient Solution
These justifications-educational or remedial-do not indicate on
their own why it is necessary to consider demographic characteristics in
making admissions decisions to attain them. The underlying problem that
makes admissions interventions necessary to achieve diverse student
bodies is the fact that there are vast inequities in the applicant pools that
fall along demographic lines. That problem--educational disparities-
has nothing to do with law school admissions. Indeed, if that problem
were solved (i.e., prevented), then there would be no need for admissions
preferences and the purposes offered in Bakke and Grutter could be
achieved without controversy.
Of course, the problem is not solved. Universities and law schools
confront demographic disparities in objective qualifications within their
applicant pools. That reality forces institutions to make a choice: they
may either take affirmative action to enhance broader accessibility across
demographic lines or they may live with the status quo and less diverse
student bodies. Most universities and law schools choose to intervene in
the admissions process in order to ensure diversity. Typically, the inter-
ventions are significant2 1 because they come at the highest level of edu-
cation within a society where there are educational disparities nearly
every step of the way from birth to law school admission. In other words,
law schools are attempting to put out a very large fire. As a result, the
effort to achieve diversity within the student body is necessarily signifi-
cant.
19. Id. at 332-33 (describing the degree to which the nation's political leadership includes
individuals with law degrees).
20. Id. at 308.
21. As Professor Sander demonstrates using the University of Missouri at Columbia as an
example, an admissions index score between 58 and 62 led to a 35% chance of admittance for a
white student, but a guarantee of admittance for an African American student. Richard H. Sander,
Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 654-55 (2011). Professor Sander
also notes that the interventions may be the "equivalent [of] a fifteen point LSAT boost for African
Americans, and a seven or eight point LSAT boost for Hispanics." Id Similarly, the University of
Michigan law school argued that without its interventions in the admissions process, "the number of
underrepresented minority students admitted to the Law School would be significantly smaller."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 385 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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In Class in American Legal Education, Professor Sander recognizes
as much when he asks the "interesting and important question" about
whether the disparities in law school enrollment along socioeconomic
lines are caused not by law school admissions policies but by the cumu-
lative effects of disadvantages in the educational system that students
from low-socioeconomic circumstances encounter throughout their aca-
demic careers. 22 Specifically, Professor Sander asks: "[A]re the relative
odds of completing college so heavily tilted against low-SES students
that there is no meaningful pool of potential law school entrants?" 23 In
order to isolate his question about the degree to which law schools are
barring access for low-SES students, Professor Sander is forced to screen
out the socioeconomic disparities in attaining bachelor's degrees. For
example, it is certainly troubling to learn that only 5% of law students
come from the bottom SES quartile. 2 4 However, the degree to which law
schools are responsible for this is limited.25 After all, only 7.6% of
bachelor's degree holders come from the bottom SES quartile. 2 6 Compar-
ing 5% to 25% to note the degree of underrepresentation of low-SES
students in law school is ghastly; comparing 5% to 7.6% remains trou-
bling, but is far less dramatic.27
Sadly, the same screening out would be required at every step of the
educational process. Isolating the degree of disadvantage faced in college
admissions, therefore, would have to account for the fact of disparities in
high school graduation rates. Isolating the degree of disadvantage faced
in high school graduation would require accounting for the disparities in
school quality during elementary and high school. Isolating the degree of
disadvantage in school quality during elementary and high school would
require accounting for disparities in pre-school literacy. And so on.
There are fires at every stage of the educational process and they
culminate in the need for a significant intervention during the higher
education admissions process. The conversation Professor Sander's arti-
cle triggers can only shrug this phenomenon off as "interesting and im-
portant." To be fair, Professor Sander's goal is not to fix the education
system and the broader societal disparities facing students from low so-
cioeconomic circumstances, but rather to fix modem affirmative action
in law schools-which is precisely the point. Restricting the conversation
to the least efficient (and most controversial) means of addressing the
problem can provide only a superficial fix. Broadening the conversation
to include prevention helps reveal a more comprehensive solution.
22. Sander, supra note 21, at 639.
23. Id
24. Id. at 646 tbl.5.
25. 1 am not, however, suggesting that law schools are absolved from responsibility. I only
mean to point out that law schools are the final step in a process rife with disparities.
26. Sander, supra note 21, at 640.
27. Id. at 640 tbl.2.
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There are many scholars and advocates, not necessarily in the legal
field, who are working on prevention. For instance, there is data indicat-
ing that pre-school literacy can have long-term educational effects.28
There is data on the impact of teacher quality on school performance,
particularly for low-SES students. 2 9 There are programs that attempt to
create a cradle-through-college safety net that ensures that students, re-
gardless of race or socioeconomic status, have the objective credentials
to attain college admission even without admissions preferences.3 0
This is not the proper forum to summarize the significant research
being done on prevention. The goal here is to indicate that this research
represents the comprehensive fix to modem affirmative action-it is the
way modem affirmative action becomes, as Justice O'Connor predicts,
unnecessary. Excluding it from an affirmative action debate, policy, or
conversation endangers any affirmative action program from being ex-
posed, often properly, as inadequate and ineffective at achieving its
goals.
C. Including Prevention Can Increase Public Support for Equitable
Educational Opportunity
Incorporating prevention into an affirmative action policy or con-
versation not only explicitly acknowledges the root causes that make
admissions interventions necessary and the inadequacies of the current
cure, but also builds a broader coalition of supporters of equitable educa-
tional opportunities that includes even opponents to the practice of af-
firmative action in admissions. Criticisms of modem affirmative action
are typically not leveled against the goal of increasing diversity, but
rather are offered against achieving diversity by manipulating the admis-
28. CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD ET AL., NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., HOME LITERACY
ACTIVITIES AND SIGNS OF CHILDREN'S EMERGING LITERACY, 1993 AND 1999, at 2, 5 (1999), avail-
able at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/2000026.pdf (noting that there is an increasing number of fami-
lies emphasizing literacy, and that there is a strong association between family literacy and chil-
dren's emerging literacy, and also discussing the differences among ethnicities in familial literacy
emphasis); HARVARD FAMILY RESEARCH PROJECT, RESEARCH BRIEF: FAMILY INVOLVEMENT
MAKES A DIFFERENCE IN SCHOOL SUCCESS (2006), available at http://www.hfrp.org/publications-
resources/browse-our-publications/family-involvement-makes-a-difference-in-school-success (find-
ing that "[c]hildren whose parents read to them at home recognize letters of the alphabet ... sooner
than those whose parents do not; [c]hildren whose parents teach them how to write words are able to
identify letters and connect them to speech sounds; [and] [c]hildren whose mothers use complex
sentences in their everyday conversations achieve high scores on literacy-related tasks in kindergar-
ten."). On average, African American three- and four-year-olds score lower on tests of school readi-
ness than white students. Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score
Group: An Introduction, in BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 1-2 & fig.1-1 (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); see also FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 3.
29. Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: At a Glance, CENTER FOR PUB. EDUC. (Oct. 4,
2005), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/StaffingstudentsfTeacher-quality-and-
student-achievement-At-a-glance/default.aspx (citing studies finding that "[tleacher quality more
heavily influenced differences in student performance than did race, class, or school of the student").
30. See, e.g., 100 Blocks, One Bright Future, HARLEM CHILDREN'S ZONE,
http://www.hcz.org/about-us/the-hcz-project (last visited May 23, 2011); The Partnership, STRIVE
TOGETHER, http://www.strivetogether.org/about-the-partnership (last visited May 23, 2011).
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sions process. A bottom-up solution-such as prevention-that could get
to diversity in higher education without the top-down manipulation of the
admissions process would likely enjoy significant public support.31 Af-
firmative action advocates who omit at least an acknowledgement that
prevention would be a better result for everyone do so at the risk of los-
ing support not only for affirmative action in its current form but for the
broader goals in the quest for more equitable educational opportunity-
the well-supported ends get lost in the controversial means.
Restricting the concept of affirmative action to the consideration of
race in admissions puts the entire effort to achieve diversity and equita-
ble educational opportunity in a constant state of uncertainty because the
use of race in the admissions process is morally, legally, and education-
ally controversial. The controversy is only heightened when the signifi-
cance of the intervention is revealed.3 2
Moral opponents of affirmative action argue that it is unjust to treat
people differently based on race or other factors that do not relate to in-
dividual merit. 3 Legal opponents of affirmative action morph the moral
criticism into a legal argument, claiming that differential treatment based
on race is inherently suspect (even when allegedly pursued for benevo-
lent ends). 34 Legal opponents go on to argue that affirmative action poli-
cies serve no compelling government interest or are not narrowly tailored
to a compelling interest to withstand the strict constitutional scrutiny
applied to all racial classifications or to diversity.35 Finally, educational
opponents of affirmative action argue that the means employed to
31. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 96-99 (2001) (referencing four state surveys on support for educational opportunity
equality, including one Kentucky survey in which 72.6 percent of pollsters said they preferred equal
educational opportunity more than high academic achievement).
32. See Sander, supra note 21, at 654 (noting that in most cases, the impact is of being identi-
fied as an African American is the equivalent of fifteen LSAT points, and seven or eight LSAT
points for Hispanics).
33. See, e.g., Louis P. Pojman, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 12 INT'L J. FOR APPLIED
PHIL. 97 (1998) (arguing that affirmative action itself requires discrimination, encourages mediocrity
and incompetence, and fails to value merit for merit's sake); G. Stolyarov 11, Three Ethical Argu-
ments Against Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED CONTENT FROM YAHOO! (June 1, 2007),
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2643 10/three ethical arguments against affirmative.html
?cat-72 (arguing that "affirmative action harms its intended beneficiaries ... punishes the most
innocent and industrious of persons, and that it defies an essentially individualistic American work
ethic").
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, contain-
ing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.").
35. For example, Justice Thomas has repeatedly insisted that any admissions policy that
considers race is unconstitutional. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that use of programs that promote differential treatment of minorities based solely
on race should be "categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause"); see also Grutter, 539
U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas is by no means
alone in this position. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner at
21-22, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 144985.
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achieve diversity distort the educational system when they deemphasize
individual merit.36
Although these criticisms argue for doing away with modem af-
firmative action, they should not be mistaken as opposition to equitable
educational opportunity.37 An affirmative action program that more ex-
plicitly demonstrates-both in its rhetoric and its policies-that it is not
solely about admissions preferences, but also about leveling the playing
field through prevention can capture the public enthusiasm for decreas-
ing educational disparities throughout the education system. If ultimately
successful, prevention would render the moral, legal, and educational
opposition moot-there would be no more need for disparate treatment
based on demographic factors, muting the moral and legal arguments,
and the educational argument would disappear as individual merit in-
creased in importance. The current affirmative action conversation, fo-
cused solely on top-down means, misses the opportunity to engage even
current opponents of admissions preferences in crafting bottom-up solu-
tions to the underlying problem of educational disparities along demo-
graphic lines.
D. What Can Law Schools Do?
A proper criticism at this point would be that law schools are not in
the business of fixing all the problems of the world, but rather are in the
business of training law students. Taken literally and to its logical ex-
treme, an affirmative action program focused on prevention would re-
quire universities and law schools to drop everything for a couple dec-
ades and focus entirely on addressing disparities throughout the educa-
tion system. Although it may be tempting to imagine what could be ac-
complished if the whole of society committed to getting education right,
it is obviously unrealistic. So, what can law schools do?
At a minimum, law schools pursuing diversity can adjust their
rhetoric to include prevention. As discussed above, limiting the conver-
sation to the most controversial method of addressing the problem-
36. In addition to the "academic mismatch" hypothesis discussed in Professor Sander's arti-
cle, arguing that admitting minority students to schools for which they are not academically prepared
does them a great disservice, others have argued that using affirmative action creates bifurcated
student bodies. See Sander, supra note 21, at 666-67. Rather than benefit from student diversity, the
goal condoned by the Supreme Court, students begin to resent and stigmatize one another, focusing
only on potential or perceived academic differences and inferiorities. See Jeffrey B. Wolff, Com-
ment, Affirmative Action in College and Graduate School Admissions-The Effects ofHopwood and
the Actions of the U C. Board of Regents on its Continued Existence, 50 SMU L. REV. 627, 637
(1997).
37. To the contrary, some affirmative action opponents would argue that they are in fact the
purest of equitable education advocates since they advocate a system that prohibits the use of any-
thing other than merit in delivering educational opportunities. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Constitution abhors classifications
based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegiti-
mate motives, but also because every time the govemment places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.").
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intervention in the admissions process-creates an unnecessarily con-
frontational atmosphere and puts the entire undertaking at risk of being
dismissed as inadequate, ineffective, or even unconstitutional. Broaden-
ing the discussion to include prevention has the potential to make allies
(at least partial allies) out of critics in the short term and, in the long
term, to contribute to the ultimate goal of making affirmative action un-
necessary.3 8
Beyond the rhetorical shift to include prevention, law schools can
take a variety of meaningful action signaling a commitment to support
prevention efforts. Each of these suggestions could be incorporated as an
element of a school's affirmative action process to serve as a tangible
commitment to prevention.
Institutionally, universities and law schools can support research
aimed at eliminating disparities throughout the educational system.
Within a local community, law schools could signal their commitment to
prevention by engaging directly with minority and low socioeconomic
students facing educational disparities. This could include anything from
adopting a school and committing resources to directly aid students to
organizing and supporting individual students, faculty, and staff involved
in direct mentoring or tutoring.
On a more substantial level, law schools could offer loan forgive-
ness to graduates who teach or counsel students from underrepresented
demographic groups. Many law schools offer loan forgiveness for stu-
dents engaging in public service legal work; 9 broadening the criteria to
include students who commit to addressing educational disparities, either
as teachers or in other capacities would signal an institution's commit-
ment to prevention. 4 0 This seems particularly promising considering the
fact that many students may enroll in law school without quite knowing
what they would like to do with their law degree and exit with a debt
load that requires them to work as lawyers, at least in the short term. In
38. One potential negative side effect to such a rhetorical shift could be that it may undermine
an institution's claim that its policies are tailored to achieve the limited compelling interest of cap-
turing the educational benefits of diversity.
39. See, e.g., COAP (Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP)), YALE L. SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/COAP.htm#WhoCOAP Serves (last visited May 23, 2011);
Low Income Protection Plan (LIPP), HARv. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/lipp/
index.html (last visited May 23, 2011); Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP), STAN. L.
SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/tuition/assistance/#overview (last visited May 23,
2011). It is typical for these programs to require law-related employment.
40. Students who teach in public schools that primarily serve low-income students are eligible
to have portions of any federal Perkins loans forgiven. Stafford Loan Forgiveness,
STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/repayment/forgiveness.php (last visited May 23,
2011). It appears that the Yale Loan Repayment Assistance Program might consider employment as
a teacher to qualify for loan forgiveness. COAP (Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP),
supra note 39.
41. One example of this is discussed in the American Bar Association's 2003 study on loan
repayment and forgiveness. See ABA COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT & FORGIVENESS, LIFTING
THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE (2003), available at
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addition, in the current economy, students are exiting law school with
J.D.'s and without legal jobs-that talent would be welcomed to help fill
the vast national need for quality teachers.42
The possibilities are limitless, but will only be conceived if law
schools are willing to recognize the broader mission of their affirmative
action programs. By contributing not only to firefighting, but also fire
prevention, law schools can redefine what affirmative action means.
II. CURE
Benjamin Franklin was smart enough to understand that even
though prevention was more efficient than cure, cure could not be ig-
nored. The Union Fire Company and other firefighting companies like it
could prevent a citywide conflagration but would never be able to pre-
vent every fire in Philadelphia. Recognizing the limitations of preven-
tion, Franklin helped form the Philadelphia Contributorship in 1752.43
The Contributorship was the first successful fire insurance company in
the colonies, insuring Philadelphians against catastrophic financial loss
in the event of a fire.
Just as Franklin confronted fires from both front-end prevention and
back-end insurance, so too must any discussion of affirmative action in
higher education consider both ways to minimize educational disparities
confronting students in the years before they apply and ways to utilize
the admissions process to address the disparities that persist. Thus, while
this article has been critical of the exclusive focus on cure, it now enters
that discussion.
As discussed above, law schools and universities have a limited
ability to implement policies aimed at prevention. The suggestions above
will not have any impact on the diversity within law schools in the im-
mediate future; they are instead aimed at reframing the affirmative action
debate. In addition, the impact of even perfect prevention of educational
disparities would take decades to reach university and law school appli-
cant pools, suggesting that some form of cure is therefore necessary for
the foreseeable future, just as Justice O'Connor suggested. The current
cure of utilizing demographic considerations in the admissions process is
sufficiently flawed to merit reexamination.
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/lrap/lrapfinalreport.pdf. That study concluded that
because of increasingly high debt amounts for law students, as many as 66% of graduates were
dissuaded from entering any kind of public interest or government job because those types of jobs
would not allow them to pay back their loans. Id. at 10. The study further noted that even those who
did initially enter public service left after only a few years due to financial constraint. Id.
42. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at BUI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/091aw.html?src=me&ref-general.
43. Citizen Ben: Insurance Ben-EFactor, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/13
citizeninsurance.html (last visited May 23, 2011); see also NICHOLAS B. WAINWRIGHT, A
PHILADELPHIA STORY: THE PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP FOR THE INSURANCE OF HOUSES
FROM LOSS BY FIRE 28-29 (1952).
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The cure constitutionally licensed in Grutter involves the considera-
tion of an applicant's race in arriving at admissions decisions. Under
Grutter, which permits the use of race in seeking the educational benefits
of a diverse student body, "diversity" should mean more than simply
race. Although the Grutter Court suggested ways to ensure proper tailor-
ing,44 it refused to offer precise guidelines as to how race may be used.
Indeed, the Court prohibited the use of any fixed formula in the compan-
ion Gratz case.4 5 Scholars are thus left to look at the outcomes to attempt
to determine the degree to which race impacts admissions decisions.
There is no need here to rehash the litany of potential criticisms
with this behind-the-curtain system. Professor Sander has identified one
particular side effect of focusing primarily on racial group membership
in providing admissions preferences-the difficulty applicants of all
races from lower socioeconomic backgrounds have in accessing legal
education. To the extent Professor Sander's article is identifying that
problem and proving its existence with data, I applaud it. As Professor
Sander notes, "Some law school policies militate against the admission
of low- and moderate-SES applicants. Even in awarding grants and
scholarships, law schools apparently generally ignore need . .,,46 This
is morally and educationally indefensible.
I wholly support the call for a comprehensive and thoughtful re-
sponse to these circumstances, though I must reiterate that Professor
Sander's own data shows that a significant portion of these disparities is
caused by the multiple other hurdles facing low and moderate SES stu-
dents throughout their lives and not by law school admission practices. It
is attention to the pre-law school disparities that is contemplated in Part I
of this Article.
For those who support the goal of increasing socioeconomic diver-
sity in law schools, there is little to quibble with in Professor Sander's
suggestions to: (1) "eliminate or minimize the harmful effects of prac-
tices that favor high-SES applicants"; (2) "institute . . . financial aid poli-
cies tied to student need"; and (3) begin implementation of admissions
preferences based on socioeconomic status. 4 7 With regard to the admis-
sions preferences, Professor Sander suggests them as "at least a partial
substitute for current racial preferences."4 8 So long as consideration of
44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-42 (2003). Specifically, the Court instructed that
narrow tailoring requires (1) a serious and good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives prior
to adopting a race-conscious plan; (2) use of race in a flexible, non-mechanical manner; (3) no undue
burden being placed on non-minority applicants; and (4) periodic reviews of the program's contin-
ued necessity. Id.
45. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (striking down the automatic addition of a
fixed number of points to an applicant's admissions index based on status as a member of an under-
represented minority group).
46. Sander, supra note 21, at 633.
47. Id. at 660-61.
48. Id. at 664.
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socioeconomic status works in conjunction with, as opposed to supplant-
ing, consideration of race, this is a useful suggestion.4 9 Sadly, the broader
forces operating in our society-a society that very much considers race
in multiple ways-justify the continued consideration of race in higher
education admissions.
In Tables 5 and 6, Professor Sander demonstrates that law schools
are more successful in proportionately admitting African American ap-
plicants than low-SES applicants. This data proves that focusing exclu-
sively on race in allocating admissions preferences does not achieve sub-
stantial socioeconomic diversity. That phenomenon is important to know.
It is tempting, given this data, to embrace socioeconomic prefer-
ences over racial ones for all the reasons Professor Sander suggests-
they stand on firmer legal ground, they are more broadly supported,so and
they do better at allocating advantages to the most individually disadvan-
taged applicants. However, focusing exclusively on socioeconomic di-
versity may lead to the opposite result where law schools are more suc-
cessful in proportionately admitting low-SES applicants than members of
racial minority groups. In the discussion of UCLA's experiment with
socioeconomic preferences in 1997 and 1998, the resulting class may
have been racially diverse, as Professor Sander notes, but the fact that the
majority of nonwhites were Asian suggests that some racial diversity was
sacrificed."
The fact that California has been able to devise creative and effec-
tive plans in the aftermath of Prop 209 is laudable, but it does not mean
that taking racial considerations off the table is ideal for pursuing the
educational benefits of a diversity that includes racial diversity. After all,
it was the quest for racial diversity that led to the filing of briefs in the
Grutter and Gratz cases by multinational corporations and the American
military in support of the University's affirmative action policies.52
49. Although in the article for this volume Professor Sander suggests only "at least a partial
substitute," the body of his work could be read to suggest the elimination of racial preferences. See
Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 367, 482-83 (2004). As a result, I feel it is appropriate to address that suggestion.
50. For instance, socioeconomic affirmative action garners public support as high as 65%,
whereas racial affirmative action only receives approximately 26% support. Richard D. Kahlenberg,
Higher Education: Reconnecting with the American Dream, Powerpoint accompanying presentation
at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Sept. I1, 2006), available at http://www.unc.edu/
inclusion/091 1KahlenbergUNC.pdf (citing EPIC/MRA poll (conducted January 29-February 3,
2003); Los Angeles Times poll (conducted January 30-February 2, 2003); and Newsweek poll (con-
ducted January 16-17, 2003)).
51. Sander, supra note 21, at 662-63. Similarly, Professor Sander notes that African Ameri-
can and Hispanic numbers have fallen at the two most elite UC campuses in the wake of Prop 209
even as black enrollment throughout the system has increased. Id. at 655.
52. Brief of Gen. Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 399096; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading
Am. Bus. in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516),
2003 WL 399056; Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in
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Achieving that racial diversity without consideration of an applicant's
race is likely to prove difficult.
In addition to this uncertainty about the impact eliminating racial
considerations would have on racial accessibility, there are further rea-
sons for maintaining considerAtion of race in the application process.
Race, independent of socioeconomic status and across the income spec-
trum, continues to impact the life trajectory of individuals. When institu-
tions are faced with choosing between two equally-qualified applicants
of identical socioeconomic status, there are credible reasons why an ap-
plicant's race should be considered. Two phenomena in particular make
this point.
First, there remain disparities in upward social mobility along racial
lines-low-income whites are more likely to ascend the income ladder
than their African American counterparts. When controlling for other
variables, whites from the lowest socioeconomic quartile are five times
as likely as African Americans from the same quartile to advance eco-
nomically. 54 Thus, it is not merely the lack of accessibility of higher edu-
cation that is holding low-income African Americans back relative to
their white peers.
In addition, there is a growing body of research suggesting signifi-
cant evaluative disparities that occur across racial lines. In one repre-
sentative study, reviewers comparing identical resumes of African
American and white job seekers rated white candidates more highly.56
Support of Respondents at 9, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL
1787554.
53. For instance, in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, after replacing racial with socioeconomic
student assignment consideration, 19.4% fewer elementary schools, 8.8% fewer middle schools, and
14.7% fewer high schools were racially integrated compared to the last year that the district was
under court-ordered race-conscious student assignment. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic
Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1556-58 (2003). In San Francisco, a consent decree in that district's
desegregation case replaced race with consideration of non-racial factors, including socioeconomic
status, in student assignment decisions. Brief of 553 Soc. Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006) (No.
05-908), 2006 WL 2927079, at *53a n.176 (citing STUART BIEGEL, ANNUAL REPORT NO. 22 OF
CONSENT DECREE MONITOR (2005) (submitted in S.F. NAACP v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-78
1445 WHA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25904 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001))). The district's race-neutral
policies did not maintain racial integration. Id. at *53a.
54. See TOM HERTZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN AMERICA 4
(2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/hertz mobilityanalysis.pdf.
55. See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation ofExplicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role
of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 835
(2002) (examining the "moderating role of motivations to respond without prejudice (e.g., internal
and external) in expressions of explicit and implicit race bias"); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive
Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH:
RIGHTS AND REALITIES 377, 377-94 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (empha-
sizing studies on unintentional discrimination in selective hiring).
56. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REv. 991 (2004), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/
files/emilygreg.pdf.
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Paradoxically, this discrepancy was more significant the more qualified
the candidates were. While modestly-qualified candidates of different
races were evaluated relatively equally, higher qualified African Ameri-
can candidates were, on average, subjectively judged to be inferior to
white candidates with identical objective qualifications.s5 Students who
have reached the point of applying for law school-a point that is among
the highest reaches for education-have likely encountered such evalua-
tive bias even more than most other African Americans. These dispari-
ties, like those regarding the limitations on social mobility, exist regard-
less of socioeconomic status.
Together, these phenomena indicate that ignoring race imposes a
colorblindness in the admissions process that does not exist in society at
large, a path likely to exacerbate racial disparities in higher' education.
Professor Sander is undoubtedly correct that more attention must be paid
to leveling the playing field for applicants from low socioeconomic
backgrounds. However, because race continues to play a role in indi-
viduals' lives both before and after they reach the age for higher educa-
tion, continued consideration of race remains justifiable in order to attain
the educational benefits of diverse student bodies.
CONCLUSION
In Grutter, the Supreme Court expressed its implicit belief that the
fires of disparate educational opportunities prior to higher education will
have been put out within a quarter century. Perhaps the Court will be
right. However, there is ample evidence that the progress of the 25 years
prior to Grutter has stalled. Simply allowing the next 25 (now 18) years
to elapse without affirmatively working to reduce those disparities-and
prevent the continued need for demographic preferences in higher educa-
tion admissions-will not allow universities or law schools to continue to
achieve diversity in their student bodies. To avoid that, universities and
law schools should expand the concept of affirmative action to include
preventive measures that would make the current controversial use of
admissions preferences obsolete. Such an ounce of prevention would go
far toward maintaining attention on the best method of preventing the
fires of disparate educational opportunities from consuming another gen-
eration of American students.
57. See id. at 12.
58. See CHUDOWSKY, CIHUDOWSKY & KOBER, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that while educa-
tion gaps have narrowed since the 1970s, "[e]ven with the general narrowing trend, the black-white
and Latino-white gaps on NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress] remain large"). But
see FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that all of the progress for 9-year-olds in narrowing the
achievement gap was completed by 1986 in math and 1988 for reading).
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In his article Class in American Legal Education, Professor Richard
Sander highlights the lack of class diversity within law schools in the
United States, particularly within elite law schools.' As Sander points
out, law students tend to come from relatively elite class backgrounds,
and Sander urges law schools to pursue class-based affirmative action,
2rather than race-based affirmative action, in their admissions processes.
As a general matter, we agree with Professor Sander that class di-
versity within a law school and within the legal community is a laudable
goal. Class-based affirmative action is neither an unnecessary nor unwar-
ranted proposal. A number of the arguments asserted in favor of racial
diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger3 also may apply to class diversity. For
example, just like racial diversity, class diversity among students can
contribute to a robust exchange of ideas on legal issues.4 Additionally, to
the extent that law schools "represent the training ground for a large
number of our Nation's leaders" and to the extent that we want to "culti-
vate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," class
diversity, like race diversity, may signal to all citizens that the law school
t Charles M. and Marion Kierscht Professor of Law, University of lowa College of Law.
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I. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 637
(2011).
2. While Professor Sander does not explicitly argue for the repeal of race-based affirmative
action in his article, he suggests, through his arguments, that the flaws in many race-based affirma-
tive action admissions policies are cause for elimination of the policy, not reform of the policy. Most
tellingly, Sander states, "As we have seen, law schools could do a great deal to foster more SES
diversity without using class-based preferences at all. But there is much to commend going further,
and using mild SES preferences as at least partial substitute for current racial preferences." Id. at
664 (emphasis added).
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. See id at 329.
807
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
path to leadership is open to people from a broad range of class back-
grounds.5 Indeed, Sander is not the first, nor will he be the last, law pro-
fessor to address the importance of class diversity within higher educa-
tion. For example, in their book The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race,
Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy, Professors Lani Guinier and
Gerald Torres examine the benefits of coalitions around "political race"
that have enabled barriers to higher education at state universities to
crumble for both disadvantaged white and minority students through the
Texas Ten Percent Plan.6 Additionally, Guinier, in her article Admissions
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic
Ideals, analyzes how measures for merit in the admissions process corre-
late more with factors such as parents' education, grandparents' socio-
economic status, racial identity, and geographic location than they do
with future academic performance.7 Similarly, in her article Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action, Professor Deborah Malamud carefully
analyzes the idea of class-based affirmative action and its potential effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness at addressing economic inequality.8 Finally, in
the article The Admission of Legacy Blacks, one of us, Professor Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, studies the complexities of class as related to race and
national origin and ethnicity for Blacks9 in the admissions game, encour-
aging institutions to account for socioeconomic status, race, and national
origin in their processes.o
In this Article, we do not take issue with Sander's identification of
class diversity as a necessary point for discussion and inclusion among
law professors and deans. Rather, we take issue with the manner in
which Sander sets up the discussion about law school affirmative action
as an either-or proposition, with class on one end and race on the other,
as though the two concerns are mutually exclusive of and incompatible
with each other. More specifically, we contest Sander's definitions of the
words "class" and "socioeconomic status" and, in many ways, his use of
those words as interchangeable terms in Class in American Legal Educa-
5. See id at 332.
6. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 67-75 (2002).
7. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our De-
mocratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113, 146-51 (2003).
8. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452,
454-71 (1997).
9. Throughout this article, the words "Black" and "White" are capitalized when used as
nouns to describe a racialized group; however, these terms are not capitalized when used as adjec-
tives. Also, the term "Blacks" is used instead of the term "African Americans" because the term
"Blacks" is more inclusive. See Journal of Blacks in Higher Educ. Found., Why "Black" and Not
"African American"?, 3 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 18, 18-19 (1994). Additionally, "[i]t is more
convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between
African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain seman-
tic symmetry between the two typologies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in
Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4 (1992).
10. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1141 (2007).
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tion (although such interchangeable use is frequently employed in legal
scholarship, even by the authors)." Merriam- Webster's Dictionary de-
fines "class" as "a group sharing the same economic or social status"' 2
and defines "socioeconomic" as "of, relating to, or involving a combina-
tion of social and economic factors."'13 Based on these definitions, it is
clear that while one's class may arguably (though not convincingly) be
defined solely in economic terms, one's socioeconomic status (SES) nec-
essarily includes social factors such as race. 14 In fact, we find Malamud's
definition of class and economic disadvantage in her article Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action most convincing. Like Malamud, at least
with respect to the category of "class," we "do not mean that [a person]
falls below a predetermined absolute threshold of economic attainment"
when we say that "that a person is economically disadvantaged";
"[i]nstead, [we mean that] one is economically disadvantaged in [our]
sense of the term when one has fewer economic goods than do members
of some relevant comparison group." 5 In this vein, we question a num-
ber of Sander's comparisons and framings of class and socioeconomic
status within his article. For instance, when Sander speaks of students of
"relatively elite backgrounds," he rarely notes to which groups these
"elite backgrounds" are relative; he never compares, for example, the
black law students from "relatively elite backgrounds" with their white,
law school peers of "relatively elite backgrounds."' 6 Along those same
lines, Sander's groupings of law school students' parents by class often
seems to be comparing apples to oranges, such as parents who are regis-
tered nurses to those who are doctors.
Finally, we reject what we view as Sander's misguided attempts to
institute class-based affirmative action in lieu of race-based affirmative
action.1 In so doing, we explain why many of Sander's arguments in
favor of substituting race-based affirmative action with class-based af-
firmative action are flawed. We also note numerous substantive reasons
why law schools must continue to pay attention to race. Contrary to what
I1. Sander, supra note 1, at 633-34 (defining "class" and "socioeconomic status" by refer-
ence to one's income, education, and occupation, and using the two terms interchangeably "when
statistics are involved").
12. Class, M-W.coM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/class (last visited June 08,
2011) (emphasis added).
13. Socioeconomic, M-w.coM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socioeconomic
(last visited June 08, 2011) (emphasis added).
14. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1847, 1866-94(1996).
15. Malamud, supra note 8, at 453.
16. Sander, supra note 1, at 633 (discussing the prevalence of students from "relatively elite
backgrounds" in top law schools).
17. Race-based affirmative action in legal education usually applies to black Americans,
Latinos, Native Americans, and some Asian ethnicities. However, we have chosen to focus most of
our emphasis on black Americans, considering that (1) Sander also puts great attention on black
Americans, (2) the greatest wealth of available scholarship is on black Americans, and (3) black
Americans are arguably the original, primary intended recipients of affirmative action, considering
our nation's past history with slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the Civil Rights Movement.
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Sander's article suggests, race and racism still matter within our society,
and in a way that supports the maintenance of race-based affirmative
action within law schools. In the end, we reject Sander's contention that
class-based affirmative action would produce similar racial diversity
within law schools.18
Overall, in this Article, we briefly lay out each of our challenges to
Sander's arguments in Class in American Legal Education. In Part I, we
first address the very problems that Sander's article highlights about the
difficulties of defining class and SES, problems that may make class-
based affirmative action programs less feasible and effective than Sander
suggests. In so doing, we identify what we consider to be defects in
Sander's class/SES groupings. We also highlight the complexities around
class and race that already exist within law student populations, answer-
ing in part the important questions about to whom black law students are
"relatively" advantaged or disadvantaged. In Part II, we focus on re-
sponding to Sander's substantive arguments against race-based affirma-
tive action, demonstrating why class-based affirmative action is an in-
adequate substitute and why race-based affirmative action is still needed.
I. WHO'S GOT CLASS? THE DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS THAT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PROFESSOR SANDER'S DATA
In making his arguments for the adoption of class-based affirmative
action as opposed to race-based affirmative action, Sander relies on the
following two factors to determine each student subject's class/SES: the
level of education of the parent(s) of the student and the occupation of
the parent(s) of the student.' 9 In so doing, however, Professor Sander
does not adequately discuss the inherent difficulties in measuring class
(or what he also refers to as SES) and demarcating persons by class. In-
stead, Sander overlooks or minimizes the racial implications of his
choices in determining class, even as he admits several flaws in his data.
He also fails to address various concerns about measuring students' SES
that other legal scholars such as Malamud have raised.
In this Part, we-neither of whom is an empiricist-first address
what we view as Sander's avoidance and minimizing of the real conse-
quences that flow from the admitted flaws in his means for measuring
SES as well as the consequences that flow from what we view as fatal
flaws in Sander's methods for demarcating SES quintiles. Thereafter, we
identify what is lost in the analysis because of Sander's failure to discuss
the inherent difficulties of measuring class and demarcating persons by
class. In particular, we highlight what we believe is lost in Sander's
18. See Sander, supra note 1, at 660-64.
19. Except where specifically noted in the remaining sections of this Article, we use the terms
"class" and "SES" as Sander does-interchangeably.
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analysis as a result of his failure to address intergenerational wealth and
account for the differences between Blacks and Whites at each defined
SES level.
A. Undercounting, Undervaluing, and Underestimating Difference
As noted above, neither one of us is an empiricist, and as a result,
we are not well-positioned to contest Sander's data from that angle.
However, even as non-empiricists, we have serious questions about the
validity of Sander's conclusions in light of the admitted flaws in his data
and in light of some of the assumptions that Sander makes in pushing his
arguments.
For example, we wonder to what extent Sander's analysis is valid
when the SES status of black students is highly likely to be overrepre-
sented for a significant portion of the black law student sample, a sample
that is already, as Sander notes, quite modest.20 Sander acknowledges
that one flaw in his measurements is that "the SES status of students
from single-parent families will tend to be overstated by the approach
used here"2' and that "Blacks disproportionately come from single-parent
families, whose income will usually be lower-despite high educational
and occupational prestige-than otherwise similar two-parent fami-
lies." 22 Nevertheless, Sander minimizes the potential effect of this flaw,
noting that "none of the data sources [he] know[s] of on the SES of the
general population of law students help us take these factors into ac-
count."23 Yet, a quick review of the data regarding the percentages of
black and white children who live in single-parent households raises se-
rious questions about whether Sander's analysis in his article can even be
legitimately run without taking such factors in account. First, as Sander
concedes himself, considering that a more accurate predictor of SES
would include all persons in a household who contribute to the ex-
penses,24 Sander's averaging of SES scores between parents greatly
overstates the SES of single-parent families. Second, and more impor-
tantly, Sander's risk of overstating privilege for single-parent households
in his study is 2.8 times as high for black children as it is for white chil-
dren.25 After all, black children are significantly more likely to be raised
in single-parent homes than white students-at a rate of 67% versus
24%.26
20. Sander, supra note 1, at 650.
21. Id. at 636-37.
22. Id. at 652.
23. Id.
24. See Malamud, supra note 14, at 1878-79.
25. See Kids Count Data Ctr., Data Across States: Children in Single-Parent Families by
Race (Percent) - 2009, ANNIE E. CASEY FouND., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/
Rankings.aspx?ind-107 (last visited June 08, 2011).
26. Id.
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Similarly, while Sander notes that his "method [may] be too conser-
vative in characterizing the eliteness of law students . . . [because] many
law students' parents have not just bachelor degrees, but bachelor de-
grees from very elite schools," 2 7 he again fails to identify and discuss the
racial implications for such a flaw. Indeed, this flaw is not just likely to
understate the eliteness of law students, but it is specifically more likely
to overstate the eliteness of black law students and consequently under-
state the differences between the eliteness of black law students and
white law students. Given the significant blatant discrimination in educa-
tion against the parents and grandparents of today's black law students,
such law students' parents are less likely than their white peers to have
bachelor degrees from very elite schools. As one example, racial minor-
ity students today have a vastly lower likelihood of benefiting from leg-
acy programs. At Texas A&M University in 2002-a school that no
longer exercises legacy preferences-legacy preferences allowed for the
enrollment of 321 white students who otherwise would not have been
admitted, but only three Blacks and twenty-five Latina/os in this cate-
gory.28 In fact, Blacks were not permitted admission to Texas A&M Uni-
versity until 1963.29 Similarly, at the University of Virginia, one report in
2003 indicated that 91 percent of the legacy applicants who were ac-
cepted on an early-decision basis were white, while only 1.6 percent of
such admits were black, 0.5 percent were Latina/o, and 1.6 percent were
Asian-American. 30 At one point in his article, Sander mentions legacy
preferences as a factor that may have a negative impact on low SES stu-
dents, 31 but even then, Sander fails to acknowledge the racial implica-
tions of such legacy preferences.
Finally, we contend that Sander's methodology is flawed with re-
gard to more than just his tools of measurement. In deciding where to
insert "meaningful breaks" as Malamud would term them,32 Professor
Sander has created a misleading heavily weighted high SES scheme. For
example, a female registered nurse is accorded an occupational score of
75 out of 100, which places her in the high SES quartile.33 Yet, such a
27. Sander, supra note 1, at 637.
28. Todd Ackerman, Legislators Slam A&M Over Legacy Admissions, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 4,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=200_3722913; see
also Gates Ends Legacy Role in Admissions, BATTALION ONLINE (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.thebatt.com/2.8485/gates-ends-legacy-role-in-admissions-1.1207693 (containing a
statement in which President Robert Gates asserted that "Texas A&M will no longer award points
for legacy in the admissions review process").
29. Michael King, Naked City: Texas A&M's Racial Legacy, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2004),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/print?oid=oid%3A193354.
30. Daniel Golden, Family Ties: Preference for Alumni Children in College Admissions
Draws Fire-Policy, Aiding Mainly Whites, Gets Embroiled in Debate Over Affirmative Action-
Critical to Schools'Donations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at Al.
31. Sander, supra note 1, at 658.
32. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1879.
8 12 [Vol. 88:4
2011] CLASS, CLASSES, AND CLASSIC RACE-BAITING
placement does not seem to accord with what the average person would
consider high SES. Although there is wide variation in measuring class, 34
the fact that Professor Sander classifies a registered nurse as high SES35
is striking because one does not even need a bachelor's degree to become
a registered nurse. Indeed, a female registered nurse without a bachelor's
degree would not meet the criteria for being middle-class according to
prominent sociologist Thomas Shapiro, who contends that a middle-class
classification according to education requires that at least one person in
the household have a bachelor's degree. 36 By creating such a broad cate-
gory of high SES persons, Sander undervalues the comparative privilege
of high SES persons by race, considering that Blacks heavily populate
the occupations at the bottom end of that quartile.37 Indeed, Sander's
misleading SES scheme has far-reaching implications all throughout his
analysis because it relies on groupings that may be inaccurate and lack-
ing in meaning, thus making any comparisons that he makes between the
various racial and class groups unreliable.
Moreover, in comparing the relative representation of racial and so-
cioeconomic groups of law students to the general population, Sander
proceeds as though the groups of minority students and low-SES students
are mutually exclusive of each other. We suspect others will respond
much like we did when reading Sander's article, asking: "What would
Table 5 look like if the SES groups (even under Sander's groupings, but
preferably under one that does not classify both registered nurses and
doctors under the same SES group) were divided by both race and
class?" After all, as Sander highlights at a different point in his paper,
"racial minorities are responsible for much of the small amount of SES
diversity we can currently observe in law schools."38
B. Having Class and What That Means
On top of the specific flaws in Sander's data lay more general prob-
lems with his definitions of class and SES. Throughout his article,
Sander fails to address various concerns that other legal scholars such as
Malamud have raised about the messiness of measuring class and SES
status.
33. Sander, supra note 1, at 636. Professor Sander adapts the CAMSIS scale, which ranks
occupations, but adds his own percentile to it reasoning that "75% of employed women in this age
cohort have lower CAMSIS codes, so registered nurses are assigned a percentile of 75." Id.
34. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 87 (2004).
35. Sander, supra note 1, at 636.
36. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 88.
37. Id. at 89 ("The gap between whites and blacks grows using the occupational definition of
the middle class because it does not have an income ceiling and thus includes proportionally more
well-to-do families, and highly paid professionals and executives tend to be white. Conversely,
employees in lower-middle-jobs-office workers, civil servants, and salespeople-are dispropor-
tionately black.").
38. Sander, supra note 1, at 651.
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1. The Difficulties of Defining Class/SES
In several articles, Malamud has undertaken a comprehensive look
at the inherent difficulties in devising a technically, morally, and cultur-
ally accurate class-based affirmative action program. 3 9 In so doing, she
has urged a structural, intergenerational approach to understanding eco-
nomic disadvantage, one that is cognizant of the limitations of most tra-
ditional indicia used to estimate economic disadvantage and that consid-
ers the intertwinement of race, gender, and class oppressions.40 For ex-
ample, Malamud asserts the following about defining and understanding
class in the United States:
Class is social in the dual sense that the class system is inherent in
and perpetuated by the structure of economic relations in the society
and that shared class position has the potential for being mobilized as
the basis for both group identity and political action. Class is dia-
chronic in the triple sense that class position is (1) intergenerationally
transmitted, (2) mediated through the strategic behavior of social ac-
tors over time, and (3) incapable of being understood without refer-
ence to patterns of change in the economic organization of the soci-
ety.
Finally, there is an alternative version of a belief in class, which
builds on the meaning of class just described, but goes beyond it. In
this view, class is said to interact with race, gender, and ethnicity
(and perhaps other elements of social identity, such as place of resi-
dence) in interlocking and mutually defining structures, and it is their
interaction that is seen to shape both consciousness and life chances.
One of the many consequences of this view, if it is correct, is that
class analysis can never be race- or gender-blind and therefore cannot
strictly be viewed as an alternative to the traditional foci of antidis-
crimination law and policy.41
Overall, Malamud suggests that, although the various elements of
economic advantage are structurally intertwined, and all are needed to
present a full picture, institutions can consider wealth, occupation, in-
come, education, consumption, and class consciousness (as well as race,
gender, and ethnicity) in determining whether applicants should be the
recipients of class-based affirmative action.42 At the same time, however,
Malamud acknowledges and explains the individual limitations and ad-
vantages of each of these elements. For example, in describing wealth,
she argues that, despite its ability to represent true inequality that is di-
rectly related to the availability of opportunities and its revelation of
stark racial inequality, wealth is rarely revealed or utilized in studies.43
39. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 14.
40. Id. at 1855-56.
41. Id
42. Id at 1870-85.
43. Id. at 1870-72.
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She further notes that occupational status demonstrates the intergenera-
tional nature of class and its lack of mobility, but points out that there is
not an agreed upon set of characteristics to classify occupations and that
job titles may not represent true duties or prestige.44
Thereafter, Malamud explains that, in contrast to wealth, while in-
come data is easily attainable and measurable, it makes economic mobil-
ity seem more accessible than it actually is. 4 5 Furthermore, she points out
that income is not accurately conveyed when given individually, but is
more truly representative of SES when presented in the aggregate form
for a family or household.
Related to that, Malamud explicates that measuring class by educa-
tional status is a catch-22 because, although it is a significant indicator of
opportunities available to a child, the complexity (such as the reputation
of the school, the type of degree, whether the program is a night or day
program) of education level cannot easily be taken into consideration,
resulting in persons with less socially valued forms of education seeming
more privileged than they actually are. 4 6 Likewise, she notes that con-
sumption is a defining characteristic of class in American society, but
that context dictates the importance of it, making, for example, a rural
family's consumption patterns difficult to compare to persons in urban
areas.47
Finally, Malamud warns of expecting students to have a shared
class consciousness and to be willing and able to discuss a disadvantaged
perspective based on class because many students-particularly by the
graduate level-may lack a strong connection to their lower class roots.4 8
In considering such elements of economic disadvantage, she also states
that decisions must be made regarding how to classify a person's disad-
vantage: gradationally, categorically, or relationally. 4 9 Furthermore, she
contends, a decision must be made on (1) whose class should be meas-
ured: that of an individual, a family, a household; (2) how to define a
household; (3) how many generations should be included; and (4) how to
treat children with parents in different households.o Malamud argues
that the most accurate way to gain an understanding of economic advan-
tage is by looking at the household as a whole, but also importantly notes
that the economic advantages of grandparents may be outcome determi-
native of a child's life opportunities.
44. Id. at 1872-77.
45. Id. at 1877-80.
46. Id. at 1880-83.
47. Id. at 1883-85.
48. Id. at 1885-88.
49. Id. at 1863-65.
50. Id, at 1866-68.
51. Id. at 1866-69.
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2. Acknowledging What's Missing in Sander's Measures of Socio-
economic Status
In his article, Sander never grapples with any of the complexities of
class that Malamud astutely lays out, choosing instead to rely on a more
simplified definition. As a result, Sander fails to tell a complete story of
SES.
Overall, Sander claims to be measuring SES, but he never takes into
consideration that racial status is highly important in American society,
conferring both social and economic benefits and detriments. In fact, he
seems to suggest that race itself comes with no disadvantages.5 2 His fail-
ure to adjust for the disparate racial impact of certain tools for measuring
SES renders racial inequality invisible. Of particular significance is
Sander's unnecessary averaging of family household SES data (as noted
in Part I.A),53 his exclusion of income data in relation to occupations,54
and most starkly, his lack of data on wealth, which would more fully
complete the stories about intergenerational wealth.ss The true SES of
many Black families is much lower than Sander emphasizes,56 thus
greatly destabilizing his argument that high-SES blacks are being un-
fairly advantaged over low-SES whites.
First, Sander's determinants of SES lack income, which, in relation
to occupation, renders pay differentials within occupations invisible. A
person may hold a job within an occupation in the public sector or the
private sector, the former which, on average, pays less.57 Considering
Blacks are more heavily represented in the public sector as civil ser-
vants,58 their SES is likely overstated by not including the income com-
mensurate to the occupation, rendering any income disparity invisible. 5 9
But even more significant than Sander's exclusion of income de-
terminantS60 is his failure to account for and analyze wealth. 6 ' While the
average income gap between black families and white families has nar-
52. See generally Sander, supra note I (centering his analysis around socioeconomic rather
than racial diversity).
53. Id. at 636.
54. Id. at 633-36.
55. Id. at 652 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is likely a racial disparity).
56. Although Professor Sander recognizes that the measures are likely to overstate the wealth
of Blacks, he denies that such flaws significantly or fatally affect his classifications. See id. (recog-
nizing that the SES of Blacks is likely to be overstated).
57. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (stating that Blacks are more likely to be civil servants who
earn less, situating themselves as lower middle-class).
58. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1893.
59. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (discussing the problem with occupation classifications
when there is no income cap, which places clerical workers and executives in the same category
despite great variance in economic advantage).
60. Id at 36 ("Income is an indicator of the current status of racial inequality . . . wealth
discloses the consequences of the racial patterning of opportunities.").
61. Sander, supra note 1, at 650-53 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is
likely a racial disparity).
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rowed to 64 cents to every dollar,62 the racial wealth gap is much
greater. The impact of the legacy of racial oppression is evident by
looking at the difference in wealth: "[B]lack families possess only 10
cents for every dollar of wealth held by white families." 64 Although the
exact spread of the racial wealth gap varies, "[w]hite households in every
income quintile have significantly higher median wealth than similar-
earning black households."65
The source of the wealth gap is not fully explained by factors such
as income ,66 education, or job status-any of the traditional measures of
class status.6 7 The racial wealth gap's lack of correlation to traditional
measures of class is illustrated by the finding that, if wealth is used as the
measure "black families headed by professionals like doctors and law-
yers would be in the same class as white families headed by blue-collar
workers, such as coal miners."68 Considering that more merit-based dif-
ferences such as "education, jobs, and earnings" do not explain the racial
wealth gap, it must be explained by non-merit-based sources such as
"inheritance, institutional discrimination, and discriminatory public pol-
icy." 69
This story of wealth is not one that can be or should be ignored
when we are talking about class and SES distinctions in the affirmative
action context. With regard to inheritance, white parents give funds to
children earlier and in greater amounts.70 In his rather revealing book,
The Hidden Cost ofBeing African American, sociologist Thomas Shapiro
discusses the power of intergenerational wealth on racial inequality by
discussing the prevalence of "transformative assets," which serve as "in-
herited wealth lifting a family beyond their own achievements."n Trans-
formative assets include "down payments and closing costs for first-time
homebuyers, college tuition payments, large cash gifts, and loans, as well
as old-fashioned bequests at death."7 2
62. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that the gap had narrowed following 1989 figures
which found that a black family made only 55 cents for every dollar a white family made).
63. Id. at 32-33.
64. Id. at 47 ("The net worth of typical white families is $81,000 compared to $8,000 for
black families.").
65. Id. at 49.
66. Id. at 88-89 (stating that his study corroborated prior findings that income does not pre-
dict wealth levels).
67. Id. at 87.
68. Id. at 92.
69. Id at 42.
70. Id. at 67-69. With respect to gifts from living family members, blacks and whites are just
as likely to receive at all levels of wealth but "[t]he gift for the average white recipient was $2,824,
compared to $805 for black families," and "[b]lack families are just as willing to help their adult
children, but their circumstances limit their ability to do so." Id. at 68. Additionally, "among those
fortunate enough to receive bequests, blacks received 8 cents of inheritance for every dollar inherited
by whites." Id. at 69.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Id.
8 17
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Similarly, institutional discrimination and policy have played an
enormous role in racial wealth differences that affect educational oppor-
tunities. For example, as a result of post-World War II governmental
policies and societal trends, the modem middle-class was built. In fact,
many middle-class white families were able to establish wealth through
greater education and homeownership as a result of these policies and
now are routinely able to leave their children inheritances as a result of
these benefits.7 3 Following World War II, the Federal Housing Admini-
stration created policies that facilitated homeownership for the masses,
and the GI Bill and Veterans Administration's home loans provided vet-
erans financial assistance for gaining an education and buying a home.74
However, these policies precede the 1968 Fair Housing Act.75 Thus,
when Whites were seizing government-provided opportunities, Blacks
were blocked from capitalizing on them due to homeowners' refusals to
sell, banks' refusals to give mortgages to Blacks or in black neighbor-
hoods, and the simple exclusion of Blacks from such housing and educa-
76tional programs.
The modern wave of increased homeownership was not the first
major governmental housing policy that overwhelmingly benefited white
families. In 1862, the federal government passed the Homestead Act,
which gave out 160 acres of "free"77 land for people to raise a family,
build wealth, and create opportunities for their children.78 Some esti-
mates calculate that a quarter of the white adult American population is a
descendant of a Homestead Act recipient and thus a beneficiary of a ra-
cially exclusive federal housing policy. 79 All the while, black Americans
never received their forty acres and a mule or a comparable tool to build
wealth following the end of slavery.
Even current housing policy benefits the families of wealth-rich
persons and yields to racial discrimination and racist consumer prefer-
ences. For example, current housing policy requires new homebuyers to
make a down payment of 20% of the home price.80 By paying such a
great portion of the home price, a person avoids paying private mortgage
insurance (which is equivalent to approximately 0.75 percent of the loan)
73. Id ("In fact, as a result of the tremendous postwar economic prosperity and public poli-
cies promoting middle-class homeownership, today inheritances are commonplace for middle-class
families.").
74. Id. at 190.
75. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
76. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 108-09; see also Census Report: Broad Racial Disparities
Persist, MSNBC.coM (Nov. 14,2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15704759/ns/us_
news-life.
77. By "free," we mean that the land was given without to the exchange of money from the
recipients.
78. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 190.
79. Id.
80. Id. at lll-12.
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and secures a lower interest rate.8 Steep initial prices provide great bar-
riers to homeownership for those with college debts and parents who do
not offer to pay all or a significant portion of the down payment-in
other words, those without access to transformative assets.82 Upon ac-
quiring adequate funds to buy a home, racial discrimination in securing a
mortgage often results in a barrier, if not complete, at least a higher cost
barrier.13 Consistently, black families with similar credentials to white
families are rejected; one study showed that lending institutions deny
Blacks home loans eighty percent more often than similarly situated
Whites. And, overall, Blacks' interest rates are 0.3% higher than
Whites.s
Finally, upon securing a home, black families (living in areas that
are more than ten percent black) find that their home equity does not
appreciate at near the same level as it would if they lived in a nearly all
white neighborhood. Their home value appreciates at an 18% lower
rate than homes in white neighborhoods, because by and large, Whites
will not buy a home in a black neighborhood.87 Therefore, the demand
for a home in a black neighborhood is limited to black families (and pos-
sibly other minorities) who have the requisite funding, rather than the
entire population, including Whites, who have a greater ability to buy
homes.88 Thus, the primary source of wealth-homeownership8 9 and
home equity-accrue to black homeowners at a significantly lower rate,
which in turn limits the quality of the schools in those areas as well as
the assets that families can further provide to their children. 90
The impact of intergenerational wealth, which has accrued and con-
tinues to grow as a result of discriminatory practices and policies, dem-
onstrates that, although strides in education and income are improving
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 111-19 (describing the vast difference in help securing the down payment for first
homes between black and white families).
83. Id. at 111.
84. Id. at 109-10.
85. Id.atlll.
86. Id. at 120-21.
87. Id. at 122 ("The pool of potential buyers is no longer 100 percent of the affordable market,
because for all practical purposes potential white buyers shun such neighborhoods. The potential
buyers are now mainly other black Americans who can afford the home and possibly other minori-
ties." (footnote omitted)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 43 ("[F]or families in the middle three-fifths of America's net worth distribution,
ranging from $1,650 to $153,000, equity in their principal residence represents 60 percent of their
wealth.").
90. Id. at 53 ("Everything else being equal, blacks accrue only $1.98 in wealth for each addi-
tional dollar eamed, in comparison to $3.25 for whites, so that, net of all other factors, the average
black family earning $60,000 possesses $76,000 less wealth than the average white family with the
same earnings. The most dramatic difference is the wealth effect of homeownership, which is worth
about $60,000 more for whites than blacks. The evidence bolsters my core argument that the way
homes are bought and sold, where they are located, and how the market values them provides a
contemporary foundation for racial inequality.").
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the current reality for some black Americans, many Blacks are left in the
dust compared to their white counterparts who are able to maintain and
raise their social status91 precisely because of racial advantage in a vari-
ety of forms.92 Plain and simple, white students are statistically more
likely to have already received greater opportunities from their families
and are more likely to receive greater future opportunities by utilizing
wealth that is unparalleled among Blacks.93
In fact, research on students at twenty-eight elite undergraduate in-
stitutions-the very kinds of institutions that serve as feeder schools for
law schools-reveals that these institutions' multiracial students, black
immigrant students, and especially black American students with long
term roots in the United States (otherwise known as legacy Blacks9 4) are
significantly disadvantaged in terms of various SES indicators when
compared to their white peers at the same elite institutions. For example:
Recent findings from a study of students at twenty-eight colleges and
universities reveal that, while only seventy percent of fathers of [im-
migrant] Blacks and 55.2 percent of fathers of legacy Blacks were
college graduates, 85.7 percent of white first-year students were col-
lege graduates; similarly, while only 43.6 percent of the fathers of
[immigrant] Blacks and 25.3 percent of the fathers of legacy Blacks
had advanced degrees, 56.7 percent of the white fathers in the group
had advanced degrees.95
91. Id. at 10 ("Many of the families I spoke to relied on transformative assets to acquire their
class standing, social status, homeownership, the kind of community they live in, and their children's
schooling.").
92. Id. at 13 ("Many whites continue to reap advantages from the historical, institutional,
structural, and personal dynamics of racial inequality, and they are either unaware of these advan-
tages or deny they exist. Black Americans in particular pay a very steep tax for this uneven playing
field and outcome, as well as for the denial of white advantage."); see also id. at 114 ("In effect,
young white families possess an advantage in housing markets and homeownership because their
parents' economic livelihoods and ability to accumulate wealth were untrammeled by race in previ-
ous generations.").
93. Id. at 40 ("A further analysis of this already disturbing data discloses imposing and pow-
erful racial and ethnic cleavages. In 1999, 26 percent of all white children grew up in asset-poor
households, compared to 52 percent of black American children and 54 percent of Hispanic chil-
dren.").
94. The term "legacy Blacks" applies to African-Americans who come from families in which
all four grandparents descend from black American slaves. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at
1149 n.27.
95. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190 (citing Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immi-
grants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113
AM. J. EDUC. 243, 257 tbl.3 (2007)); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE
RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT AMERICA'S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES 30-31 tbl.2.5 (2003). Among the schools included in the study were the following (in
alphabetical order): Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, Denison Univer-
sity, Emory University, Georgetown University, Howard University, Kenyon College, Miami Uni-
versity-Oxford, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Pennsylvania State University, Princeton
University, Rice University, Smith College, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, Tufts Univer-
sity, Tulane University, University of California-Berkeley, University of Michigan, University of
North Carolina, University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, Washington University in
St. Louis, Wesleyan University, Williams College, and Yale University.
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Admittedly, these statistics reveal a generally more privileged group in
the United States as a whole, but such racial differences in educational
attainment among this more privileged group stand separate and apart
from the eliteness of the schools attended by the students' fathers, a fac-
tor, which for the reasons described in Part I.A., are far more likely to
slant in favor of white students.
Additionally, the same study of twenty-eight elite institutions re-
vealed that black students at these schools were more likely than their
white peers to come from families that were earning less as middle-
income families and that black students also were more likely than their
white peers to be experiencing many of the factors related to coming
from poverty. Specifically, the study showed "that only 23.8 percent of
black immigrant families and 25.5 percent of African-American fami-
lies" with students at the elite institutions "had an income over $100,000
as compared to 52.9 percent of white families, for whom fewer mothers
were working outside of the home."97 Furthermore, "whereas 15.7 per-
cent of the black immigrant families and 19.5 percent of the African-
American families in the twenty-eight college study had ever been on
welfare, only 5.3 percent of the white families had ever been on wel-
fare."9 8
Lastly, studies show that black and white students experience sig-
nificantly different advantages with regard to homeownership, a fact that
should come as no surprise given Shapiro's accounting of institutional
and attitudinal discrimination against Blacks in housing. For example,
the same "study of the black and white students at select elite colleges
revealed that, while only 71.4 percent of black immigrant families and
73.7 percent" of legacy Black families in the study "owned a house as
opposed to renting (a relatively elite group compared to average Ameri-
can families), 93.8 percent of white families owned one." 99 Second, and
more importantly, the study showed that, even among this elite group,
Blacks were at a significant disadvantage in terms of wealth through
assets, as the average value of the homes for the black immigrant fami-
lies was $220,600 and the average value of the homes for the legacy
Black families was $193,200 compared to the average value of the
homes for the white families at $327,400, a difference of more than
$100,000-$130,000 for both groups.'oo
96. See supra Part I.A.
97. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190-91 (citation omitted); see also Dorothy A.
Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1469, 1501 (1997) (highlighting that black married couples are more likely to be equal wage
earners).
98. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1191-92 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 1192 (citation omitted).
I 00. Id.
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Such stark differentials in wealth indicated by these studies as well
as the research by Shapiro and others on intergenerational wealth demon-
strate that Sander's attempts to compare occupation- and education-
indicated, high-SES black persons to high-SES white persons without
any consideration of real wealth distorts the reality of societal advantage
and privilege and thus distorts the results of such studies.
II.WHAT'S RACE GOT To DO WITH IT? A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
SANDER'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST RACE-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In addition to our concerns about Sander's measures of class and
SES, we also have several substantive responses to Sander's push to re-
place race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action.
Apart from the practical reasons presented above, there are numerous
policy reasons why Sander's proposal to do away with race-based af-
firmative action lacks merit. Specifically, we respond to Sander's misun-
derstanding of the benefits of diversity, his failure to recognize the raced
implications of "neutral" admissions criteria, and his underestimation of
the effects of contemporary racism.
A. Understanding Race, Grutter, and the Benefits of Diversity
As an initial matter, we believe that Sander misunderstands the
benefits of diversity in articulating his arguments for class-based affirma-
tive action and against race-based affirmative action. To begin, by alleg-
ing that law schools pay little attention to the actual diversity contribu-
tions of students of color, 0 ' Sander misses the objective of race-based
affirmative action. The purpose is not to expose white students to the
minority opinion.102 The purpose is to break down racial barriers between
students, reduce stereotypes, and create enhanced learning as a result of
cross-racial interactions. 0 3 Such results help white students, who have
likely lived highly racially segregated lives,104 to learn that there is not
one minority opinion (and vice versa). 05 Furthermore, a critical mass of
racial minorities improves minority students' educational experience
because it allows individual students to hold less of the burden (that
white students do not have) to educate inquisitive and unknowing white
101. Sander, supra note 1, at 666.
102. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
103. Id. at 330.
104. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 143 (referencing GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE:
CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 34 (2001)) ("A recent study on school segrega-
tion reports that 'white students are by far the most segregated in schools dominated by their own
group.' Whites on average go to schools where 80 percent of the students are white. In comparison,
blacks and Latinos attend schools where a little over half of the students are black or Latino.")
105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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classmates about racel 06 and allows minority students to focus on their
own education.
The interest in breaking down stereotypes through a critical mass of
racial diversity continues to provide public benefits long after students
graduate. Multinational firms support race-based affirmative action be-
cause they desire a well-educated workforce that includes employees of
all races who, through prior exposure to diversity, have an ease and fa-
miliarity with working in diverse groups. 0 7 Moreover, major corpora-
tions and the military have expressed a great need for a well-educated,
racially diverse workforce. 0 8 This is due in part to the finding that het-
erogeneous workgroups produce better outputs.'0 9
This interest in breaking down stereotypes and creating a robust ex-
change of ideas is not furthered by the presence of low-SES students,
that is, if we accept Professor Sander's emphasis on characteristics that
distinguish low-income students from students of color. Indeed, we take
issue with several of Sander's problematic arguments for why class-
based affirmative action is better than race-base affirmative action: his
arguments that students who receive class-based preferences can remain
invisible, are less likely to be stigmatized, "may not even be aware that
they have received a preference," and are less likely to engage in "group
self-segregation." 1 o
First, Sander's argument that the ability to remain invisible is a
benefit of class-based affirmative action"' is tantamount to arguing that
black racial passing as white is a healthy act with no psychological or
material consequences. The very point and benefit of diversity, including
class or SES diversity, is that students see, hear, acknowledge, accept,
and embrace differences and learn from each other by listening to and
respecting the views of others whose opinions and analyses may differ
from their own because of differing backgrounds and life experiences.
Because economic background can be invisible, and students are not
readily identifying themselves as low-SES as Sander claims and Mala-
mud warns,112 there is not as great of a broadening of perspective intro-
duced by low-SES students. It follows that having a critical mass of in-
visible low-income students in the class would not, based on Sander's
arguments, help to challenge stereotypes or facilitate better interpersonal
skills. Furthermore, even now with race-based affirmative action, "no
106. Id at 319 (discussing the impact of having a critical mass of racial minority students in
that it allows students to not feel obligated to serve as racial spokespersons).
107. See id. at 330-31.
108. See id (citing the amici from the business and military community in support of race-
based affirmative action).
109. See id. at 330.
110. Sander, supra note 1, at 665-66.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.; see also Malamud, supra note 14, at 1886-88.
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one can readily tell which [students] have received a preference."" 3 That
some students think they can or, worse, assume that all black students
must have benefited from a preference is not an issue that we should shy
away from, but rather challenge. As educators, it is fair to say we have a
responsibility to teach students not to paint all members of a group with a
broad brush of stereotypes simply based on their racial background.
Second, as one study conducted by Professors Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Emily Houh, and Mary Campbell has shown, racial minorities do
not feel stigmatized by affirmative action, either internally or exter-
nally.114 The findings of another study by Professor Deirdre Bowen fall
in line with the Onwuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell study about the
stigma argument.' 15 Thus, contrary to what Sander asserts, the stigma
argument does not necessarily hold water. Even if the stigma argument
does carry weight, it is not admissions preferences per se that stigmatize
students, but rather the negative stereotypes and associations that attach
to students' identity groups that stigmatize. As Erving Goffman's theory
of stigma explicates, stigma is both a precondition to and consequence of
being a "non-normal"-where "normal" status is defined and perpetuated
by the very privileges, social and otherwise, that attached to such
status.116 The stigmatized individual is one who "possesses . . . an unde-
sired differentness from what we had anticipated."ll 7 For example, On-
wuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell found in their study that groups that
were not negatively stereotyped within the educational context, such as
Asian Pacific Americans, were not presumed by student subjects to bene-
fit from affirmative action, even in cases where they were actually in-
cluded in affirmative action programs. 18 Or as Professor Christopher
Bracey has explained, students are only "stigmatized" by affirmative
action if their racial group is already generally stigmatized in that manner
in society; the actual facts do not matter. 19
More so, we, as an academic legal community that relies so heavily
on factors such as the LSAT, stigmatize students with our words and
113. Sander, supra note 1, at 666.
114. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the
Egg: Which Came First-Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (2008)
(finding that "l) minimal, if any, internal stigma felt by minority law students, regardless of whether
their schools practiced race-based affirmative action; 2) no statistically significant difference in
internal stigma between minority students at affirmative action law schools and non-affirmative
action law schools; and 3) no significant impact from external stigma").
115. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1198-99, 1223-25 (2010) ("Underrepresented mi-
nority students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and
external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.").
116. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2-5
(1963).
117. Id at 5.
118. Onwuachi-Willig, Houh & Campbell, supra note 112, at 1344-45.
119. Christopher A. Bracey, Getting Back to Basics: Some Thoughts on Dignity, Materialism,
and a Culture ofRacial Equality, 26 CHiCANO-LATINO L. REv. 15,39 (2006).
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rhetoric about deservingness based on LSAT scores (which Sander never
acknowledges as a factor in favor of high-SES students). 120 Consider this
one true story, a story which we are confident other minority law profes-
sors, low-SES law professors, or minority and low-SES professors could
recount.
Law students at an institution are engaged in intense debates about
rankings and admissions. During this debate, a white, low-SES student
approaches a minority law professor to discuss the discussions within the
law school. He feels conflicted. The white, male student knows that he
had among the lowest, or perhaps the lowest, LSAT score of any student
in the law school. He has performed well in law school and wants to con-
test the validity of the LSAT to his classmates. He knows that he belongs
in the law school. He also wants to respond to attacks on minority stu-
dents as the persons responsible for lower rankings. He knows that peo-
ple are attributing low scores to minority law students that he himself and
another white friend had. He wonders whether he should out himself. In
fact, he never does. He never speaks out. He remains silent.
Contrary to what Sander thinks, it was not any preference that this
low-SES, white student received that made him feel stigmatized. Inter-
nally, he knew that he had earned his spot. He also did not feel any ex-
ternal stigma, as he felt no burden from students' doubts about him or
mistreatment of him; in fact, no students doubted him precisely because
he is white. What made him feel stigmatized, if anything, was the rheto-
ric about who belonged based on LSAT scores. More than its revelation
about stigma, this student's story highlights the problems with Sander's
identification of invisibility as a positive. Because this low-SES, white
student could remain invisible, his classmates never had the opportunity
to learn from him in a way that could have challenged their blind accep-
tance of the factors currently used during law school admissions proc-
esses.
Additionally, Sander's point about group self-segregation is just
plain disturbing. 12 1 Ask any random, racially mixed group of law school
graduates from a predominantly white institution who their closest
friends from law school are, and you will likely find that the racial mi-
nority students have the more diverse group of law school friends; white
law students are more likely to have a group of close friends who also are
white. The fact is that racial minority students at predominantly white
institutions cannot self-segregate. It is impossible to function within a
predominantly white law school as a minority student and not interact
with students of different races. That students of color may eat lunch
together or have a party together is not group self-segregation, that is,
120. See infra Part ILB.
121. See Sander, supra note 1, at 666.
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unless one also wants to identify the all-white lunch tables and all-white
parties, too, as group self-segregation. Unfortunately, the only time that
racial groups seem to bother people in school settings is when it is mi-
nority students who are together. Very few people ever question the all-
white tables or all-whites groups that are surrounding the minority tables
or group or having their own parties.12 2 That Sander would identify group
self-segregation as an argument against race-based affirmative action
only highlights the importance of racial diversity among both the stu-
dents and the faculty, as minority students and faculty are more likely to
impart these important lessons about double standards in looking around
at "segregated" groups to their white peers.
Finally, we respond to Sander's argument that low-SES students are
worthier beneficiaries of affirmative action because their level of disad-
vantage is more accurately determinable than that of black students be-
cause class status more fully conveys privilege than skin color. 2 3 As one
example of his point, Sander points to the overrepresentation of first and
second generation black students from Africa and the Caribbean at col-
leges and universities, asserting that multiracial students and black Afri-
can and Caribbean immigrants should be considered demographically
distinct from black descendants of American slaves124 (referred to as
legacy Blacksl25 or ascendants).126
First, we reject Sander's contention that low-SES students are wor-
thier beneficiaries of affirmative action than minority students because
their disadvantage is more determinable. It is a misnomer to state that
SES preferences are based on individual circumstances, whereas race is
based on group membership; thus, the former are more just.127 SES pref-
erences are based on group membership in that one does not have to
show that she ever actually suffered from being in that class. In that way,
race is also based on group membership. In order to be based on individ-
ual circumstances, people would need to show that they individually
have been harmed by being low-SES.
122. See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, "WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN
THE CAFETERIA?" AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52 (1997) (discussing how questions
regarding seating at lunch tables are generally framed).
123. Sander, supra note 1, at 664-66.
124. Id. at 665.
125. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1148-49.
126. Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the
Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1236 (2008) (defining such persons as "ascendants" in order to emphasize
"blacks' ascendancy out of chattel slavery and segregation" as well as limit persons in the category
to those that "personally experienced America's racially discriminatory history their entire lives or
were born from parents who were generally considered black at the time that affirmative action
policies were first adopted . . . a product . . . of analyzing affirmative action from its inception from
the perspective of the historical struggle undertaken by the black community to overcome its racial
oppression in the United States").
127. Sander, supra note 1, at 664.
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But, while we do not agree with Sander's larger point about who is
a "worthier" affirmative action beneficiary, we do agree that groups of
black students should be distinctly considered based on national origin
and interraciality due in part to the fact that multiracial students and
black immigrants generally tend to have greater privilege than legacy
Blacks.12 8 We also agree that the presence of multiracial students and
black immigrants in elite law schools when classified as simply "black"
overestimates the presence of legacy Blacks.12 9 Finally, we contend that
it is important, especially for remedial purposes, to ensure that racial
diversity includes greater numbers of legacy Blacks.130
However, we do not think that law schools should exclude multira-
cial and black immigrant students from their race-based affirmative ac-
tion plans. Because racial stereotypes of black people do not entirely
exclude multiracial and black immigrant people,131 many of the interests
served by including legacy Blacks in race-based affirmative action plans
also are furthered by the presence of multiracial and black immigrant
students. 13 2 Indeed, race-based affirmative action for legacy Blacks is
supported in part because it counteracts the external and internal factors
that hinder the success of affirmative action beneficiaries (such as race
discrimination and stereotype threat, respectively). Because multiracial
students (if they identify as black or part-black) and black immigrant
students are often subject to the same stereotypes as legacy Blacks, they
also are at risk of suffering the effects of race discrimination and stereo-
type threat.13 3 Furthermore, while some black immigrants, particularly
first generation, voluntary immigrants, do not tend to suffer from stereo-
type threat, voluntary black immigrants and their descendants are not
forever exempt from bearing the weight of the effects of societal anti-
black discrimination; while black immigrants are often able to proceed
successfully with their goals unencumbered by cultural stereotypes that
often hinder legacy Blacks, the advantage of the immigrant perspective,
which allows them to distance themselves from black American stereo-
types as well as compare their situation not to white Americans but to
their life back home, starts to give way after the very first generation. 3 4
Thus, the advantages gained by higher education for black immigrants
128. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1165-79.
129. See id. at 1144-45 (discussing the diverse backgrounds of "Black" students admitted to
law schools); see also Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1245 (arguing that the percentage of "As-
cendants . . . may be considerably less than many administrators and members of the faculty and
admissions committee realize").
130. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1162-63.
131. Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1241.
132. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1180-1207 (arguing that legacy Blacks, as well as
black immigrants and multiracial students, serve the purposes of race-based affirmative action by
advancing diversity and social justice).
133. Id.atll87-88.
134. See id. at 1195, 1198 (discussing the impacts of cultural assimilation and stereotypes on
immigrants).
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may not curtail the future detrimental effects of racial stereotypes and
stigma on their descendants.
Moreover, race-based affirmative action, which includes multiracial
and black immigrant students, also benefits Whites. The presence of mul-
tiracial and black immigrant students and their interaction with white
students in the classroom may help to counter Whites' stereotypes of not
only that particular subgroup of Blacks, but Blacks in general. Such an
environment allows Whites to develop greater cultural competence and
become better prepared to work with co-workers from different back-
grounds.
Regardless, the current lack of precision in beneficiaries of race-
based affirmative action in law school admissions is not a fatal flaw; a
more appropriate approach is to reform race-based affirmative action.
For example, one of us has urged the required inclusion of ra-
cial/ancestral heritage background essays in admissions processes for all
applicants. In such an essay, an applicant who is a legacy Black could
describe discrimination that she has faced in American society, and a
black immigrant applicant could describe the challenges in light of her
circumstances. 3 5 Such a procedure would allow an admissions commit-
tee to gain a greater understanding of who an applicant is, including her
privileges and disadvantages; the challenges she has personally faced;
how far she has come; and whether her admission will advance the
school's mission.
B. Failing to Understand the Racial Implications of "Neutral" Admis-
sions Criteria
In addition to articulating arguments that display a fundamental
misunderstanding of the benefits of diversity, Sander fails to discuss and
critique many important admissions criteria that work to the advantage of
high-SES students and disadvantage of low-SES students. Although
Sander highlights current admissions criteria that slant in favor of high-
SES students, such as legacy preferences, the lack of accounting for
grade inflation at private colleges, and preferences for "interesting" re-
cords,' 37 he does not acknowledge all of the criteria that can work to dis-
advantage low-SES students during the law school admissions process,
including rather prominent criteria. One of the most startling omissions
in Sander's list of factors that negatively impact low-SES students is the
LSAT. That Sander excludes the LSAT itself from a list of items that
may privilege higher-SES students is shocking. Numerous studies reveal
that the results of exams like the LSAT correlate very highly with paren-
135. Id. at 1220-24.
136. Id. at 1221-24.
137. Sander, supra note 1, at 658-59.
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tal income.' 38 Also, basic common sense would require including the
LSAT on any list of high-SES advantages in the admissions game, given
that the preparation courses that help many students raise their LSAT
scores by an average of 7 points costs over $1,000-$2,000 and that some
students have the privilege of having the resources to hire private tutors
for the LSAT.'3 1 Yet, Sander never discusses the LSAT, which plays a
huge role in the admission process, as one of the disadvantages to low-
SES students.
Additionally, Sander attacks the "interesting factor" in admissions
decisions as being anti-low SES, but in so doing, he does not consider
how such a factor may be used to recognize the contributions from
groups that have been historically discriminated against in society.140 The
interesting factor not only may assist racial minorities, but also would
allow white low-SES students to be viewed more holistically and favora-
bly than if the admissions committee considered only LSAT and UGPA.
A broad conceptualization of the interesting factor should not be seen as
an impenetrable barrier for low-SES students, as it may include student
involvement in popular, mainstream activities, such as student govern-
ment, and non-popular or specialized school and community organiza-
tions. In addition to not harming low-SES students, the interesting factor
may allow greater diversity of groups that have been historically dis-
criminated against. Particularly, "interesting factors" may include leader-
ship positions in intercultural organizations such as black student organi-
zations, feminist organizations, and GLBTQ organizations. Activity and
leadership in such groups enriches the campus experience for many and
provides an outlet for minorities and allies of all types to improve a cam-
pus they perceive as hostile to their group. Consequently, although the
interesting factor may work to benefit high-SES students whose privi-
leges and connections make Capitol Hill internships or knowing several
languages more likely, such non-standardized criteria also allow other
types of diversity to be taken into consideration that are vital for a well-
rounded class and that provide recognition for student involvement that
is local and non-cost prohibitive.
Finally, Sander's critique of admissions criteria does not acknowl-
edge the role of race in American society. A difference in average LSAT
scores between black and white students does not delegitimize the pres-
138. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 CoLuM. L. REV. 1622, 1630 (2003); see
also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 987-88 (1996) (discussing the relationship between SAT scores and
parental income).
139. Julie A. Helling, Law and Diversity Program: A Model for Attracting, Retaining, and
Preparing Diverse Students for Law School, 4 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 561, 565 (2006) ("[M]any
students take an LSAT preparation course and the typical cost is over $1,000."); Jerry R. Parkinson,
Admissions After Grutter, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 159, 163 (2003) ("[T]aking an LSAT preparation
course improves an applicant's score by approximately seven points.").
140. Sander, supra note 1, at 659-60.
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ence of the group with lower scores, harm the student, or serve as an
accurate indicator of longtime future success. Stating that racial prefer-
ences are equivalent to an increase in LSAT score by seven to fifteen
points for Hispanic and Black students, respectively,141 should be consid-
ered valid only if the LSAT predicts law school grades, bar passage, and
the ability to practice law and be a citizen lawyer.14 2 However, the LSAT
does not do that work-the LSAT is intended only to predict first year
grades and is able to do so only at a correlation of 0.40 with a 0.00 being
no correlation, and 1.00 being a perfect correlation. 14 3 Considering that
the LSAT is not a strong predictor of success as a lawyer or even as a
second or third year law student,144 non-GPA and LSAT factors, includ-
ing race, should not be considered a delegitimizing factor in admissions.
Additionally, it would be telling to see what other factors result in a
boost to traditional measures of credentials. For example, how much of a
LSAT score boost do admitted students whose parents attended that law
school "earn"? While such students would have already received the
social boost of privilege that leads to a higher likelihood of gaining a
higher UGPA and LSAT score, how much would admissions officers
overlook the lower UGPA or LSAT scores of such students?
Not only does a differential in LSAT score not deny a black stu-
dent's legitimacy as having earned her spot in the law school class, but it
also does not harm the student due to a "mismatch effect," which claims
that recipients of race-based affirmative action are given such a great
preference in admissions that it overcompensates for their weak LSAT
scores and UGPAs such that they are incapable of competing with their
white counterparts whose scores are much higher.14 5 The rates of black
students dropping out of law school, having lower law school GPAs, and
having higher bar failure rates should not be readily attributable to lower
intelligence or preparedness, but rather should be considered a possible
result of racial discrimination and microaggressions encountered by
black students in predominantly white schools.14 6 Furthermore, black
students may be underperforming on ability tests such as the LSAT, law
141. Id. at 654.
142. See Guinier, supra note 7, at 149 (citing the University of Michigan Law School's study
which found that "individuals with lower LSAT scores and college grades tended to spend more
time in public or unremunerated legal service" and that "following graduation, the school's black
and Latino students succeeded in ways that eluded many of their white counterparts whose entry-
level credentials were higher" (footnote omitted)).
143. Stephen P. Klein, Law School Admission, LSATs, and the Bar, ACAD. QUESTIONS, winter
2001-02, at 33, 34.
144. Id. at 33 (conceding that "[t]he LSAT is not designed to predict who will be a good (or
otherwise 'successful') lawyer").
145. Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of "A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools", 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 15
(2005) (stating that the mismatch effect theory is flawed, as "[e]ven when the LSAT scores and
UGPAs of African-American law school students are similar to those of their white peers, black
students do not receive law school grades that are comparable to those of their white counterparts").
146. Id. at 16-20.
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school exams, and the bar exam, due to pressure that a failure may result
in a perceived stereotype confirmation-a phenomenon known in psy-
chology as "stereotype threat."1 4 7
Even more egregious than Sander's unquestioned acceptance of the
LSAT as an accurate, unbiased predictor of ability to practice law is his
disregard of the racialized nature of legacy preferences in a country
where de jure access to predominantly white law schools is barely two
generations old. Sander's reference to legacy preferences as unduly bene-
fiting high-SES students 48 should not be seen as race-neutral.14 9 Legacy
preferences disproportionately benefit white students who are socially
and economically privileged.so This non-merit based criterion serves as
affirmative action for children of alumni.' ' It also has a much greater
likelihood of benefiting white high-SES students due to prior barriers to
education for people of color and a continued lower graduation rate at all
levels of education.152 Legacy preferences are not used to remedy past
discrimination, but rather to maintain the status quo and ensure that their
beneficiaries maintain their family privilege, which was gained in part
through direct and indirect oppression. 13 While Sander discounts this
impact as an insignificant factor in law school admissions,154 the recent
scandal at one university, which was reported to include trading admis-
147. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Perform-
ance ofAfrican Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995) (demonstrating
through a series of experiments that when told that a test was measuring a person's ability, black
students performed worse than if they thought that it did not measure ability and concluding that "the
present experiments show that making African American participants vulnerable to judgment by
negative stereotypes about their group's intellectual ability depressed their standardized test per-
formance relative to White participants"); see also Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 142, at
20-21 (applying stereotype threat theory to black law students).
148. Sander, supra note 1, at 658.
149. Richard D. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths About Legacy Preferences in College Admissions,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/10-Myths-About-
Legacy/124561/ (discussing legacy preferences at the undergraduate level and stating "legacy pref-
erences continue to disproportionately hurt students of color"); see also supra Part L.A (discussing
Professor Sander's failure to acknowledge the racial implications of legacy preferences).
150. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 (discussing how underrepresented minorities make up "only
6.7 percent of the legacy-applicant pool" at selective colleges and universities as compared to 12.5%
of the total applicant pool).
151. Id. (discussing the fact that "being a legacy increased one's chance of admission to a
selective institution by 19.7 percentage points").
152. Id. ("Moreover, this disparate impact is likely to extend far into the future. In 2008, Afri-
can-Americans and Latinos made up more than 30 percent of the traditional college-aged population
but little more than 10 percent of the enrollees at the U.S. News 's top 50 national universities."); see
also SARAH R. CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2007 U.S. CENSUS CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 4-5 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p20-560.pdf (providing high school diploma attainment rates
for native, non-immigrants, as follows: 89.6% of non-Hispanic whites, 80% of Blacks, 76.5% of
Hispanics of any race; and providing Bachelor degree attainment rates as follows: 30.1% of non-
Hispanic Whites, 16.2% of Blacks, and 15.9% of Hispanic of any race).
153. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 ("Because they disproportionately benefit whites, legacy
preferences reduce, rather than enhance, racial and ethnic diversity in higher education. And rather
than being a remedy for discrimination, they were born of discrimination. . . . They explicitly clas-
sify individuals by bloodline and do so in a way that compounds existing hierarchy.").
154. Sander, supra note 1, at 658-59.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sions for the children of politically powerful people in exchange for jobs
for current students'55 coupled with the statistics that show that the rate
of white legacy admits at elite undergraduate institutions is often at least
ten times that of non-white legacy admits, should raise questions. 56 The
role of parental connections, whether it be as an alumni or a politically
well-connected person, should not be overlooked as a possible racial
barrier to law school admissions. 5 7
Finally, as the work of Professors Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris
demonstrates, the required exclusion of race from the law school admis-
sions process is not race-neutral and, in fact, negatively impacts racial
minorities, creating a new racial preference for Whites.1s As Carbado
and Harris ask, what does it mean to ask a racial minority student, for
whom race has been central to her life experience, to write a personal
statement without any reference to race? As Carbado and Harris explain:
This incentive structure is likely to be particularly costly to applicants
for whom race is a central part of their social experience and sense of
identity. The problem is compounded by the fact that the life story of
many people-particularly with regard to describing disadvantage-
simply does not make sense without reference to race. Consequently,
should these applicants attempt to transcribe their experiences in
race-neutral terms, they risk that they will be disadvantaged because
their lives will be unintelligible to admissions officials and unrecog-
nizable to themselves.1 59
C. Recognizing That Contemporary Racism Supports the Need to Main-
tain Race-Based Affirmative Action In Order to Achieve Racial Diver-
sity
Contrary to Sander's assertion that the elimination of race-based af-
firmative action would not affect racial diversity if replaced by class-
based affirmative action,160 several studies show that class-based affirma-
tive action results in lower racial diversity, particularly lower black stu-
dent enrollment. This was evident with regard to Sander's university,
155. See Jodi S. Cohen et al., U. of I. Jobs-for-Entry Scheme, CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-ui-trustees-26-jun26,0,3541380.story; Lee A. Dan-
iels, 'Clout U': The Admissions Scandal at the University ofIllinois, DEFENDERS ONLINE (Sept. 29,
2009), http://www.thedefendersonline.com/2009/09/29/%E2%80%98clout-u-%E2%80%99-the-
admissions-scandal-at-the-university-of-illinois.
156. Kahlenberg, supra note 147 ("At Texas A&M, 321 of the legacy admits in 2002 were
white, while only three were black and 25 Hispanic. At Harvard, only 7.6 percent of legacy admits in
2002 were underrepresented minorities, compared with 17.8 percent of all students. At the Univer-
sity of Virginia, 91 percent of early-decision legacy admits in 2002 were white, 1.6 percent black,
and 0.5 percent Hispanic.").
157. The impact of the scandal on racial minorities is unclear, but considering that Whites hold
most positions of political power, it is likely to disproportionately help them.
158. See generally Devon Y. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1139 (2008).
159. Id. at 1148 (footnote omitted).
160. Sander, supra note 1, at 664.
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UCLA School of Law, following Proposition 209.161 Sander's reference
to maintained racial diversity at UCLA School of Law after Proposition
209162 was not a clear win for all racial minorities, considering that al-
most all of the diversity consisted of two-thirds white and one-third
Asian American students, with a great decrease in enrollment of La-
tino163 and black students.164 Interestingly, the greatest direct losers in
removing race-based affirmative action were black Americans, who are
the primary intended beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action.
While low-SES white students may suffer from economic disadvan-
tage, they gain great benefits from white privilege. Proposing to replace
race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action will
shift the beneficiaries of affirmative action to white low-SES applicants
due to the sheer greater number of poor white students than poor students
of color. By failing to note the privileges and disadvantages that low-SES
white students and high-SES black students have, Sander paints an in-
complete picture. As discussed before, high-SES Blacks may have a
greater amount of income than low-SES whites, but they may not be
anywhere close to equals when it comes to wealth. Additionally, Blacks
are still disadvantaged by their race, which serves generally to advantage
Whites.
In sum, race and class are not equal forms of status. Being a racial
minority is not the same disadvantage as being low-SES. Unlike race,
which often carries physical, immutable characteristics, 165 white students
from low-SES backgrounds are able to makeover themselves in order to
render their background near invisible to outsiders, especially by gradu-
ate school.16 6 While attempts at passing (which we do not advocate) as
economically privileged may be discovered, passing in and of itself is
far more attainable for the majority of economically disadvantaged
Whites than it is for Blacks. By passing as not economically disadvan-
taged, students from low-SES backgrounds will not suffer external
stigma for being poor; even if they are "discovered," they may be ad-
mired for exemplifying the power of meritocracy. Furthermore, white
persons from economic disadvantage have not suffered the same perva-
sive racial discrimination that Blacks have encountered, and continue to
encounter, regardless of class. Blacks of all classes suffer racial oppres-
161. Id. at 663-64.
162. Id. at 661-64.
163. The authors recognize that the classification "Latino" represents a very large, encompass-
ing ethnic group that is multiracial. However, for the purposes of classifications, many sources use it
as one monolithic group in comparison to multi-ethnic, and in some regards multi-colored racial
groups. As a result, we will not disturb the comparative groups.
164. Sander, supra note 1, at 663-64.
165. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands ofAnalysis Under
Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1103 (2010) (discussing that although race is a social construct, physi-
cal markers include not only skin color, but hair texture).
166. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1887.
167. Id
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sion,'68 which can be particularly more harmful for dark-skinned Blacks
than light-skinned Blacks.'6 9
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we perceive numerous defects in Sander's methodol-
ogy that raise serious questions about the results in his article Class in
American Legal Education. Even if one accepts all of Sander's meas-
urements and arguments, the necessary conclusion is not that race-based
affirmative action should be replaced with class-based affirmative action,
but rather that class-based means for ensuring diversity also must be em-
ployed in law school admissions processes. More importantly, Sander's
arguments, if anything, reveal that our means for measuring merit in the
admissions processes in higher education, and in law schools specifi-
cally, are not class-neutral at all, but instead class-biased in favor of stu-
dents from high-SES backgrounds. To our minds, such revelations sup-
port an overhaul of the way in which we consider students for admission
into law schools, not an overhaul of any existing affirmative action pro-
grams.
168. BART LANDRY, THE ECONOMIC STAGNATION OF THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS: A BRIEFING
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 24-25 (2005), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/122805_BlackAmericaStagnation.pdf (statement of Professor Landry,
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park) (describing upper class occupa-
tions as an area of highly "intense" discrimination, and stating that "in 1983, with 43.4 percent and
35.7 percent of whites and blacks concentrated in the upper middle class, there was a gap of 7.7
percentage points. The gap worsened by 1990 before declining again by 2002, but is still standing at
about 8.1 percent").
169. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1166 ("For example, studies have shown that '(flor
every 72 cents a dark-skinned Black [makes], a light-skinned Black earn[s] a dollar."' (alterations in
original)).
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RACE AS A RED HERRING? THE LOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF
THE RACE VS. CLASS DEBATE
ARIN N. REEVESt
A theory has only the alternative of being right or wrong. A model has a
third possibility: it may be right, but irrelevant.
- Manfred Eigent
INTRODUCTION
A theory is a hypothesis of what will happen when a particular set
of circumstances are in play. The theory can be right in predicting out-
comes or it can be wrong. When a theory is well-tested and highly reli-
able, it can hope to become a scientific principle or even a scientific law.
A model, on the other hand, is a structure or a narrative through which
one strives to illustrate the theory being pursued. As Manfred Eigen
elucidates in the quote above, a theory can be proven right or wrong with
data and/or by experimentation; however, the model or narrative created
to explain that theory does not necessarily have to be wrong to be wholly
irrelevant.
Professor Richard Sander's theory posits that by not focusing di-
rectly on class in their admissions processes, law schools are doing a
disservice to their stated quests for diversity.3 He painstakingly creates a
socioeconomic status (SES) data set that compares respondents in the
After the JD study (AJD) 4 to demographic slices of the 2000 census data
with carefully integrated components of occupational indices. Although a
reasonable person can/may/should disagree with the validity and reliabil-
t Arin N. Reeves is a J.D. (University of Southern California) and Ph.D. (Northwestern
University) who currently serves as the President of Nextions (www.nextions.corn), a consulting
firm that specializes in leadership and inclusion. She has led several key research studies on race,
ethnicity and gender in the legal profession and consults with law schools and legal workplaces on
increasing the effectiveness of the leaders and the overall inclusion in the organizations.
1. Manfred Eigen, The Origin of Biological Information, in THE PHfYSICIST'S CONCEPTION
OF NATURE 618 (Jagdish Mehra ed., 1973) (Manfred Eigen is biophysicist and won the 1967 Nobel
Prize in Chemistry).
2. See generally SCIENTIFIC THEORY OR MODEL, http://aether.lbl.gov/www/classes/pl0/
theory.html (last visited May 17, 2011) (discussing theories and models for Professor Smoot's phys-
ics class). See also George Smoot Wins Nobel Prize in Physics, BERKELEY LAB,
http://www.lbl.gov/Publications/Nobel/ (last visited May 17, 2011) (providing a perspective and
biography on Professor George Smoot, his Nobel Prize, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Labo-
ratory).
3. See Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REV. 631,
631 (2011).
4. For more information on the AJD-a longitudinal study undertaken by the American Bar
Foundation on the careers and experiences of law graduates--can be found at, see After the JD, AM.
BAR FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/publications/afterthejd.html (last visited May
17,2011).
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ity of the data logic that Sander has created, the data he presents ade-
quately supports his narrowly constructed theory that the lower SES tiers
are disproportionately underrepresented in law schools in comparison to
higher SES tiers.5
Sander's theory may be right; however, the narrative model of pit-
ting SES against race-even if the data is correct-is so irrelevant, that
one can question the logic in introducing race into a theory that neither
requires it nor requests it in order to withstand scrutiny. In other words, if
one were to take all references to race out of Sander's narrative-the
theory that law schools need to explicitly focus on SES in order to open
"doors of opportunity," improve "mobility in American society," make
sure "that national elites reflect talent from all corners of society," and
produce "graduating classes that look like America" can stand on its own
merit 6-why then, does Sander create a model that pursues both the ex-
ploration of socioeconomic diversity in law school as well as the com-
parison of racial and class diversity as rational objectives for law
schools?'
I. THE PURSUIT OF DIVERSITY
We begin with Sander's dissection of why law schools are so fo-
cused on diversity:
It is hard to think of any issue in the legal academy that has generated
as much discussion, reflection, or debate for the past forty years as
the quest for student diversity. Nearly all law schools have some type
of diversity program; the ABA weighs school efforts in fostering di-
versity heavily in its process of accrediting law schools.8
Sander argues that this intense focus on diversity "[i]n rhetorical
terms . . . is about both class and race;" however, "as a practical matter
. . . the discussion almost invariably focuses on race."9 Because Sander
does not argue that the focus on diversity is inherently a bad thing, the
theory that he is beginning to build starts with this premise: in their quest
for diversity, law schools have not paid as much attention to class as they
have to race, and this has impacted their ability to "maximize student
opportunities and improve [their] health, and [their] conscience." 0
The logic in his theory goes awry when-instead of simply demon-
strating how law schools have ignored class and why they now need to
integrate class into their diversity efforts-Sander proceeds to create a
model where he tries to argue for the integration of class by creating a
5. Sander, supra note 3, at 637-40.
6. Id. at 631.
7. See generally id.
8. Id. at 631 (citation omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 669.
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false competition between class and race in order to prioritize one over
the other." After meandering through limited data models and the thorny
politics and jurisprudence on race, he concludes that an SES focus on
diversity should replace a race focus on diversity.12 Thus, the theory that
a greater focus on SES diversity is necessary is right. The model of race-
based diversity being complicated and thorny in comparison to class-
based diversity is also right. That said, the model is irrelevant to the the-
ory because increasing SES-based diversity in law schools is not depend-
ent on unraveling race-based diversity. The logical problem with
Sander's argument is that he never directly argues two critical points: (1)
racial diversity should not be a priority for law schools; and (2) law
schools are somehow limited to only one focal point in diversity, thereby
necessitating an either/or conflict between a race focus and an SES focus.
So, why does Sander introduce the logical irrelevance of race in order to
prove a theory on class?
II. INTERSECTIONALITY AVOIDS THE "RED HERRING"
A "red herring"-a distraction or diversion from one point by an-
other point"--changes the direction of a dialogue so that the real conver-
sation ceases, at least temporarily. While trying to prove his theory on
the underrepresentation of the lower SES tiers in law school, Sander con-
sistently creates a conflict between race and class based efforts (the red
herring) to articulate his argument, even though he does not need to. In
doing so, he ignores the very large body of intersectionality research that
has taught us to understand connections between social inequities instead
of creating a competition between them.14 Upon reading Sander's thesis,
one has to wonder if he is ignoring intersectionality and using race as a
red herring to strengthen his argument on class-based diversity or
whether he is using class as a red herring to attack law school efforts
towards racial diversity without appearing to do so.
For decades now, scholars have researched and presented on the
need to understand race and class (along with gender and other key iden-
tity characteristics) as interconnected, not oppositional, in explaining
inequity.' 5 Intersectionality has been accepted and embraced as a meth-
11. See generally id.
12. See id. at 668. Professor Sander disagrees with this characterization of his article.
13. See Red Herring, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?term=red+herring (last visited May 17, 2011) (giving an etymological discussion on the back-
ground of the phrase "red herring").
14. For a summary of this research, see Rachel Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Em-
pirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REV. (forthcoming
2011), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/lawlibrary/cgi-bin/library/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/20 10/11 /best-etal-multipledisavantages.pdf.
15. For purposes of the focus and space requirements of this publication, I do not cover the
additional intersectionality impact of gender. For some of the seminal and critical work on the inter-
sectionality of race, class and gender, see generally RACE, CLASS AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY
(Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds., 7th ed. 2010); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK
FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 227 (2d
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odology for studying the relationships among multiple dimensions and
modalities of social relationships and subject formations.16 This method-
ology holds that the classical conceptualizations of inequalities within
society, such as classism, racism, sexism, homophobia, and religion-
based bigotry intersect with each other to create complex forms of dis-
crimination; we need to study these modalities together in order to un-
derstand each one. Opposing one against the other disables our ability to
fully understand any single inequality. 7 Intersectionality asks us to ex-
pand our intellectual vision and understand greater complexity, not be-
cause it is easy to do so, but because it is necessary to guarantee aca-
demic rigor and understand practical implications.
A simplified Venn diagram of the intersection of race and class in-
equities would show race inequity as one contained set and class inequity
as another contained set that intersect to create a shared set of both race
and class inequities. Both of these sets of inequities need to be attacked
and neutralized in order to create law schools and a legal profession that
can actualize the meritocracy we now merely idealize-and the intersec-
tion is a place where our work can have dramatic results.
According to Sander, "[s]tark as black and Hispanic underrepresen-
tation is, it pales in comparison to the absence of students from the bot-
tom half of the SES distribution."18 Sander seems to recognize that race
plays a role separate from that of class; however, he argues for the focus
to be on class because the racial difference is not as bad as the difference
between SES tiers. He also does not address directly how working on
SES inequity alone begins to mitigate the inequities faced by minorities
in lower SES tiers who confront the double-bind of race and class.
Sander presents additional data that demonstrates that, even within the
same SES tier, African Americans are less likely to be represented in law
school as their white counterparts.19 Surprisingly, even as Sander illus-
trates racial inequality within SES tiers, he argues that class inequality
should be the focus, at the exclusion of racial inequality without ever
explaining why we need to force a choice between two compatible alter-
natives.
Further, Sander asserts that "the shift to class preferences [in Cali-
fornia due to Prop 209] has not proved inconsistent with racial diver-
sity.,, 2 0 Even Ward Connerly, the driving force behind Prop 209 and an
ed. 2000); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
16. See Leslie McCall, The Complexity oflntersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1772 (2005).
17. See Susanne V. Knudsen, Intersectionality-A Theoretical Inspiration in the Analysis of
Minority Cultures and Identities in Textbooks, in CAUGHT IN THE WEB OR LOST IN THE TEXTBOOK
61 (Eric Bruillard et al. eds., 2006).
1 8. Sander, supra note 3, at 647.
19. Id. at 649-53.
20. Id. at 663.
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avid opponent of race-focused diversity efforts, conceded in 2010 that
"the percentage of black and Latino students has declined at UC Ber-
keley, UCLA and UC Santa Barbara." 2 1 The race versus class model is
not only an ineffective way to achieve either class-based or racial diver-
sity, but the model is irrelevant in helping us better understand the dy-
namics of either inequity.
Ideally, in order for Sander's model to be relevant, he would either
need to remove all references to race or present evidence as to why a
competition between the inequities is necessary for us to move forward
(i.e., limited resources, conflicting strategies, etc.).
Sander discusses the twin ills of racial and class inequity, but he
forces an irrelevant and unnecessarily exclusive choice instead of advo-
cating for a protocol that addresses both ills without compromising ei-
ther. It is therefore critical, when assessing his model, not to lose sight of
the larger perspective simply because a red herring throws off our sense
of direction.
III. THE PERNiCioUS EFFECT OF RACE
Race matters-not more or less than class-but it matters. The ra-
cial inequality component of the Venn diagram is critical and relevant to
understand if we are to strive for the equality of opportunity goals that
Sander cites as his ultimate goal. 2 2 The universe of racial inequality is as
damaging to our collective goal of equal opportunity as the universe of
class inequality. Further, the understanding of both inequalities are espe-
cially critical to removing barriers to success for those who survive in the
intersection of the two worlds; the individuals who experience twice the
obstacles and have access to half the support. 2 3
The universe of class inequality is often structural; there are barriers
that prevent access to opportunities based on the educational success of
your parents or the family income into which you were born. The uni-
verse of racial inequality is often visual; stereotypes are triggered when
your visible racial identity triggers stereotypes and characteristics for
people associated with your racial identity instead of with you as an indi-
vidual. Our national history of racial inequities has, without doubt,
morphed racial inequities into class inequities for many. The understand-
21. Bay City News, Affirmative Action Foe Says UC Schools With Increases in Minority
Admissions Have Lower Standards, Are "Not as Selective ", SFAPPEAL (Feb. 16, 2010, 8:56 PM),
http://sfappeal.com/alley/2010/02/affirmative-action-foe-says-uc-schools-with-increases-in-
minority-admissions-not-as-selective.php.
22. See Sander, supra note 3, at 1, 668-69.
23. See Bernice McNair Barnett & Ann R. Tickamyer, Theories and Research on the Intersec-
tions of Race, Gender, and Class Inequalities: From Lenski's Status Inconsistency to Collins' Matrix
of Domination and Beyond, 1954-2004 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.allacademic.com//
meta/pmla apa_research citation/I/8/5/0/8/pagesl8508 3 /pl85083-1.php (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City),
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ing of the Venn diagram as three distinct, yet interrelated components,
allows us to avoid the red herrings thrown in our path. Race matters-not
more or less than class-but it matters.
As Brian Lowery at Stanford Graduate School of Business reveals
through his research on racial stereotypes:
Negative stereotypes about various racial groups bombard us every
day in the mass media and deposit their residue deep into our minds,
often without our realizing it . . . . Even among the most well-
intentioned and consciously egalitarian people . .. non-conscious as-
sociations about ethnic groups still have a pernicious effect on behav-
ior and attitudes. 24
Lowery further finds that focusing on race itself-through positive mes-
sages-can begin to counter the impact of negative stereotypes. 2 5 SES
differentials, on the other hand, do not trigger visual reactions to the
same extent as racial differences. We need background data in many
instances in order to trigger SES-based stereotypes, but our racial biases
are always running as long as our eyes are open.
Furthermore, we assign static racial identities to individuals in a
way that disadvantages those individuals even when there are opportuni-
ties to make conscious choices that do away with such assignments.
Nonetheless, there remain significant obstacles. For example, hy-
podescent is the automatic assignment of an individual to a group or
class that is considered subordinate or inferior. It is the one-drop rule
dating back to a 1662 Virginia law on mixed-race individuals, upheld in
a 1985 ruling in Louisiana regarding a woman with a black great-great-
great-great-grandmother who was denied the right to classify herself as
"white" on her passport. 26 Since its conception, the notion of hy-
podescent has been critically scrutinized and evaluated, and "[o]ne of the
remarkable things about . . . hypodescent is what it tells us about the hi-
erarchical nature of race relations in the United States . . . . Hypodescent
against blacks remains a relatively powerful force within American soci-
,,27
ety. According to Ho et al., American culture still reinforces a racial
hierarchy with whites having the highest status, followed by Asians, and
24. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Racial Stereotypes Can Be Unconscious but Reversible,
STANFORD KNOWLEDGEBASE (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.stanford.edu/group/knowledgebase/cgi-
bin/2008/01/15/racial-stereotypes-can-be-unconscious-but-reversible/ (discussing the research con-
ducted by Brian Lowery, Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior, Stanford Graduate School
of Business).
25. See id.
26. See Arnold K. Ho et al., Evidence for Hypodescent and Racial Hierarchy in the
Categorization and Perception of Biracial Individuals, 100 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PYSCHOL. 492,
493 (2011).
27. Steve Bradt, 'One-Drop Rule' Appears to Persist for Biracial Individuals, HARV. FAC.
ARTS & SCI. (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.fas.harvard.edu/home/content/%E2%80%98one-drop-
rule%E2%80%99-appears-persist-biracial-individuals (discussing the research conducted by Arnold
K. Ho and Jim Sidanius at Harvard University).
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both groups being trailed by Hispanics and African Americans. 2 8 If yOU
are black, you do not get to change, transform or transcend in any way.
SES tiers are much more porous and allow for movement. Movement
from a lower SES tier to a higher SES tier is viewed as heroic, while the
attempt to redefine oneself racially is viewed as inauthentic, perhaps
even insane.29
Combine the above data with data from research by Kurt Hugen-
berg and Galen Bodenhausen that shows that whites who look at identi-
cal facial expressions on white and black faces perceive greater levels of
hostility in black faces, 30 and the picture becomes clear that no matter
what the data is on class inequality, we cannot relegate racial inequality
to a "has been" social issue. If we are not dealing with both race and so-
cioeconomics individually and collectively, we are not increasing
opportunity in law schools and in the legal profession.
According to Sander, the "two [race and class] are often conflated
in discussions of diversity." 1 Once Sander's model of race versus class
is examined in the context of the logical irrelevance of such an argument
(given the volume of data showing that racial inequity is an issue sepa-
rate and apart from class inequality), it is difficult to explain why Sander
chooses to frame his perspective as "conflation" of race and class instead
of "intersection" between race and class.
. Nevertheless, Sander proceeds to make the point that "the contribu-
tion racial diversity makes to socioeconomic diversity in legal education
is quite modest."32 Again, the answer may be correct, but if it is not an-
swering the right question, it is irrelevant. So what if racial diversity
makes only modest contributions to socioeconomic diversity? Where is
the evidence that if we focus on one inequality, we have to desert other
inequalities? If working on racial inequity does not solve socioeconomic
inequity, should we abandon the efforts to try and achieve racial equity?
In other words, does Sander's model ask the question in a way where we
get the right answer, but we end up answering a completely irrelevant
question?
Sander posits, as part of his model, an exposition of "Comparing the
Advantages of 'Class' Versus 'Racial' Preferences."33 He advances the
proposition that "there is much to commend going further, and using
mild SES preferences as at least a partial substitute for current racial
28. Ho et al., supra note 26, at 492.
29. See Steven Gray, Michael Jackson and the Black Experience, TIME (Jun. 27, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1907472,00.html (discussing Michael Jackson and his
perceived attempts to transcend race).
30. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and
Perception ofa Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCt. 640, 642-43 (2003).
31. Sander, supra note 3, at 649.
32. Id. at 654.
33. Id. at 664.
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preferences." 34 As he expounds: "SES preferences are based on individ-
ual circumstances, not group membership. This is more appealing on
grounds of fairness. It is hard to justify giving large preferences to blacks
and Hispanics from privileged backgrounds while ignoring the needs of
low-SES applicants of all races."3 Again, he presents evidence for a
theory, but his model is untenable because he never proves why we have
to choose between advancing racial equity over SES equity. In other
words, by throwing the red herring of race into the discussion, Sander
keeps us arguing the merits of fighting racial inequity instead of asking
him to defend his model of pitting race against class. Or maybe, the real
red herring is class so that we believe we are discussing class inequity
while we are being set up to defend having to fight for racial inequities.
The presence of a red herring in Sander's model is inarguable; whether
that red herring is race to bolster the case for class or the red herring is
class to catalyze disagreement on race is up for debate.
To further illustrate the weakness of the logical irrelevance of
Sander's model, let us examine his closing thoughts in his article. Sander
states, "In the age of Obama, there is abundant evidence that upper-
middle class minorities have made dramatic gains over the past fifty
years, and experience genuine access to mainstream American institu-
tions."3 Obama's identity as a racial but upper-middle class minority-
according to Sander's logic-emphasizes the opportunities available to
minorities thereby negating the need to continue to work toward racial
equity. Based on this logic, any work fighting for equity for people with
physical disabilities was unwarranted after the ascendency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt to the presidency in 1933. More poignantly, given the SES tier
into which Bill Clinton was born, we should be done with class-based
diversity efforts as well. A trailblazer's journey does not erase inequali-
ties and inequities faced by many who happen to share characteristics
with that trailblazer.
CONCLUSION
There are many logical fallacies with Sander's overall argument,
but his insistence on arguing against racial equity by arguing for class
equity is an outmoded syllogism that undermines his stated commitment
to greater diversity in law schools. His additional efforts to take a trail-
blazer like Barack Obama and apply his success to African Americans
overall without explaining (or even considering) why Bill Clinton's suc-




36. Id. at 668.
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Sander's fundamental theory-that unless the lower SES tiers are
adequately (perhaps even equitably) represented in law schools, we can-
not purport to be diverse-has merit. That said, the merit in his theory is
lost as he forces us to muddle through an illogical and irrelevant model
of "pick one-race or class." Sander's data may be right, but it does not
matter, because he merely gets good answers to really bad questions.
The intersectionality theory invites us to try and understand that
identities are not monolithic or simple. In order to understand SES, you
have to understand race, gender, and perhaps even sexual orientation. If
not, you risk proving up a right theory but making your model irrelevant.
Moreover, when you pit one social identity against another, you break
down the very conversations that we want to see occur on a regular basis.
Diversity across many individual and group characteristics is criti-
cal in our law schools, not just because of the enhanced educational
benefits that are derived from multiple perspectives, 3  but because our
law schools create the next generations of lawyers. As a nation of laws,
lawyers have always played a central role in how we organize and gov-
ern ourselves as a society.38 Without lawyers who look like and represent
all of the various components of the society that we seek to influence,
our role, much like Sander's model, will be deemed irrelevant.
37. See SUSAN AMBROSE ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY FOR EDUCATION AT CARNEGIE
MELON 1-4 (2004), available at http://www.cmu.edu/teaching/trynew/BenefitsOfDiversity.pdf.
38. Twenty-five of the fifty-six signatories to The Declaration of Independence were lawyers
or jurists. Steve Mount, Signers of the Declaration of Independence, U.S. CONST. ONLINE,
http://www.usconstitution.net/declarsigndata.html (last modified Feb. 28, 2011). Twenty-five of the
forty-four unique U.S. Presidents have been lawyers. See The Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ (last visited May 18, 2011). Over 50% of U.S. Sena-
tors have law degrees. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE




RACE AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION: A RESPONSE TO RICHARD SANDER
DANIELLE HOLLEY-WALKERt
INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding diversity in legal education continues. The
centerpiece of this debate for over forty years has been racial diversity
and the admission policies that help to foster that diversity. In the realm
of K-12 education, as the likelihood of true racial integration has receded
there has been a greater focus on efforts to increase socioeconomic status
(SES) diversity in public schools.' Colleges and universities have also
begun to implement undergraduate programs that encourage greater class
diversity.2 The need for and methods of encouraging SES diversity in
law schools is now emerging as a significant part of the diversity dia-
logue. In this essay, I will argue that SES diversity is an important goal
for law schools to aspire to, and class-based efforts to increase law
school diversity should be used in conjunction with ongoing race-
conscious admissions policies. The most significant obstacles to SES
diversity efforts are: (1) the constant comparisons to racial diversity,
which create a suspicion that class-based efforts are part of the move-
ment to end affirmative action; (2) the need for greater empirical re-
search on SES diversity in law schools to discover the types of admission
policies and retention efforts that will have the most impact; and (3) the
failure of the American public school system to adequately educate poor
children, leading to an insufficient pool of poor students who are eligible
for admission to law school.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RACE AND CLASS
In the lead article for this symposium, Class in American Legal
Education, Professor Richard Sander argues that "[f]aw school admission
policies use very large and relatively mechanical racial preferences, but
appear to generally ignore SES considerations."3 He hopes that his article
t Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.A., Yale College; J.D. Har-
vard Law School. Thanks to Rose Beth Grossman for her research assistance. Thanks to John
Wesley Walker for his constant encouragement and support.
1. Nancy Connelly, After PICS: Making the Case for Socioeconomic Integration, 14 TX. J.
C.L. & C.R. 95, 103-04 (2008); Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, School Diversity Based on
Income Segregates Some, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/
education/l 5integrate.html.
2. Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and
Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCES: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 135 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004).
3. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REV. 631, 633
(2011) [hereinafter Sander, Class in American Legal Education].
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and this symposium will help begin a serious discussion in the legal
academy about encouraging socioeconomic diversity.
One of the main goals of Professor Sander's article is to "compare
racial and 'class' diversity as objectives that law schools should pursue." 4
One fundamental question about Sander's approach is why do these two
types of diversity need to be compared? Is Sander arguing that SES di-
versity should replace racial preferences or that SES diversity will pro-
mote racial diversity? If SES and racial diversity are not interdependent
in some way, then it seems a bit of a red herring to compare them in a
study whose ultimate goal is to demonstrate that "a serious discussion in
the legal academy about how to address socioeconomic diversity is long
overdue."5
What is the justification for SES diversity? In an earlier article that
chronicled UCLA's experiment with class-based affirmative action,
Sander suggested several possible rationales for SES diversity:
(1) Greater socioeconomic diversity in law schools can produce a
richer education for all students, by making the range of experiences
brought to law school closer to the "real" world. (2) Bringing more
low-SES people into law school, and hence into the legal profession,
confers more legitimacy on the profession and makes it better able to
respond to the needs of the public. (3) Increased access to low-SES
applicants actually improves the quality of the student body, because
test scores and other admissions criteria understate the ability of low-
SES applicants. (4) Helping low-SES people to enter higher educa-
tion increase social mobility and thus helps, however modestly, to re-
duce poverty and increase equality.6
All of these rationales support the promotion of class-based diver-
sity independent of any discussion of racial diversity. Sander suggests
that a fifth possible justification for class diversity is to provide a race-
neutral alternative to race-based affirmative action.7 If the replacement of
race-based affirmative action is the true goal of the promotion of SES
diversity, then its merits should be considered on that basis.
The justification for race-based affirmative action has developed
over time. Initially, racial preferences in admission were primarily justi-
fied as a way to redress historic racial discrimination by increasing ac-
cess to legal education for racial minorities.8 The Supreme Court's deci-
4. Id. at 632.
5. Id. at 633.
6. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472, 475 (1997) [hereinafter Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action].
7. Id. at 475-76.
8. See generally Rachel F. Moran, OfDoubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action
in Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 203 (2006) (noting that affirmative action programs
grew out of civil unrest in the 1960s and blacks' demands to increased access to higher education);
David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systematic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57
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sion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke9 introduced the
idea that affirmative action was constitutionally justified by a univer-
sity's view that racial diversity improved the classroom setting and en-
hanced the learning atmosphere.'o In 2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the diversity rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger." In Grutter, Justice
O'Connor found that there was a compelling state interest for the Uni-
versity of Michigan's law school to utilize race-conscious admissions
policies when the law school determined that "diversity is essential to its
educational mission."' 2
If the primary rationale for SES diversity is to replace race-
conscious admissions and serve as a race-neutral method of promoting
racial diversity, then those who promote this view should demonstrate
that class-based diversity is capable of accomplishing that goal. In
Sander's article about the UCLA School of Law's use of class-based
preferences, he concluded that these preferences "had only mixed suc-
cess in preserving racial diversity at law school" and that "[t]he enroll-
ment of blacks and American Indians fell by more than 70 percent."13
The comparison of SES diversity and race-based diversity may also
ultimately hurt the effort to implement more class-conscious admissions
policies. Sander concludes, "[f]aw school admission policies use very
large and relatively mechanical racial preferences, but appear to gener-
ally ignore SES considerations."l 4 These types of statements give the
impression that the discussion and promotion of SES diversity is just
another mechanism to undermine and delegitimize race-based affirma-
tive action. Many potential proponents for class-based affirmative action
include those who are attempting to preserve race-conscious admissions,
so putting the two in tension is both unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive.,s
If class-based preferences are to be implemented on their own merit,
without regard to the promotion of racial diversity, then there should be
significant additional study on whether the benefits of SES diversity can
be verified in the law school setting. Professor Sander has made a sig-
nificant contribution to the discussion of socioeconomic diversity by
STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1920-22 (2005) (recounting the systematic exclusion of racial minorities in the
legal profession and affirmative action as a way of increasing access to legal education).
9. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10. Moran, supra note 8, at 205.
11. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. Id. at 328.
13. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 6, at 473.
14. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 3, at 633.
15. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits
of "A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law Schools ", 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y
REP. 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that instead of attacking race conscious admissions a "more constructive
endeavor would be to consider what policies will further efforts to more fully diversify law schools
and attempt to ensure educational opportunity").
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providing more data on this question, but undoubtedly, more study of the
SES of law school students must be done. It appears that very few law
schools attempt to collect statistics on the SES of their students. While
every law school and the ABA collects statistics on the racial back-
ground of students, we know very little about those students' SES.' 6 Be-
cause we know a significant amount about the history and impact of
race-conscious admissions, there is the instinct to try and compare other
forms of diversity to race.
I strongly believe that increased SES diversity would enhance class-
room settings and improve the legitimacy of the legal profession, but
these theories have to be backed by strong empirical data. In the area of
racial diversity, long term studies such as William Bowen and Derek
Bok's book, The Shape of the River, help establish the tangible benefits
that flow from racial diversity.17 In addition, Richard Kahlenberg has
done groundbreaking work on the need for socioeconomic integration in
K-12 schools and the notion that good education is best guaranteed by
having "solidly middle-class" schools.' 8 These types of comprehensive
studies are sorely needed in the area of SES diversity and graduate edu-
cation.
The "After the JD" (AJD) study gives us some information on SES
from a small group of law students,19 but if the goal is to create class-
based preference programs, every law school should begin to gather
comprehensive SES data on their students. This data should attempt to go
beyond basic information such as parental levels of education, occupa-
tion, and income to capture information about generational family
wealth.
II. OUTSIDE THE WORLD OF ELITE LAW SCHOOLS
While Professor Sander uses national data on law schools such as
the AJD study, many of his conclusions and the overall study of law
schools admissions data place too much emphasis on elite law schools.
One of the key findings of Professor Sander's study is that at the most
prestigious law schools, "only five percent of all students come from
16. The ABA website includes statistics about race. The statistics on race include the total
minority J.D. degrees awarded from 1983-2009. There are also enrollment numbers for minority
students, which are provided for each minority racial and ethnic group. ABA Section of Legal Edu-
cation & Admission to the Bar, Legal Education Statistics from ABA-Approved Law Schools, AM.
BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legaleducation/resources/statistics.htnl (last
visited May 17, 2011).
17. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RiVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (2000).
18. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 1 (2001).
19. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 3, at 634-35.
20. The AJD study is a study of four thousand law school graduates who became licensed in
1999 or 2000. Id. at 634.
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families whose SES is in the bottom half of the national distribution."21
Sander notes that "[a]cross the spectrum of law schools, there is a lop-
sided concentration of law students towards the high end of the socio-
economic spectrum, which becomes more lopsided with the eliteness of
the law school." 22 He admits that at less elite law schools the socioeco-
nomic disparities are "substantially smaller."23
Many studies on the impact of affirmative action in higher educa-
tion, specifically in graduate schools, have focused on elite institutions. 2
It is understandable that scholars are interested in detailing the admis-
sions policies of the most selective universities. However, in giving a
picture of law school admissions, especially as to the SES of law school
students, it is important not to overemphasize elite or highly selective
law schools.
The United States now has 200 accredited law schools.25 Professor
Sander provides data from the AJD study on the level of SES eliteness of
law students relative to the law school's eliteness.2 6 Overall, students in
the bottom half of the SES spectrum account for only 16% of the law
school students.27 At law schools ranked 101st and lower, 21% of the
students are in the bottom half of the SES spectrum.28 There does appear
to be a rise in the number of low-SES students at less elite law schools.
Even with the data given, however, it is difficult to assess the entire law
school landscape. There are significant differences between law schools
ranked in the third tier and law schools ranked in the fourth tier.2 9 The
fourth tier, unlike the third tier, includes a number of schools that have
special missions, such as historically black law schools including Thur-
good Marshall School of Law, North Carolina Central, and Southern
University. Although Professor Sander did not compile separate SES
21. Id. at 632.
22. Id. at 637.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 17 (a study of 45,000 students who attended "aca-
demically selective institutions" and the impact of race conscious admissions policies).
25. ABA Section of Legal Education & Admission to the Bar, ABA-Approved Law Schools,
AM. BAR ASS'N http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal education/resources/abaapprovedlaw_
schools.html (last visited May 17, 2011).
26. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 3, at 637. As Professor Sander
acknowledges in his article, there are significant limitations to the use of the AJD data, and to defm-
ing SES based on the information given in the AJD survey. Id at 634. AJD only sampled approxi-
mately 4,500 law students who became licensed attorneys in 1999-2000. The survey respondents
were asked four questions related to SES, specifically the education level and occupation of their
mother and father. Only Professor Sander used this survey information to develop a numerical SES
index for each AJD respondent. Id at app. I.
27. Id. at 639 tbl..
28. Id.
29. I examined several different 2010 law school rankings. See Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS
& wORLD REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-
law-schools/law-rankings (last visited May 17, 2011); Top 2011 Law School Rankings, TOP-LAW-
SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/rankings.html (last visited May 17, 2011).
2011] 849
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
data for fourth tier schools, I believe that data would show there are even
more low SES students at these schools due to their missions.
This need for more data is especially prescient due to the shifting
nature of legal education. With 200 law schools in the United States,
access to legal education has increased substantially. In fact, in the years
since the AJD study was done, an additional 16 law schools have been
provisionally or fully accredited by the ABA.30 Legal education is no
longer characterized by the most elite law schools, but instead law
schools are increasingly offering more part-time programs and online
education that attracts students with broad backgrounds.3 1
III. CONCLUSION
Beyond admissions policies that adopt class-based preferences, SES
diversity in legal education will only be expanded by creating programs
that increase the number of low-SES students that are eligible to attend a
law school. Sander points out that "students from the top [SES] quartile
were nearly five times as likely to finish a four-year college as students
from the bottom quartile."32 This means that the disproportionately low
numbers of low-SES students graduating from college will continue to
have an impact on all efforts to bring additional class diversity to law
school. These college graduation statistics are a reflection of the larger
problem of providing quality K-12 education to children who are at the
bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
30. See ABA Section of Legal Education & Admission to the Bar, ABA-Approved Law
Schools by Year, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legaleducation/resources/
aba approved law schools/by_yearapproved.htmI (last visited May 17, 2011).
31. Part-time Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/part-time-law-
rankings (last visited May 17, 2011) (ranking law schools with part-time programs).
32. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 3, at 640.
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COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR RICHARD SANDER'S CLASS
IN AMERICAN LEGAL ED UCA TION
L. DARNELL WEEDENt
INTRODUCTION
Professor Sander's article discussing class in American Legal edu-
cation is an open invitation for thoughtful individuals to discuss real stu-
dent diversity-involving much more than simply support of racial di-
versity. Racial diversity in a law school is indeed a desirable goal. In an
American society with an increasing class divide, the continual quest for
racial diversity is misguided if pursued without an equally aggressive
attempt to have the law school classroom reflect the social and economic
diversity that exists in America. Even in rhetorical terms, the historical
debate about diversity in the legal academy has been understood as ex-
clusively promoting racial diversity at the expense of any real articula-
tion of the need for class-based diversity.
As a practical matter, the diversity that the legal academy should
address in the future should include a deliberate and focused discussion
regarding class or socioeconomic status (SES) issues because the pri-
mary continuing effect of historical racial discrimination is economic
disadvantage. In white urban neighborhoods, only one percent of the
community is "extremely impoverished."' The poverty rate of the Latino
neighborhoods is similar to that of African American neighborhoods;
twenty-two percent are in low poverty.2 Twenty-five percent of the Afri-
can American communities suffer "extreme levels of poverty." Signifi-
cantly, these impoverished communities are also marginalized in that
they suffer from inadequate education, unemployment, and high incar-
ceration rates.4
Although racial discrimination against blacks is the predominant
factor leading to economic disadvantage in the black community, I do
t Associate Dean and Roberson King Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas
Southern University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. I extend a special word of thanks to my
wife and my children for their moral support. I would like to thank my Research Assistant, Kayla
Timmons, J.D. Candidate 2012, for her research assistance.
1. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Race, Residence, and Violent Crime: A Structure of
Inequality, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 903, 924 (2009).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Geneva Brown, The Wind Cries Mary-The Intersectionality of Race, Gender, and Reen-
try: Challenges for African-American Women, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 625, 643 (2010).
5. See id. (discussing the disproportionate impact the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which denies drug offenders eligibility for public assistance for life,
has on African Americans, particularly African American women and children).
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not think racial disadvantage and class disadvantage are the same. I agree
with the position that a significant degree of both race and class based
discrimination systematically exist in America and in its law schools.6
Professor Kleven argues that the United States is an inherently classist
and racist society-and that classism and racism are interconnected with
common characteristics. 7 It is clearly a very plausible argument that ra-
cism and classism are interconnected. If one accepts Kleven's assertion
to be true-that racism and classism are interconnected-then it is unac-
ceptable for institutions (with the responsibility to collect statistics and
facts beneficial to the legal academy) to collect a wide-range of informa-
tion associated with race without collecting a quantity of systematic in-
formation concerning SES that might impact a person's opportunity to
become a law student, a lawyer, or a law professor.8 Thus, because clas-
sism and racism are interconnected, Sander's article, at a minimum, is a
necessary and proper call to the Law School Admissions Council, the
National Association for Law Placement, the American Association of
Law Schools, and the American Bar Foundation to collect relevant sys-
tematic data regarding the impact of class or socioeconomic status on the
legal profession.9
Reasonable minds can disagree as to the nature and quantity of ei-
ther race-based discrimination or class-based disadvantage. Nevertheless,
if I had the ability to prohibit the practice of racial discrimination in
America, and end it today, without addressing SES issues, most African
Americans would remain at a competitive disadvantage in American
society because of SES issues.10 Regardless of race, if racial discrimina-
tion ceased to exist, African Americans would only become competitive
in society by inclusion in broad-based social and economic justice poli-
cies designed to help all similarly situated individuals." Obviously, in
our social order blacks have experienced racial discrimination incalcula-
bly more than any other racial group. 12 By focusing on class rather than
race-in creating diversity in law school classrooms-the legal academy
undermines the argument that race-based affirmative action plans in law
school admission plans produce reverse racial discrimination against
whites.13 A class-based admission process to promote diversity is a rea-
6. Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in The United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 207, 207 (2009).
7. Id.
8. See Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REV. 631,
632 n.3 (2011).
9. Id
10. See Peterson & Krivo, supra note 1, at 924.
11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
12. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 528 ("Racial preferences appear to 'even the score' (in some small degree) only if
one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races, making
it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated for by discrimi-
nating against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace. Since blacks have been disproportionately
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sonable means of avoiding the problems associated with an admission
system utilizing racial preference since it would directly contribute to the
objective of increasing opportunities for economically underprivileged
applicants without discriminating on the basis of race. 14 In Regents of
University of California v. Baake,15 Justice Powell argued that an admis-
sions program could be hindered if it concentrated only on ethnic diver-
sity; thus, it should include a class based-system to enhance diversity.1
Under a class-based admission program, minorities would still receive
admission preferences because a relatively high number of minority
groups are impoverished.17
I suppose one could argue that the search-which has occurred over
the past several decades-for race-based student diversity at elite law
schools speaks collectively about both race and class only in a very re-
stricted set of circumstances. Traditionally, race and class have only been
addressed as a consequence of the theory that traditional race-based af-
firmative action law school admission policies open doors of opportunity
predominantly to those African Americans from upper or middle class
families.18 Almost all of the nonwhite law students, similar to their white
cohorts, are from rather elite families.19
The great debate about diversity in legal education over the last sev-
eral decades has been about promoting racial diversity as a symbolic
gesture of social justice without any similar promotion of class-based
diversity as an effective tool for advancing social justice. A race-neutral
class-based SES admission policy is a necessary and proper tool to effec-
tively generate graduating classes at elite law schools that reflect the
interesting intermix of SES and racial diversity in American society.
Sander's article makes a very valuable contribution to diversity scholar-
ship by inviting scholars to systematically explore the issue of whether
the law school community should begin to address SES law school ad-
mission policies with the same energy it has utilized to justify race-based
admission criteria.20
Sander's article does an excellent job of demonstrating how the lack
of SES diversity in American law schools requires those promoting true
intellectual diversity at law schools to seek both racial and economic
diversity with equal vigor. Sander provides information that reveals that
a very large percentage of American law students are from rather privi-
disadvantaged by racial discrimination, any race-neutral remedial program aimed at the disadvan-
taged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks.").
14. John P. Cronan, The Diversity Justification in Higher Education: Evaluating Disadvan-
taged Status in School Admissions, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 305, 321 (2001).
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Id. at 311-15.
17. Cronan, supra note 14, at 320.
18. See Sander, supra note 8, at 632.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 632-33.
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leged families.21 For example, at elite law schools, only ten percent of the
students are from families at the bottom half of the SES stratum. 22 If
blacks and Hispanics are effectively represented in law schools (when
judged against the total number of college graduates) while low and
moderate SES college graduates are not adequately represented, it is im-
perative that a strategic plan be implemented in the law school commu-
nity addressing the development and improvement of SES diversity.23
I. DATA AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CLASS
Sander has provided a good example of how legal scholars can in-
corporate demographics statistics from social science to measure the
class or SES divide among people living in America, while exploring the
merits of class-based diversity in legal education.24 From a historical
perspective, it is clearly appropriate to implement social science data to
support class-based diversity in legal education on account of the impor-
tant role social science data has played in promoting equality in educa-
tion. Take, for example, Brown v. Board of Education,2 5 where social
science data was a pivotal factor in demonstrating stark racial inequali-
ties, which helped facilitate a decision promoting equality in our system
of education. 26
Theoretically, Sander's position that the impact of class or socio-
economic status in contemporary Western society is multifaceted and
complex 2 7 should be viewed with suspicion and perhaps even rejected
because no matter who the poor people in society are (i.e., black, His-
panic, white), they are typically ignored by their neighbors and marginal-
ized by society.28 Unlike the disadvantaged poor, however, the rich have
influence over, and contact with, many powerful friends.29 In general, as
a result of this power and influence, the privileged receive the best avail-
able education and are overrepresented in the most promising and pres-
tigious professions. Sander's use of SES statistics and racial demograph-
ics demonstrates what the human experience already knows; that those
with the most money and their offspring are more likely to earn a higher
income from investments, acquire both a better education and a higher
level of education, and hold the more desirable occupations.
I believe that Sander's use of a numerical SES Index is a useful al-
ternative heuristic tool to support a discussion regarding class-based di-
versity in legal education, but I reject any suggestion that the numerical
21. See id.
22. Id. at 643.
23. See id. at 633.
24. See generally Sander, supra note 8.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Id. at 495 n.11.
27. See Sander, supra note 8, at 633.




SES Index is necessary to move this alternative diversity discussion from
"beyond vague generalities." 30 Instead of using the numerical SES Index
to support the SES diversity option in legal education, I think the dispa-
rate impact analysis adopted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 3 1 forty years
ago-with its potential for a significantly more limited use of numbers-
is equally as effective and perhaps less burdensome to demonstrate that a
class-based or SES diversity admission policy is beneficial for legal edu-
cation and represents good public policy.
II. SES PROFILES FROM THE AJD
According to Sander, the After the JD study (AJD) is the top avail-
able resource available regarding the SES of modern-day law students.3 2
AJD produced a nationally representative illustration of some four thou-
sand law graduates who were licensed as attorneys in 1999 or 2000." As
a result of the self-evident universal truth that privileged elites have
many friends while the economically disadvantaged are virtually without
any powerful friends, 34 the findings of the AJD should not be surprising.
The AJD SES disparity study reveals that approximately fifty percent of
the students at elite law schools have parents in the upper tenth of the
SES divide in America, whereas merely one-tenth of the students have
parents from the bottom fifty percent of the SES divide.35 Or, to state it
another way, a young person living in the United States and fortunate
enough to have parents whose SES positioned them in the top ten percent
of the SES divide were twenty-four times more probable to attend an
elite law school when compared to a young person whose parents' SES
situated them in the bottom fifty percent of the national SES divide.36
The fact that the economic divide makes one student twenty-four times
more likely to go to an elite school than another demonstrates that no one
who is serious about diversity in the legal education can afford to ignore
the compelling justification for an SES preference admission policy.
III. SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT
From an historical perspective of legal education, the incredible ad-
vantage given to elite members of society to receive a legal education at
an elite law school has not changed in the last forty years. 37 The available
data confirms that there has not been any increase in SES diversity for
the last four decades.38 The available data and historical trends make a
30. Sander, supra note 8, at 634.
31. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
32. Sander, supra note 8, at 634 (citing RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (Janet E. Smith et al. eds., 2004)).
33. Sander, supra note 8, at 634.
34. Proverbs 14:20 (New International Version).
35. Sander, supra note 8, at 637.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 645 tbl.4.
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compelling justification to adopt SES diversity-based admission pro-
grams in elite schools and throughout legal education.
IV. COMPARING RACIAL AND SES DIVERSITY
Sander's heuristic numerical Tables 5, 6, and 7 lend very credible
support to his conclusion that efforts directed at increasing racial diver-
sity-attempting to remedy the effects of racial discrimination-have
been very successful when compared to the wayward efforts to assist
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups (regardless of race). If it is true
that college graduates of every race go to law school in almost equal
proportions, then the information in Table 6 demonstrates the relatively
unremarkable conclusion that-in the context of acquiring a legal educa-
tion in America today-class or SES matters more than race in determin-
ing a person's chances of attending law school.40 Additionally, the data
in Table 7 inspired Sander to make the following conclusion:41 "Indeed,
it is fair to say that low-SES representation at elite law schools is compa-
rable to racial representation fifty years ago, before the civil rights revo-
lution."42 I support Sander's heuristic rationale (articulated nearly fifteen
years ago) for expanding the opportunities to attain a legal education
based on SES, rather than focusing exclusively on race: (1) increased
SES diversity in law schools will create a better education for all stu-
dents, by giving each student an expanded opportunity to simulate "real"
world experiences; (2) enrolling a greater percentage of low-end SES
students at a law school, who subsequently become lawyers, creates di-
versity in the legal profession while simultaneously increasing the le-
gitimacy of the legal profession in the eyes of an increasingly diverse
public; (3) low-end SES candidates in fact enhance the value of the stu-
dent body experience in law school because standardized test scores and
traditional admissions criteria devalue the potential and competence of
low-end SES candidates; (4) assisting low-end SES candidates to enter
law school and successfully become lawyers expands social mobility by
decreasing poverty and boosting economic equality by closing the SES
gap; (5) socioeconomic preferences are a "race-blind" replacement for
traditional affirmative action that will expand diversity in legal educa-
tion.43
The truth of the matter is that there is virtually no overlap between
SES and racial diversity because non-white students attending law school
are usually from somewhat elite status (in particular, at the best law
schools).44 Because of the somewhat elite status of racial minorities in
39. Id. at 646-49.
40. Id. at 648 tbl.6.
41. Id. at 649 tbl.7.
42. Id. at 649.
43. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472,475-76 (1997).
44. Sander, supra note 8, at 655-56.
856 [Vol. 88:4
COMMENTARY
law school, racial diversity as a general rule does not advance socioeco-
nomic diversity in legal education.
VI. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS PRACTICES
The Grutter v. Bollinger4 6 decision endorsed a separate and elitist-
focused admission system in legal education. In this case, the Court up-
held an admission practice where students with the highest LSAT scores
and undergraduate grades-within each racially elite cohort-had the
greatest opportunity to be admitted to law school.47 Sander's data reveals
that the Grutter decisions give law schools permission to practice a race-
based, but elitist, system of admitting students.4 ' A law school admission
system that favors the elite of all races at the expense of those in society
who are economically disadvantaged is truly tainted.4 9
VII. THE ATTAINABILITY OF "CLASS DIVERSITY"
Sander identifies the UCLA School of Law class-based diversity
initiative as an example of a successful race-neutral law school admis-
sion program because it expanded both SES diversity and racial diversity
in the law school student population.o Nonetheless, Sander's conclu-
sion-that the UCLA Law School's class-based preference system was
only successful because most other law schools were not implementing a
SES based preference in their admission process-should be rejected
because of a lack of data to support this conclusion. I am confident that a
similar study in the future will reveal that virtually every law school act-
ing in good faith can advance SES diversity in legal education by delet-
ing any consideration of race.
Indeed, "[i]t is well established that when the government distrib-
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications,
that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny."5 Under the strict scrutiny
standard, each law school with a racial preference admission plan should
at least be required to provide compelling evidence that a UCLA type
SES plan would not advance intellectual diversity in legal education.5 2
Unlike Sander, I think the UCLA SES plan can be implemented success-
fully at other law schools even if every law school in the country has
implemented an SES admission preference plan to close the class divide.
Diversity in American education is a positive thing for law students and
the law school community. Because "[SES] discrimination is the pre-
45. Id.
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. Id. at 315-16, 343-44.
48. Sander, supra note 8, at 667-68.
49. See generally L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep
Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 161 (2004).
50. Sander, supra note 8, at 661-62.
51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
52. See Weeden, supra note 49, at 198-99.
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dominant impediment to achieving meaningful educational diversity" in
the legal academy, it is proper to regard the UCLA SES preference plan
as providing effective race-neutral tools to close America's SES legal
education divide. 3 The legal academy "must work harder by thinking
outside the race box to expand diversity" to those students with a disad-
vantaged SES history while deleting race as a factor in its admission cri-
teria.54
My commitment to the concept of economic justice in our society
leads me to believe that the successful SES diversity plan at UCLA fur-
ther supports my conclusion articulated in an earlier commentary ad-
dressing race-neutral affirmative action programs. I posited, and continue
to support the assertion, that "the Michigan Law School [in Grutter] did
not make a compelling case that there were no effective race-neutral al-
ternatives to achieve diversity."5
Similarly, I argued, "Race-based affirmative action programs should
be rejected in law schools as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."56 Likewise, "a law school can meet its goals of a qualified and
diverse student body by considering class, lack of cultural exposure, in-
teresting life experiences, present and historical economic status, and
57skills;" no discussion of race is necessary.
VIII. COMPARING THE ADVANTAGES OF "CLASS" VERSUS "RACIAL"
PREFERENCES
As I said fifteen years ago:
Because racial determinations [supporting diversity] are likely to be
subjected to either misuse or misunderstanding by both the propo-
nents and opponents of race-based affirmative action, race-based af-
firmative action programs intended to bring diversity to a law school
should be abandoned in favor of [SES] as a basis for affirmative ac-
58tion.
Unlike race, an SES-preference admission program "would be subject to
the rational basis level of judicial review rather than the much tougher
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review."5 9 Under the rational basis
theory, a state sponsored SES diversity program is entitled to a presump-
tion of constitutional validity under the rationale of United States v.
53. See, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create
Educational Diversity While Attacking Socio-economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT 297, 297 (2005).
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id.
56. L. Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the
Right Thing to do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 533, 536 (1996-1997).
57. Id.




Carolene Products Co. 60 Even if there are currently no federal cases in
the pipeline challenging the admissions practices at law schools for vio-
lation of the Grutter guidelines, 61 undergraduate race-conscious admis-
sion guidelines implemented at the University of Texas under the Grutter
rationale were unsuccessfully challenged as a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.62 While evaluat-
ing the elements of the University of Texas' race-conscious admissions
policy, it is clear that the structure was modeled after the Grutter pro-
gram, which the Supreme Court decided did not qualify as a quota.
According to the Fifth Circuit, "Grutter is best read as a path toward the
moment when all race-conscious measures become unnecessary."" In
order to make race-conscious measures unnecessary, Grutter requires
law schools that utilize race-conscious admissions to honestly consider
the race-neutral SES option utilized by the UCLA law school.s While it
is conceded that "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative," 66 it must at a minimum require
compelling evidence that the UCLA SES preference plan will not en-
hance intellectual diversity at the law school.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sander's thoughtful heuristic presentation of the role of
class in American legal education suggests that SES in the age of Obama
has arguably replaced race as the new battle cry in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury for social justice. Thus, at a minimum, SES matters in one's ability
to attend law school. The issue facing the legal community now is
whether SES matters more than race in deciding who goes to law school.
Nevertheless, my reading of Sander's article leads me to the conclusion
that reasonable minds in legal education could disagree as to whether
SES matters more than race in deciding who attends law school in Amer-
ica.
60. Id. (citing 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
61. Sander, supra note 8, at 668.
62. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 235.
64. Id. at 238.
65. Id
66. Id (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003)).
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In Class in American Legal Education, Richard Sander provoca-
tively argues that law schools should replace racial preferences with so-
cioeconomic preferences in their admission decision-making processes.
Some of Professor Sander's claims are compelling, for example, his de-
fense of enhanced classroom diversity as an important and desirable
goal,2 and his assertion that diversity ought to include under-represented
f Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
thank Arthur Best, Alan Chen, Russ Pearce, Joyce Sterling, Leah Wald, and David Wilkins for their
insightful comments. A special thanks to Kelly Cox, and to Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services
Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, for their
research assistance.
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 663,
668 (2011) [hereinafter Sander, Class in American Legal Education]. Class-based affirmative action
has attracted growing attention since the mid 1990s, and Professor Sander has been a leading con-
tributor to the discourse. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913 (1996); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Les-
sons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847 (1996); Kenneth Oldfield, Social Class-Based Affirmative
Action in High Places: Democratizing Dean Selection at America's Elite Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL
PROF. 307 (2010); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 370, 478-79 (2004) [hereinafter Sander, Systemic Analysis] (assert-
ing that the costs of affirmative action imposed on minority students-lower grades and less learn-
ing, "higher attrition rates, lower pass rates on the bar, [and subsequently] problems in the job mar-
ket"-may outweigh the benefits); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997) [hereinafter Sander, Experimenting]; Richard H. Sander, The
Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1755, 1755, 1819-20 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Sander, Racial Paradox] (arguing that aggressive affirmative action policies implemented by law
schools and large law firms result in counterproductive outcomes: minority lawyers with relatively
weak academic credentials are being hired but subsequently not promoted); Brent E. Simmons,
Should Class-Based Affirmative Action Be Substituted for Race-Based Affirmative Action?, 56
GUILD PRAC. 95, 96, 102 (1999) (arguing that class-based affirmative action would be a poor substi-
tute for racial-based affirmative action). The discourse has expanded outside of the academic arena
to popular venues. See, e.g., Reactions: Is It Time for Class-Based Affirmative Action?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Reactions-Is-It-Time-for/6
2 6 15/.
2. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631. See generally David L.
Chambers et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 495 (2000) (exploring the beneficial effects of desegregating law
schools and the legal profession); Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender,
Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 541
(1996); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Learning from Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About Race
and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515 (2003); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege and Liberalism in
Legal Education: Teaching and Learning in a Diverse Environment, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 88
(1995).
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constituencies other than racial minorities. Other claims are intuitively
plausible, for example, the contention that historically law schools have
advocated for diversity of all sorts but in practice have focused their pref-
erential admission policies mainly on fostering racial diversity.4 And yet
other claims are questionable. For example, the speculation that so-
cioeconomic preferences would effectively achieve racial diversity, or
the suggestion that socioeconomic and racial preferences are in some
way inherently linked such that pursuing the former must come at the
expense of the latter.6 Such a tradeoff is conceptually dubious as one
could, of course, advocate for both socioeconomic and racial diversity.'
At the end of the day, Sander clearly succeeds in achieving his overall
stated goal: stimulating the diversity discourse and exploring it in new
and exciting directions.8
3. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631, 668-69. While Sander
has been a leader in calling for greater socioeconomic diversity in law schools, others have called for
increased religious, national origin, and students-with-disabilities diversity in legal education. See
Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious Diversity" Got to Do with It?,
78 MARQ. L. REV. 427, 428, 430 (1995) (discussing religious diversity in law school admissions and
accreditation); Meredith George & Wendy Newby, Inclusive Instruction: Blurring Diversity and
Disability in Law School Classrooms Through Universal Design, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 475, 475
(2008) (exploring disability diversity in law school instruction).
4. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 631. Law schools have also
successfully addressed gender diversity and some ethnoreligious diversity, but generally speaking,
did so by removing discriminatory admission policies without resorting to preferential treatment of
women, Catholic, and Jewish candidates. On past gender discrimination in law schools' admission
processes, see Eli Wald, Glass-ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2250-51
(2010). Currently, women law students account for approximately fifty percent of the national law
school student body. Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the Legal Profession, 4 ANN. REV.
LAW. & Soc. Sc. 299, 300 (2008). On the use of discriminatory ethnoreligious admission policies,
see Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1837
nn.155-57 (2008). See generally JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON (2005).
5. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 663-64. Sander himself has
admitted elsewhere that "a class-based system is not a fungible substitute for a race-based system,"
at least where racial diversity is the goal. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 1, at 503; see also
Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 504 (1997) [herein-
after Malamud, Response to Professor Sander] (critically analyzing the UCLA experiment with
class-based affirmative action and its negative impact on racial minorities); Deborah C. Malamud,
Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 454, 471 (1997) (arguing that
while class, socioeconomic status, race, gender, and ethnicity are inherently intertwined, class-based
affirmative action would not be an effective substitute for racial-based affirmative action and would
not achieve racial diversity). But see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (asserting that class-based affirmative action should replace race-
based affirmative action even if the former would not achieve the same results as the latter).
6. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 664. But see Deborah C.
Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 729,730
(2011) ("I strongly disagree, however, with Sander's decision to link his class analysis to his critique
ofrace-based affirmative action.").
7. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Race, Class, Diversity, Complexity, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 289,
302 (2004) ("In practice and in principle, affirmative action is not at odds with socioeconomic diver-
sity. When pursued in the interest of important institutional and social purposes, racial justice and
economic justice find common ground, build on common principle, and strengthen a common un-
derstanding of equal opportunity.").
8. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 632-33.
THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS
This Response explores only one argument Professor Sander makes
about class diversity: his assertion that socioeconomic status is inherently
invisible. Specifically, Sander argues that, as a matter of fact, socioeco-
nomic preferences are going to be invisible, stating that "once students
have matriculated to a law school, no one can readily tell which of the
others have received a preference;" 9 that the invisibility of socioeco-
nomic preferences makes socioeconomic diversity superior to racial di-
versity and its visible racial preferences; and finally, that such invisibility
is desirable, both because recipients of preferences would likely not
know that they received preference and therefore would not doubt their
own intellectual self-esteem, and because recipients would not be visible
to others and therefore would not suffer stigmatization or become targets
of bias and stereotyping.' 0
Sander is not alone in believing in the invisibility of socioeconomic
status. In a reply to Class in American Legal Education, Richard Lem-
pert similarly argues that "students from lower class backgrounds who
apply to and attend elite law schools may by the time they reach law
school have largely shed their lower class identities,"" adding that
"[f]ower class graduates of elite schools will not stand out in the law
school crowd,"' 2 and concluding that "[lower SES students will, by con-
trast [to racial minority students], blend into the student body, and in
most settings students find themselves in they will be responded to ac-
cording to race, gender, and/or age rather than according to class
status."' 3
To be clear, Sander and Lempert invoke socioeconomic invisibility
for very different, indeed, opposite reasons. Sander sees the invisibility
of socioeconomic status in contrast to the visibility of racial status as a
reason to prefer class-based affirmative action over racial-based affirma-
tive action, 14 whereas Lempert believes that the invisibility of socioeco-
nomic status diminishes the value of socioeconomic diversity and ren-
ders class-based affirmative action undesirable.' 5
Both Sander and Lempert are mistaken about the likely invisibility
of socioeconomic status and preferences. Socioeconomic status and, in
particular, the related concepts of social and cultural capital which in-
form and contribute to it, play a significant role and have a considerable
impact on the experience of law students while at law school and on their
9. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
10. Id. at 665-66.
11. Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L.
REv. 683, 711 (2011).
12. Id. at 712.
13. Id.
14. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
15. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711 ("When it comes to contributing to diversity within law
schools and to social contributions beyond law school, class-based affirmative action may add little
of value.").
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legal careers after graduation.' 6 Importantly, socioeconomic status, the
possession of social and cultural capital and lack thereof are highly visi-
ble, and students of lower socioeconomic status are unlikely to be able to
pass for affluent students or completely cover their status effectively
even if they tried.
The visibility of socioeconomic status means that Sander is also
mistaken about the relative advantage of socioeconomic preferences over
racial preferences. Contrary to Sander's assertion, because socioeco-
nomic status and preferences are going to be visible, to the extent that
visible racial status and racial-based affirmative action result in signifi-
cant costs incurred by its recipients, socioeconomic preferences are likely
to impose similar, if not higher costs. Finally, Sander is wrong about the
desirability of invisibility, that is, even if socioeconomic preferences
were either inherently invisible or coverable, it is not at all clear that re-
cipients should cover their socioeconomic status.
Sander invokes the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences to bol-
ster his argument that class-based affirmative action should replace ra-
cial-based affirmative action." The fact that socioeconomic status and
therefore socioeconomic preferences are visible, however, is not an ar-
gument against class-based affirmative action. Quite the contrary: if so-
cioeconomic status was invisible, Lempert's unpersuasive assertion that
class diversity adds little value to diversity within law schools would be
more compelling.' 8 Instead, while the visibility of socioeconomic status
does weaken Sander's argument regarding the relative advantage of ad-
ministering socioeconomic preferences over racial preferences, it does
support the case for class-based affirmative action. The visibility of so-
cioeconomic status only means that law schools committed to diversity
have to appreciate and anticipate the possible costs socioeconomic pref-
erences might impose on recipients and respond in appropriate fashion
by pursuing measures to enhance the educational experience of recipients
and to mitigate the costs of affirmative action.
I. THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
CULTURAL CAPITAL
A. The Visibility ofSocioeconomic Status
"Once students have matriculated to a law school," writes Professor
Sander, "no one [would be able to] readily tell which of the others have
received a [socioeconomic] preference."' 9 Presumably, one would not be
16. See infra Part I.
17. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666. In Class in American
Legal Education, Sander uses the terms socioeconomic and class interchangeably, see id at 655-66,
and this Response follows his lead.
18. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
19. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
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able to tell because socioeconomic background, unlike, for example,
gender or racial identity, is invisible.20 Whereas women law students
cannot pass for men law students, and black law students can often not
pass for white law students; students from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds, suggests Sander, can easily pass for more affluent law students
because one's socioeconomic status is supposedly invisible. Professor
Lempert makes the same point more forcefully, arguing that "students
from lower class backgrounds who apply to and attend elite law schools
may by the time they reach law school have largely shed their lower
class identities."2 1 According to Lempert, socioeconomic status is invisi-
ble because all law students, by virtue of attending law school, have ar-
guably attained the same class status such that telling them apart would
be hard, even impossible to do. Furthermore, asserts Lempert, if law stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds have not already "shed" their
class identity, surely they will as lawyers.22
Is socioeconomic status inherently invisible? "Passing," explains
Kenji Yoshino, is the concealment of aspects of one's identity by passive
meansfor example, by remaining silent about certain otherwise salient
characteristics. 23 "Covering" is a more active form of "ton[ing] down a
disfavored identity" by acting pursuant to expectations consistent with
24identity traits one does not possess. Students of lower socioeconomic
status could attempt to pass for hailing from a more affluent status by
remaining silent about their background. For example, they might not
mention in conversations with other law students that they attended pub-
lic schools, public colleges or private colleges on financial aid; they
might refrain from talking about being the first person in their family to
20. Two American Bar Association reports study the experience of perhaps the most visible
minority group within the profession, women of color. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY, WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006); ARIN N. REEVES,
2008 ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FROM VISIBLE INVISIBILITY TO VISIBLY
SUCCESSFUL: SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR LAW FIRMS AND WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2008).
21. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
22. Id. at 714 ("[L]ow SES students who attend elite law schools are seeking and will obtain a
credential that will allow them to transform their class identity from low to high.").
23. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2006).
24. Id. at ix. Yoshino's work on passing and covering is somewhat paralleled by Carbado and
Gulati's study of "identity work." See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260-62 (2000) (exploring a form of covering at the workplace as outsiders
respond to stereotyping by altering their work, and sometimes aspects of their personal identities).
Both works have generated a significant discourse. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering
Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, passim (2007) (discussing both Yoshino's and Carbado &
Gulati's work). Moreover, the works have been built upon by scholars exploring the interplay of
discrimination, stereotyping and professional identity. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl 1.
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1212-13 (2008) (criticizing colorblind-
ness as it relates to admissions); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE
L.J. 728, 812 (2011) (arguing that comparators are no longer useful tools in workplace discrimina-
tion cases); Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance
Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 657, 662-64 (2010) (discussing challenges
faced by plaintiffs in intra-group discrimination suits); Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-
Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 551 (2010) (arguing that courts should recognize
claims of multiracial discrimination).
865
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
attend college or law school; and they might not talk about having to
work part- or full-time while at law school to support themselves.
Yet in the most basic of ways, successful socioeconomic passing is
still doubtful. One might be asked where one attended school, whether
there are any lawyers in one's family, or why one chooses to forgo com-
peting for law review in lieu of working in the library. Or one might be
asked about driving a lemon, having three roommates in an apartment in
a remote part of town, not joining everybody for expensive drinks at the
end of the school day, or about travel plans during spring break. For the
very same reasons, covering one's socioeconomic status, even if one was
willing to try more actively to "fit in," might be quite hard if not impos-
sible to do.
Consider the following examples of passing and covering. Recalling
her experience as a first year law student from a low socioeconomic
background, Lisa Pruitt writes, "I recall needing to keep secret those
familial details," adding "[i]f I was asked about my family of origin, I
probably referred to my father as the owner of a 'small business.' Which
he was, of course; it's just that his office had eighteen wheels and he
spent his days (and very often his nights) traversing the country in it."26
Pruitt concludes, "I now know that my behavior is called 'passing'-
class passing to be precise."27 If passing, for example, by keeping secrets,
was enough, socioeconomic status would be inherently invisible. But
once one has to hide or embellish the truth, one is engaged in the more
proactive act of covering, which suggests that class identity and socio-
economic status are not inherently invisible.
Moreover, covering is sometimes hard to accomplish even if one is
willing to attempt it. Revisiting his law school experience, Ezra Rosser
recalls the following exchange during a job interview: "'You didn't go to
the Corcoran while you lived in D.C.?' I was asked by a member of a
hiring committee incredulously before she reacted by turning away from
me with seeming disinterest in my candidacy,"28 exposing, if you will,
his attempt to cover his class identity. Class privilege, asserts Rosser, "is
infused in every conversation and is an understood shared reference, yet
it is never acknowledged." 29
In particular, the possible need of some students of lower socioeco-
nomic status to work either part-time or full-time while enrolled in law
school deserves special attention because it impacts not only one's visi-
25. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735 ("Unlike Sander, I believe that class is often made visible
through social interaction.").
26. Lisa R. Pruitt, How You Gonna' Keep Her Down on the Farm .. , 78 UMKC L. REV.
1085, 1092 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Ezra Rosser, On Becoming "Professor": A Semi-Serious Look in the Mirror, 36 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 215, 221 (2009).
29. Id. at 222.
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bility, but may also constitute a significant hurdle to one's academic suc-
cess in more direct ways.30 Law school, especially in the first year, is
generally considered an- intense, time-consuming endeavor." Part of
"learning to think like a lawyer" involves reading significant volumes of
case law. Sixty-, seventy-, and even eighty-hour weeks are not unheard
of, and a part-time or full-time job may put one at a significant disadvan-
tage. Considering that performance at the first year of law school is dis-
proportionally important to one's success in law school,32 and that law
school grades are curved such that one is measured and graded explicitly
relative to other law students, a socioeconomic-based time constraint can
turn into a real disadvantage.
Sander proposes that socioeconomic preferences may require a sig-
nificant increase in financial aid to level the playing field.33 Indeed, in
competing for top law students, law schools have recently began to grant
not only tuition waivers but also "cost of living" stipends.3 4 It should be
noted, however, that offering such significant financial support to stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status, even if financially feasible,3 5 would
not necessarily allow for effective passing or complete covering. Finan-
cial aid may address some aspects of disadvantage at law school: it may
alleviate the need of some students to work part- or full-time and allow
them to concentrate on their studies; and it may allow them to pay for
30. See, e.g., JEAN JOHNSON ET AL., PUB. AGENDA, WITH THEIR WHOLE LIVES AHEAD OF
THEM 4 (2009), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/theirwholelivesaheadofthern.pdf
(finding that a primary reason students drop out of college is that they have to work to support them-
selves and their families). Interestingly, while both Sander and Lempert are mindful of the impact of
work commitments on the academic achievements of college students, see Sander, Class in Ameri-
can Legal Education, supra note 1, at 647 ("Much of the reason for underrepresentation of some
groups in law school has to do with low rates of college entrance and completion. This is particularly
true for young Hispanics, who often drop out of high school to help support their families."); Lem-
pert, supra note 11, at 706 ("[A] student who has to work almost a full time job while in school to
pay her college tuition may have grades below those of fellow students whose parents paid their
way."), both appear to overlook the consequences for law students.
31. Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law
School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 77-79 (2002) (summarizing the research showing that the law school
experience is stressful, intensely competitive, time-consuming, and anxiety producing). But see Paul
D. Carrington, The Pedagogy of the Old Case Method: A Tribute to "Bull" Warren, 59 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 457, 460-61 (2010) (documenting educational reforms meant to reduce student stress, if not
time-commitment); Clinton W. Shinn, Lessening Stress of the IL Year: Implementing an Alternative
to Traditional Grading, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 355, 368 (2010) (same).
32. Roger C. Cramaton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321,
329 (1982) ("First-year grades control the distribution of goodies: honors, law review, job place-
ment, and, because of the importance placed on these matters by the law-school culture, even the
student's sense of personal worth."); see Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better IL Assessments, 54
DUKE L.J. 765, 773-75 (2004) (summarizing the literature on the importance of first-year grades).
33. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 660.
34. For examples of such policies, see GA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, BULLETIN 2010-
2011, at 66--68 (2011), available at http://law.gsu.edu/resources/registrar/Collegeof Law
Bulletin _2010-2011 l.pdf; Tuition andFinancialAid, COLUM. L. SCH. (2011), http://www.law.
columbia.edu/jd applicants/admissions/tuition (last visited May 14, 2011).
35. A cost, by the way, that may make socioeconomic preferences quite expensive, perhaps
even more expensive than administering racial preference. This is contrary to Sander's position that
socioeconomic preferences are going to be easier to administer and entail lower costs that racial-
based affirmative action. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 664-68.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and enroll in bar exam prep courses putting them on equal footing with
their more affluent counterparts.36 But it cannot address some inherent
aspects of socioeconomic status. It will not change where one went to
school, one's family background, what one's parents do for a living, or
where one vacations.37
Three important conceptual clarifications are in order. First, the
visibility of status and identity is not a binary characteristic; rather, it is a
question of degree. Furthermore, some statuses and identities are more
inherently visible than others, for example, racial, ethnic, and gender
identity are more intrinsically visible than class, religious, and national
origin status (assuming one does not have a pronounced accent). Fur-
thermore, some identities and statuses such as race and gender are, if you
will, prima facie visible whereas other, such as socioeconomic status,
may be less obviously so.
To be fair, both Sander and Lempert appear to argue that socioeco-
nomic status is relatively rather than absolutely invisible. Sander points
out correctly that socioeconomic status is not as inherently visible as
racial status." Yet contrary to Sander's position, socioeconomic and ra-
cial identities may nonetheless end up imposing similar costs on recipi-
ents of admission preferences. Socioeconomic status may be less inher-
ently visible than racial and gender identity and more easily coverable,
but still be visible enough to impose costs on and compromise the expe-
rience of law students of lower class standing.
Lempert explicitly acknowledges that visibility is a relative concept,
noting, "I do not mean to suggest that all differences between lower class
and more privileged law students will be wiped out by a shared elite edu-
cation,"39 but believes that class identity can be "shed" and "blended" to
such a degree as to render it invisible. Lower class graduates, maintains
Lempert, "may not only have already have shifted their attitudes to be
more like those of their more privileged peers but will also have shared
with them many of their most important recent life experiences." 4 0 Not
so, argue Pruitt and Rosser. "My failure to learn more about the law
school scene in advance of becoming part of it is not, mind you, because
36. Studying means of legitimizing power and authority, Bourdieu has identified three forms
of symbolic capital: economic capital (money and property), social capital (social networks) and
cultural capital (cultural competence). Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241-58 (John G. Richardson ed.,
1986). Following Bourdieu, significant financial aid would contribute to the economic capital of
students of lower socioeconomic status, but its impact on social and cultural capital would be more
tenuous. See Fiona M. Kay, The Social Significance of The World's First Women Lawyers, 45
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 419-20 (2007), for a discussion of the expanding use of the Bourdieusian
approach in studies of contemporary law practice.
37. In other words, generous financial aid would likely have little direct impact on one's
social and cultural capital.
38. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
39. Lempert, supra note 11, at 712 n.85.
40. Id. at 712.
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I wasn't ambitious," points out Pruitt; rather, "I didn't know enough to
know what I didn't know."4 1 And Rosser, as if directly responding to
Lempert notes "[b]y the time I entered Yale, I had grown more used to
the wealth of my peer group, but had not yet acquired the set of experi-
ences that is the backdrop for conversations among the elite. I needed to
go to Europe, or so everybody said."4 2
Since the visibility of socioeconomic status is a matter of degree
and its impact on law students no doubt varies across students, law
schools, and contexts, one may be tempted to conclude that ultimately
the question of visibility is an empirical one. To an extent, of course, it
is, although it should be noted that while only limited evidence exists, it
tends to support the claim that socioeconomic status is visible and has a
significant impact on law students and lawyers alike.43 Moreover, if
nothing else, one should question Sander's and Lempert's empirically
unsupported sweeping claims regarding the relative invisibility of socio-
economic status. "No heads will turn," argues Lempert, "if an upper class
white student is out with a student from the bottom of the SES pecking
order . . . . If this example seems trivial, consider that no one has ever
posited a crime of 'driving while lower class."' 44 The examples are any-
thing but trivial. The point is not only that some heads may very well
turn in both expensive restaurants and snobbish elite circles if an upper
class student dated a student from a lower class but also that such inter-
class dating may or may not be very common and should not be assumed
to be commonplace. And while no one may have ever been accused of
"driving while lower class," many law students and lawyers have experi-
enced the feeling of "trying to get an elite job while lower class." 4 5
Second, because aspects of one's identity and certain statuses can
change over time, visibility is a dynamic rather than a static characteris-
tic. Lempert, in particular, is of the belief that the class identity of stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic backgrounds has so changed by the time
they arrive in law school as to render it invisible and meaningless.4
Without a doubt, socioeconomic status can and does change. Rosser, for
example, colorfully explains how he has come to like brie and therefore
has acquired the "the most essential character trait for any aspiring law
41. Pruitt, supra note 26, at 1088.
42. Rosser, supra note 28, at 221.
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. Lempert, supra note 11, at 713.
45. Rosser, supra note 28, at 221. See also Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish
Law Firms, supra note 4, at 1821-25, 1836-42 (discussing the experience of lower socioeconomic
status Jewish lawyers seeking to get hired and promoted by elite Wall Street law firms); THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 144-55 (1991)
(exploring the experience of blue-collar Italian-American lawyers seeking elite positions). See gen-
erally ALFRED LUBRANO, LIMBo-BLUE-COLLAR ROOTS, WHITE-COLLAR DREAMS (2004) (docu-
menting the frustrations of "straddlers," professionals of blue-collar backgrounds who struggle to fit
in the white-collar world).
46. Lempert, supra note I1, at 711-15.
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professor [and lawyer]: I had become comfortable with wealth and privi-
lege." 47 Yet the fact that socioeconomic status is dynamic does not mean
that the hurdles and challenges faced by students (and lawyers) of lower
classes should be overlooked or belittled, and that class passing and cov-
ering should be taken for granted. Moreover, becoming comfortable with
wealth and privilege is very different from attaining, let alone benefiting
from, wealth and privilege.
Finally, Sander points out that the visibility of affirmative action
and admission preferences may be a function not only of the status of
recipients but also of the size of preferences given to them.48 This obser-
vation is related to his controversial "mismatch" hypothesis, pursuant to
which the significant credential gap between recipients and non-
recipients of preferences ends up hurting recipients academically and
subsequently as lawyers. 4 9 Here, Sander merely argues that irrespective
of any possible mismatch effects, the visibility of preferences is likely
going to increase with the size of preferences given. But, of course, the
visibility of preferences is going to increase with their size if and only if
the mismatch hypothesis is correct. Exploring the validity of the mis-
match hypothesis is outside the scope of this Response. Importantly,
however, and regardless of the mismatch hypothesis, socioeconomic
status is not inherently invisible, and therefore, the visibility of socioeco-
nomic status ought to be meaningfully considered in assessing the desir-
ability of class-based affirmative action.
B. The Visibility ofSocial and Cultural Capital
The visibility of socioeconomic status is further evidenced by the
fact that two salient elements of socioeconomic status in play at law
school and upon graduation, "social capital," including the ability to
benefit from existing networks and capacity to effectively build relation-
ships; and "cultural capital," including the possession of confidence and
intellectual self-esteem, are highly visible.so Social capital is a resource
that "exists in the relations among persons."5 It is the sum of the re-
sources that allow a person to accomplish economic and non-economic
47. Rosser, supra note 28, at 220.
48. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
49. Id.; Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1. But see Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon,
Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
649 (2008) (finding only weak empirical support for the mismatch hypothesis).
50. Of course, questions of class, privilege, social capital and cultural capital impact all edu-
cational institutions, not only law schools. See, e.g., Caroline Hodges Persell & Peter W. Cookson,
Jr., Chartering and Bartering: Elite Education and Social Reproduction, 33 Soc. PROBS. 114, 126
(1985); Liz Thomas, Student Retention in Higher Education: The Role ofInstitutional Habitus, 17 J.
EDUC. POL'Y 423, 427 (2002).
51. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. 95,
100-01 (1988) (exploring the use of social capital through demonstrating its effect in the family and
in the community in aiding the formation of human capital).
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goals, achieved through a person's network of relationships. 5 2 This net-
work provides its members with an advantageous credential that arises
from its members' obligations, norms, status, friendships, and esteem
with other members in the network.53 In addition, a person's network,
extended by "friends of friends," connects him with opportunities that
would otherwise not have revealed themselves. 54 This network of rela-
tionships can exist "inter-generationally," within the family, or outside of
it. Outside of the family, social capital "consist[s] of the social relation-
ships that exist among parents, in the closure exhibited by this structure
of relations, and in the parents' relations with the institutions of the
community."5 s
Cultural capital consists of embedded and acquired cultural compe-
tence. It is accumulated through educational accomplishments, travel,
and exposure to a wide of range of experiences, and recognized and re-
flected by one's credentials, personality and conduct. 6 Cultural capital
includes both knowledge, such as mastery of particular subject matters,
language proficiencies, well-roundedness in current affairs, music, the
arts and literature, and the enjoyment of various hobbies; and skills, such
as the development of intellectual self-esteem and confidence, strong
writing capacities, and speaking abilities.57
A significant body of work documents the role of social and cultural
capital in lawyers' careers. Networking social capital, the extent of one's
personal and institutional contacts, is "crucial to advancement within the
52. See Bourdieu, supra note 36, at 249. See generally RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL
HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 8-13 (1992) (discussing how the different types
of capital are invested to create a "profit").
53. See Bourdieu, supra note 36, at 249.
54. See generally JEREMY BOISSEVAIN, FRIENDS OF FRIENDS: NETWORKS, MANIPULATORS
AND COALITIONS 83-96 (1974) (discussing different factors that add to a person's network); Mark S.
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360, 1378 (1973) (demonstrating that weak
connections among groups of people are "indispensable to individuals' opportunities and to their
integration into communities").
55. Coleman, supra note 51, at 113.
56. See Craig Calhoun, Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question ofHistorical Speciicity, in
BOURDIEU: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 70 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 1993); see also NAN LIN,
SOCIAL CAPITAL: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ACTION 14-17 (Mark Granovetter ed.,
2001).
57. Some legal scholars have discussed social and cultural capital, as well as other forms of
capital, in terms of "professional capital." See, e.g., Carole Silver, The Variable Value of US. Legal
Education in the Global Legal Services Market, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3-4 (2011); Nancy J.
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Work-
place Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923, 942 n.59 (2002) ("Professional
assets accrue from a combination of human capital, social capital, and cultural capital and are the
'stuff' from which advancement occurs. Human capital is operationalized as the specific lawyering
skills acquired through both legal education and practice experience. Social capital consists of indi-
viduals' ability to draw on relationship networks for establishing support. Although this network may
initially consist of other lawyers in the firm, it may then expand to lawyers in the community and, in
turn, expand to the acquisition of clients. Theorists such as Bourdieu suggest that success in careers
results from the accumulation of these forms of capital.").
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firm,"5 8 increases the likelihood of partnership, 59 and relates to the likeli-
hood of working in more prestigious fields of law, 6 0 leading to higher
earnings.61 On the other hand, limited social capital is identified as a
cause of inequality.62 Similarly, cultural capital has been shown to be an
important and necessary asset for those who seek promotion to partner-
ship, and its concentration in the partnership ranks to produce a structural
transformation and a new stratification of the legal profession, meaning
that those who possess limited cultural capital end up facing an addi-
tional hurdle on their quest for promotion and equality.6 3
Importantly, social and cultural capital also play a significant and
visible role in one's legal education. Lucille Jewel has shown that "stu-
dents who come to legal education with amassed cultural and social capi-
tal are more likely to attend better law schools and achieve higher grades
in law school than students who lack the same amount of cultural and
social capital," concluding that "the level of status and prestige that one
can attain in the practice of law is related to law school status and law
school performance, which are, in turn, related to cultural capital advan-
tages."64 Similarly, Timothy Clydesdale has demonstrated that while
black students have the highest levels of self-confidence upon entering
law school, "they report the lowest level of social capital (i.e., fewest
lawyers in the family) and describe nearly twice as many experiences of
race discrimination during law school as any other minority group."65 In
contrast, "[w]hite American law students have the highest social capi-
tal."66 Clydesdale points out that "[a]ll minority law students . . . have
consistently lower [first-year] GPAs . . . than their white classmates,"6 7
58. Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Cultivating Clients in the Competition for Partnership:
Gender and the Organizational Restructuring of Law Firms in the 1990s, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
517, 542 (1999);
59. See Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Raising the Bar: The Gender Stratification ofLaw-Firm
Capital, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 728, 737 (1998); see also Ronit Dinovitzer, Social Capital and Con-
straints on Legal Careers, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 445, 445-47, 451-52 (2006); Bryant G. Garth &
Joyce Sterling, Exploring Inequality in the Corporate Law Firm Apprenticeship: Doing the Time,
Finding the Love, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1361, 1368 (2009).
60. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL. URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
69 (2005).
61. See John Hagan, The Gender Stratification ofIncome Inequality Among Lawyers, 68 Soc.
FORCES 835, 837 (1990); Jo Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex,
Sector and Salary, 29 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 381, 382 (1995).
62. David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The Role ofPublic Service in the Careers
of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1, 27 (2004) (arguing that for black lawyers, a lack
of social capital in the form of elite networks maintains or reinforces their disadvantage in the pro-
fession).
63. See John Hagan et al., Cultural Capital, Gender and the Structural Transformation of
Legal Practice, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239, 239-44 (1991).
64. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2008).
65. Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward Understand-
ing Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 711, 727-32 (2004).
66. Id. at 732.
67. Id. at 736-37.
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speculating that "[slomething intrinsic to the structure or process of legal
education affects the grades of all minorities; [law school first-year] GPA
differences are not explained by differences in academic ability . . . dif-
1168ferences in entrance factors ... or first-year experiences ....
Of course, to an extent, success at law school is a function of merit.
Performance on law school examinations has to do with the ability to
comprehend and analyze a large body of case law, statutes, and secon-
dary materials, and demonstrate critical thinking and effective writing
skills.6 9 It also, however, has a lot to do with possessing social capital
including the ability to network, and cultural capital, including conduct-
ing oneself with confidence and self-esteem. Doing well in law school
requires not only listening to but also understanding professors, their
lingo, and cultural frames of reference. It requires the confidence to
speak up, the ability to take criticisms, even in modified Socratic ways,
constructively, and a thick skin. It requires familiarity and the ability to
deal effectively with a stressful, highly competitive environment, which
puts an emphasis on strong individualism. It requires some sophistica-
tion: in knowing how to interact with law professors to secure mentors,
in knowing to apply for law review, and in seeking and securing extra-
curricular opportunities and activities.70 In short, it requires a healthy
dose of social capital, including proficient networking, and cultural capi-
tal, including self-esteem.n
To be sure, social capital, for example, the ability to network, and
cultural capital, for example, acting confidently showcasing self-esteem,
are not uniquely possessed by the affluent, nor are they binary qualities
one either possesses or not. Rather, social and cultural capital are com-
plex multifaceted phenomena, which some possess more than others. But
it would be imprudent to underestimate the impact of high socioeco-
nomic status on law school performance, and ignore the fact that affluent
students are more likely to possess greater social and cultural capital than
68. Id. at 737; cf Garth & Sterling, supra note 59, at 1365-66, 1393 (suggesting that over
time law school prestige will tend to matter less for large law firm hiring decisions); David Wilkins
et al., Urban Law Schools Graduates in Large Law Firms, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 433, 442 (2007)
(showing that outsider graduates, even of elite law schools, found employment in large law firms
only when they had the appropriate social capital).
69. Critical scholars have compellingly deconstructed the notion of objective merit and ex-
posed its inherent reliance on social and cultural factors. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The
Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-58 (1996).
70. Cf Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education is Failing Women, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 391-92 (2006) (exploring the experience of female law students at Yale Law
School, and specifically investigating why female students, with similar credentials to their male
counterparts, participate less in class discussion and are less likely to form professionally beneficial
relationships with faculty members).
71. Some argue that merit and social capital are so inherently intertwined that it is impossible
to understand one without the other, that is, that defining and assessing "merit" by some set of so-
called objective criteria without exploring it in context is misleading and undesirable. See, e.g.,
Margaret Y. K. Woo, Reaffirming Merit in Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 514, 515 (1997)
(arguing that merit analysis must include considerations such as motivation, maturity and persever-
ance).
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their lower socioeconomic counterparts, and take advantage of their so-
cioeconomic status both while in law school and following graduation.
Those who have been groomed since birth-via prep schools, private
schools, and elite private education-to acquire cultural capital, to be
confident, and to possess social capital, to network effectively, are sim-
ply more likely to do better in law school. Indeed, it is precisely because
social and cultural capital are so visible that students of higher socioeco-
nomic class are well positioned to do better than their less affluent coun-
terparts. Law school and law practice, or at least elite law schools and
elite law practice, implicitly but inherently build on social capital and
networking, as well as on cultural capital and self-esteem, in many fun-
72damental and complex ways.
That is not to say, of course, that law students of lower socioeco-
nomic status who are less likely to be endowed with cultural and social
capital cannot and do not do very well getting into and succeeding in law
school. Deborah Malamud demonstrates the risk of exaggerating the im-
pact of cultural capital on soft entrance variables employed by admission
officers at law schools. On the one hand, the possession of cultural
capital, for example, access to "interesting" life experiences, and of so-
cial capital, such as having family contacts who can provide "interesting"
job leads, is likely to render an affluent candidate more appealing than a
lower class candidate in terms of soft entrance variables.74 On the other
hand, suggests Malamud, admission officers may be impressed by "up
from adversity" stories which candidates of lower socioeconomic status
are more likely to be able to tell.75 Once in law school, students from
lower class backgrounds who do not have as much cultural and social
capital may be at a disadvantage compared to their affluent counterparts,
but may be able to somewhat compensate for that by featuring strong
72. Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of Structuring
Legal Careers, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1, 10 (2007) ("[S]chools are a key site through which students
acquire their professional expectations-schools thereby play a critical role in the reproduction of
social stratification, with students not merely acquiring the skills they require for professional life,
but perhaps more trenchant, adapting to the dispositions necessary for the professional roles they are
destined to take. This can be achieved because schools are themselves embedded in the reproduction
of students' social origins: the prestige of the school that individuals attend is itself a function of their
social class, so that in bestowing degrees and credentials, schools confirm and reaffirm students'
anticipated status within the profession. Research on law schools .. . indeed establishes that these are
key sites in the development of students' expectations and aspirations." (citation omitted)); Rebecca
L. Sandefur, Staying Power: The Persistence of Social Inequality in Shaping Lawyer Stratification
and Lawyers' Persistence in the Profession, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2007) ("Professional
degrees play an important role in social mobility and in the social reproduction of the American
upper-middle class."); see also DEBRA J. SCHLEEF, MANAGING ELITES: PROFESSIONAL
SOCIALIZATION IN LAW AND BUSINESS SCHOOLS 44 (2006). See generally David B. Bills, Creden-
tials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship between Schooling and Job Assignment, 73
REV. OF EDUC. RES. 441 (2003).
73. Malamud, supra note 6, at 742-22.
74. Id. at 743.
75. Id.
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work ethic and personal drive.76 Moreover, while students of lower so-
cioeconomic status may be less likely to have access to interesting jobs
and have limited life experiences of the sort that matter in law school,
they are certainly not clueless.n
The experience of Jewish male law students, the first minority
group to enter the legal profession in relatively large numbers, is reveal-
ing regarding the inherent importance of socioeconomic status on legal
education and law practice. Once discriminatory quotas fell, Jewish male
law students began to attend elite law schools in large numbers. As I
have discussed elsewhere in detail, some Jewish law students, mostly of
German descent, were able to pass or cover as WASPs, demonstrating
the "requisite" cultural capital, and rose to the top of their classes.7 9 As
importantly, what many poor Jewish students of Eastern European de-
scent lacked in visible cultural capital, they made up in personal drive,
self-esteem, and networking. While these students could not pass or
cover for WASP students, they built on a long tradition of learning and
excellence to rise to the top of their classes, and they relied on a signifi-
cant number of Jewish lawyers in the lower spheres of the profession for
necessary networking.80
Still, upon graduation, many Jewish students in the top of their
classes were not hired by elite WASP Wall Street law firms. And while
one might be tempted to think of such discrimination as simply based on
ethnoreligious grounds, the discrimination had significant socioeconomic
and class roots. The elite law firms of the day did not hire Jewish law
students who otherwise met their merit criteria exactly because these
students did not fit their elite socioeconomic and cultural WASP status.8 1
The experience of Jewish male law students thus demonstrates that social
and cultural capital is highly visible both in law school and in law prac-
tice and is hard to cover, and that aspects of socioeconomic status, such
as social capital, including effective networking, and cultural capital,
including the possession of self-esteem, are inherent to one's success as a
law student and as a lawyer.
In sum, if the history of legal education and of the legal profession
teaches us something, it is that socioeconomic status, social capital, and
cultural capital play an inherently integral role in determining one's pro-
fessional fate. In particular, one's socioeconomic status plays an impor-
tant role in determining the quality of one's legal education. And not
76. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 45, at 127-64 (arguing that blue-collar lawyers feature a
particularly strong work ethic).
77. Pruitt, supra note 26, at 1086-88.
78. Wald, The Rise and Fall ofthe WASP and Jewish Law Firms, supra note 4, at 1837.
79. Id. at 1812.
80. Id at 1837-39, 1852; Eli Wald, The Rise ofthe Jewish Law Firm or Is the Jewish Law
Firm Generic?, 76 UMKC L. REv. 885, 928 (2008).
81. Wald, supra note 4, at 1813-25; Wald, supra note 80, at 918-25.
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only are socioeconomic status, social capital, and cultural capital tre-
mendously important to one's legal education and legal career, they are
highly visible and hard to cover.82
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF VISIBILITY: SOCIOECONOMIC AND RACIAL
PREFERENCES REEXAMINED
Sander argues that the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences is
desirable, both because recipients of preferences would likely not know
that they received preference and therefore would not come to doubt
their own intellectual self-esteem, and because recipients would not be
visible to others and therefore would not suffer stigmatization or become
targets of resentment. 83 Because socioeconomic status is visible and be-
cause students of lower socioeconomic status are unlikely to be able to
pass or completely cover it, the purported benefits Sander attributes to
the invisibility of socioeconomic statues are misguided.
The visibility of racial preferences has led to what some have called
the costs of affirmative action. The literature argues that recipients of
racial preferences sometimes experience self-doubt and low self-
esteem.84 In the law school context, knowing that their classmates have
performed better than they have in college and on the LSAT might cause
recipients of preferences feelings of insecurity, and lead to self-
segregation, which in turn impact and compromise the educational expe-
rience at law school.85 Moreover, recipients of racial preferences some-
times experience bias, stereotyping, and resentment as some law profes-
sors and classmates assume that recipients of racial preferences only got
into law school because of their race, and experience similar bias and
stereotyping again when applying for a job.86 The bias further hurts self-
82. Sander and Lempert are not alone in failing to notice and explore the consequences of the
visibility of socioeconomic status. Kenji Yoshino, who popularized the terms passing and covering,
has been criticized for failing to explore class and privilege as aspects of identity that people often
attempt to cover. See Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1294-96 (2007).
83. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
84. JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 229
(2000) (noting that affirmative action "creates private doubt," depriving its recipients of "the unal-
loyed sense of personal, individual responsibility for their accomplishments").
85. See, e.g., John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IowA L. REV. 313, 331 (1994) ("Affirmative action is
wrong because its beneficiaries, by definition, cannot meet the standards and cannot do the work.");
Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 856 (1997) ("Some
critics of affirmative action argue that its pervasiveness has caused successful minorities to suffer a
stigma: the belief that minority achievements are the result of affirmative action, not individual
merit."). Others, however, have discounted the impact of stigma on recipients of affirmative action.
See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1986); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY. JR., NOT ALL BLACK
AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES 81 (1996) ("[A]ffirmative action has a
cost ... [and] part of the cost is the risk of stigma ... [however,] the stigma I may suffer is a small
price compared to the price I would pay if I faced closed doors .... ).
86. In his autobiography, Justice Clarence Thomas described the process of his job search
after law school as humiliating, having experienced the stigma and bias of affirmative action first
hand. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 86-87 (2007).
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esteem, an inherent component for success in law school and law prac-
tice, and feeds into the insecurity of racial minority students. This vicious
cycle tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: competent students who
are put down and experience a biased legal education end up not per-
forming as well, supposedly "proving" the biased assumptions of racial
preference.
To the extent that the costs of affirmative action impose harm on its
beneficiaries, the visibility of socioeconomic status and the relative lack
of social and cultural capital, are likely to result in a similar effect on
students of lower socioeconomic status.87 Once it becomes common
knowledge that law schools are granting socioeconomic preferences,88
the visibility of socioeconomic status will likely reveal the identity of
preference recipients, causing them self-doubt and making them likely
targets of bias and stereotyping. Therefore, Sander is mistaken in sug-
gesting that socioeconomic preferences are going to be superior to racial
preferences in the sense of not imposing the costs of affirmative action.
Indeed, in some ways the visibility of socioeconomic preferences
may be harder to overcome than the visibility of racial preferences. If
Sander is right that racial preferences tend to benefit racial minorities of
higher socioeconomic status," then once matriculated, such racial mi-
norities are more likely to possess the self-esteem and networking skills
necessary for success in law school, at least relative to minorities and
other students of lower socioeconomic status. To be clear, all beneficiar-
ies of affirmative action face significant bias and stereotyping challenges,
yet, nonetheless, racial minorities of higher socioeconomic status are
actually likely to possess the social and cultural capital necessary for
attaining success in law school. Students of lower socioeconomic status,
however, will not only face the devastating stigma, bias, and stereotyping
of affirmative action, they are also more likely to actually not possess the
requisite social and cultural capital so essential for professional success.
Moreover, lower socioeconomic status may frustrate class-based af-
firmative action efforts in yet another way less applicable to racial-based
87. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735 ("Sander should acknowledge that very-low-SES students
might well experience some of the down-sides he insists accompany race-based affirmative ac-
tion.").
88. Sander suggests that students benefiting from socioeconomic preference may not be aware
that they received such a preference. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at
666. This suggestion is naive: public universities that would implement class-based affirmative
action in conjunction with their admissions policies would be subject to regulations requiring them
to disclose their admission policies. Moreover, as noted by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Gratz
v. Bollinger, "If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed
College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods,
and disguises." 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 655. But see Deborah C.
Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939,
988-97 (1997) (arguing that alternatives to racial-based affirmative action are unattractive even if
such policies tend to benefit minorities of higher socioeconomic status).
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affirmative action. Two recent trends make students of lower socioeco-
nomic status less likely to apply to law school or enroll even if admitted.
First, law school education, both private and public, has become signifi-
cantly more expensive, in real dollars, over the last fifteen years. 90 This
of course impacts all law students, but constitutes a more significant hur-
dle for students of lower socioeconomic status. Second, the economic
downturn accelerated ongoing trends that make it harder to find a job
after graduating from law school, and even harder to find a well-paying
position that could help address mounting student loans.91 The combined
effect of both trends has been a perceived decline in the value of legal
education, at least in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, with some arguing
that legal education is simply not worth its cost. 9 2
The perceived decline of the value of legal education impacts all
prospective and current law students, as well as practicing attorneys. Yet,
it may have an additional negative impact on prospective students of
lower socioeconomic status. In America, "law is king,"9 3 opined Thomas
Paine, lawyers are the aristocracy, 94 the high priests of a civic religion,95
and members of the ruling class,96 at least in terms of social and cultural
status. This perspective, however, is more likely to be shared by affluent
Americans hailing from higher socioeconomic classes. Therefore, even if
legal education is becoming a less attractive cost-benefit proposition,
such analysis is more likely to deter students of lower socioeconomic
status who cannot afford to pay for it, and less likely to deter students of
affluent backgrounds, who not only can afford to pay the higher costs,
but also apply to law school for reasons other than cost-benefit analy-
sis-the pursuit of an elevated social and cultural status as members. of
90. Denis Binder, The Changing Paradigm in Public Legal Education, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
1, 10-15 (2006) (documenting the law school tuition "explosion"); John A. Sebert, The Cost and
Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516, 516-19 (2002); William K.S. Wang, The
Restructuring of Legal Education Along Functional Lines, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 331, 333
(2008) (summarizing available data on law school tuition increases).
91. Eli Wald, Foreword, The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2051, 2051-52 (2010). William Henderson has documented the distribution of lawyers' start-
ing salaries, concluding, "For many, getting a JD is a very risky financial proposition . . . ." Bill
Henderson, Distribution of 2006 Starting Salaries: Best Graphic Chart of the Year, EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, (Sept. 4, 2007, 3:29 PM), http://www.elsblog.org/the empirical legalstudi/2007/
09/distribution-of.html.
92. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2011, at
BUI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?src=me&ref-general.
93. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 45, 98 (Isaac Kramnic ed., Penguin Classics 1986)
(1776).
94. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 302-11 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Libr. of Am. 2004) (1835) (analyzing the practice of law in the United States and discussing the
integral role played by the law and lawyers in American society).
95. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of
New York City Lawyers, 1879-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 51, 51-57 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (exploring the elevated role and status of lawyers
in American society).
96. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America 's Governing Class: The Formation and Dis-
solution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381, 383 (2001).
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the legal profession. This, to be sure, is not because students of lower
socioeconomic status have different dreams and aspirations than more
affluent students, but rather because in the real world the former may not
be able to pursue such dreams when their cost-benefit value is declining.
The consequences of the visibility of socioeconomic status cannot
be overstated. If students of lower socioeconomic status are less likely to
apply to law school to begin with, are less likely to enroll even if admit-
ted, are likely to do worse in law school and in law practice relative to
more affluent law students because they do not possess the same social
capital, networking capabilities, cultural capital, and intellectual self-
esteem, then simply administrating socioeconomic affirmative action will
be irresponsible on the part of law schools. This by no means suggests
that law schools should abandon their commitment to diversity and,
when appropriate, to affirmative action. Rather, it suggests that true
commitment to diversity, class diversity included, means that law
schools should do more than simply extend offers of admission to stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status. Social capital skills could be taught
while in law school, and law schools should explicitly and proactively
help students who do not possess these skills to acquire them. Cultural
capital might present more of a challenge, but true commitment to diver-
sity requires law schools to do whatever they can to assist their students
to acquire it.
Interestingly enough, Sander himself has previously made argu-
ments along this very line of reasoning.97 Exploring the costs affirmative
action imposes on black law students, Sander has elsewhere argued that
"[t]he net trade-off of higher prestige but weaker academic performance
substantially harms black performance on bar exams and harms most
new black lawyers on the job market."98 The very same argument would
be applicable to recipients of socioeconomic preferences who would end
up in higher prestige law schools and would likely end up with weaker
academic performance compared with their more affluent counterparts.
Sander might counter that because class-based affirmative action would
require smaller preferences, recipients of lower socioeconomic standing
would not experience a significant a mismatch,99 yet his mismatch hy-
pothesis is controversial and unproven.
Questioning the mismatch hypothesis in the context of the trade-off
between law school prestige and academic performance, David Wilkins
has argued that:
[I]t is precisely because these [affirmative action] policies have been
so successful that for the first time blacks with high grades from
97. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1, at 371-72, 478.
98. Id. at 371-72.
99. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 666.
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lower-status schools have a plausible chance of gaining entry into
high-paying positions in the legal profession. These tentative gains,
however, are unlikely to continue if the number of black graduates
from highly ranked schools were to decline dramatically. 00
This is because the network effects, that is, social capital, of attending
high-status law schools continued to advance the careers of black law-
yers who were "rollin' on the river" of the prestige benefits of those insti-
tutions for many years after graduation. 0'
Regardless of the relative importance of school prestige and aca-
demic performance, Sander's concern with the impact of poor academic
performance on the careers of recipients of affirmative action highlights
the need to pay close attention to the factors that impact academic per-
formance, including social capital, networking, cultural capital, and intel-
lectual self-esteem. Ironically, both academic performance and law
school prestige are not only products of social and cultural capital, but
upon graduation, become elements of one's social and cultural capital.
While Sander and his critics have debated the latter aspects of social
capital, Sander fails to notice the former-that academic performance in
law school is very much a product of the visible aspects of socioeco-
nomic status and social and cultural capital, including networking and
intellectual self-esteem.
Visible affirmative action policies, race-based and class-based alike,
impose costs on recipients of preferences, as well as on non-recipients.
While Sander believes that class-based preferences are likely to be less
costly than race-based preferences, the visibility of socioeconomic status,
the relative lack of social and cultural capital, and the perceived decline
in the value of legal education suggest quite the opposite, that is, that
socioeconomic preferences are likely to be as costly, if not more expen-
sive (once factoring in the cost of increased financial aid), than race-
based preferences. Put differently, Sander is wrong to assert that admin-
istering class-based preferences is going to be cheaper than implement-
ing race-based affirmative action. Yet, as we shall see, the visibility and
cost of class and racial preferences is not a reason to abandon class-based
diversity, or race-based preferences, because the benefits of diversity, for
both recipient and society, may easily outweigh the costs.
100. David B. Wilkins, Response, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Re-
sponse to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2005).
101. See David B. Wilkins, Rollin' on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Para-
dox, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 527, 554 (2000).
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III. VISIBILITY AND CLASS DIVERSITY
A. The Questionable Desirability ofInvisibility
In touting the invisibility of socioeconomic preferences as an advan-
tage relative to the visibility of racial preferences, Sander makes a ques-
tionable assumption: that invisibility, passing, and covering are inher-
ently desirable. Specifically, Sander believes that because recipients of
socioeconomic preferences would not be visible to others, they would
not suffer stigmatization or become targets of bias and stereotyping.102
Lempert similarly argues that students of lower socioeconomic status
will generally seek to blend into the crowd and shed their class identity,
and that such invisibility would be desirable, signifying progress and
upward mobility.10 3
If racial minorities could pass or cover and avoid some of the costs
of affirmative action, perhaps some would choose to do so. And if socio-
economic status was invisible or completely coverable perhaps some
students of lower socioeconomic status would choose to avoid the
stigma, bias, stereotyping, and self-doubt that comes with preferences
and affirmative action. Yet, it is noteworthy that invisibility, just like
passing and covering, is not inherently either desirable or undesirable.' 0 4
Some people, in some circumstances, may choose to pass, cover, or be
invisible, while others would not. For some, the cost of passing, cover-
ing, or being invisible may be too high a price to pay to avoid the conse-
quences of preferences. One may be proud of her background, of her
parents and of her circumstances and not wish to remain silent about
them. To be clear, passing, that is, remaining invisible, and covering are
legitimate choices. Yet, while remaining invisible has its benefits, suc-
cessful passing and covering entails significant costs that some may find
too high to incur.
Once again, the experience of Jewish male lawyers is instructive in
this regard: Once admitted to elite law schools, some Jewish students
who were able to pass as WASPs or cover their Jewish identity, chose to
do so and accepted positions in elite Wall Street firms.105 To these Jewish
lawyers, the costs of passing and covering were outweighed by the prom-
ise of an otherwise well-deserved career path at the elite firms. Impor-
tantly, however, others chose to embrace their Jewish identity, accepted
the prevailing discriminatory hiring and promotion realities at the WASP
102. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 665-67.
103. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711-15.
104. Interestingly, Yoshino, although popularizing the ideas of "passing" and "covering,"
missed this very point, assuming that passing and covering are always coerced and therefore unde-
sirable. Horwitz, supra note 82, at 1284, 1294; see also Dinovitzer, supra note 59, at 445 (arguing
that social capital is not inherently positive or negative).
105. Wald, supra note 4, at 1836-39.
88 1
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
firms, and opted to practice with the emerging Jewish law firms.106 For
those who can pass or cover, the choice of whether to remain or become
invisible is far from obvious.
Indeed, the complexity of assessing the desirability of invisibility is
revealed even in instances where the minority group in question does not
have the option of passing and covering, and is forced to visibility. A
rich body of literature examining the experience of women law students
in legal education reveals that some women experience law school as a
male-designed institution, causing them to feel alienated, isolated, and
silenced, and pushing them to become, in meaningful ways, "gentlemen"
as a condition precedent for becoming lawyers. 0 7 Other women, on the
other hand, perceive law school as a meritocratic institution, thrive in it,
and report an enriching and fulfilling educational experience.
Would alienated female law students choose to pass and cover for
men law students if they could? Some would. Indeed, some women law
students report that in order to succeed in law school they attempt to
cover perceived undesirable feminine characteristics. Other women
strongly oppose covering, seeing it as a coercive measure, exactly the
one that causes them to be disillusioned with law school and law prac-
tice. To them, the appropriate response to prevailing male-designed fea-
tures of law school is reform of legal education, not coerced gender cov-
ering.o108
Visibility, as we have seen, is a relative characteristic, with some
identities, for example, gender and racial, being more inherently visible
and harder to cover than others, such as class. From the perspective of
students of all identities and statuses, a decision to remain or seek invisi-
bility is as legitimate as a choice to embrace visibility. Law schools must
embrace both postures-visibility and invisibility-as legitimate, and, in
106. Wald, supra note 80, at 923 (documenting the choice of some Jewish lawyers to opt out of
competing for a position with the elite WASP firms).
107. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 28-29 (1997); Bashi & Iskander, supra note 70, at 391-92, 403, 409 ("De-
spite gender parity in entering J.D. classes, law schools are not adequately preparing female law
students for success .... As individuals, law school professors treat women differently from men,
and as institutions, law schools cultivate and reward pattems of behavior that are more likely to be
found among men than among women . . . ."); Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to Be Human in This
Place": The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 166-70 (1998)
(analyzing the experience women were having in law school and how their conscious career paths
may affect their experiences); Beth Goldstein, Little Brown Spots on the Notebook Paper: Women as
Law School Students, 84 KY. LJ. 983, 1004-07 (1996) (presenting the narrative experiences of
sixteen women involved in law school retention programs); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentle-
men: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994); Cath-
erine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299,
1299-1302 (1998) (discussing the experiences of women law students in the 1980s and examining
the premise that "women experience law school differently" than men).
108. See Eli Wald et al., Looking Beyond Gender: Women's Experience at Law School 41
(Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research Series, Working Paper No. 11-04, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1757882.
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particular, should not assume and encourage passing and covering, and
should not consider invisibility, when possible, desirable. Yet students'
choices regarding visibility have a significant impact on law schools'
institutional perspective and approach to diversity.
B. Visibility, Invisibility, and Class Diversity
While law schools should honor the choices of some students to
pass and cover, they should also be prepared to support the educational
experience of those who cannot avoid visibility and of those who choose
visibility over invisibility. Indeed, true commitment to diversity in legal
education must mean more than simply admitting a diverse class of stu-
dents and relying on the invisibility of the diverse group to lower the
costs of affirmative action and diversity. To be sure, admitting a diverse
class is a very important first step. The past exclusion of ethnoreligious,
gender, and racial minorities and the current exclusion of socioeconomic
minorities reminds us that diversity in admission decisions is not to be
taken for granted. Law schools, however, must remain committed to di-
versity even after they make admission decisions,1 0 9 and, in particular,
assist their students in building and acquiring social and cultural capital.
They must support and enhance the educational experience of all of their
students, those who fully participate in legal education as it stands today,
those who choose to pass for or cover aspects of their identity, and those
who reject passing and covering or cannot pass and cover and are visible
in ways that may hinder the quality of their legal education.
Moreover, even as they respect the choice of some of their students
to pass and cover, law schools (and Professors Sander and Lempert) must
bear in mind that invisibility, passing, and covering contradicts, in mean-
ingful ways, the very essence of diversity and of affirmative action ef-
forts meant to enhance it. If the concept of racial, gender, and socioeco-
nomic preferences in law schools' admissions policies is, at least in part,
to promote the diversity of the viewpoints, backgrounds, and life per-
spectives of the students who compose a class, then invisibility would
work directly to undermine that underlying goal.'lo
Sander's contention that the invisibility of socioeconomic status is
desirable is therefore mistaken for two reasons. First, it trivializes and
usurps an important decision facing minority students. While some mi-
nority students may choose to remain invisible, pass, or cover, others
may wish to bear the costs of visibility so they can celebrate its benefits.
109. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Retaining Diversity in the Classroom: Strategies for
Maximizing the Benefits that Flow from A Diverse Student Body, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 663, 703 (2008)
(exploring strategies for effective incorporation of and retention of diversity in law schools beyond
the admission stage).
110. Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination and Equality in the Legal Profession or
Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2011) (explor-
ing various justifications for diversity applicable to lawyers and the legal profession).
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Assuming or encouraging invisibility is, therefore, both inappropriate
and undesirable. Second, invisibility and successful passing and covering
inherently undermines diversity and affirmative action measures meant
to promote it by silencing the very plurality and richness of perspectives
diversity is supposed to promote. While law schools certainly should not
encourage visibility nor push minority students into playing the "model
minority" role in order to foster to goals of diversity, treating invisibility
as desirable on the ground that it may reduce the costs of affirmative
action might end up sustaining affirmative action while undermining the
very diversity of opinions it is meant to achieve.
If socioeconomic status was invisible or completely coverable, and
if students of lower socioeconomic standing would all choose to cover
their class identity, then Lempert would arguably be more persuasive in
asserting that "[w]hen it comes to contributing to diversity within law
schools . . . class-based affirmative action may add little of value." 11 But
class identity is not completely coverable, and even if it was, some stu-
dents of lower socioeconomic status would legitimately choose not to
cover their identity. As a result, class diversity may be of significant
value at law schools.
Consider the following example. A student from a lower socioeco-
nomic class expresses his or her views about the relationship between
corporate bailouts and public welfare. Assuming invisibility or success-
ful passing or covering, no one would necessarily be aware that his or her
perspective is at least partly informed by having been brought up on food
stamps. As a result, the student's views might be dismissed by class-
mates as knee-jerk liberalism, and might hold less weight or credibility
than they would if people knew that the student was poor, and that his or
her views were informed by intimate familiarity with public welfare pro-
grams.l12
111. Lempert, supra note 11, at 711.
112. I thank my colleague Alan Chen for suggesting this example. See also Angela Onwuachi-
Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What's in a Definition?, 88
DENv. U. L. REV. 807, 825 (2011) (criticizing Sander's characterization of invisibility as desirable
and noting that "[b]ecause [a] low-SES, white student could remain invisible, his classmates never
had the opportunity to learn from him . . ."); Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why
Affirmative Action Needs Race & Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751, 782 n.180 (2011)
("Sander also touts the invisibility of SES preferences. I am not sure if those who lived in the type of
poverty that Sander's SES preferences are designed to help would necessarily agree." (internal
citations omitted)).
Lempert does concede that "some students from lower class backgrounds with elite un-
dergraduate educations make distinct contributions to a law school's education environment which
students from more advantaged backgrounds could not or would not make"; howewer, Lempert "still
maintain[s] that with respect to diversity standpoint an elite law school is likely to get fewer benefits
from admitting more lower SES students than one might expect." Lempert, supra note 11, at 712
n.85. As is likely obvious by now, I believe Lempert underestimates the value of class diversity.
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As Justice O'Connor wrote in describing the University of Michi-
gan Law School's affirmative action plan in Grutter v. Bollinger 13 :
The policy aspires to "achieve that diversity which has the potential
to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class
stronger than the sum of its parts." The policy does not restrict the
types of diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight" in
the admissions process, but instead recognizes "many possible bases
for diversity admissions." The policy does, however, reaffirm the
Law School's longstanding commitment to "one particular type of di-
versity," that is, "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to
the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native
Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented
in our student body in meaningful numbers." By enrolling a "'criti-
cal mass' of [underrepresented] minority students, " the Law School
seeks to "ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the
character of the Law School." "14
The Michigan Law School's program and the Court's decision in
Grutter thoroughly embrace the notion that the goal of diversity is not
simply the demographic composition of the entering class, but the holis-
tic enhancement of all students' education by the introduction of perspec-
tives from across the universe of the human experience. Invisibility,
passing, and covering would not necessarily mask the perspectives (al-
though they might), but they would certainly cover the origins of those
perspectives in ways that would undermine the very goal of socioeco-
nomic affirmative action.
Lempert suggests that a good test for measuring the value of diver-
sity in legal education is to assess the scope and quality of extracurricular
activities that exist in law schools." 5 Reporting that Michigan Law
School "has never started a low SES law journal, nor have there been
groups organized along SES lines to invite speakers to the law school or
to ask for the creation of new courses," 1 6 and that he cannot "recall ever
hearing a non-minority student explicitly reference a personal experience
associated with his family's poverty or low SES,"'1 7 Lempert concludes
that class diversity is likely to add little value to legal education. While
assessing extracurricular activities is a plausible measure of the value of
diversity, Lempert's anecdotal observations are subject to serious ques-
tion. As Deborah Malamud points out, "having been homeless, having
been dependent on welfare, having parents who neither valued education
... nor encouraged it ... differences of these kind . . . can be a source of
113. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
114. Id. at 315-16 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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significant embarrassment for students from lower-SES backgrounds."" 8
Rather than suggesting that class diversity has little value, Lempert's
observations may show instead that students of lower socioeconomic
status were covering their class identities. A plausible approach might be
not to abandon class diversity but rather to make legal education more
supportive and welcoming to students of lower socioeconomic status
such that some may choose visibility over invisibility and enrich the edu-
cational experience of all students.
Lempert further believes that the invisibility of socioeconomic
status and the desirability of such invisibility render class diversity of
little value to social contributions beyond law school. He argues that "[i]t
is doubtful whether elite law school graduates from lower SES back-
grounds would show a .. . disproportionate tendency to serve people like
them.""l9 Lempert offers no support for this speculation and appears to
invoke a narrow construction of "giving back."1 2 0 Diversity, especially
within the legal profession, is justified on the ground that it is closely
aligned with equality.' 2 1 Fundamentally, diversity initiatives embody
an effort to overcome bias, address discrimination, and pursue equal-
ity, all core values of the legal profession and the rule of law. "The
United States occupies a special place among the nations of the world
because of its commitment to equality, broad political participation,
social mobility, and political representation of groups that lack politi-
cal clout and/or ancestral power," noted the American Bar Associa-
tion, explaining the "democracy rationale" of diversity, and pointed
out that "[w]ithout a diverse bench and bar, the rule of law is weak-
ened as the people see and come to distrust their exclusion from
mechanisms of justice." 122
Next, diversity is intimately related to access to lawyers and jus-
tice and to the quality of representation of the under-privileged. It is
not the case, of course, that only minorities or lawyers of lower socio-
economic background can or should represent other minorities or
lower class clients. Nonetheless, ample research suggests that empa-
thetic lawyers who actively listen to their clients, as opposed to imput-
ing to them generic goals, in part because they do not understand
their clients, their goals, their backgrounds, and their ways of reason-
ing, offer more effective representation.123 And while all lawyers, irre-
spective of their identities, could do their jobs effectively, a diverse
bar, class diversity included, is more likely to be able to meet and be
118. Malamud, supra note 6, at 735.
119. Lempert, supra note 11, at 714.
120. Id. at 713.
121. Wald, supra note I10 at 1101.
122. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS (Apr. 2010) at 9.
123. See generally William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991); Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and There-
fore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747 (2008).
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perceived as able to meet the goals of access to lawyers, justice, and
effective representation.124
Finally, as I argued elsewhere, "law not only means effective access
to lawyers, and through them to equity, justice, and first-class citizen-
ship, but also access to upward social mobility and key leadership posi-
tions because in the United States, political leaders are often drawn from
the ranks of the legal profession."1 25 Moreover, "[t]his understanding of
the role of diversity reframes and expands it from one that is focused on
the needs of minority communities, to an account that re-envisions op-
portunities for minority lawyers as leaders within the profession and so-
ciety."1 2 6 As importantly, it also questions simplistic measures of the
value of diversity which focus on whether minority lawyers (racial and
class minorities alike) directly serve minority communities.127 Because
socioeconomic status is not invisible, class diversity, especially within
the legal profession, may be of great value. Law schools and the legal
profession ought to pursue it, alongside other types of diversity, and act
proactively to make legal environments more welcoming and supportive
of visible class identity.
CONCLUSION
In Class in American Legal Education, Sander argues, passionately
and compellingly, that law schools should not simply employ the rhetoric
of diversity, but should pursue it vigorously, and should promote diver-
sity of all sorts, not only racial diversity.1 2 8 When it comes to racial di-
versity, Sander maintains that it is not enough for law schools to simply
admit students of color, if the result is that many fail to graduate or pass
the bar exam and do poorly as lawyers after graduation.129
It is at this junction that Sander begins to pursue a less persuasive
line of reasoning. Sander believes that given the costs and consequences
of racial-based affirmative action, it ought to be abandoned or at least
partially replaced with class-based affirmative action. As this Response
shows, however, Sander is wrong to argue that class-based affirmative
action is not going to be as costly as racial-based affirmative action. To
the contrary, because socioeconomic status is highly visible and plays
such an important role in both legal education and the practice of law,
class-based affirmative action is likely to be as, if not more, costly than
racial-based affirmative action.
124. Wald, supra note I10 at 1101-3.
125. Id. at 1103 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. For a recent thought-provoking challenge to simplistic ways of thinking about what it
means to be and appropriately act like a minority, see TOuRi, WHO'S AFRAID OF POST-
BLACKNESS?: WHAT IT MEANS TO BE BLACK Now (2011).
128. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 1, at 632, 664.
129. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 1, at 481; see also Sander, Racial Paradox,
supra note 1, at 1773-76.
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More importantly, whereas Sander appears to believe that the solu-
tion to costly affirmative action policies is to abandon them or replace
them with less costly alternatives, the appropriate solution for law
schools is not to abandon affirmative action policies, but rather to meet
their challenges head on. Accordingly, to the extent that racial-based
affirmative action imposes significant costs on its recipients and non-
recipients, law schools ought not to abandon racial preferences, rather,
they need to enhance the educational experience of racial minorities. 1 30
Similarly, the fact that socioeconomic status is visible does not mean that
law schools should not pursue class diversity. Rather, it means that, in
addition to implementing socioeconomic preferences, law schools should
be prepared to support the educational experiences of students of lower
socioeconomic status and pursue measures that will help recipients of
socioeconomic preferences acquire and build social capital, including
networking skills and cultural capital, including the development of intel-
lectual self-esteem.
130. Likewise, and contrary to Lempert's position, to the extent that class-based affirmative
action imposes significant costs on its recipients and non-recipients, law schools ought not to aban-
don class preferences, rather, they need to enhance the educational experience of lower socioeco-
nomic minorities.
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The debate over affirmative action in higher education has entered a
new era. For decades the argument was largely ideological, between
those who thought racial preferences were intrinsically a betrayal of the
color-blind ideals of the civil rights movement, and those who believed
that a sudden shift from Jim Crow to official color-blindness would leave
the upper reaches of America segregated and impervious to change. In
sharp contrast, the emerging debate is empirical and pragmatic. Few pro-
ponents of affirmative action believe it should go on indefinitely; most
proponents acknowledge that preferences carry with them some undesir-
able side-effects. Few of those who oppose racial preferences are really
comfortable with the idea of minority numbers dwindling towards zero at
any elite institution. These are circumstances in which it is possible for
angry debate to evolve into discussion, where empirical findings matter
and where policy alternatives can be candidly compared. Under such
hopeful conditions, the premium on combat skills declines and the value
of listening goes up.
t Professor Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I am deeply indebted to Michael
Jussaume, Yana Kucheva, and Flori So for outstanding research assistance and analysis in this piece,
and to Richard Kahlenberg and Stuart Taylor for thoughtful comments on a draft, and to Tal Greitzer
for his typically remarkable assistance in editing.
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My opening piece in this symposium, Class in American Legal
Education' (hereinafter CALE) argued that the institutional quest for "di-
versity" in American law schools has produced quite substantial racial
diversity but very little socioeconomic diversity, and that most law
schools follow a double standard, using very large preferences to com-
pete for the pool of affluent minority candidates, while creating substan-
tial barriers to students from poor, working class or even "middle class"
backgrounds.2 My hope was to provide enough data, in enough forms, to
make many of the empirical claims transparent and provide the tools for
readers to draw their own conclusions.
The eleven commentators, in their ten response essays, have done
just that, providing varied and often insightful perspectives on how law
schools should take account of "class." Many good questions are raised,
along with some thoughtful answers. Some of the contributors agree with
and expand upon the central points in CALE. Others agree with some
reservations. About half of the contributors are concerned (mistakenly)
that my essay is really a Trojan horse for ending racial preferences.
Nearly all the contributors, however, agree that the absence of socioeco-
nomic diversity in American law schools has been too long overlooked,
and are willing to consider seriously steps to reform current preference
systems. Nearly everyone also put forth ideas that should undoubtedly be
part of the reform mix. That is a very good start. In this reply essay, I try
to synthesize many of these ideas into a specific proposal for the reform
of preferences systems, and show how the various contributors' ideas fit
together. There are in some cases deep differences and incompatibilities
among the essayists here (see Parts III and IV of this essay if you doubt
that), but beneath the rhetoric there is also a lot of common ground.
I have four goals in this essay-which thus has four parts. In Part I,
I provide some background helpful in thinking about the most common
critique of CALE: that addressing "class" diversity should be completely
divorced from discussions of racial diversity and existing race preference
systems. I see instead a natural evolution where we learn from the suc-
cesses and problems of race preferences, and reform preference systems
to better achieve the underlying goals of diversity, social mobility, and
fairness. The three sections of Part I each illustrate a different aspect of
this theme.
In Part II, I advance a specific proposal for reforming law school
preference and financial aid systems, and then consider the ways in
which the proposal captures-or at least attempts to capture-the key
values and ideas of each contributor. At the end of Part II, I present data
that addresses the "feasibility" question-in particular, whether there are
1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U. L. REv. 631 (2011)
[hereinafter CALE].
2. See generally id.
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enough promising students from low-SES backgrounds to make law
school SES diversity possible.
Part III responds to specific criticisms advanced by the symposium
participants. And Part IV takes up the state of the law school "mismatch"
debate, and why the evidence for mismatch provides in itself a sufficient,
though not necessary, basis for supporting the types of preference re-
forms outlined in Part II.
PART I. SOME FURTHER NOTES COMPARING RACE AND CLASS
Most of the participants in this symposium agree that "class" should
be more central to law school diversity efforts. A central disagreement
concerns how such efforts should co-exist with racial preferences. Part II
offers an answer to this question, but Part I prepares the ground. First, I
discuss recent work by two very thoughtful black writers who have dis-
tinct but complementary takes on how the meaning of race is changing in
contemporary America. Then I critically examine the two most common
justifications for giving "race" preeminence in law school affirmative
action: the "discrimination" argument and the "viewpoint diversity" ar-
gument. In both cases, recent research and the added perspective of
"class" are helpful in thinking about these issues afresh.
A. Prelude: A Time for Reassessment
Academics can sometimes be quite insular, especially in specific
fields that can lose touch with real-world trends and developments. Over
the past sixteen years or so-since the mid-1990s when modern chal-
lenges to affirmative action began with Hopwood v. Texas and Proposi-
tion 209-many in higher education have focused on defending the
status quo, and when unconstrained by outside rules, their rules have
tended to either be static or to have moved in the direction of further so-
lidifying the status quo.4 In the meantime, however, the world that
American minorities face has changed substantially, even dramatically.
Many thoughtful observers outside the academy see this change plainly.
In this section, I want to provide some sense of this new perspective.
A particularly thoughtful contribution, touching on many of the
themes of this symposium, is Eugene Robinson's recent book Disinte-
gration: the Splintering of Black America.s Robinson is one of the na-
tion's leading black journalists; his reporting and commentary for the
Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize in 2009. In his book, Robinson
3. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
4. For example, in the years since the Supreme Court's holding in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), law school racial preferences have become larger and even more mechanical than
before. Richard H. Sander, Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The Practical Effects of
Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, in NEW DIRECTION IN JUDICIAL POLITICS (Kevin McGuire, ed., forth-
coming 2012).
5. EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA (2010).
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insightfully analyzes the emergence, over the past generation, of four
distinct black communities in the United States.6 "Mainstream" blacks
are those in the middle- and upper-middle class, a group that has, as
Robinson documents, expanded dramatically since the Civil Rights revo-
lution.7 "The Emergent" include both black immigrants, the children of
those immigrants, and interracial blacks, groups who together now con-
stitute over twenty percent of the nation's black population.8 Immigrant
blacks tend to arrive with strong educational credentials-the strongest,
according to Robinson, of any immigrant group9-and see America not
as a land of discrimination, but as a land of opportunity (hence their deci-
sion to immigrate). Interracial blacks often similarly see race through a
non-traditional prism-a matter of choice rather than inescapable iden-
tity.o "The Transcendent" are the black elite, who are not only extraor-
dinary achievers in their own right, but also enjoy a special glow from
their racial identity." Oprah Winfrey, Tiger Woods, Morgan Freeman,
and of course Barack Obama are all Americans of remarkable talent, but
they also enjoy a special reverence that is connected to their racial iden-
tity.
This leaves "the Abandoned"-the half of the black population that
remains intensely isolated in urban ghettos or the rural South, that has
extraordinarily high poverty rates, where unemployment is pervasive,
incarceration is common and stable two-parent families are the excep-
tion.12 Robinson argues that the rise of the other three black Americas
has intensified the plight of the Abandoned in several ways. The devel-
opment of fair housing policies made it possible for Mainstream blacks
to leave core ghettos, leaving those communities populated by the Aban-
doned, sans the middle-class amenities, stores, and institutions that gave
many mid-century ghettos considerable vibrancy.13 Some conservatives
point to the three successful black Americas as a rationale for ignoring
the fourth, blaming its problems on internal pathologies. Many Main-
stream blacks do not share the identity of interests with the Abandoned
they once did, so the latter group has lost some of its most important
advocates and spokesmen. And white liberals are likely to be more com-
fortable with easy policy measures that help the Mainstream than with
6. See generally id.
7. See generally id.
8. See generally id.
9. Seeid.at165-66.
10. See id. at 179-90. Americans self-identifying as multiracial numbered 3.9 million in 2000,
and 5.3 million in 2009, thus growing at four times the rate of the United States population as a
whole, and growing faster in proportionate terms than any other racial group. UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 10 tbl.6 (2011).
I1. See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 139-62.
12. Id. at 107-38.
13. These ideas were earlier developed by William Julius Wilson in THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987), and are empirically investigated and elaborated in Yana Kucheva & Rich-
ard H. Sander, The Misunderstood Consequences of Shelley v. Kramer, (July 16, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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the much harder work of tackling the tough problems that dominate the
world of the Abandoned.
Robinson was not aware of the research in CALE when he wrote his
book, but my findings illustrate his thesis. The benefits of law school
affirmative action policies flow overwhelmingly to upper-middle class
blacks, and disproportionately to the Emergent. The rhetoric of legal
educators suggests that affirmative action seeks to help the Abandoned
into the mainstream, but the actual representation of poor and working-
class blacks is miniscule, and law school policies tend to aggravate this
bias rather than counter it.
Interestingly, even though Robinson's empirical focus is not on ra-
cial preferences (he focuses on general patterns of social life, mobility,
and employment, not on higher education), he recognizes that reforming
affirmative action is an important part of any strategy to address the
plight of the Abandoned.' 4 He suggests that there are three key steps to-
wards a progressive strategy.'" The first is to recognize that the problems
of the Abandoned are distinct and of a greater order of magnitude than
those affecting other blacks. The second is to pursue large-scale initia-
tives that are focused, not on race itself, but on the problems that the
Abandoned experience in disproportionate numbers, such as industrial
unemployment, inner-city decay, and inadequate education. (Robinson
commends Obama for taking significant steps along these lines; Obama
has characterized and shaped many of his most important initiatives in
race-neutral terms even though they are targeted at key problems facing
the Abandoned. 16) The third is to make a key gesture to the concerns of
many Americans that racial preference programs have evolved into a
poorly-targeted, special interest boondoggle:
Obama has an important card that he can play: means-testing of af-
firmative action programs. He can declare that from now on, the
black Mainstream should be on its own-in exchange for the political
leeway to concentrate money and attention on the Abandoned. ...
[For this to work he] would need support ... from other black leaders
and opinion-makers-from members of the Congressional Black
Caucus, for example, as well as big-city mayors, the major civil
rights organizations, and other important actors. For African-
17
American officeholders, this would require considerable courage... .
CALE provides a lot of empirical support for the intuition behind
Robinson's policy recommendations on affirmative action. Traditional
preference programs are increasingly out-of-kilter with the social reality
on the ground. Not only does this lead to neglect of those most disadvan-
14. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at at 208-14.
15. See generally id. at 191-221.
16. Id. at 217-19.
17. Id. at 219.
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taged, it also exacts a significant and growing political price because the
policies have shrinking legitimacy in most people's eyes.
Another fascinating reassessment of the American racial scene has
come recently from Ellis Cose, a black journalist and social observer best
known for his 1993 book The Rage of a Privileged Class.18 In Rage,
Cose examined in detail a seeming paradox: while a growing number of
blacks were, by the early 1990s, successful and even "privileged," they
still felt surrounded by subtle and less-than-subtle indicators of continued
racism and discrimination, small bars so pervasive that many felt almost
as though they were in caged exhibits intended to show off America's
willingness to tolerate them. 19 In his new book, The End of Anger, 20
Cose documents a dramatic evolution over the past two decades. "Few
people of any race would claim that full racial equality has arrived in
America," he writes.
Still, so much has changed since Rage was published. It's not that
discrimination has stopped or that racist assumptions have vanished.
But they are not nearly as powerful as they once were. Color is be-
coming less and less a burden; race is less and less an immovable
barrier. Some forty-four percent of blacks now claim to believe that
blacks and whites have an equal opportunity of getting ahead--
compared to thirty percent twelve years ago .... And in the lifting of
that oppressive weight, many blacks have finally felt free to breathe-
-and to believe.21
Cose reports some astonishing shifts in black attitudes. In 2009,
69% of blacks agreed with the statement that Martin Luther King's vi-
sion of a racially just America had been fulfilled. In 2010, in the midst of
a deepening recession, a CBS poll found that nearly half of all blacks
said they thought America's next generation would be better off than
those living today (compared to only 16% of whites).22 A majority of the
corporate and professional blacks Cose interviewed thought they were on
an equal footing in their workplace with their white peers, and nearly as
many believed there was no racial glass ceiling at their workplace. His
interviewees recurringly see "a world in which race seriously affects
opportunities for blacks and Hispanics, but (and this is a crucial 'but')
not strongly enough to prevent them from getting where they want to
go."2
3
18. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS: WHY ARE MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS
ANGRY? (1993).
19. See generally id.
20. ELLIS COSE, THE END OF ANGER: A NEw GENERATION'S TAKE ON RACE AND RAGE
(2011) [herinafter THE END OF ANGER].
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 12.
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Although Cose does not cite Robinson, and though The End of An-
ger is quite a different book from Disintegration, the resonance of certain
themes is unmistakable. Cose's interviewees redound in the celebration
of successes among the black middle class, but they also express great
alarm over the ground being lost by poor and working-class blacks
(Robinson's "Abandoned"). As one black Harvard MBA observes,
I am much more optimistic about the future of my children than I am
about the future of all black children, two-thirds of whom are born in
poverty.. . . I think the opportunities are being made [available] to a
smaller and smaller population of blacks and that our lower class is
growing and becoming more permanent. 24
Others perceive a broader social divide increasingly defined by
class and economic inequality rather than race.
Cose does not embrace specific policy strategies, but near the end of
his book he writes,
One of the most clear-headed thinkers I know in the field of social
policy is john powell, director of Ohio State University's Kirwan In-
stitute. He believes fervently that the time is ripe for a new social vi-
sion, that the old language of opportunity and inequality, so much of
which is narrowly focused on race, needs to become significantly
broader. A new movement for social justice, as he sees it, would rec-
ognize the broad nature of America's unfinished business and bring
various groups together in the embrace of what he calls "targeted
universalism."
As an example, he offered the following:
Some people invited me to talk about health care. [And] I started out
by saying, 'How many of you know a relative, friend, family mem-
ber, who doesn't have insurance?' About half the people raise their
hands. 'How many people do you know who have lost their insurance
because they have a serious illness?' Within two questions or three
questions, you get everybody .... And I said, 'We should do some-
thing about this. This problem that affects your community, affects
your family, actually affects the black and Latino community even
more so.' At that point, nobody walks away. So now the black and
Latino community is in the conversation, but it's in the conversation
in a way that they can empathize with. What we often do-and this is
why we shouldn't start with just disparities-is that we say, 'there's
this huge gap between blacks and whites, and we need to fix it.'
Well, if I'm talking to a white audience and that's the start of my
conversation, they're not in the conversation. 25
24. Id. at 23.
25. Id. at 281-82.
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I don't know whether either powell or Cose have applied this logic
to affirmative action policies, but as Robinson points out, the logic fits
particularly well on that issue.
As a third example of emerging views among left-of-center intellec-
tuals concerned with issues of inequality, consider the types of stories
that have recently cropped up in The New York Times and The Washing-
ton Post. Several times in the past year, the Times has run stories on the
increasingly multi-racial character of America, and the seeming obsoles-
cence of traditional racial categories. A particular pertinent example of
this coverage came on the front-page of the June 14, 2011 Times:
At the beginning of the college application season last fall, Natasha
Scott, a high school senior of mixed racial heritage in Beltsville, Md.,
vented about a personal dilemma on College Confidential, the go-to
electronic bulletin board for anonymous conversation about admis-
sions. 'I just realized that my race is something I have to think
about,' she wrote, describing herself as having an Asian mother and a
black father. 'It pains me to say this, but putting down black might
help my admissions chances and putting down Asian might hurt it.
My mother urges me to put down black to use AA to get in to the col-
leges I'm applying to . .. I sort of want to do this but I'm wondering
if this is morally right.' Within minutes, a commenter had re-
sponded, 'You're black. You should own it.' Someone else agreed,
'Put black!!!!!!! Listen to your mom.' 26
While the fellow students writing comments on College Confiden-
tial may not have appreciated Natasha's moral dilemma, the two report-
ers of the story certainly did, and so will most Times readers. They will
also internalize this and other fresh evidence of a morally-wayward pref-
erence system. A few weeks earlier, the Times's newest Pulitzer-Prize-
winning columnist, David Leonhart, wrote another prominent article, this
one dealing with the failure of most American colleges to achieve even a
semblance of socioeconomic diversity.27 Meanwhile, the Washington
Post reported on a poll the Post conducted with the Kaiser Family Foun-
dation, which found that both black and white residents of the District of
Columbia see, by large margins, "income" rather than "race" as the criti-
cal divide in the city-a remarkable change in what was long regarded as
one of America's most racially polarized cities.28
These varied sources suggest that the world-views of people think-
ing about race and inequality in America are undergoing significant
26. Susan Saulny & Jacques Steinberg, On College Forms, a Question Of Race, or Races,
Can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at Al.
27. David Leonhart, Top Colleges, Largely for the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at Bl.
28. Chris L. Jenkins, Theola Labbe-DeBose & Peyton M. Craighill, Class, Not Race, a Di-
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change. In particular, black intellectuals who are spending time talking to
people outside academia have observed a striking evolution in America's
racial scene and a growing urgency to address the problems of low-
income minorities in a broader context of addressing the exclusion of
low-income Americans from the mainstream of American life. The idea
of rethinking traditional affirmative action policies, in light of the find-
ings in CALE, is therefore of something more than passing interest; it is,
rather, particularly timely because it goes to the heart of social and atti-
tudinal changes in contemporary America.
B. Discrimination and Outcomes
There is no question that racial discrimination continues to be a
common event in America. For some symposium contributors, the exis-
tence of racial discrimination is in itself a sufficient justification for not
even touching the subject of racial preferences in law school. The logic
goes something like this: "If racial discrimination exists, all minorities
are substantively and seriously injured. Preference programs help to off-
set these injuries, and directly combat discrimination." This sort of rea-
soning has been repeated so often as to take on the aura of an incantation.
Let us scrutinize the argument a bit.
Consider, first, the observation quoted earlier from Ellis Cose's
work: "race seriously affects opportunities for blacks and Hispanics, but
(and this is a crucial 'but') not strongly enough to prevent them from
getting where they want to go." 29 A more analytic way of putting this
point is that individual acts of discrimination may increase search costs
without necessarily, or even materially, affecting final outcomes. If, for
example, a black job applicant has a 20% chance of encountering racial
discrimination, that does not mean that she will have 20% lower earn-
ings, or 20% less employment; it means that she will need to submit 20%
more job applications, on average, to achieve the same results as a white
job applicant.
This insight helps us understand findings from the social science lit-
erature. The Urban Institute conducted perhaps the most famous of the
job market "audit" studies in the early 1990s. Ten pairs of carefully-
trained "testers" (with one black and one white tester in each pair) ap-
plied for hundreds of jobs advertised in Chicago and Washington, D.C..
Out of 438 completed audits, 62 produced job offers for both testers, 65
produced offers only for the white tester, and 23 produced offers for only
the black tester.o (The other 288 audits produced offers for neither
tester.) A way of summarizing these results is that out of every ten
29. See COSE, THE END OF ANGER, supra note 20, at 12.
30. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, MICHAEL E. Fix & RAYMOND J. STRUYK, URBAN
INSTITUTE, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
HIRING (1991).
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searches, the white tester received 2.9 job offers, while the black tester
received 1.9 offers. Another very well-known study that appeared about
the same time, by economist June O'Neill, found that when one con-
trolled for human capital qualities (something very few -labor market
studies do), the "earnings differential" between black and white workers
virtually disappeared.3' These findings are not incompatible: the presence
of some job discrimination implies higher search costs for blacks, but not
32necessarily lower earnings.
Of course, discrimination in itself is an evil to be combated. For me
that is not merely a moral sentiment; I have spent a good deal of my
working life fighting discrimination, and I believe I have done a lot to
increase the enforcement of fair housing laws. My general point is that
we often extrapolate from evidence of discrimination to other conclu-
sions that are not necessarily justified.
Discourses on discrimination tend to focus on racial discrimination.
In fact, the tendency of people to make fine distinctions about "others"
and extend accordingly differential treatment is extraordinarily perva-
sive. This is particularly well-illustrated in a recent study that examined
how people react to the brands of clothing others wear. 3 The researchers
found that a woman asking strangers to participate in a survey had four
times the response rate when she wore a Tommy Hilfiger sweater as
when she wore an identical sweater with no label. Volunteers who went
door-to-door seeking charitable contributions raised nearly twice as
much when they wore shirts with designer logos as when they wore iden-
tical shirts with no logo. 34
"Fashion" discrimination may seem relatively benign; we are not
tied to our clothes, thank goodness-though fashion certainly correlates
31. June O'Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Diferences Between Black and
White Men, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (1990). O'Neill observes, "The black-white hourly earnings ratio
is 82.9 percent before adjusting for any characteristics . . . after adjusting for region, schooling and
potential work experience . . . the ratio rises to 87.7 percent. The addition of the AFQT raises the
ratio to 95.5 percent, at which point close to three-quarters of the gap is explained. Adding actual
work experience virtually closes the gap." Id. at 40.
32. Note that perhaps the most in-depth study of racial discrimination patterns ever con-
ducted-the National Housing Discrimination Study of 2000 conducted by The Urban Institute,
found very low levels of net discrimination. See generally THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION STUDY 2000 HDS (2000). See The "net" rate of discrimination experienced by
blacks seeking to establish the availability of rental housing was about 4%; the net rate of "segrega-
tion" steering by real estate agents towards black testers was also about 4%. In other, more subtle or
subjective aspects of housing search, net discrimination rates are higher, but the general pattern is
one of astonishing progress, even relative to the prior national discrimination audit studies of 1989.
See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, STEPHEN L. Ross, GEORGE C. GALSTER & JOHN YINGER, THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS
FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 3-2, 6-7 (2002).
33. Rob M.A. Nelissen & Marijn H.C. Meijersa, Social Benefits ofLuxury Brands as Costly
Signals of Wealth and Status, 32 J. EVO. & HUM. BEH. 343 (2011).
34. One defect in this study is that it was not "double-blind"-that is, the people seeking
donations or survey participants presumably knew whether they were wearing a logo, and that may
have influenced their behavior in subtle ways.
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with socioeconomic status, and the logo study buttresses Eli Wald's ar-
gument that class is "visible" and has effects in daily interactions. But
there are many in-born characteristics, unrelated to race, that are associ-
ated with widespread discrimination. In recent years, social scientists
have shown that labor market outcomes are strongly associated with the
height,3 6 weight,3  and physical attractiveness of individuals. The pat-
terns vary some across groups-being tall seems to matter somewhat
more for males, and being slender matters more for women (of all
ages)-but the associated wage differences are large. There is still a good
deal of debate over the nature of the causal link-partly because large-
scale audit studies have tended to focus on factors like gender and race,
and neglect these other variations-but there is considerable evidence
that a significant part of the earnings differential is due to discrimina-
tion.39 I suspect that most readers can think of situations where the
height, weight, and attractiveness of others have affected their own be-
havior, even in relatively formal circumstances.
Since discrimination based on physical characteristics is linked to
lower earnings, it is reasonable to infer that it is sufficiently pervasive so
as to not be easily avoided by longer and more intensive searches. Dis-
crimination in this realm is plausibly associated with worse personal out-
comes; a short man may experience discrimination so pervasive that it
directly reduces his life chances. For blacks and Hispanics growing up in
affluent circumstances, it is much more doubtful that such discrimination
as they experience is sufficient to substantively affect their long-term
outcomes. Studies of college graduates based on cohorts after 1990, if
they control for such human capital factors as school eliteness, test
scores, and college grades, not only do not show earnings deficits for
35. See Eli Wald, The Visibility ofSocioeconomic Status and Class-Based Affirmative Action:
A Reply to Professor Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 861, 865 (2011).
36. Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on Workplace Suc-
cess and Income: Preliminary Test ofa Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 428 (2004). Note,
however, that some commentators think that at least part of the difference in height outcomes is
attributable to differences in cognitive ability, and others think that height effects are mediated by
adolescent experiences related to height. See N. Persico, A. Postlewaite & D. Silverman, The Effect
ofAdolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case ofHeight, 112 J. POL. EcoN. 1019
(2004); Anne Case & Christina Paxson, Stature and Status: Height, Ability, and Labor Market
Outcomes, 116 J. POL. ECoN. 499 (2008).
37. John Cawley, The Impact ofObesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 2 (2004); Dalton
Conley & Rebecca Glauber, Gender, Body Mass, and Socioeconomic Status: New Evidence from the
PSID, 17 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVS. RES. 253 (2007).
38. Daniel S. Hammermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AMER. ECON.
REV. 1174 (1994); Markus Mobius & Tanya Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters, 96 AMER. ECON. REV.
222 (2006).
39. See Mobius & Rosenblat, supra note 38, for experimental evidence on the causal role of
physical attractiveness.
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blacks and Hispanics; instead, they tend to show earnings advantages,
especially for blacks.40
Thus, if preferences are meant to counterbalance societal dis-
crimination, then current preferences are very poorly calibrated.
Where is the evidence that contemporary, well-educated blacks suffer
more consequential discrimination than those with socially disfavored
flavors of height, weight and beauty? I have no doubt that race im-
poses very substantial burdens when it interacts with low SES and
limited educational opportunity. But if so, we should be focusing not
on race alone, but on the intersection of race and class.
Table 1, below, is helpful in getting a sense of the relative role that
education and race play in determining earnings levels in contemporary
America.
Table 1
Median Family Income by Race and Education of Household Head
Married Couples with Heads from 35-44 Years Old, 2009
Education of Asian Black Hispanic Non-Hispanic
household head Whites
Less than high $36,000 $35,200 $37,000 $46,600
school diploma
High School $50,000 $52,030 $49,000 $66,000
Bachelor degree $102,000 $95,000 $88,300 $108,500
Graduate degree 1 $130,000 , $110,000 $114,000 $129,000
Source: Author's calculations from the 2009 American Community
Survey
This table reveals several interesting things. Most obviously, edu-
cational levels matter enormously in determining earnings, at least for
families whose primary earner is approaching his or her peak earning
years. Families headed by someone with a bachelor's degree earn from
more than two to almost three times as much as families headed by
someone who has not completed high school. Indeed, looking at this
table it is hard to avoid the conclusion that education dwarfs race as a
determinant of earnings. It is also important to note that black/white and
Hispanic/white income differences decline with greater education: the
black family income "deficit", relative to whites, is 24.5% for high
school dropouts; 21.2% for high school graduates; and 12.4% for college
graduates. The gap widens again a bit (to 14.7%) for those with graduate
degrees, but this plausibly is due to mismatch effects, which are more
pervasive at the graduate school level than at the bachelor's level, and
work to systematically lower the earnings of minorities with graduate
40. For one particularly relevant example, see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 463-64 (2004) (hereinafter
Systematic Analysis], and accompanying text.
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degrees. 4 1 (Consider, for example, the vast numbers of blacks who com-
plete law school-a graduate degree-but never pass the bar.4 2) Indeed,
it is more than plausible that if one better controlled for human capital
characteristics, such as grades, professional certifications, work history,
and schools attended, the analysis would show no black-white or His-
panic-white deficit in the bottom two rows of Table 1.43
It follows that educational attainment is an incomparably more im-
portant determinant of affluence than is race. And, as one could infer
from the analyses in CALE, socioeconomic background is a more impor-
tant determinant of one's educational attainment than is race. To show
this point more directly, consider Table 2, which shows (for a cohort of
twelve thousand students who would be, if they completed high school,
in the class of 1992) educational attainments for high-SES blacks, com-
pared with low-SES blacks and low-SES whites.
Table 2
Rates of Attaining Particular Educational Outcomes
by SES Quartile and Race Among Participants in the National Educa-
tional Longitudinal Survey, 1988-2000
Percent ofBlacks in each SES Whites in theBot-
Outcome group with the given outcome: tom SES Quartilewith the given
Top Quartile Bottom Quartile otcoe:outcome:
Attain a bachelor's de- 41% 6% 6%
gree
Complete a graduate 5.5% 0.2% 0.4%
degree
Attended an elite college 7% 0% 0.2%
Proportion of bachelor
recipients who obtain 1 in 7 or8 1 in 30 1 in 12
graduate degree by age 26
Source: Author's calculations from NELS database
There is another, perhaps even more forceful, way of grasping this
point. If one examines any of the large, longitudinal databases of teenag-
ers and young adults created during the past twenty years, and asks what
factors strongly predict college attendance, controlling for student back-
ground, test scores, academic preparation, and other relevant factors, one
41. Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1755 (2006); Sander, supra note 40, 456-68 (2004); Linda Loury & David Garman, College Selec-
tivity and Earnings, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 289 (1995).
42. See Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who
Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEG. EDUC. 3 (2010).
43. Differences in black and white incomes often appear much starker when one does not
control for family composition, but it is important to do so, since the issue here is how human capital
is rewarded in the labor market. The reasons for the very large proportion of unmarried blacks are
undoubtedly complex, ranging from the high incarceration rates of black men to the attitudes of
black women towards interracial marriage. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE
PEOPLE? HOW THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011).
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will find that being black is a strong positive predictor while low-SES is
a strong negative predictor. As best we can tell, black high school
graduates are about 30% more likely than comparable whites to attend
college, while high school graduates in the bottom SES quintile are about
80% less likely to attend college than high school graduates from the top
SES quintile.4
In sum, I think the social science evidence is consistent with the
more casual empiricism of Eugene Robinson and Ellis Cose: affluent
blacks, and the children raised in those families, are doing pretty well.
They may encounter occasional discrimination, but it is hard to show that
this translates, for them, into worse outcomes in their lives. Disadvan-
tages they may experience are not in the same league as those facing
low- and moderate-SES families and their children.
Recall that I launched on this discussion to evaluate the following
argument: "If racial discrimination exists, all minorities are substantively
and seriously injured. Preference programs help to offset these injuries,
and directly combat discrimination." For the reasons outlined in this sec-
tion, I think the first statement is incorrect: affluent minorities may en-
counter discrimination, but it is doubtful that this has a material effect on
their economic and professional life outcomes. Now consider the second
claim, that preference programs combat discrimination.
Set aside for the moment the mismatch issue (though only for a
moment-I revisit mismatch in some detail in Part IV). Set aside even
the growing evidence that artificially boosting students into more elite
schools hurts, rather than helps, their long-term earnings.45 Consider the
simple logic of the idea that systematic and very large racial preferences
effectively combat racial stereotypes and discrimination.
My finding in Systemic Analysis,4 that large preferences generally
translate into poor academic performance, remains undisputed by the
critics. The finding has been duplicated by other recent research in law
schools and higher education generally.4 7 With the current scale of pref-
erences at elite colleges and professional schools, about half of blacks
end up in the bottom ten percent of the class; about half of Hispanics end
up in the bottom twenty percent of the class. Particularly in law school,
44. Jay D. Teachman, Kathleen M. Paasch, Randal D. Day & Karen P. Carver, Poverty Dur-
ing Adolescence and Subsequent Educational Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP
POOR 382-418 (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, eds., 1997), and author's analysis of data from the Na-
tional Educational Longitudinal Study.
45. Richard H. Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret ofMy Success: How Status, Prestige, and
School Performance Shape Legal Careers, J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2011). This article
substantially elaborates on my earlier work on the interaction of law school grades and school elite-
ness on post-law-school earnings.
46. Sander, supra note 40, at 425-36.
47. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., What Happens After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time
Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice, (Duke University, Working Paper, 2011).
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these performance deficits are not meaningfully due to anything other
than preferences; that is, performance improves in direct proportion to
the reduction in preferences.48
Probably the most pernicious stereotypes about African-Americans
have to do with intellectual capacity and work ethic. 4 9 As a method of
combating these stereotypes, it is hard to imagine a worse policy than
deliberately putting blacks into graduate-level classrooms in which they
are at an enormous competitive disadvantage. The students (including the
beneficiaries themselves) are not entirely aware that large preferences are
at work. If minority students disproportionately end up with the worst
grades in the class, how can this not be reflected in perceptions of class-
room performance? Even though black first-year law students tend, if
anything, to spend more hours on their homework than do their white
counterparts, will they not seem disproportionately unprepared when
called upon in class? Will they not disproportionately ask questions that
suggest they do not get the point of the case under discussion, and will
they not be perceived as more likely to detour class discussion in to re-
petitive explanations of the obvious? And, when the shock of first-
semester grades undermines the morale and engagement of minority law
students, will these effects not simply be intensified?
One of the saddest aspects of the diversity debate is the utter failure
of the diversity lobby to seriously confront this issue-or for that matter,
to even acknowledge that the issue exists. Advocates instead ignore, un-
derplay, or gloss over the grade gap.50 This is even odder given the
emergence of "stereotype threat" as a common explanation of poor mi-
48. See Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN L. REV. 1963, 1972-73 (2005). The
data reported in Tables 2 and 3 show that the GPA improvement for black "second-choice" students
closely mirrors the reduction in the credential gap between those students and others in the same tier.
49. Lawrence D. Bobo & Ryan A. Smith, From Jim Crow Racism to Laissez-Faire Racism:
The Transformation ofRacial Attitudes, in BEYOND PLURALISM: THE CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND
GROUP IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 199 (Katkin, Landsman & Tyree eds., 1995). This article presents
1990 survey evidence showing that 56% of whites rated blacks as less intelligent than whites, and
over 60% rated blacks as lazier than whites. The survey method had respondents rate various racial
groups on a series of scales, and then compared the average scalar ratings, rather than asking respon-
dents to make direct comparisons. Bobo and Smith also note that whites have moved sharply away
from "biological" explanations for racial differences and towards "cultural" explanations.
50. See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, "From the
Trenches and Towers": Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000). In their in-depth analysis of affirmative action at the
University of Michigan Law School (UMLS), the authors nowhere mention the abysmal academic
performance of UMLS blacks, 60% of whom had GPAs in the bottom tenth of their class during the
period they studied. In The Shape of the River, Bowen and Bok to their credit do discuss the problem
of poor academic performance of minorities in college. But they misleadingly imply that low grades
are mostly connected to some sort of racial underperformance, rather than the use of preferences by
colleges. Even more misleadingly, when they talk about minority performance they only give "aver-
age" class rank (the 23" percentile for elite college blacks, according to them). Given the highly
skewed distribution of minority GPAs towards the bottom of the distribution, an average is very
misleading-an "average" 23rd percentile probably translates to a 10th percentile median. See
wILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 72 (1998).
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nority performance in test settings.51 If one believes stereotype threat is a
serious issue, isn't it obvious that large-scale preferences are likely to
exacerbate the threat?52 Apparently not to affirmative action partisans,
who have long shown a capacity to simultaneously advocate logically
inconsistent positions.
Instead, partisans have put forward research attempting to show a
variety of educational and attitudinal benefits of affirmative action pro-
grams. Much of this research is contradictory on its face. Consider, for
example, the only study of which I am aware that attempts to show edu-
cational benefits from diversity in law schools. 53 In the study, Orfield and
Whitla surveyed students at Harvard Law School and the University of
Michigan; a key question asked respondents how many close friends they
had of another racial or ethnic background. A vast majority (over 90%)
of the white respondents responded that they had "three or more" close
friends of another racial/ethnic background, which the authors noted with
satisfaction and took to be evidence of the positive effect of affirmative
action programs. But nearly two-thirds of the black respondents and
nearly three-quarters of the Latino respondents reported two or fewer
close friends of another racial/ethnic background. These varying statis-
tics are logically irreconcilable. The two schools both had enrollments, at
the time the surveys were conducted, that were about 77% white. If we
conservatively assume that the mean student who said she had "three or
more" close friends of another race had four such friends, and estimate
the total number of interracial friendships per one hundred law students,
we find that the white students claimed a total of 293 close interracial
friendships, while blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians
claimed a total of 50 such friendships. Even if we implausibly assume
that none of the interracial friendships of blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and
American Indians were with members of other minority groups, the
51. Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance
ofAfrican Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCH. 797 (1995). 1 am a stereotype-threat
skeptic, for three reasons. First, most of research showing stereotype-threat research has been done
in laboratories; tests in real-world settings have not produced comparable results. See Michael J.
Cullen, Chaitra M. Hardison & Paul R. Sackett, Using SAT-Grade and Ability-Job Performance
Relationships to Test Predictions Derived from Sterotype Threat Theory, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH.
220 (2004). Second, in law school at least, entering credentials accurately predict first-year GPA
performance for minorities. See Sander, supra note 48, at 1968. (Research I have completed since
Reply to Critics is even more compelling, demonstrating that blacks and whites have indistinguish-
able first-semester grades when we control for entering credentials and undergraduate college.)
Third, again in law school, the black-white performance gap is the same or larger in legal writing
classes as in timed exam classes, even though the former should not evoke the stereotype threat
effect. See Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 424.
52. Some research has at least examined how self-perceptions about affirmative action affect
stereotype threat, finding that students who believe they have received large preferences are more
vulnerable to the threat effect. See Colette van Laar, Shana Levin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Identity
and Personal Identity Stereotype Threat: The Case ofAffirmative Action, 30 BASIC AND APPLIED
SOC. PSYCH. 295 (2008).
53. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in
Leading Law Schools, in GARY ORFIELD & MICHAL KURLAENDER, DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143 (2001).
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white respondents would still appear to be exaggerating their "close in-
terracial friends" by a factor of six!5 4
All that the extant pro-diversity literature has demonstrated to date
is that college students (and especially those oh-so-bright law students)
manage to pick up quickly on the diversity ideology that pours forth from
deans whenever students are assembled; the students readily infer the
danger of not enthusiastically echoing this ideology whenever the oppor-
tunity arises.
An example of the type of research that could help us better under-
stand the actual racial dynamics fostered by affirmative action is a study
of law school study groups. A good deal of anecdotal evidence suggests
that these groups tend to be segregated along racial lines." It is possible
that this simply reflects discrimination or racial preferences, but it is also
possible that this reflects the desire of law students to join study groups
with academically strong members. Individuals who give signals in or
out of class that they are struggling with the material are likely to be
shunned in the competition for good study groups. Worse, if students
decide that academic strength is correlated with race, then black and His-
panic students may be shunned based on their race-an example of how
large preferences could lead directly to invidious discrimination. By ex-
amining not only the extent of segregation in study groups, but also how
the level of segregation varies across schools using different levels of
racial preferences, one could gain genuine insight into how preferences
affect racial attitudes and behavior. There is already some significant
circumstantial evidence that a real problem exists. Cross-sectional re-
search shows that participation in a study group tends to raise a student's
first-year law school performance; this makes sense, since talking in
some depth about classes with a cross-section of peers can help an indi-
vidual "get" the subtle nuances of how law school pedagogy works. But
Hispanic and especially black students do not share these benefits; when
they participate in study groups, their grades are unaffected and some-
times even hurt.' 6 This is consistent with minority students ending up in
54. Further evidence that the Orfield/Whitla survey was merely summoning up PC responses
comes from an analysis done by the eminent sociologist Thomas Espenshade, who asked college
students (in a survey that bad no visible "diversity" agenda) to list their five closest friends; the
survey administrators than coded the race of each identified friend. These results showed (a) no
logical inconsistency in the number of interracial friendships and (b) far lower levels of interracial
friendship than those produced by the Orfield-Whitla survey. Personal communication from Dr.
Espenshade (March 2007).
55. See generally Kevin Deasy, Enabling Black Students to Realize Their Potential in Law
School: A Psycho-Social Assessment of an Academic Support Program, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
547 (1991); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational Stream to
Move Students From Isolation to Autonomy, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 667 (1994).
56. Matt Moore, Ailing Method, Essential Motive: An Examination of Two Strategies to
Improve Core Legal Learning Among Underrepresented Minority Law Students (2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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largely segregated study groups comprised of students who tend to be
academically weak.
The idea of doing research on what causes law school study groups
to have differential benefits across racial lines, like the idea of studying
whether large racial preferences foster racial stereotyping, are not par-
ticularly original suggestions. Indeed, they are obvious questions if one
gives a little thought to racial dynamics at a contemporary law school.
They have not been studied because they imply an ability to look at di-
versity issues honestly that does not exist in legal academia (or graduate
schools of education), and perhaps exists nowhere in contemporary
higher education. Until such obvious inquiries are undertaken, it is folly
to believe claims that preference programs effectively combat discrimi-
nation, or to defer to the judgment of school administrators in assessing
the benefits of large-scale preferences.
C. Viewpoint diversity
The preeminent justification for race-based affirmative action in
higher education, as articulated in Supreme Court decisions, is the ra-
tionale of providing viewpoint diversity on college campuses." An im-
portant question, but one rarely asked in anything other than a rhetorical
manner, is how much current preference programs contribute to view-
point diversity, particularly if the diversity is being provided by upper-
middle-class students from various racial groups. How much do upper-
middle-class minorities add to the viewpoint diversity in the classroom?
Would low-SES students of various races add more?
To investigate how attitudes vary across race and class, I consulted
data from the General Social Survey (GSS). 58 The GSS is a biennial,
national survey of about two thousand adults; through ninety-minute,
face-to-face interviews, the survey seeks to gather core demographic data
from respondents (race, occupation, education, etc.) as well as attitudes
and opinions on a wide variety of political and social issues. The GSS
has a unique status among opinion surveys because of the care with
which it is conducted and the ability to trace the evolution of attitudes on
important issues as far back as 1972. Based on the demographic informa-
tion collected on respondents, the GSS assigns each respondent a socio-
economic score, using a process similar to the method I used in CALE to
measure SES. With this variable, I assigned each respondent to one of
five roughly equal SES quintiles; I could then divide respondents by both
race and class, and examine variations in attitudes across these cells. I
57. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-33 (2003).
58. The General Social Survey website, found at http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/, has a
wealth of information about the survey and its methodology.
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emphasize that the analysis presented here is intended to be suggestive
rather than conclusive.59
Table 3
How social perspectives vary across lines of race and
class General Social Survey, 2008 [?]
Percent of each group agreeing with position:
Issue positions Blacks, Blacks, top Whites, Whites, top
bottom two two SES bottom two two SES
SES gaintiles quintiles SES quintiles quintiles
Immigration to
the U.S. should 41% 34% 59% 49%
be reduced ("a
little" or "a lot")
Books by anti-
American Mus-
















penalty for mur- 53% 45% 75% 68%
der
Source: 2008 GSS, analyses by Yana Kucheva and the author
Table 3 draws on the GSS to tabulate views across class and racial
lines on several controversial social issues. To achieve a reasonable
sample size for blacks, I combine the bottom two and top two SES quin-
tiles. The cleavages along race and class lines are not deep on many is-
sues, suggesting that factors other than SES and race explain much indi-
vidual variation in attitudes (for example, religion and region are proba-
bly as probative or more probative on many social issues than race and
class). Still, this rather simple analysis suggests that both race and class
matter, and interestingly, they seem to matter to differing degrees on
different issues. For example, class divisions are larger than race divi-
sions on questions concerning abortion and free speech. But on other
59. Note, for example, that since I use only a single year of GSS data, the sample sizes for the
black cells are measured only in the dozens. Some of the literature cited in this section provides
examples of more sophisticated methods that sociologists routinely use to reach more definitive
conclusions about attitudinal pattems.
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issues, such as gay marriage, race divisions are more significant than
class divisions, while on still others, such as immigration, both class and
race have significant effects on outlook.
If we put race, class, and other individual characteristics into a re-
gression analysis, social and educational factors often dominate race. For
example, an analysis of GSS data from the 1990s found that educational
level-in particular, college education-was the dominant factor ex-
plaining variation in attitudes towards immigration policy; "effects of
race, income, and fear of crime appear to be negligible." 6 0 Larry Bobo
and Frederick Lacari similarly found education quite important, and race
non-significant, in explaining patterns of political tolerance for outlier
groups. 6 1 Law students with low SES will themselves have college de-
grees by the time they reach graduate school, but they are far more likely
to have family members and friends without college educations than are
students from high-SES backgrounds. Moreover, even when the type of
viewpoints expressed in surveys differ by only ten percentage points
across different classes, this can easily belie a much deeper difference in
assumptions and modes of argument. It makes sense that a wide range of
experiences and attitudes will be missed in law school discussions if only
a negligible proportion of students come from the bottom half of the
class distribution.62
Sociologists who have examined attitudinal differences within the
black population have found conflicting evidence about the depth of a
"class" divide within the black community on major social and racial
issues.6 3 But they do consistently report a greater tendency among upper-
middle-class blacks to favor race-conscious policies and to see racial
64inequality as a structural characteristic of American society. Poor and
working-class blacks are more likely to favor race-neutral policies that
broadly increase opportunity and social mobility. Some observers have
been puzzled by these patterns, but they fit well with much of the re-
search discussed here and in CALE. After all, if racial preferences in
higher education are the single most salient "race-conscious" policy, this
is certainly one that primarily benefits affluent blacks, and it is not sur-
prising that working-class blacks would have no great passion for the
60. Charles R. Chandler & Yung-mei Tsai, Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes:
An Analysis ofDatafrom the General Social Survey, 38 Soc. SCI. J. 177 (2001).
61. Lawrence Bobo & Frederick C. Licari, Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the
Effects of cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect, 53 PUB OPINION Q. 285 (1989).
62. Even recreational activities vary more across working-class groups of different races than
among middle-class groups of different races. Floyd et al., Race, Class, and Leisure Activity
Preferences: Marginality and Ethnicity Rrevisited, 26 J. LEISURE RES.158 (1994).
63. Sean-Shong Hwang, Kevin M. Fitzpatrick & David Helms, Class Differences in Racial
Attitudes: A Divided Black America?, 41 Soc. PERSP. 367 (1998).
64. Jason E. Shelton & George Wilson, Race, Class, and the Basis of Group Alignment: An
Analysis OfSupport for Redistributive Policy Among Privileged Blacks, 52 SOC. PERSP. 385 (2009);
Zoltan Hajnal, Black Class Exceptionalism: Insights from Direct Democracy on the Race Versus
Class Debate, 71 PUB OPINION Q. 560 (2007).
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policy. And as Eugene Robinson points out, broad initiatives aimed at
poverty or poor schools, without regard to race, are likely to have more
impact upon the lives of the "Abandoned" than limited race-conscious
policies.
The attitudinal data also suggests that the attitudes of upper-middle-
class blacks, to the extent they diverge from those of affluent whites,
match closely the world-views of the typical law professor: very liberal
on issues of individual rights and immigration, progressive but not very
specific on economic justice issues, somewhat hostile to law enforce-
ment, supportive of race-conscious affirmative action. More generally, in
my observation of the environment of a fairly elite law school (UCLA), I
am struck by how little viewpoint diversity actually finds its way into
class discussion. Students seem to sense the prevailing world-view, and
they are reluctant to challenge it on matters touching fundamental values
that spark emotional chords. On issues such as gay marriage and abor-
tion, invitations to discuss the topic often produce no dissent to the pre-
vailing law school worldview (favoring both).
A long-standing critique of law school from the left is that Ameri-
can professions excel at reproducing themselves, and more specifically
legal education elites reproduce themselves in the student bodies they
65create. To the extent this is true, it does not seem that contemporary
affirmative action policies create much of an exception. We like to talk
about viewpoint diversity, but there is little critical assessment of how
much such diversity actually exists. Expanding SES diversity would
probably help to introduce some less conventional viewpoints into law
school classrooms, and this would be a good thing.
PART II. STEPS TOWARD REFORM IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
If in Part I I have tried to set the race vs. class debate in a broader
perspective, Part II is about concrete specifics. Section A details a road-
map for the reform of law school preferences. Section B compares this
roadmap with the values articulated by the symposium contributors, and
suggests that there is a good deal of common ground in this debate. Sec-
tion C works through the question of whether there really are as many
potential low-and-moderate SES law students as I have supposed.
A. A Tentative Proposal
When I published my initial analysis of the "mismatch" effect in
2005,66 many of those in the then-highly-polarized debate assumed that if
I was finding some serious, counterproductive consequences of law
65. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004); see also RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS 48-73 (1989).
66. Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 40.
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school racial preferences, I must therefore be on the abolitionist side of
the preferences debate. This assumption was often made, to my initial
surprise, by both supporters and opponents of racial preferences, even
though the piece took no explicit policy position and suggested that a
very promising solution to the mismatch problem was to reduce, rather
than eliminate, the size of existing preferences.
That same pattern shows up, even more strikingly, in this sympo-
sium. A sizeable number of the commentaries on my main piece as-
sume-and often build extensive discussions upon the belief that-I see
socioeconomic and racial preferences as an "either/or" proposition, or
even that my "true" agenda is the abolition of racial preferences. This is
simply not the case. I have been asked about my policy views on affirma-
tive action dozens of times-at legislative hearings, in radio interviews,
before national commissions-and I have consistently eschewed aboli-
tionist positions. In other contexts, I've strongly advocated for race-
conscious strategies when they are well-justified by empirical findings.
But as my principal essay makes clear, I also do not believe that
"class" and "race" preferences should be considered in isolation. First, I
think it is self-evident that racial preferences, as currently pursued by
American law schools, have some very serious problems; it would be
foolish to construct new preference programs that were not mindful of
the need to avoid similar problems. Second, it is important to understand
how and why racial preferences are no substitute for "class" preferences,
and to realize how thoroughly and hypocritically the legal education es-
tablishment ignores class-based issues while claiming to pursue genuine
diversity. Third, as I shall explain in this section, I think it is quite con-
structive to link the two types of preferences as a matter of policy.
For purposes of making discussion concrete, it is valuable to think
about specific policy formulations. I do not believe we yet know enough
to determine what exact policies would best achieve any particular set of
goals one might articulate, so I would like to consider this section as
something of a thought experiment. Suppose some significant number of
schools endorsed, or were constrained to adopt (by law or by accredita-
tion bodies) the following requirements in awarding admissions prefer-
ences:
1) Racial preferences are not limited in size, so long as the average
size of a racial preference given by a law school does not exceed the av-
67. Id. at 482-83.
68. On eschewing abolitionist positions, see, e.g., my comments in a January 2005 debate: "I
want to keep reminding participants [in the mismatch debate] that one can make enormous progress
in addressing this problem short of abolishing preferences." Legal Affairs Debate Club, January 14,
2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclubsander0105.msp. On my
advocacy of race-conscious strategies in addressing housing segregation, see generally Richard H.
Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 874 (1988).
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erage size of its socioeconomic preferences. In determining socioeco-
nomic preferences, schools should not only be permitted, but encour-
aged, to use factors which recognize the intersections of class and race,
such as the level of poverty in the neighborhood one lived in during high
school, whether one is raised in a single-parent family, and the academic
strength of one's high school.
2) Any student admitted to a law school with credentials below the
average of the law school's matriculants must be given a disclosure re-
port with the school's admissions letter. The disclosure report provides
objective information on the following: (a) the average law school GPA
earned by matriculants at that school with the applicant's credentials; (b)
the graduation rate of matriculants at that school with the applicant's
credentials; (c) the bar passage rate of graduates of that school with the
applicant's credentials; and (d) the median and mean earnings, and rate
of occupation as a lawyer, for graduates of that school with the appli-
cant's credentials.
3) At least half of the financial aid given by any law school must be
need-based, unless the school can demonstrate that dependent students
from families with incomes below the national median are able to com-
plete their law degree at the school without, on average, adding more
educational debt than those students assumed during their undergraduate
college careers.
4) Law schools should offer courses and research fellowships ex-
plicitly aimed at "pipeline" problems-that is, how academic preparation
gaps can be reduced across racial and socioeconomic lines, and how mo-
bility and representation can be fostered in the absence of admissions
preferences. Graduates working on these problems should be given espe-
cially generous loan forgiveness terms.
These four practices directly address many of the most serious
weaknesses in current law school preference systems, and they also cre-
ate incentives with further beneficial effects. Consider some of the prop-
erties of this system:
* Flexibility. Practice I gives schools great discretion and flexibil-
ity in the design of preference systems. The school can choose the size
and focus of their racial and class preferences, so long as the size of the
preferences are measured, and so long as the average size of race prefer-
ences does not exceed those used for class.
* Measurement. Practice 1 also pushes schools to develop some
system of defining the size of preferences they use. This addresses a ba-
sic defect in the law governing preferences. Both Justice Powell in Bakke
v. University of California, and Justice O'Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger,
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evaded the hard choices implicit in their decisions by phrasing preference
doctrine in very vague terms.6 9 As I suggested in Systemic Analysis, and
as Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster forcefully elaborated two years later, the
governance of racial preferences is not viable-and strict scrutiny is not
meaningful-in the absence of concrete methods of measuring prefer-
ences and evaluating their costs relative to their benefits. 7 0 A number of
viable methods of measuring and comparing preferences have been ad-
vanced.
* Narrow tailoring. Practice 1 gives substance to the general consti-
tutional understanding that the use of race should be narrowly tailored to
the ends sought-in other words, that race should only be used as much
as is vital to achieve its compelling justification.72 Consider: both race
and class help diversify the classroom; class diversity is currently more
lacking than race diversity; viewpoint diversity is, plausibly, at least as
enhanced by greater class diversity as by race diversity; class diversity
addresses more salient, and more neglected, mobility and opportunity
problems in our society. And class-based preferences are not suspect-
for good reason-in the way that racial preferences are.73 Practice (1) is
thus a logical way for a school to achieve narrow tailoring in a meaning-
ful way.
* Transparency. Practice 2 is an enormous step towards giving ap-
plicants the facts they need to make rational choices about (and between)
law schools-an issue that has received great attention this year in the
related context of law school data on employment prospects.7 4 Students
should not only have accurate employment data for the school as a
whole; they should have good information on their individual prospects
for graduating, passing the bar, and getting a good job. The sort of
school-wide data available today is sufficient for students with creden-
tials at or above the school median, but it is misleading and deceptive for
students admitted with preferences. Especially in an era of rising law
school costs and a weak market for law graduates, elemental fairness
requires that students have good information.
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003). Richard Sander, Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The Practical Effects of
Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS (Kevin McGuire, ed., forth-
coming 2012).
70. Sander, Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 390-410; Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't
Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., concurring).
71. A discussion of these methods, and the logical necessity of such criteria to implement
strict scrutiny, is in Ayres & Foster, supra note 70; Sander, supra note 4.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-28.
73. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
74. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, available at
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-economics-job-market-weakens-tuition-
rises.html; Elie Mystal, A Resigning Law Dean Spills the Beans on the Fleecing of Law Students,
ABOVE THE LAW, July 29, 2011, available at http://abovethelaw.com/2011/07/a-law-dean-resigns-
and-spills-the-beans-on-how-his-university-has-been-taking-advantage-of-law-students/.
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* Transparency also addresses-and resolves-the mismatch ques-
tion, by transforming it from an academic debate into a simple matter of
choice. If students admitted with very large preferences to a higher-
ranked school learn, through disclosure, that their prospects at that school
seem worse (at least in some respects) than their prospects at a lower-
ranked school, they can evaluate the tradeoff for themselves. If a signifi-
cant number of students begin to reject more elite schools for less-elite
ones, this will cause the more elite schools to re-evaluate their practices.
Moreover, simply disclosing the often-dismal facts about outcomes for
students receiving large preferences will push schools to make useful
reforms to their own curricula, such as improved academic support or the
development of better predictors of long-term success. Better data also
helps schools properly calibrate preferences, by focusing their attention
on the tradeoff between preference size and student outcomes.
* 'Need' over zero-sum competition. Most law school financial aid
is spent to recruit very high-credential students, or to compete for minor-
ity (but affluent) applicants. Both efforts are essentially zero-sum enter-
prises; one school's loss is another's gain. Practice 3 pushes schools to
devote a significant part of their financial aid towards a positive-sum
effort: improving access for applicants of limited means. This helps to
put financial aid in legal education on a more principled basis; as nearly
all the commentators agree, it is better on moral grounds for schools to
use financial aid to help those in need and increase opportunity, rather
than (through merit-based aid) using aid as merely another strategy for
inching up the US News rankings. Practice 3 also helps to guard against
the possibility that law schools will cynically comply with Practice I by
making offers of admission to students who have little chance of being
able to afford to accept, in the absence of any aid. In other words, it helps
to insure that schools actually devote some portion of their growing re-
sources to foster genuine diversity.
* Focusing on the pipeline. Practice 4 follows Professor Kiel's sug-
gestion that law schools direct genuine effort toward the underlying
problems that cause racial and class enrollment disparities-generally
known as the "pipeline" problem. This resonates with Justice
O'Connor's holding in Grutter that law schools should have strategies
for reducing their dependence over time on racial preferences. Practices
(1) and (3) reinforce this focus on expanding the pipeline, by making it
more difficult and costly for law schools to solve their "diversity" prob-
lem by the simple expedient of racial preferences. (Practice 2 also makes
it harder for schools to shift the costs of preferences onto unwitting stu-
dents.) Of course, these efforts may have a very small impact relative to
the size of the problem. But the effort is important in itself, and the expe-
2011] 913
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
rience of schools such as the University of California suggest that pipe-
line initiatives can make a large difference.
Moderating preferences. Though none of the four practices man-
date that schools curtail racial preferences, each of them is likely to have
that effect over time. This should warm the hearts of those who are skep-
tical of racial preferences on a variety of moral and legal grounds, in-
cluding, of course, an apparent majority of American voters and a major-
ity of Supreme Court Justices. But that should not be in itself a reason for
those who support preferences to reject this approach. These practices all
go to the heart of the best motivations behind preferences-to foster mo-
bility, inclusion, and genuine diversity-while recognizing that racial
preferences must have some logical end point. The practices each push
schools to be more thoughtful about their preference policies, a sort of
introspection that in recent years has been sadly lacking.
B. Consensus Approach: The Contributors and the Proposal
The reform strategy I have outlined is intended not only to build on
the general problems identified in CALE, but also to respond creatively
to the widely varying perspectives of the symposium contributors. Is it
possible to find reasonable areas of consensus that connect the values of
thoughtful observers, even if they require some compromise on favored
policies? That is my inquiry in this section.
Table 4 summarizes my interpretation of three key aspects in each
of the ten commentaries in this issue. For the sake of brevity I have, of
course, oversimplified the work, and I apologize for that. But there are
some genuine benefits to a direct side-by-side comparison of the authors.
75. In the wake of Proposition 209, the University of California adopted innovative, large-
scale outreach efforts to improve the rate at which disadvantaged students could qualify for univer-
sity admission. See, e.g., KARL S. PISTER, UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UC OUTREACH:
SYSTEMWIDE PERSPECTIVE AND STRATEGIC Plan (1998), available at
http://www.ucop.edulucophome/commserv/outreach/outpdfloutreach.pdf . Within a few years of
implementation, the number of blacks and Hispanics admitted to the UC undergraduate system
exceeded the numbers achieved under the old, racial preference system. It is plausible that improved
outreach played a significant role.
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Table 4
A Summary of the Commentators and Their Goals
Author Central message Reforms endorsed Consonant elements of
my proposal
(1) Taking account of
both class and race in Substantive features are
admissions; quite similar; like
It is a mistake to Bowen, I favor taking
o n entirely supplant a (2) Expanding need- wealth into account in
o n "race" discourse with based scholarships; assessing SES; not clear
a "class" discourse. how "large" a preference
(3) Better data on de- Bowen favors for par-
mography of law school ticular groups.
qitsmiarlkadmissions
(1) Taking account of H-W might well have
both class and race in concerns about any
admissionsmodification of racial
Law schools should preferences, but the spirit
Holley- foster SES diversity, (2) Better data and ogmy s r
Walker but not at the expense research on what policies ing SES and racial pref
of racial diversity. have biggest effect on erences, and increasing
both the class diversity transparency and evalua-




We should remedy (1) Moving towards
the neglect of "class" "a rather than
in admissions poli- my proposal as not going
Kahlenberg cies; a good deal of race" preferences; far enough, but he is very
other research is (2) Greatly improving
consonant with fin component as a step in
Sander's basic find- fancial supportfo the right direction.
ings. pro-sal studentin
Law schools should
Debates about law (f) include themes of Very close consonance
school admissions fixing the pipeline in between Kiel's values
policies overlook the institutional thinking and and those animating my
fundamental impor- rhetoric; reform proposal; as
ttance of the pipeline; discussed in accompany-
Kel w  must seek long- (2) foster research and
term improvement in focused interventions wogl text, mys ref ors
tequantity and related to the pipeline twulds alor pshescols
the towardshmore seouou
quality of both low- problem; investment in the pipe-
SES and URM line issue.
applicants. (3) modify admissions
systems to foster SES
diversity.
Sander interestingly
highlights the lack of
SES diversity in law Further research is
schools, but there are desirable, but for now Lempert is perhaps,
Lmet many underlying we know too little to among all the commenta-
challenges in prop- intelligently improve tori, most comfortable
erly understanding upon our current prac- with the status quo.
tclass" that make tices.
facile reforms un-
wise.
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Author Central message Reforms endorsed Consonant elements 
of
my proposal
Elite law schools should
Sander helpfully
nudges scholarship (1) increase at the mar-
and policy towards gin low-SES recruitment rlts valuesal
Malamud greater awareness of and admissions; suppots buts 
clarly
SES issues, but hismore
critiques of racial (2) reform financial aid
preferences are policies to improve focus
counterproductive, on "need" and low-to-
middle SES applicants.
While "class" diver- Law school admissions The type of SES prefer-
siyin law school is should take greater ences suggested in my
On-(2 reformafiania aid ih h
I tinkmy ropsa
desirable, it is not so account of SES diver-ale
Willig & easily achieved as sity, and strive to elimi- naottouets doubt-car
ip Sander suggests and nate subtle sources ofbuts
rfis not a substitute for bias against low-SES arthey'd support any
change in racial prefer-middeiSESiypplic . ences.
Comparisons of SES Greater SES diversity is The use of "intersection-
Reeves and racial preferences good, but it should ality" in my constructionor policies are intrin- emphasize the intersec- of SES preferences
________sically incoherent. tions race and class, should appeal to Reeves.
Law schools should Wald's proposals mesh
modify admissions
Low-SES students policies to increase SES doiv closlytierh m
disity, and srivelt ow.l mi-iulrw
are as vulnerable to dvriyanshud both emphasize the
stigma and mismatch ngorously evaluate responsibility of law
Wald as are URM students, o s schools for student
y and implement more
ve an success (which in my
should be undertaken tgsive and iuagmr- view also requires
with eyes wide open. livegaadmic toesuprht schools to be honest
both low-SES and URM about the risks entailed
admits succeed, with preferences).
Race-related disad-
vantage has an in- Implicitly, Weedon
creasingly economic favors at least a partial Weedon's normative
Weeden cast; shifting admis- shift from race-based prescription seems to fit
sions policies to- admissions preferences vey well with my rec-
wards an SES focus to SES-based prefer- ommendations.
thus has much to ences.
tgcommend it. s mat
I don't know how many of the commentators would endorse the
proposals I've advanced, but I do know that the four practices I've out-
lined reflect a genuine effort to grapple with the problems in our current
preference system while listening to the values expressed by the contrib-
uting authors. Professors Weedeon, Wald, Kiel, and Mr. Kahlenberg are
probably those most dissatisfied with the current system; they share my
basic assumption that current practices are fundamentally flawed, and
most of the reforms I suggest are more or less akin to the types of re-
forms they advance, too. Professors Bowen, Holley-Walker, and On-
wauachi-Willig, and Ms. Reeves and Ms. Fricke, all acknowledge that
the lack of socioeconomic diversity is a problem, and they support a va-
riety of strategies to try and increase it. For them, a common concern is
that "class" preferences supplant racial ones; each of them emphasizes,
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in one way or another, that race creates special barriers in society, and
that racial diversity has a uniquely important role in legal education. I
think they tend to overestimate this point (as I have elaborated in Part I)
and underestimate the costs of racial preferences (as I will discuss in Part
IV), but I nonetheless have some sympathy for their argument. Moreo-
ver, I think the values they emphasize can be reflected in reform propos-
als that give schools considerable leeway in using racial preferences,
while structuring the implementation in a way that erodes the most dam-
aging practices. I also believe that I recognize the intersections of class
and race, and, as Practice 1 emphasizes, it is important to design socio-
economic preferences in ways that capture the special SES disadvantages
experienced by many nonwhites (particularly blacks).
Many of the symposium contributors believe that better information
and thoughtful research are necessary and important; both my transpar-
ency proposal (Practice 2) and the "pipeline" initiative (Practice 4, bor-
rowed directly from Professor Kiel) foster just this sort of information
and purposeful investigation. Section C of this Part, infra, discusses
what we know about the pipeline in more detail.
For many of the symposium contributors, and no doubt for many
readers, any disquiet about the lack of SES diversity (or the other prob-
lems I've suggested exist in the current system) is overshadowed by a
general contentment with things as they are, and a belief that outside
forces are unlikely to preempt the discretion of law schools to make re-
forms when and if they choose. How one feels about my proposal, in
other words, may depend significantly on how much outside pressure
there is to change. Faced with a Prop 209-like ballot initiative that seeks
to ban racial preferences altogether, or with a Supreme Court poised to
apply the philosophy of Seattle School District or Adarand to higher
education preferences, my proposal would probably be appealing to
many who otherwise would prefer the status quo.
I don't think law schools can afford to be complacent. The rising
cost of law school and the weakness of the legal market create pressure
for reform. Evidence of the mismatch effect continues to mount (see Part
IV). Because of this, the legitimacy of a preference system that is entirely
focused on race, and creates barriers to low-SES students, will continue
to erode. A broader conversation about reform is not only the right thing
to do; it is the smart thing to do.
C. Is Class Diversity Feasible?
Some of the commentators suggest that class-based preferences are
impractical because there are too few low-SES students available for law
schools to admit. As I noted in CALE, it is certainly true that pipeline
issues play a large role in the dearth of socioeconomic diversity in legal
education. But if law schools shift from being part of the problem to be-
ing part of the solution, there is little danger of shortages, even if class-
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based preferences are far smaller (as they should be) than those currently
used in race-based affirmative action.
It is helpful to think of the "pipeline" problem as having five dis-
tinct aspects:
a) The narrowing effect of social inequality in the formative years-
that is, the ways that poor primary schooling, parenting practices, and a
myriad of other social factors shrink the number of high school students
with the academic preparation necessary to succeed at challenging col-
leges and graduate schools.
b)The effect of aspirations-the degree to which social conditions
cause more privileged students to want, and therefore to pursue, more
privileged occupations, while less privileged students settle for jobs that
seem more "realistic" and attainable, given the hurdles in their path.
c) The effect of colleges-the degree to which undergraduate insti-
tutions effectively recruit the available talent and insure that baccalaure-
ate programs at least do not have the effect of further narrowing the pipe-
line;
d)The effect of law school policy-the degree to which law school
admissions and outreach practices further narrow or expand the pipeline.
e) The effect of financial assistance-in economic terms, how "elas-
tic" is the supply of low-SES students of high promise, given greater or
lesser degrees of financial assistance?
In CALE, I provided some evidence on points (d) and (e). Law
school admission practices tend to undercut rather than promote SES
diversity, and current law school financial aid policies largely ignore
economic need. In this section, I will provide some evidence on (a), (b)
and (c).
a) Academic preparation across class lines.
Academic preparation among high school students, as measured by
various types of test scores, is strongly correlated with SES. Does the
underrepresentation of low-SES students in law school simply reflect the
scarcity of academically strong candidates in their ranks?
The National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), which I have
drawn upon for data earlier in this paper and in CALE, is a good source
for considering this question. It started in 1988 with a large national
sample of eighth-graders and tracked them over the next twelve years.
Participants took a battery of tests in their high school years. Table 5
summarizes the relevant findings:
76. NELS is discussed in CALE's Appendix 2; additional documentation is available here:
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88/.
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Table 5
High-Performing Students in Two Socioeconomic Groups
Socioeconomic group
Testing threshold: Bottom Top
half tenth
Proportion of students scoring at the 94th per- 1.5% 22%
centile plus
Number of students scoring at the 94th percen- _30,000 -88,000
tile plus
Proportion of students scoring at the 80th per- 8.5% 54%
centile plus
Number of students scoring at the 80th percen- ~170,000 ~216,000
tile plus
Source: Author's calculations from NELS. The "number" estimates
assume an annual cohort of four million students, roughly the recent an-
nual average of 8th graders.
These numbers should be viewed as rough estimates, but they make
the point well enough. Academic preparation certainly does explain part
of the gap in SES representation in law school; low-SES students are far
less likely to have top scores than very high-SES students. But by the
same token, there are numerically a lot of high-performing, low-SES
students.
There is every reason to think that the low-SES students who score
in high school at the 94th percentile nationally, or above, would develop
into college students fully qualified to enter the most elite law schools;
certainly those schools currently admit many students who, even in their
twenties, do not have credentials at the 94 th percentile of a national pool.
For every three very-high-SES NELS students at the 94th percentile,
there is one low-SES student with comparable scores. Yet at the elite law
schools, the ratio of very-high-SES students to low-SES students is 11:1.
In other words, even if we assume that attending college would not nar-
row the academic preparation gap of high- and low-SES students, and
even if we assumed that no preferences were used by law schools to ad-
mit low-SES students, the pool of raw talent among low-SES students
still overshadows their presence in elite law schools.
Similarly, it is a conservative estimate to suggest that high school
students who score in the 80th percentile are on the path to being aca-
demically competitive for a place in the broader spectrum of law schools.
In relative terms, low-SES students are still underrepresented compared
to those from the SES top tenth; but the relative gap is narrower, and the
absolute gap has almost disappeared (the absolute ratio is about 6:5). Yet
in the actual law school population (see Table 1 in CALE), the ratio of
very-high-SES students to low-SES students is well over 2:1. In other
words, a very conservative approach to controlling for academic prepara-
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tion still suggests dramatic underrepresentation of very able but low-SES
students.
b) Aspirations: Do low-SES students want to go to law school?
Dr. Lempert suggests that the pipeline of low-SES students is quite
slim, in part because low-SES students do not aspire to go to law school
in anything like the same numbers as high-SES students.77 As evidence,
he cites the same data source (the Warkov study) that I used in CALE to
examine law school SES diversity in the 1960s. Warkov's research is
very valuable in studying historical trends (as I use it), but it is hardly a
reliable source for making claims about contemporary conditions.
Moreover, the specific data and tables Lempert relies on are not at all
designed to answer the question of interest. The Warkov data shows that
among freshmen college students in the late 1950s, those who reported
that they intended to pursue a graduate degree in law had more elite
backgrounds than those who expressed no such goal. The data do not tell
us, even for this distant era, answers to more relevant questions: among
the most talented young people, how many would aspire to become law-
yers (or other professionals) if they could see a realistic path to the goal?
What might be the pattern of aspirations if we could set aside financial
and admissions barriers, or counsel them on their chances of admission
to law school given their current academic level of achievement?
Lempert suggests that 'alas, better data does not exist,' but in this he
is surely mistaken. An abundance of surveys, such as the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth and the National Educational Longitudinal
Survey, ask far more recent cohorts of high school students and college
freshmen about their career aspirations, and have much richer back-
ground data on respondents than one can obtain from the Warkov tables.
I consulted one source, a College Board dataset on SAT takers, that I
happen to be using for another project, and summarize the results of my
inquiry here. High school students who take the SAT complete a ques-
tionnaire in their initial application which asks them, among many other
things, about their highest degree aspiration. These answers are
anonymized and combined with the results of their SAT I and SAT II
examinations into large databases; researchers can request extracts of
these data. My research team obtained a large extract originally created
for the economists David Card and Alan Krueger, which Professor Card
generously (and with College Board's permission) shared with us.78
77. Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENv. U.L. REV.
683, 702 (2011).
78. High school students who take the SAT complete a questionnaire in their initial applica-
tion to the College Board which asks them, among many other things, about their highest degree
aspiration. These answers are anonymized and combined with the results of their SAT I and SAT II
examinations into large databases; researchers can request extracts of these data. My research team
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Table 6 presents data on the degree aspirations of different pools of
high school students taking the SAT. The SES quintiles used here are
constructed by methods similar to those I applied in CALE to the AJD
data, except that in the College Board data, we have information onfam-
ily income rather than parents' occupations (both data sets have informa-
tion on the highest degree obtained by mother and father).
Table 6
Degree aspirations of low- and high-SES high school students
Degree Bottom SES quintile Top SES quintile
Aspiration All SAT- SAT-takers w/ All SAT- SAT-takers w/
takers math SAT >650 takers math SAT>650
Doctoral 18% 35% 26% 42%
Master's 27% 33% 34% 32%
Bachelor's 27% 14% 21% 9%
Lower/other 7% 2% 2% 0%
Undecided 21% 16% 17% 17%
Source: College Board Sample of High School Juniors Taking the SAT,
with Questionnaire and Score Data, 1994-2001.
The data show a remarkable similarity in the aspirations of high-
and low-SES students, especially among those with high test scores-
that is, those who would meet the "academic preparation" test laid out in
the previous section. Table 6 does not support Lempert's intuition that
low-SES students have dramatically lower aspirations than high-SES
students.
c) The Role of Colleges.
Every scholar who has closely examined the question has concluded
that low-SES students are extremely underrepresented at elite schools,
whether those schools are public or private. Young people growing up in
the top SES quartile are some twenty times as likely to attend such as
school as are their bottom SES quartile counterparts. The proportion of
enrolled students qualifying for Pell Grants hovers around 10-12% at
nearly all the elite undergraduate colleges in the nation.7 9
The notion that this simply reflects an inadequate supply of strong
low-SES students is belied by the record of the University of California,
where (as noted in CALE) the two most elite undergraduate schools have
Pell Grant rates of 32% (at Berkeley) and 33% (at UCLA).so The obsta-
cles to SES diversity at elite colleges are similar to the obstacles at law
obtained a large extract originally created for the economists David Card and Alan Krueger, which
Professor Card generously (and with College Board's permission) shared with us.
79. Pell Grants are federal scholarships available, roughly speaking, to students in the bottom
half of the income distribution. They are discussed in more detail at CALE, supra note 1, at 641
n.29.
80. See CALE, supra note 1, at notes 28 & 30.
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schools: limited outreach, a focus on racial diversity to the neglect of
SES diversity, and inadequate financial aid-though on all three counts I
believe the record at many elite schools is now far better than the record
at nearly all law schools.
One way of getting a sense of college outreach practices is to meas-
ure the likelihood that the most able high school students in different
socioeconomic and racial groups will send their SAT scores to elite insti-
tutions. The College Board data allows us to do this, and the results of
one analysis are shown in Table 7. Note that this data describes the
score-sending behavior of students with aggregate SAT scores (math and
verbal combined) of 1200 or higher-roughly the top tenth of SAT tak-
ers, and a group that is plausibly competitive for even the top schools.
Table 7
Probability of Students Sending SAT Scores to a Very Elite
College Among 1999 SAT-takers Scoring Above 1200
SES quintile Asians Blacks Hispanics Whites
Lowest 34% 4% 8% 14%
2nd 37% 8% 16% 14%
3rd 41% 15% 22% 18%
4th 47% 25% 30% 22%
Highest 61% 48% 45% 34%
Source: Author's calculations with College Board cross-section data-
base. Colleges include the Ivy League, Duke, and Stanford.
The patterns in Table 7 are telling. Socioeconomic status plays an
enormous role in determining which students apply to elite schools.
Large numbers of very able but low-SES high school students are never
admitted to elite schools because they are never make it into the appli-
cant pool. The class disparities are more intense for Hispanics and most
intense for African-Americans. These numbers, at least, suggest that a
greater focus on SES in outreach and "pipeline" efforts would dispropor-
tionately benefit low-income underrepresented minorities. Recall our
earlier finding that, even after controlling for test scores, low-SES high
school graduates are 80% less likely to attend college than high-SES
graduates, while blacks are 30% more likely to attend college than simi-
lar whites. Table 7 seems to be telling much the same story, in a slightly
different context: high-SES blacks are more likely to be in the applicant
pool than comparable whites, while low-SES persons of all races are
largely missing.
What does this review tell us about the relative importance of the
five factors (identified at the beginning of this section) in narrowing the
pipeline of opportunity for low-SES youths? There is not much evidence
that low aspirations are the problem. The size of the "strongly academi-
cally prepared" pool is obviously a factor, but a huge gap remains after
adjusting for the size of the talent pool. Inadequate outreach by higher
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education appears to be a very large factor, and, as we saw in CALE, law
school admissions and financial aid practices are large factors as well.
Although this paper does not attempt a precise forecast of what would be
necessary to achieve particular low-and-moderate SES enrollment goals,
I think this discussion makes clear that simply overhauling aid and out-
reach policies to address "class" disparities would, by itself, probably
make a substantial difference. Pipeline initiatives reaching high school
students, and very modest preferences (equivalent to two or three LSAT
points) would make an even larger difference. The bottom line: this is a
problem where college and professional school policies matter, and they
matter a lot.
PART III: RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC CRITIQUES
A. Methodological Issues
In general, the commentators in this issue agree that CALE does a
fair job of capturing the SES distribution of law students and young law-
yers. In particular, there is a good deal of consensus that the data cap-
tures a genuine lack of SES diversity at law schools, which increases
with the eliteness of the law school.
There are some dissonant notes, and in this section I will address
them.
Dr. Lempert points out that my primary data source, After the JD
(AJD), is based on a sample of young lawyers-that is, people who have
actually graduated and passed the bar-rather than law students.8 ' If low-
SES students are more likely to drop out of law school or fail the bar,
then lawyers as a group would be more elite than law students, and my
measures would understate the level of SES diversity within law
schools.82
It is a fair point, but one that's easily addressed. The Bar Passage
Study (BPS) from the 1990s contains an enormous sample of first-year
law students, and thus avoids the weakness Lempert identifies in the
AJD. I did not rely primarily on the BPS in constructing my SES indices
because the BPS is somewhat older data (it tracks a cohort six years
older than the median AJD respondent) and, more importantly, because it
has much less detailed data on parental occupation. But the data on pa-
rental education was collected in very similar fashion by the BPS and
81. Lempert, supra note 77, at 694-95.
82. Id.
83. The Bar Passage Study ("BPS") was a longitudinal study of law students conducted by the
Law School Admissions Council in the 1990s. It tracked over twenty-seven thousand students from
matriculation to law school in 1991 through their efforts to pass the bar in the mid-1990s. All par-
ticipants completed a detailed "entering student questionnaire", from which this socioeconomic data
is drawn. The survey covered roughly eighty percent of all law students at roughly ninety percent of
all law schools, providing an excellent sample for the purposes discussed here. It is certainly not
subject to any of the selection bias problems identified by Dr. Lempert.
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AJD, and thus can provide an ideal check on whether the AJD data gives
a misleading picture. Table 8 summarizes the comparison:
Table 8
Distribution of Parental Education AJD
National Sample Compared to BPS Entering Law Students
Top Educational AJD BPS AJD BPS
Level Completed Mothers Mothers Fathers Fathers
Grade school 2.5% 2.5% 3.3% 2.9%
Some high school 3.2% 3.3% 3.4% 3.5%
High school grad 22.1% 22.3% 14.9% 12.8%
Trade school 4.7% 5.6% 3.9% 3.7%
Associate degree 16.6% 19.7% 11.8% 10.1%
Bachelor's deg 24.6% 21.7% 18.8% 18.7%
Some grad school 4.3% 6.2% 4.1% 5.6%
Grad/prof degree 22.1% 19.4% 39.9% 40.0%
Source: Author's calculations based on AJD and BPS datasets
While the AJD and BPS distributions are not identical, they are ex-
traordinarily similar. AJD mothers are slightly more likely to have fin-
ished college than their BPS counterparts, 4 but AJD fathers are slightly
less likely to have finished college. There is no evidence here that limita-
tions in the AJD are leading us to overstate the SES eliteness of law stu-
dents.
Dr. Lempert also wonders whether missing observations in the AJD
bias the data: "I am concerned that his SES index is less reliable when it
is based on two measures rather than four."85 This too is a reasonable
concern; in particular, one might wonder whether respondents who only
report two measures (and in some cases come from single-parent fami-
lies) have much lower SES measures than those who report four meas-
ures. Table 9 shows the median SES index computed from respondents,
depending on how many of the four SES questions they answered. (Note
that the relatively small number of respondents who provided only one
response were excluded from my analyses in CALE, from the same con-
cern Lempert identifies.) While it is likely true that indices based on
fewer measures are somewhat less reliable, there's no evidence in Table
9 that this defect biases the general SES analysis upwards or downwards.
84. And the small gap is plausibly due to the slightly older cohort.
85. Lempert, supra note 77, at 690-91.
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Table 9
Median "SES Index" by Number of SES Questions Answered in AJD
Number ofanswers Median SES





Source: Author's calculations from AJD data
Onwachi-Willig and Fricke (O-W&F) are perhaps, among the con-
tributors, most skeptical of my SES analysis. They raise an interesting
point: is it possible to really compare the socioeconomic status of differ-
ent racial groups, since race is part of one's SES?86 Analytically, the an-
swer is "yes": the whole point of social analysis is to break down social
phenomenon into different components and try to understand how they
interact. (One could similarly argue that "income" and "education" are
inseparable-certainly how one uses one's income depends in part on
one's level and type of education. But that doesn't mean one can't use-
fully examine each apart from the other, and study how they interact.) In
another sense, O-W&F have a point: as I have discussed a number of
times, the SES measures in CALE tend to overstate black SES, because
blacks at a given education or income level typically have less wealth
and live in poorer neighborhoods than similar whites. (But these limita-
tions can be and are overcome in well-executed class-based admissions
systems.)
The most important flaw in O-W&F's argument, however, is that
the effect of race on one's social condition clearly varies with one's other
socioeconomic characteristics. If one is in the bottom two quintiles of
SES, one's circumstances are generally far less dire if one is white than if
one is black. The interaction of "race" and "low SES" amplifies many
types of problems for blacks-and for Hispanics to a large degree. In
contrast, as I discuss in Part I-C, the effect of race on blacks in the top
quintile of SES is much more ambiguous. High-SES blacks generally
have good access to mainstream opportunities and networks, and have
the added advantage of race-specific networks. They absorb a very dis-
proportionate share of all the race-related preferences extended in educa-
tion, employment, and other spheres; controlling for human capital char-
acteristics, they tend to out-earn other races, especially early in their ca-
reers. This is exactly why it is important to compare "race" and "class"
effects.
86. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting:
What's in a Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (2011).
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Onwachi-Willig and Fricke also argue that my SES analysis is
deeply flawed because of improper classifications and analytic choices.
They say:
In deciding where to insert 'meaningful breaks', as Malamud would
describe them, Professor Sander has created a misleadingly heavily
weighted high SES scheme. For example, a female registered nurse is
accorded an occupational score of 75 out of 100, which places her in
the high SES quartile. Such a placement does not seem to accord
with what the average person would consider high SES . . . by creat-
ing such a broad category of high SES persons, Professor Sander
conflates the privilege of high SES persons by race, considering that
Blacks heavily populate the occupations at the bottom end of that
quartile. Indeed, Sander's misleading SES scheme has far-reaching
implications all throughout this analysis because we cannot be certain
if any of his groupings are accurate and meaningful and thus cannot
truly rely on any comparisons that he makes between the various ra-
cial and class groups.
There are three claims here. First, is the "75" SES score assigned to
registered nurses too high, and thus a sign that the SES coding scheme is
unreliable? No, it is not. Registered nurses88 complete, on average, sev-
eral years of college-level training; many consider an "R.N." degree to
be roughly comparable to a bachelor's, and many R.N.s independently
hold bachelor degrees. More concretely, registered nurses have high
earnings: in 2009, the median female registered nurse had earnings of
$60,000, putting her at the 80th percentile of all women earners.89 There
is no evidence that the "75" score is inappropriate. Second, are these SES
scores a "Sander scheme"? No, they are not. As I explain in detail in the
CALE appendices, my SES methodologies are based on the most authori-
tative indices developed by social science scholars-primarily sociolo-
gists in England and the United States.90 These indices are basic tools of
the trade for scholars studying social stratification. Third, are the results
in CALE deceptively influenced by a strategic choice of "break points"?
No, they are not. O-W&F's argument implies that, for example, a par-
ticularly high number of black law students are swept into the "75 th to
90t percentile" range because they have SES values at the bottom end of
this range. In fact, the median law student in all the cells of Tables 1 and
8 of CALE has an SES score that is higher than the midpoint of the cell.
Consider, for example, the third data cell in the fourth data column of
CALE's Table 8 which reports that among black law students at the top
87. Id. at 812-13.
88. Note that there are several occupational tiers of nurses; vocational nurses are assigned
lower scores for occupational prestige than registered nurses, while nurse practitioners are assigned
somewhat higher scores.
89. Author's analysis of data contained in: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURvEY (2009).
90. See CALE, supra note 1, at 670 app. 1.
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two tiers of law schools, 23% have SES scores in the 75th to 90th percen-
tile range, and 43% have SES scores in the 9 0 th to 9 9 th range.91 The me-
dian score of the blacks in the first group is at the 84 th percentile, and the
median score of the blacks in the second group is at the 9 6 th percentile.
9 2
In other words, my groupings are understating the "average" actual
eliteness of these students. Indeed, because of the top-skewness of the
law student SES distribution, any broad grouping will understate the
actual eliteness of these students.
B. On the Visibility of Class
In CALE's comparison of race and class preferences, I wrote:
Moreover, [class-based preferences] are "invisible": once students
have matriculated to a law school, no one can readily tell which of
the others have received a preference. Both the small size and the in-
visibility of these preferences are advantages. Students receiving
such preferences are much less likely to be stigmatized and, indeed,
may not even be aware that they have received a preference. They
are also likely to perform scholastically at levels close to the middle
of the class, a good thing both for them and for the academic atmos-
phere of the school. There is much less likely to be group self-
segregation or the nourishment of group resentment, which some-
times happens with strictly race-based preferences.93
Professor Wald builds his comment largely around this passage. He
argues that class identity is not only palpable, but that "socioeconomic
preferences are going to be as visible as race preferences"; that "socio-
economic preferences will impose similar, if not higher costs" on their
recipients; and that the "social and cultural capital" of students (which
Wald thinks are closely associated with their SES) "have a considerable
impact" on the careers of these students.
Some of Wald's language makes me bristle a bit. I thought it was
clear from my essay (see the quoted passage) that I meant "invisibility"
in a relative, not an absolute sense. Certainly, if I thought class was a
completely invisible trait, I should not place so much importance on SES
diversity in the first place. And much of the lessened visibility I associate
with the use of SES preferences comes from their smaller size; Wald
seems to assume that I propose simply replacing existing racial prefer-
ences with similar SES preferences. I do not.94 Still, Wald was not the
91. Id. at 651 tbl.8.
92. Calculations by the author from the CALE data; original data available from the author.
93. CALE, supra note 1, at 665-66 (emphasis added).
94. As I have written many times, and repeat again in CALE (see page 666), the mismatch
effect is not caused by racial preferences but by large preferences. If law schools instituted SES
preferences on the scale currently used for blacks and American Indians, this would have the same
counterproductive effects on low-SES students that are currently experienced by those racial minori-
ties. But I think it quite unlikely that any school would ever extend widespread SES preferences on
the scale of many current racial preferences. This is, in large part, because one can achieve substan-
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only commentator to interpret my observation about "invisibility" as a
strong claim, so I am grateful to him for highlighting the issue and giving
me an opportunity to clarify my views. More importantly, Wald is rais-
ing intrinsically interesting issues.
On most of these matters, I completely agree with Wald. We agree
that any preference system needs to vigilantly monitor the academic out-
comes of beneficiaries, and that admissions systems should be modified,
or effective academic support instituted (and itself monitored for results)
if preferenced students are performing poorly. We also agree that finan-
cial support is vital, and perhaps special orientation programs are impor-
tant to contribute to the success of students who will have few role mod-
els from their own past to help them decipher the culture of law school
and the legal profession.
I do not believe, as Wald fears I do, that students and faculty will be
unaware of the greater class diversity in the student body, or that all or
even most low-SES students will seamlessly "pass" as elite and privi-
leged. Like Wald, I think those would be both unlikely and undesirable
outcomes. As I point out in Part I, low-SES students are much more
likely to bring different attitudes and viewpoints to law school than their
affluent peers. These different views will come out in class and hallway
discussions, as will the greater range of life experiences and hardships in
the more diverse student body. This is all very much to the good.
Thus, in our assessment of the failings of the current affirmative ac-
tion system, and in our values and goals, Wald and I seem to be as one.
Our disagreements mainly lie in two matters that are not values but rather
empirical judgments: first, just how "visible" SES status is at law school,
and second, how much low-SES students are handicapped simply by vir-
tue of their background in their legal careers. Wald provides little em-
pirical evidence on these points, and I think the available evidence sup-
ports contrary views.
Careful surveys that ask individuals to place themselves in the SES
hierarchy find a relatively low correlation between objectively-measured
SES and self-identified SES.9 ' That is, even though SES has very power-
ful effects on many life outcomes in the United States, Americans are not
terribly class-conscious. This carries over into law school. Low-SES
tial SES diversity with small preferences (see the analysis in Part I, as well as the UCLA law school
experiment, where the school achieved very high SES diversity with preferences that were, on aver-
age, one-fifth the size of its earlier racial preferences for blacks and American Indians. The smaller
preferences, as I tried to make clear in CALE, are an important contributor to the lower visibility of
SES preference recipients.
95. For example, the General Social Survey asks respondents questions (e.g., about education,
occupation and income) that allow us to assign them an SES score. It also asks them a couple of
questions about how they would describe their own "class" (e.g., "working," "middle," "upper-
middle"). If we rank-order these self-assigned classes, they correlate poorly with the objective meas-
ure of SES (correlations are generally under .25). For the source data, see supra note 59.
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students do not perceive higher levels of student tension than other stu-
dents. I doubt that any law professor or student can pick out low-SES
students with anything approaching the accuracy with which they can
make racial classifications. When UCLA was at the zenith of its SES
diversity efforts, there were no visible signs of class hostility, and study
groups appeared to be far more integrated across class lines than they had
ever been across racial lines (though these last observations are based on
very casual empiricism). Moreover, UCLA's historically highest bar
passage rate was achieved by its most socioeconomically diverse class-
the class of 2000 that I wrote about in 1998. All of these things imply
that "stigma" and segregation is not likely to be as severe with a system
of modest class preferences as it is with current, large racial preferences.
The question of how SES affects the careers of lawyers is fascinat-
ing and important. As it happens, my colleague Jane Yakowitz and I re-
cently completed a major study of how well law school eliteness, law
school grades, and social class predict success as a lawyer.9 7 We found
that law school performance (as measured by grades) has the largest im-
pact on outcomes, and that its impact has grown over time. Law school
eliteness has a somewhat less important, and diminishing effect. Social
class was undeniably quite important at one point-certainly as late as
the 1950s 98-but its significance has declined over time and is undetect-
able in contemporary datasets. 99 This is completely consistent with the
anecdotal evidence from practicing lawyers. Social stratification within
the legal profession was once endemic, but attitudes and practices with
respect to race, religion, and class have all progressed remarkably over
the past forty years. Because of these changed attitudes, low-SES law-
yers are no longer handicapped, to any measureable degree, in pursuing
their careers, including careers at elite law firms. Ironically, the barriers
to class mobility for would-be lawyers are not in the marketplace, but in
higher education.
C. Knocking Down a Few Over-the-Top Claims
In most of this reply article, I have responded to the more critical
essays indirectly, by elaborating on the available research, suggesting
new ways of looking at old debates, and emphasizing areas of common
ground. In some cases, however, fundamental views of particular critics
are based on mistaken evidence, and it would be counterproductive to let
those claims pass without rebuttal. This section dissects some of those
claims.
96. The UCLA class of 2000 had a bar passage rate of 90% on the July 2000 California bar
exam. Its bar passage rate on the prior three July exams-the last three years of conventional race-
based affirmative action-had averaged under 82%.
97. Sander & Yakowitz, supra note 45.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Id. at tbl. 11 and accompanying text.
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For example, in explaining his skepticism about class-based admis-
sions preferences, Richard Lempert gives a dismissive account of the
UCLA Law School experiment in using SES preferences after Proposi-
tion 209 went into effect in 1997:
[T]he students enrolled through this program were overwhelmingly
Asian, who benefited from the fact that their parents who were often
immigrants raised in other cultures who had limited formal education
and resided in relatively impoverished if culturally rich immigrant
communities... .only five black students enrolled ... and Hispanic en-
rollment was also way down. Because of these outcomes the faculty
decided to discontinue the experiment.,too
Lempert says he got these facts from an oral presentation he heard
some years ago. Probably his anonymous, oral source was misinformed;
possibly Lempert's memory is faulty; what we know for sure is that his
facts are wrong. Out of 269 applicants admitted to UCLA Law School in
1997 with SES preferences, only fifty, or 19%, were Asian.o10 Over the
prior seven admissions cycles at UCLA-before the SES program be-
gan-Asians had made up an average of 15.5% of admitted students.10
Asians thus did only slightly better under the SES system than under
conventional admissions; it is wildly inaccurate to suggest that Asian-
Americans were the "overwhelming" beneficiaries of the program. His-
panics made up 17% of those admitted with SES preferences; they ac-
counted for 9.8% of overall admissions in the prior seven cycles. 03
Blacks made up 5.2% of those admitted with SES preferences. UCLA's
black and Hispanic enrollment numbers were hurt some because the SES
preferences we used were smaller than our traditional racial preferences;
thus our black admittees, in particular, had competing offers from more
elite schools.10 4 Nonetheless, UCLA's black enrollment was ten stu-
dents-not five, as Lempert claims. Furthermore, black and Hispanic
enrollment combined made up 12.8% of the first-year class 0 5-a re-
markable achievement in the first year of a regime that used no racial
preferences. The faculty did not "abandon" the SES experiment after one
year; it shifted instead to a system of using subjective rather than objec-
100. Lempert, supra note 77, at 19-20.
101. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472,496-97 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. Average enrollments of minorities during the six years before Prop 209 went into
effect were 9.7% black, 14.1% Hispanic, and 16.7% Asian.
104. This point is elaborated in Sander, supra note 101, at 492.
105. Id. The enrollment figures can be independently verified in a number of sources, such as
the admissions statistics compiled by the University of California Office of the President (copy on
file with the author).
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tive evaluations of socioeconomic disadvantage,10 6 which (as some of us
warned) did lead to significant declines in minority enrollment.
Deirdra Bowen makes some inaccurate claims about law school ra-
cial preferences and black enrollment. She claims, without any direct
evidence, that "it is really only in [the] top ten law schools that one finds
the most aggressive use of affirmative action."' 0 7 This is not true; as I
showed in Systemic Analysis, very large racial preferences are used in
every tier of American law schools except among the "historically mi-
nority" schools. 0 8 Indeed, the very top law schools tend to have more
black and Hispanic students with small preferences because these
schools, unlike all others, do not have their top minority candidates suc-
tioned up by more elite schools.' 09
Bowen also claims that black and Mexican-American enrollments
in law schools have been eroding away over the past fifteen years." 0 She
does have a source for this claim: Conrad Johnson, a law professor at
Columbia who conducted a study in collaboration with the Society of
American Law Teachers (SALT)."' Unfortunately, Professor Johnson's
study was bogus: he made a variety of research errors that invalidated
nearly all of his results. The Law School Admissions Council issued a
statement disclaiming Johnson's results," 2 and even SALT backed away
from the study. In point of fact, black law school enrollment rose some
from 1992-94 to 2006-08, and Hispanic enrollments (of which Mexican-
Americans make up the largest share) jumped a dramatic 38%. It is
equally untrue that black law students are rejected from law schools at
"double" the white rate; because of racial preferences, blacks are many
106. Under the objective system, UCLA measured four "household" and three "neighborhood"
characteristics of each applicant, and used an algorithm to assess overall socioeconomic disadvan-
tage. Under the subjective system (which, in my judgment, was less effective), admissions officers
read essays and looked at each individual's reported statistics, and developed an intuitive judgment
about socioeconomic disadvantage.
107. Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race &
Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 751, 768 (2011).
108. Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 416. Using the Bar Passage Study data, I calculated
the black-white gap as measured by a standard academic index; the gap was 170 points among the
most elite schools; in the next four tiers, the gap was, respectively, 174 points, 202 points, 165
points, and 172 points. Only in the sixth tier, of historically minority schools, was the gap signifi-
cantly smaller.
109. See id. at 417.
110. Bowen, supra note 107, at 769-70.
111. See id.
112. See Statement from Stephen T. Schreiber, Exec, Vice President, Law School Admissions
Council (Jan. 14, 2010) (on file with author) available at http://www.saltlaw.org/userfiles. Unfortu-
nately, Johnson's inaccurate findings got wide play in a January issue of the New York Times. See
Tamar Levin, Law School Admissions Lag Among Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/education/07law.html. When I wrote to Tamar Lewin, the
author of the Times article, pointing out the inaccuracies, she expressed "hope" that the Times "will
do a better job" next time. No published correction was forthcoming. Email from Tamar Lewin, New
York Times Correspondent, to the author (February 2, 2010) (on file with author).
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times more likely to be admitted at nearly every American law school
than are whites with comparable credentials' 13
Near the conclusion of CALE, I write "In the age of Obama, there is
abundant evidence that upper-middle-class minorities have made dra-
matic gains over the past fifty years, and experience genuine access to
mainstream American institutions. There are still significant problems
for these groups . . . but in most ways the landscape has been trans-
formed since 1960.',114 In a confusing passage, Arin Reeves misquotes
me and implies that I believe that Barack Obama's election, by itself,
demonstrates that full racial equality has been achieved in America. In
fact, I advance neither the premise nor the conclusion Reeves suggests.
Like Eugene Robinson and Ellis Cose, I see President Obama's election
as a symbol and metaphor of black progress, but not, by itself, a fact
upon which any particular racial policy should be built. The story of how
racial disparities have evolved, and what this evolution implies for law
school admissions policies, is complex, and much of CALE and this es-
say aim to provide a coherent version of this story.
Reeves makes a related point that requires comment. She suggests
that Franklin Roosevelt's election to the presidency in 1932 said as much
about public attitudes towards disability as Barack Obama's election in
113. See Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 409; Jane Yakowitz & Richard H. Sander, Lifting
the Veil on Law School Admissions, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Much of
Bowen's article seems to either miss the point of my arguments in CALE, or insinuates, without
providing evidence, that I'm misleading readers. For example, she writes that my discussion of
admissions at the University of Missouri at Columbia ("UMC") "indicts students of color. . . .
Sander goes into great detail offering the gradation of scores and the odds that a white student was
admitted within a certain range, but does not offer the same data regarding students of color." There
are two misrepresentations here. The point of my discussion of UMC's admissions is not to "indict"
black students, but to give the reader insight into both the mechanical use of race by law schools
admissions officers and the focus of these officers on admitting those blacks with the highest scores,
not the blacks who would most enhance "diversity" at the school. I use fewer categories in discuss-
ing black admissions at UMC than white admissions, because there were only two relevant catego-
ries for blacks in the admissions cycle I discuss: 93% of blacks with an academic index above 44
(UMC's scale) were admitted, and 100% of blacks with an academic index below 44 were rejected
(as noted in CALE, whites were rarely admitted with index scores below 58). Bowen goes on, "The
reader is left to wonder, how many black students applied? What were their scores? Were they all
lower than the white students? Without providing this information, Sander gives an impression that
all black students were mismatched or robbed more qualified white students of seats at UMC."
Bowen, supra note 108, at 781-82. 1 hope most readers recognize that none of my work on affirma-
tive action is concerned with whether white students are "robbed" admissions places, but rather with
how well a school's diversity objectives, and the preferenced students themselves, are served by
highly mechanical processes that focus on a single factor (race) and ignore the academic disparities
that result. Bowen (like any reader) is welcome to examine the data from UMC (or dozens of other
datasets our research gmup has collected). The data about UMC offered in CALE is sufficient to
make the point developed there. As to Bowen's other concems, here is some additional data: in the
admissions cycle I examined, UMC had forty-one black applicants for UMC's class of about one
hundred fifty. Fourteen were admitted, and seven enrolled. The median black applicant had an
index of 42. Many white applicants had even lower scores, but these were all rejected; the median
white applicant had an index of 60. The blacks who ended up enrolling from this group had a me-
dian index of 54, about eight points lower than the class median and enough, I believe, to put them at
serious risk of mismatch and bar failure.
114. CALE, supra note 1, at 668.
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2008 said about public attitudes towards race' 15 (the implication is that
prejudices simmered undiminished towards, respectively, the handi-
capped and blacks, despite the elections). This analogy is utterly falla-
cious. FDR went to great lengths to hide from the public the extent of his
disability, and he lived in an era when the press was willing to respect his
privacy (or collaborate with his deception, if you prefer). The public
knew he had suffered from polio, but it was not generally realized until
after his death that he was essentially paralyzed from the waist down.
FDR's advisers agreed, and he apparently did as well, that the public
would not accept a seriously handicapped President. 16 The Obama case
is radically different; Obama's race was a central fact of his biography,
and for legions of his supporters it was a central virtue of his candi-
dacy. 117
PART IV. REVISITING THE "MISMATCH" DEBATE
One of my central goals in this symposium was to show that the
need for reform in law school diversity policies goes far beyond the
problem of "mismatch" that I wrote about in 2004, 2005, and 2006.
Nonetheless, the question of whether and how any admissions preference
harms its intended beneficiaries looms over this discussion, and my reply
would be incomplete without a discussion of the mismatch issue.
Moreover, this is a particularly good time to examine the state of
debate on the mismatch question. 2011 has seen the publication, in the
American Economic Review, of results from what could be described as
the first large-scale, randomized experiment on the mismatch effect."'
The K-12 version of the mismatch debate is the controversy over "track-
ing"--that is, whether students should be grouped by "ability" or taught
with completely heterogeneous peers. The AER study reported on a
World Bank-funded experiment in Kenya, in which thousands of stu-
dents were randomly assigned to "tracked" classrooms or more hetero-
geneous classrooms. The authors found dramatic improvements in learn-
115. Arin N. Reeves, Race as a Red Herring? The Logical Irrelevance of the Race vs. Class
Debate, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 835, 842 (2011).
116. This issue is thoroughly discussed and documented in JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING
MOMENT: FDR'S HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE (2007).
117. Helene Cooper, Black Voters' Support for Obama Is Steady and Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/us/politics/obamas-support-among-
blacks-remains-strong.htmlpagewanted=all ("Beyond issues, many African-Americans feel an
emotional connection to Mr. Obama that seems unshakable, saying that nothing can compare with
seeing someone who looks like them in the White House."). Tim Groseclose discusses in detail
research that suggests that to the extent race factored into the 2008 presidential election, it was a net
benefit for Obama. TIM GROSECLOSE, LEFT TURN: How LIBERAL MEDIA BIAS DISTORTS THE
AMERICAN MIND 85-86 (2011).
118. Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and
the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya, 101 AM. ECON. REV.
1739 (2011). Duflo won the 2010 John Bates Clark medal, now given annually to the American
economist under the age of forty judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic
thought and knowledge.
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ing among the tracked students-improvements that occurred across the
spectrum of students. Though there are, of course, vast differences be-
tween Kenyan schoolchildren and American law students, it is notewor-
thy that all of the empirical implications of mismatch theory, including
findings about teachers "pitching" the level of instruction to the prepara-
tion level of students, held robustly in the context of a rigorous experi-
ment.
Closer to home, Duke economists recently released the second in a
series of studies" 9 that examine in detail the effects of preferences on
undergraduates at Duke; the research has tested and found strong support
for a host of 'mismatch' phenomena. So far as I know, this innovative
and thorough research has gone completely unanswered by mismatch
critics.
This year has also seen the formal retraction of earlier anti-
mismatch findings published by Katherine Barnes, a law professor at the
University of Arizona who has been one of the half-dozen leading em-
pirical critics of mismatch.120 Barnes has conceded that her earlier analy-
ses were mistaken;121 her revised analysis of data from the Bar Passage
Study (the main data source for all the major analyses, to date, of law
school mismatch) leads her to conclude that eliminating affirmative ac-
tion would have no measureable impact on the number of black lawyers.
In Barnes's model, she assumes that eliminating racial preferences would
reduce the number of blacks entering law school by 21%, so her finding
that the number of black lawyers produced by this system would not
change implies that individual blacks are doing much better in the sys-
tem. My colleagues and I calculate that her revised model implies that,
without preferences, the rate at which black law students become lawyers
goes up by 28%, and the number of black law students who fail to be-
come lawyers drops by fifty-five percent. 122 This would seem to be a
striking confirmation of the mismatch hypothesis, and it is certainly a
striking change of position by someone who had been a very harsh critic
of mismatch.
Of far more significance is the recently completed research of Doug
Williams, the Wilson Professor of Economics (and department chair) at
Sewanee: The University of the South. In two related papers, Williams
119. Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban M. Aucejoz, Hanming Fang, Kenneth I. Spenner, Does Af-
firmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence, QUANTITATIVE ECON. (forthcoming
2011); Arcidiacono et al., supra note 47.
120. Barnes's originally advanced her critique in Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action
Responsible for the Achievement Gap Between Black and White Law Students?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1759 (2007).
121. Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsible for the Achievement Gap Between
Black and White Law Students? A Correction, A Lesson, and an Update, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 791
(2011).
122. Doug Williams, Richard Sander, Marc Luppino & Roger Bolus, Revisiting Law School
Mismatch: A Comment on Barnes, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 813 (2011).
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has painstakingly analyzed the methods of every significant empirical
critique of law school mismatch.12 3 (It was through this work that the
mistakes committed by Barnes first came to light.) In every instance,
Williams's research disclosed one or multiple research flaws that ac-
counted for the original author's conclusions against mismatch. Using
each researcher's methods, Williams found that more defensible analyses
of the underlying data showed evidence that leaned towards a mismatch
interpretation, sometimes overwhelmingly so. Williams's findings are
straightforward and easy to understand and replicate. They leave very
little ground left for any critic of the mismatch effect to stand upon.
Yet the current state of knowledge about law school mismatch is not
reflected in institutional behavior. Professor Malamud writes that
"Sander has made it impossible (and rightfully so) to ignore [the possi-
bility of mismatch effects]."l 24 I wish she were right. It is true that al-
most all legal academics are aware of the fireworks occasioned by my
earlier research, but it is emphatically not true that the legal academy is
engaged in any even-handed deliberation about the mismatch issue. In-
deed, it would be more accurate to say that, at the major institutions of
the legal academy-such as the Law School Admissions Council, the
American Bar Foundation, and the American Association of Law
Schools-it is considered extremely bad form to take the mismatch hy-
pothesis seriously. If the topic of mismatch is brought up at all, it must
quickly be cast aside in a tone both conclusory and dismissive. The de-
termination to ignore the mismatch issue, and to ostracize those who
think the problem is real, is manifest. How else can one explain why, in
the six years since Systemic Analysis appeared, none of these institutions
have released new data relevant to assessing the mismatch issue or the
problem of minority bar passage? Why have none of them empanelled
neutral social scientists to evaluate and report on the mismatch debate?
On this issue, many otherwise distinguished academics have fostered an
environment in which data is inaccessible and honest debate is pro-
foundly chilled. Thus, I can think of at least one highly-regarded re-
searcher in legal academia who lost a job, at least in part, for not regard-
ing the mismatch issue with sufficient wariness. Other academics regu-
larly tell me of their concerns about being punished professionally for
engaging in mismatch research or even for investigating minority bar
123. Doug Williams, Does Affirmative Action Create Educational Mismatches in Law
Schools?, (Working Paper 2009), available at http://econ.duke.edu/~hfl4/ERID/Williams.pdf. This
paper was presented at the American Law and Economics annual meeting in 2010, and revised
version in 2011).
124. Deborah C. Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88
DENv. U. L. REv. 729, 730 n.2 (2011). Her full language on this point follows: "In my own work, I
have acknowledged that the diversity rationale pushes institutions towards a focus on their own
institutional goals, rather than on the consequences of affirmative action for the lives of its intended
beneficiaries [citation omitted]. I believe Sander has made it impossible (and rightfully so) to ignore
those consequences-although I am more persuaded by his critics on the merits of the question of
what those consequences are in fact."
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passage outcomes at their schools. One distinguished (and apolitical)
academic offered to help me with mismatch research so long as his name
was never attached to the work. I have many times been invited to give
lectures or publish articles, only to have the invitations withdrawn when
colleagues of the person making the invitation learn of it and protest.
Indeed, the Stanford Law Review staff who published Systemic Analysis
were pressured into publishing only critical response pieces, even though
distinguished academics who (in article outlines submitted to the law
review) offered more balanced assessments sought to participate.12 5 A
2008 academic conference largely devoted to the issue of raising minor-
ity bar passage rates was undoubtedly precipitated in large part by my
mismatch research, but made no attempt to address mismatch in a serious
way.1 26 The United States Civil Rights Commission conducted hearings
on the mismatch effect in 2006, issued a report containing a careful dis-
section of Systemic Analysis and the major critiques, and concluded that
the problem was a potentially serious one, requiring corrective measures
similar to the transparency recommendation I advanced in Part II. 12 But
the legal education establishment has completely ignored the report. Of-
ficials asked about the mismatch hypothesis almost automatically react
the way several contributors to this symposium did: they say something
to the effect that "it's been dealt with" and cite critiques that have, in
truth, been all but discredited. It is hard to imagine legal education offi-
cialdom ignoring any other civil rights issue in this way.
Coherent debate about law school mismatch has proven difficult in
the legal academy for reasons that are, in some degree, understandable.
Obviously, many of those who have been deeply invested in affirmative
action throughout their professional lives find it almost impossible to
contemplate the idea that preference programs at law schools systemati-
cally injure the vulnerable people they purport to help. Moreover, serious
discussion of mismatch usually involves discussion of the size of racial
preferences, the poor performance of preferenced students in law school,
and the abysmal disparities in bar passage rates across racial lines. These
facts are upsetting to many academics; some of their colleagues want to
avoid discussion simply because they know that others will be upset. Still
others conclude that the topic is so emotional that rational discussion is
impossible and that raising the subject is therefore pointless. All of this
helps to explain why the principal scholarly reaction to the mismatch
125. An editor at Stanford Law Review told me of this decision; proposed essays by James
Lindgren and William Henderson were among the more balanced responses that the journal by-
passed to focus only on very critical pieces.
126. Bar Exam Passage Conference, held in Chicago in October 2008, and sponsored by the
ABA and the Law School Admissions Council. It is described here:
http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/calendar/conferences/Bar/20Passage/barpassageagenda.html.
127. U.S. COMMIsSIoN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS:
A BRIEFING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 143 (2006), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/AALSreport.pdf.
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hypothesis has been dominated by diatribes-some clothed in empiri-
cism, some not-rather than dispassionate analysis. Robust debate, re-
lease of new relevant data, deliberative assessments by non-partisan
scholars-none of these have been in evidence.12 8
Nonetheless, the evidence that the mismatch effect is real, and is
particularly acute in law schools, continues to grow. It touches upon and
affects all of the issues raised in this symposium. It is thus appropriate to
summarize in an accessible way why every legal academic needs to pon-
der the problem. In the next few pages I lay out why the three different
ways of approaching the mismatch issue all lead to a common conclusion
that now goes unrefuted.
A. The Conceptual Demonstration
First is the empirical paradox laid out in Systemic Analysis.12 9 Black
law students perform as well in law school, or very nearly as well, as do
whites with similar entering credentials (LSAT, UGPA, and undergradu-
ate college). They also perform as well on the bar exam as do whites
with similar credentials and law school grades. Yet if we predict bar per-
formance based on pre-law credentials (LSAT and UGPA), a huge gap
opens up between blacks and whites. How can this be? According to
mismatch theory, the explanation lies in the fact that law school racial
preferences cause blacks to be clustered at the bottom of the credential
distribution at the great majority of law schools. Although blacks receiv-
ing preferences get the grades predicted by their credentials at these
schools, these grades are so low that they signify (based on later bar per-
formance) that little learning is going on. Most whites with comparable
credentials go to much less elite schools, get better grades, learn more,
and thus do far better on the bar. Confirming this pattern, we know that
at virtually all law schools, getting grades that put one's class rank in the
bottom ten percent of one's law school class (where most blacks receiv-
ing preferences end up) translates into terrible bar passage outcomes. The
mismatch hypothesis-that students with credentials far below the class
mainstream learn less, because the instruction is not "aimed" at them,
than they would learn at another school where their credentials better
match the mainstream-can explain all of these observed facts. No one
128. It is striking, for example, that law students (often minority students) at Harvard, Stanford,
New York University, Michigan, Northwestern, and Duke have organized forums or debates on law
school mismatch issues. So have nearly all of the major organizations of black lawyers. But no law
faculty at these schools (or any other "top 10" law school) has organized any kind of debate or forum
exploring the evidence for and against the mismatch effect.
129. This paragraph summarizes an argument laid out in Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at
425-54, and which is revisited and elaborated upon in Sander, supra note 48, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1963, 1966-78 (2005).
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in the entire mismatch debate has put forth any coherent alternative ac-
count. 130
Indeed, few of the critics have even attempted to explain these facts.
Ayres and Brooks, near the end of their critique, half-heartedly suggest
that "stereotype threat" might account for the patterns. 13 1 But stereotype
threat implies underperformance on tests where rumors of inferiority
distract students and undermine performance; it is thought to be most
serious on standardized exams. How then, can one explain that the black-
white grade gap is as large in legal writing classes (a finding demon-
strated from multiple data sources) as it is in timed law school exams or
the LSAT?l3 2 Katherine Barnes offers a closely-related argument: she
believes that discrimination against blacks causes lower performance.
But this account fails, for the same reason-discrimination would show
up in lower-than-expected grades in law school for blacks, or lower-than-
expected bar passage rates. Neither phenomenon appears in the data.
Moreover, research on older white students, who receive significant
preferences at many law schools, suggest that they, too, end up with low
grades and worse bar passage outcomes at schools where they face a
credential deficit.133 The fact that in six years of discussion, no one has
articulated an alternative explanation to account for even most of these
facts is, by itself, compelling evidence supportive of the mismatch hy-
pothesis.
B. The Simple Empiricism of Comparing Law Schools
The idea that mismatch might be occurring at law schools first oc-
curred to me when, at UCLA in the early 1990s, I learned that black
graduates from the school often had a fifty percent failure rate on the
California Bar. California's exam is a hard one, but even with prefer-
ences, UCLA's black students during this period had very respectable
130. The only part of this logic disputed by the critics, to my knowledge, is the first state-
ment-that black grades in law school show little evidence of underperfonnance. But my claim is
backed not only by my own analyses, but by a series of authoritative LSAC studies (which again, to
my knowledge, no one has disputed), showing very small levels of black underperformance in law
school. My own research suggests that when such studies control for undergraduate college attended
by students, even this slight underperformance goes away.
131. Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Law-
yers? 57 STAN. L. REv. 1807, 1838-40 (2005). Ayres and Brooks cite no actual evidence of stereo-
type threat in law schools and concede that "we do not have a compelling theory as to what is caus-
ing" lower rates of black achievement on the bar. In their piece, they simply sidestep the logic of the
argument summarized here. With no sense of self-irony, Ayres and Brooks suggest that the histori-
cally black law schools are good places to see where things are going right for black students. Of
course, it is at these schools that mismatch is minimized, and it is these schools that Ayres and
Brooks inexplicably omit from one of their central mismatch analyses!
132. Ayres and Brooks suggest that perhaps stereotype threat affects every intellectual task
undertaken by law students; but this proves too much, since it implies that black law students will go
on to become black lawyers whose performance is hindered throughout their careers by stereotype
threat. Moreover, this entire explanation seems to hinge on substantial black underperformance in
law school grades, for which there is no evidence.
133. Christian DuBois, "Too Old for Law School?" (2005 working paper on file with author).
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credentials. Based on their credentials, they should have been passing the
bar at a rate above the state average; instead they were often fifteen
points below it. The disparity was worse if one simply focused on stu-
dents (of any race) admitted with particularly large preferences. For ex-
ample, students admitted to UCLA's Class of 2005 with large prefer-
ences (that is, they had LSAT scores more than ten points below the
school average) had a first-time California bar passage rate in July 2005
of 44%; graduates of lower-ranked Southwestern Law School, who had
an overall median LSAT about the same as the "large preference" UCLA
students, had a first-time bar passage rate in 2005 of 66%. This suggests
that "mismatch" was lowering the bar passage rate among "large prefer-
ence" UCLA students by twenty-two points, or a full third. Almost cer-
tainly, the effect was even larger, because the Southwestern bar passage
rate would itself be misleadingly depressed by the school's own "mis-
matched" students. At UCLA, students admitted with LSAT scores at
the school median had bar passage rates of 96% (far above the school
average of 89%), so a student with the median LSAT at Southwestern
may well have had a bar passage rate of 75% or 80%. In any case, it
seems clear that students who would have had very good prospects of
passing the bar at Southwestern had much worse prospects at UCLA. 134
This disparity is what we would expect if the mismatch hypothesis
is true. Are there alternate explanations? One idea often advanced is that
lower-ranked schools are more focused on "teaching to the bar," so their
pass rates are artificially inflated at the expense of a well-rounded legal
education. Thus, the low black bar passage rate at UCLA might simply
reflect a broader and better legal education. But this explanation floun-
ders on the data; analyses of bar takers always show a positive effect of
law school eliteness upon bar passage rates. 135 Probably some, or even
all, of this eliteness advantage can be accounted for by the higher unob-
served credentials of elite school students,136 but the fact remains that no
evidence exists for the idea that lower-ranked schools do a systematically
better job of preparing their students for the bar.
The other possible hypothesis is that nonwhite students (who make
up a disproportionate share of the "large preference" students at UCLA)
simply do worse on the bar when we hold credentials constant. But as we
have seen, that is clearly not true; race itself explains none of the bar
passage disparities. Once again, it is hard to think of a plausible alterna-
tive to the mismatch account.
134. The UCLA data for this class comes from a spreadsheet prepared by the UCLA Records
Office, and available from the author; data from Southwestern comes from the ABA-LSAC Official
Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schoools, 2004 edition (2003) at 663 (for Southwestern student
credentials), and State Bar of California, General Statistics Report, July 2005 California Bar Exami-
nation (2006).
135. See, e.g., Systemic Analysis, supra note 40, at 444.
136. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 48, at 1972 (discussing the unobserved credentials problem,
which will make bar passage performance at elite schools appear stronger).
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The UCLA example was provocative, but it was a single case and
therefore could be dismissed as a fluke. For this reason, I did not include
it, even as an example, in Systemic Analysis. But since that time, detailed
data has become available for two other, quite different law schools: the
University of Michigan and George Mason University. Do similar pat-
terns hold at these schools?
Through a series of public records requests, my research associates
and I were able to assemble data on the graduation and first-time bar
passage outcomes (for Virginia) of ten cohorts of students at George
Mason (GMU)-those matriculating from 1998 through 2007.137 The
sample is modest, partly because GMU's black enrollment was generally
small and partly because some GMU graduates do not take the Virginia
bar exam, but we nonetheless have complete data on forty-one black
entering students. Among this entire group, only 29% graduated from
GMU and passed the Virginia bar on their first attempt. These GMU
blacks had a median LSAT score of 151 and a median UGPA of 3.17.
Compare these students with those at predominantly black Howard
University School of Law, just a few miles from the GMU campus.
Howard students in 2001-04 had a median LSAT score of about 151 and
a median UGPA of about 3.12, nearly identical to the GMU blacks. The
proportion of entering students graduating and passing the New York bar
on the first attempt was an average of 60% during the 2001-04 period,
about double the GMU rate.'38 Once again, a cohort of students with
similar credentials apparently had much better outcomes when they at-
tended a school where their credentials were close to the school median.
It is true that this comparison is far from exact; we do not know
who within the Howard class is taking the New York bar, and the New
York bar during the period of comparison had a slightly higher first-time
bar passage rate than did the Virginia bar. But I do not think that any
combination of plausible assumptions can explain away even a large
fraction of the vast difference in black outcomes between the "mis-
matched" students at GMU and the generally well-matched students at
Howard.
A third example, the University of Michigan Law School (UMLS),
is particularly interesting, not only because UMLS policies were the sub-
ject of Grutter v. Bollinger,13 9 but because studies of UMLS graduates
137. Why George Mason? Because administrators there were uniquely willing to provide
detailed individual-level data on outcomes, so long as our request came from a resident of Virginia
(as required under the state's public record laws). This analysis is based on the George Mason
Disclosed Database for 1995-2007 and is available from the author.
138. See AMER. BAR ASS'N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS
(2002-2005 editions). I averaged Howard data on attrition and New York bar passage over four
years. For the reasons discussed supra, text accompanying note 138, this is almost surely an under-
estimate of the success rate of Howard students with credentials at the class "median".
139. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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have played an outsized role in the debate over the effects of law school
affirmative action. Richard Lempert and his two coauthors (David
Chambers and Terry Adams) published, to much acclaim, a 2000 study
that painted a generally rosy picture of the post-graduate careers of
UMLS's minority students.14 0 In particular, the study purported to dem-
onstrate that virtually all of UMLS's black students passed the bar exam.
Lempert even took the stand in Grutter and testified that the bar passage
rate of UMLS blacks was very close to one hundred percent.141 This as-
sertion, which Lempert frequently invoked in one form or another,142 was
very salient in the debate over Systemic Analysis. How could the mis-
match effect be a real problem if, at the one school where minority out-
comes had been most carefully studied, bar passage was a non-existent
problem for minority students?
I was always highly skeptical of Lempert's claim because it did not
line up with any of the other available data. As discussed above, the most
comprehensive data source on the bar outcomes of individual (anony-
mous) students was the Bar Passage Study (BPS), the LSAC's longitudi-
nal survey that had tracked some twenty-seven thousand first-year stu-
dents in the 1990s from their entry into law school through the beginning
of their professional careers.143 Law schools are not identified in the
BPS, but the UMLS was certainly grouped either in 'Cluster 4' or 'Clus-
ter 5', the two clusters that contain the most selective law schools. At
those schools, according to the BPS, nearly 30% of black students fail
the bar on their first attempt, and over 15% never pass. A substantial
number of blacks graduating from these schools never attempt the bar,
and thus also do not become lawyers. Thus, for Lempert to be right-for
UMLS black graduates to essentially never fail the bar-something ex-
traordinarily would have to be happening in Michigan.
In the fall of 2005, I was able to obtain aggregated bar records from
the State of Michigan, which reported the overall bar passage rates of
bar-takers from each of Michigan's law schools for each year from 1975
to 1995, a period roughly contemporaneous with the period covered by
the Lempert et al study.144 The data was not broken down by race, but it
did show that over the twenty-year period, all UMLS graduates who took
140. Lempert, Chambers & Adams, supra note 50, at 395 (suggesting minority bar passage rate
varies from 95% to 98%).
141. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("almost all" minor-
ity graduates pass a bar exam).
142. U.S. COMMissioN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 127, at 9, 52 ("virtually every minority
Michigan graduate passed the bar").
143. The BPS has, on the one hand, wonderfully detailed data on individual students, including
detailed surveys completed at various points during the student's progression through law school. On
the other hand, as discussed further below, the BPS obscures vital data for comparative analyses:
schools are grouped into six broad 'clusters'-it is not even possible to know for sure which schools
are put in which cluster-and state bars are grouped into broad geographic areas.
144. The UMLS Bar data was supplied by Tim Raubinger, Assistant Secretary, Michigan
Board of Law Examiners, in the fall of 2005 (on file with the author).
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the Michigan bar had a 90.7% first-time bar passage rate. The first-time
rate for all students in the comparable BPS clusters was 91.2%. This
suggested that there was nothing unusual about UMLS's overall bar per-
formance. Moreover, since the Michigan state data showed a fairly low
rate of success among UMLS students who re-took the bar, Lempert's
claim that essentially all UMLS students passed the bar was implausible.
A few months later, in analyzing data from Michigan alumni sur-
veys, I learned another startling fact: about 60% of UMLS blacks ended
up in the bottom tenth of their class. This was somewhat worse than the
rate at comparable BPS schools (about 50%), and thus pretty much
dashed the idea that UMLS had some special form of academic support
that allowed its black graduates to have unique success on the bar.
Rather, it implied that, if anything, UMLS black graduates would have a
lower first-time bar passage rate than comparable BPS blacks (recall the
BPS black rate at elite schools was 70%).
In September 2006 I wrote about these findings on the Empirical
Legal Studies blog, 145 arguing that the bar success rates Lempert claimed
for UMLS blacks could not possibly be true. Lempert wrote three com-
ments on my blog entry, totaling some seven thousand words! He made
some thoughtful points but mainly avoided the central issue: what did the
University of Michigan's internal records on its graduates say about
black bar passage rates? And why hadn't Lempert and his coauthors ex-
amined and reported on this data in the course of a major research project
on the success of UMLS's affirmative action program? Lempert wrote
that it had never occurred to him to inquire about first-time bar passage
rates, and that in any case it would be impossibly difficult to track down
the actual bar outcomes of Michigan graduates. Both claims seemed un-
believable, since every law school I've encountered not only tracks the
bar outcomes of graduates, but regularly generates internal reports on
year-to-year changes. Of course, ordinarily only faculty (like Lempert)
and administrators have access to such data. So how to nail down what
was actually happening?
Happily, fate intervened at this point, assisted by the discovery
process. In November 2006, Michigan voters passed Proposition 2, a
measure (similar to Prop 209 in California) which prohibited the use of
racial preferences by state entities, including the University of Michigan.
A suit to enjoin enforcement of Prop 2 followed,14 6 and the lawyers rep-
resenting one of the parties in the litigation sought my advice in shaping
discovery requests. Among many other things, we learned that UMLS
145. Richard Sander, Do Elite Schools Avoid the Mismatch Effect?, EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Sept. 22, 2006),
http://www.elsblog.org/theempirical legalstudi/2006/09/do eliteschool.html.
146. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607 (6th
Cir. 2011).
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did indeed maintain records of how its graduates did on the bar exams of
many states, and we obtained lists, for several cohorts of UMLS gradu-
ates, of bar outcomes. By comparing names in these lists to UMLS stu-
dent facebooks, we could reasonably categorize students by race, and
thus, at last, measure the actual bar performance of UMLS students by
race. 147
The results suggested that UMLS blacks taking a bar exam for the
first time had a 62% pass rate; those taking multiple bar exams had an
eventual success rate of 76%. In other words, UMLS black performance
on the bar was, as we guessed, a little worse than the rate found in the
BPS for similar schools. This finding is, in my view, devastating to
Lempert's study and to his testimony in Grutter.14 8 It also suggests that
UMLS fits the pattern I have discussed with UCLA and George Mason.
Students at a less-elite neighbor of UMLS-Wayne State University
School of Law-have average credentials similar to or a little lower than
those of UMLS blacks, but entering students have an aggregate gradua-
tion and first-time bar passage rate (in Michigan) of about 73% (again,
the rate for students at Wayne State with "average" credentials is almost
certainly much higher). Taking attrition at the University of Michigan
into account, conservatively, the comparable figure for black Michigan
students during the same period is 60%.149 This simple comparison thus
suggests that the mismatch effect sharply lowers the success rates of the
purported beneficiaries of affirmative action at UMLS. Rather than being
an exception that confounds mismatch theory, the University of Michi-
gan fits the pattern.
These three case studies of law schools provide easy to understand,
prima facie evidence of the mismatch effect. I submit that any law pro-
fessor or dean can confirm similar patterns by examining the records of
their own school. Those who disbelieve the mismatch effect have an ob-
ligation to explain these patterns in non-mismatch terms. To date, no one
has.
147. One might criticize this method for relying on facebooks to classify students by race. We
had two different graduate students classify the students, and they produced essentially identical
results. Moreover, to the extent our classification of blacks might contain errors (say 10% of those
we classified as black are of another race), that would tend to raise, rather than lower, our estimate of
the group's bar passage rate. Of course, I would also welcome the school to release its own reports
on bar outcomes by race.
148. These results imply that Lempert, Chambers & Adams' study, supra note 50, overlooked
or omitted virtually all the black students-and a very large number of them-who never became
lawyers. Since the whole point of the study was to evaluate the post-graduate outcomes of UMLS's
minority graduates, it is hard to see how this problem does not invalidate all of their results. Note,
however, that Richard Lempert, after reading a draft of this article, vigorously disputed my estimate.
Readers may find additional debate and discussion of this issue at http://www.seaphe.org/.
149. See, e.g., AMER. BAR Ass'N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW
SCHOOLS (2002-05 editions). As with the analysis of Howard, supra, I analyzed four years of attri-
tion and bar passage statistics for Wayne State. Because of the small sample size in the disclosed
data, the Michigan estimate applies to blacks taking the bar in all the states disclosed by UMLS.
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C. The Demonstration through Statistical Analysis ofBPS Data
Most of the empirical debate about the mismatch effect has focused
on quantitative modeling, rather than the simple intuitive or school-by-
school comparisons I have discussed in the last two sections. In this
work, a scholar will typically draw a conceptual inference from the mis-
match theory: if mismatch is true, then we should observe such-and-such
empirical regularity in large-scale databases. Over half-a-dozen such
studies in this vein have been completed: by Ayres & Brooks, Yoon &
Rothstein (who published one study and wrote a second), Daniel Ho,
Katherine Barnes (original and revised), Lempert and another group of
coauthors (one published and two unpublished), Doug Williams (two
working papers), and (indirectly) Timothy Clydesdale. 5 0 Many of these
studies conclude that the evidence for the mismatch effect is weak or
nonexistent, and although few legal academics have the quantitative
chops to follow the debate, this collective body of research provides
comfort to those who wish to believe that the mismatch idea can be
safely ignored.
I suggest, however, that anyone who spends some time carefully
reading this body of work, together with the commentaries written by
Williams, 5 ' by me,15 2 and by Williams et al 5 3 will find this research
quite compelling in supporting the mismatch hypothesis. The key to un-
derstanding this literature is to keep in mind five methodological issues
that affect all the work to some degree or other:
* The conservative effect of noise. All of these studies have relied
entirely on the Bar Passage Study ("BPS"), which remains the only
large-scale dataset that includes student credentials, law school perform-
ance, and bar outcomes for a national sample of students. Unfortunately,
the BPS data is extremely noisy - that is, inexact -- for these analytic
purposes. The "pass" data is more complete than the "fail" data; the only
data on school attended is in the "cluster" variables, which are broad and
overlapping in their measures of school eliteness; there is no data on ac-
tual bar scores, but only whether a graduate passed or failed in a group-
150. Ayres & Brooks, supra note 131; David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C.
Kidder & Richard 0. Lempert, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005); Jesse
Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Prefer-
ences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 649 (2008); Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Mismatch in Law
School (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://gsppi.berkeley.edulfaculty/jrothstein/workingpapers/rothsteinyoonmay2009.pdf, Daniel Ho,
Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005);
Barnes, supra note 121; Barnes, supra note 122; Williams, supra note 124; Timothy Clydesdale, A
Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward Understanding Age, Gender, Race, and Related
Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 711 (2004).
151. Williams, supra note 123.
152. Sander, supra note 47; Richard H. Sander, Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Reply to Ho,
114 YALE L.J. 2005 (2005).
153. Williams, Sander, Luppino & Bolus, supra note 122.
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ing of states (and bar pass thresholds usually vary significantly within
these groups); we cannot even measure mismatch exactly, since we can't
isolate students within a single school and measure their relative creden-
tials. All of these weaknesses in the data make it more likely that actual
patterns will not stand out; in the context of testing for mismatch, it
means that any mismatch (or anti-mismatch) findings that are statistically
significant are likely to be strong indeed, while findings that are merely
consistent with mismatch (e.g., a coefficient that points in the predicted
direction but is not statistically significant) should not be dismissed.15 4
Selection bias from unobserved variables. A fundamental chal-
lenge in measuring mismatch is the problem of "unobserved characteris-
tics." Law school admissions officers base decisions largely on LSAT,
UGPA, and race, but other factors-undergraduate college, writing abil-
ity, references, etc.-are important at the margin, and are likely to be
especially important in anomalous admissions decisions (e.g., when
someone with low credentials is admitted to an elite school). Thus, when
we compare Student A at an elite school with Student B at a non-elite
school, even if the two students have the same LSAT and UGPA, it is
very likely that Student A has other, hidden characteristics that make her
a stronger candidate (e.g., Student A got a 3.6 at Harvard, while Student
B got a 3.6 at Ball State). Different techniques for modeling mismatch do
a better or worse job of dealing with this problem, but nearly all models
will incorporate some bias against finding mismatch, because in any
comparison of students from higher-ranked and lower-ranked schools,
the unobserved credentials of those at the lower-ranked schools will tend
to be lower and they are thus handicapped in direct comparisons of out-
comes.iss
* Choice of outcome. Different outcome measures are more or less
relevant for assessing "mismatch" per se. Nearly all of the critics of Sys-
temic Analysis focused on whether a student ultimately passed a bar
exam and became a lawyer.156 In these models, someone who takes five
attempts to pass a bar is considered just as successful as someone who
passes on their first attempt. This is a relevant test if one is only inter-
ested in whether affirmative action actually reduces the number of mi-
nority attorneys (since then one only cares about who ultimately obtains
a license). But it is a very poor measure of whether affirmative action
causes its beneficiaries to learn less in law school. The reason is obvious:
if someone fails the bar on their first attempt, they will spend an enor-
mous amount of time trying to re-educate themselves about the law.
154. This problem is often referred to as "attenuation" or "regression dilution."
155. Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 150, at, provides a good discussion of this problem. Ayres
and Brooks acknowledge this problem in motivating their second-choice method, but then discount
the results that flow from their second-choice model.
156. This is the primary outcome focused upon by Ayres & Brooks, Barnes, Rothstein &
Yoon, and, apparently, Ho.
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They may hire special tutors, buy new study aids, and immerse them-
selves in their bar preparation course. These are all post-law-school
treatments, so they will tend to counter whatever harms mismatch may
have inflicted during law school. If we are interested in mismatch itself
(which of course we should be interested in), then first-time bar passage
is a more relevant measure.
On the other hand, if we simply measure first-time bar passage for
law graduates, we may create a bias in favor of the mismatch hypothesis.
Suppose, for example, that more-elite school C almost never flunks out
students; it has a 98% graduation rate for matriculants. Less-elite school
D, in contrast, weeds out its weaker students (partly to protect its overall
bar passage rate); it has a 75% graduation rate for matriculants. If we
measure how graduates of these two schools do on the bar, we may cre-
ate a bias in favor of less-elite school D because that school has weeded
out its weakest matriculants. An appropriate measure of mismatch is
therefore one that considers all law school matriculants, and considers
graduation and first-time bar passage as the successful outcome.15 7
* Paying attention to coefficients. My claim in Systemic Analysis
was that the mismatch effect might explain as much as half of the black-
white gap in first-time bar passage rates-that is, about fifteen points (the
rest is explained by the broad differences in credentials between blacks
and whites). Suppose that in actually testing mismatch with the BPS, an
analyst considers "eventual" bar passage rather than first-time bar pas-
sage. The predicted mismatch effect (in the BPS) is now less than half as
large-perhaps six or seven points. Suppose the technique of the analyst
does not compare someone with "no" mismatch with someone who is
"maximally" mismatched, but compares two people with moderately
different levels of mismatch. The predicted effect might now be only two
or three points. Suppose, finally, that the test being used has a modest
sample size-say two groups of two hundred students.158 What analytic
result would we expect?
Even if no other forms of bias contaminate the results, this test is
not likely to produce a statistically significant result, regardless of
whether mismatch is operating or not. The test, we can say, has been
engineered to fail. It is therefore relevant in discussing mismatch tests
and their results, to think about what coefficients we could reasonably
157. Williams refers to this as the "smooth passage" outcome variable; I believe he is the only
scholar in this literature to use this very logical measure.
158. A notorious example of this problem is in Ayres & Brooks, supra 131. When the authors
used their "second-choice" model to evaluate mismatch, they found that second-choice students
were significantly more likely to pass the bar on their first attempt, and more likely to take fewer
attempts to eventually pass the bar. But because they found merely a positive (and not "statistically
significant") effect of "second choice" on the probability of ever passing a bar exam, they essentially
dismissed the importance of all three results. In fact, as Williams shows in some detail in his 2011
article, and as I suggested in Reply to Critics, all three outcomes are part of a consistent and logical
pattern showing mismatch.
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expect, and whether these would be significant or not. Similarly, if varia-
tions on a given test produce coefficients that are in the predicted direc-
tion and roughly of the predicted magnitude, that is evidence in favor of
the theory, not against it.
* Robustness checks. As with any social science analysis, mismatch
analyses should be carefully vetted to insure that results are robust to
variations in formulation, so that reported results are not driven by idio-
syncratic assumptions. Ayres and Brooks, for example, based their nega-
tive assessment of the mismatch effect almost entirely on an analysis that
excluded historically black law schools.159 The results change sharply
without this restriction, yet the authors neither noted this dependency on
an idiosyncratic assumption, nor provided a valid justification for exclud-
ing most "non-mismatched" blacks from their analysis.
I think the vast majority of empirical scholars would agree that solid
research should adhere to all five of these principles. But the empirical
critics of law school mismatch have neglected or ignored these princi-
ples, sometimes to a stunning degree. Daniel Ho, for example, violated a
number of these principles in his "matching" test of the mismatch hy-
pothesis.1 60 The concept behind his test was sound: find pairs of black
students with similar characteristics who attended law schools of differ-
ing eliteness, and compare their outcomes. But in executing his test, he
compared students in adjacent (and eliteness-wise, overlapping) tiers,
rather than comparing students from elite schools with students from
very non-elite schools. His choice greatly increased the noisiness of his
analysis. He failed to acknowledge that his test was biased against find-
ing a mismatch outcome, since he could not match on many academic
unobservable characteristics (e.g., undergraduate college) (thus ignoring
the selection bias issue). Indeed, he was unable to show whether the pairs
of students he was comparing actually experienced any difference in how
their credentials compared to their peers! He not only failed to present
results for alternative outcomes; he did not clearly explain what outcome
he was testing. Most seriously, though, he never presented results for the
most logical "matching" analysis: comparing pairs of black students
from the top BPS tiers with the bottom BPS tiers-that is, comparing
similar students who did, and did not, receive large admissions prefer-
ences. That test, as performed by Williams, shows large and highly sig-
nificant mismatch effects.16 1 Those who know matching methodology
159. Ayres & Brooks, supra note 131, at 1824. Ayres & Brooks did two principal tests of the
mismatch effect in their paper, a "relative tier" test and a "second choice" test. The relative tier test
omitted historically black schools, and the "second choice" test generally produced results confirm-
ing or consistent with mismatch (tests for mismatch outcomes either showed statistically significant
mismatch effects, or showed results consistent with mismatch but not statistically significant). In
summing up, the authors discounted the second-choice results and emphasized the deeply flawed
"relative tier" results. Id. at 1838.
160. See Ho, supra note 150, at 2002-04.
161. See,e.g., Williams, supra note 123.
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cannot understand why Ho would have left out entirely what seems to be
the most appropriate use of his test.1 62 It is indeed hard to comprehend-
unless Ho's mismatch test was simply engineered to fail.
A similar disregard of some or all of these basic principles affects
the critiques of Ayres & Brooks, Barnes, Clydesdale, Lempert et al, and
Rothstein & Yoon. Some are much worse than others. Clydesdale made a
gross methodological error that invalidated most of his analysis.163
Barnes, as I have noted, made pervasive errors, perhaps in her program-
ming, that invalidated hers. Rothstein & Yoon, in contrast, were con-
cerned about some of these problems (e.g., "selection bias") and de-
ployed strategies to counteract them.16 4 All of the critics, however, vio-
lated at least two of the relevant principles, and thus missed (or con-
cealed) the decisive evidence of mismatch that flows from their models.
The great contribution Williams makes to this literature is his scru-
pulous concern with all five of the methodological problems I've out-
lined. Williams conducts several conceptually distinct tests of mismatch
effects, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each, and presents re-
sults of over one hundred variations on mismatch tests.16 5 He finds strong
and consistent evidence that mismatch substantially hurts the "smooth
passage" of students receiving large preferences from matriculation to
first-time bar passage; indeed, his coefficients suggest that mismatch can
entirely explain the underperformance of blacks on the bar exam, and he
shows that mismatch affects other students receiving preferences (e.g.,
Hispanics).
Table 11 provides an overview of the major empirical pieces testing
mismatch models with the BPS data. The central message of this table is
that all of the extant tests, when done appropriately, provide strong evi-
dence of mismatch. Indeed, the question of whether mismatch is hurting
minority law students is not even a close one.
162. Personal communication from James Lindgren, Northwestern University.
163. Clydesdale, supra note 150. Clydesdale's error is that he predicts student law school
performance without standardizing his two most important predictors (LSAT scores and under-
graduate grades) for the school attended. This is like using today's temperature to predict what
month it is without controlling for one's latitude (or even whether one is in the southern or northern
hemisphere). Had the editors of Law and Social Inquiry been familiar with the data Clydesdale
used, and understood this problem in his method, it is inconceivable that the article would have been
published in anything like its current form.
164. Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 150 (unpublished manuscript).
165. Doug Williams, Do Racial Preferences Reduce Minority Learning in Law Schools?
(Working Paper 2011), available at http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/williamsseptember.pdf.
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Table 10
An Overview of "Mismatch" Analyses Using BPS Data




Ayres & "Relative tier" - (1) A&B ignored strong Strong evidence of
Brooks examined how evidence of Hispanic mismatch for both
(2005) "mismatched" stu- mismatch effects in their blacks and Hispan-
dents did when model; ics, especially
compared to out- when one consid-
comes in tier they (2) A&B omitted histori- ers outcomes most
would have attended cally black law schools relevant to the
without preference from analysis, which mismatch issue.
account for a majority of
non-mismatched black
students.
Ayres & "Second choice" - (2) A&B used the outcome Overpoweng
Brooks examined black variable most likely not to evidence that black
(2005) students who passed show mismatch: whether "second-choice"
up the most elite graduates ever passed the students do better
school that admitted bar, and then in graduating and
them to attend a less passing the bar on
elite school (2) failed to explain that their first attempt;
the coefficient they ob- all other "second-
tained fell within the ex- choice" results
pected range. closely follow
mismatch theoty
predictions.
Ho "Matching" - uses Ho matched students Matching black
(2005) matching techniques across adjacent tiers of law students in the top
to compare out- schools, even though, in two tiers with
comes of very simi- the BPS, the tiers overlap similar students in
lar pairs of students in eliteness. Most of his the bottom two
attending different matched students therefore tiers shows that
law school tiers. attended schools virtually students attending
identical in eliteness, and the less-elite law
it is not surprising that he schools have dra-
found non-significant matically lower
effects. A proper match- rates of failing the
ing test would compare bar.
students at least two tiers
_________apart.
Yoon & "Eliteness" test: Yoon & Rothstein com- When the two
Rothstein predicts ultimate bar pare the two most elite middle tiers are
(2009) passage of blacks tiers with the "bottom removed from
from individual four" tiers; there is signifi- Yoon & Roth-
characteristics and cant overlap in the actual stein's model, or
credentials, includ- eliteness of schools in when more appro-
ing an "eliteness" these groups, blurring the priate mismatch
variable to capture effects of mismatch. They outcomes are
whether students are also fail to test the most utilized, the model
mismatched. logical "mismatch" out- shows strong mis-
come - whether students match effects.
graduate and pass the bar
on their first attempt.;
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Yoon & "Race" test: uses Yoon & Rothstein find Since 75% of
Rothstein "black" as a proxy significant evidence for blacks in the BPS
(2009) for preferences, thus mismatch from this test, are in the bottom
putting in functional though they argue it may quintile of creden-
form the concept I pick up underperformance tials, this test actu-
used to illustrate of blacks unrelated to ally shows perva-
mismatch in Sys- mismatch. They also argue sive mismatch
temic Analysis. the effects only show up in effects, and the
the bottom quintile of the effects become




Bapes "Open functional Barnes's published results When properly
(2007) form," simulating were wildly incorrect, and corrected, Barnes's
outcomes for stu- she reports her original original model
dents at specific code was lost. Her "cor- shows significant
credential levels at rected" results use differ- mismatch effects
different tiers. ent outcome measures, but for students, espe-
in any case now finds that cially blacks, with
if preferences were abol- low credentials.
ished, and the bottom 22%
of black applicants were
not admitted to law
school, there would be no
significant change in the
number of black lawyers.
Williams "Effect of selectiv- Williams' paper is the Each of Williams'
(2011) ity" only one to date to care- tests finds strong
fully think through the and consistent
Williams "Second choice" various empirical issues I support of mis-
(2011) _ discuss in the text; he match, for both
Williams "Instrumental van- considers each of these blacks and minori-
(2011) able on choice" tests to be somewhat hi- ties generally; for
ased against a finding of the first two tests,
mismatch, but he devises his estimates very
innovative alternative closely match the
measures to provide in- "unexplained" gap
sight into how modeling in black/white
choices affect the meas- outcomes.
urement of mismatch.
Williams is also the only
analyst to include analyses
of non-black minority
_______ _____________groups.
Many of the results presented in this part are new, or are just enter-
ing into the circulatory system of legal scholarship. Together, perhaps
along with other important work still in the pipeline, these findings may
persuade many law professors not only that the mismatch problem is
real, but that it is sufficiently serious to overshadow the sensitivities of
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those upset by the very idea of mismatch. A unified expression of con-
cern from a substantial number of legal scholars might well be all that is
necessary to set in motion formal inquiries, better information disclosure,
and (perhaps?) even transparency in admissions.
Yet the ideological dynamic within the legal academy may continue
to make it irresistible to ignore the mismatch problem. It is so easy for a
law school dean to behave, say, in a way similar to a school board mem-
ber in a rural district where strong lobbying groups oppose the teaching
of evolution, or like a congressman in a district where grassroots con-
stituents oppose measures to curtail global warming. "All the evidence is
not in"; "it's a theory, not a fact"; and other such platitudes provide a
comforting way of evading responsibility. The problem with these analo-
gies, of course, is that the law school dean presides over a house of
scholars, in a place where pursuit of the truth is supposed to be para-
mount. And the law school dean often has direct access to evidence bear-
ing on the mismatch problem. So analogizing the law school dean to the
rural school board member or congressman is really too kind.
The battle unfolding in California over the disclosure of the State
Bar's database highlights the sad state of debate.16 6 The State Bar has
assembled information on California bar-takers over the past thirty years
that constitutes an almost ideal database for studying the mismatch ef-
fect. It has many of the key variables that exist in the BPS, but in much
more precise form: actual schools attended by students (rather than an
imprecise "tier"), and actual scores obtained on bar exams, along with
information on pre-law school credentials and law school grades. Analy-
ses with the State Bar data would thus not be subject to many of the ana-
lytic problems that inhere in the BPS (discussed earlier in this section),
making the demonstration of mismatch more obvious and making it pos-
sible to measure how "mismatch" varies with the size of a law school's
preference (something that is largely beyond the capacities of the BPS).
In 2006, the State Bar's psychometricians and I developed a re-
search plan for a study using the State Bar data that would involve no
release of the Bar's internal data, but would generate invaluable insight
into the mismatch issue. The plan generated wide support among Bar
officials, until California law schools and various academic partisans in
the mismatch debate (including Dean Larry Kramer of Stanford Law
School, Professor Lempert, and the Society of American Law Teachers)
argued that such a study would be improper and might even be illegal!
The arguments were absurd-but the political power they intimated was
real, and the Bar backed down.
166. Extensive materials on the California Bar lawsuit are available at
http://www.seaphe.org/topic-pages/california-bar-lawsuit.php.
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Joined by advocates of greater government transparency, I then
filed a public records request with the Bar and, when again rebuffed,
filed suit in 2008, seeking a redacted version of the Bar data that would
rigorously protect the anonymity of bar-takers while preserving the ana-
lytic value of the database. In June 2011, a panel of the California Appel-
late Court ruled unanimously in our favor, holding that the State Bar was
subject to a common law right of access.167 The case has now been ac-
cepted for review by the California Supreme Court, 168 and already a
stream of amicus briefs is arriving at the Court, often from associations
of minority lawyers who claim any data disclosure will jeopardize their
privacy.
Even if there were genuine doubt about the existence of law school
mismatch effects-even, let us suppose, that there was only a 50/50
chance that the Bar data would confirm the mismatch problem-it is
hard to see how the actions of those seeking to bury data and kill aca-
demic inquiry are defensible. What one can see are the actions of a small,
essentially reactionary cohort, fearful of what data will show and even
more fearful of reforms to existing preference systems, invoking the
specter of an ideological attack on affirmative action to rally troops un-
aware, and uninterested, in the true pattern of underlying motives.
PART V. CONCLUSION
The Denver University Law Review has performed a signal service
with this symposium. The time is ripe to assess what we have learned
from past diversity efforts, and to think afresh upon how to better con-
nect our fundamental values to the initiatives we put forth. The sympo-
sium has brought together a true diversity of perspective and many con-
tributors with creative and thoughtful suggestions.
American higher education in general, and legal education in par-
ticular, plays a unique role in the development of national leadership. It
does not write upon a blank slate-necessarily, much of what it does is
simply recognize and certify successive cohorts of pre-packaged elites.
But higher education undoubtedly influences the shape of American
elites, and since the 1960s educational leaders have perhaps become
more self-conscious about the way they use that influence.16 9 Law
schools are thus bastions of privilege that try, in theory at least, to rede-
fine and re-channel the sources of privilege. This is a delicate task, and it
is easy for yesterday's innovative reform to become entrenched and un-
accountable.. All of the contributors to this symposium, I think, believe
that law schools should engage in a process of continual revolution from
167. Sander v. State Bar of California, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
168. Sander v. State Bar of California, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 9272 (Cal. Aug. 25, 2011).
169. This was one of the central messages of the classic study by Christopher Jencks and David
Reisman, The Academic Revolution (2d edition, 1969).
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within. We all recognize the need to challenge complacency and to re-
make a system that continually seeks to perpetuate and encrust itself.
For this process of ongoing rebellion to work, we must welcome
new ideas and challenges to sacred assumptions. We must question
whether what we do really works, and openly consider how new means
can better foster cherished ends. Above all we must welcome empiri-
cism, and must be committed to the transparency that empiricism thrives
upon. Otherwise we unwittingly enshrine a dogmatic privilege under
another name.

